The defeat of the Russian army on the Black River
160 years ago, 4 (16) August 1855, a battle took place on the Black River. Combined French troops defeated the Russian army. Errors of the Russian command predetermined defeat. Field Marshal Paskevich called the operation plan itself “a matter of unrealizable” and noted that Gorchakov had gone “in full, in Russian, at random to attack a position that ... stronger than Sevastopol fortifications ". Analyzing the battle report, the field marshal came to the conclusion that "it was accepted without purpose, without calculation and without need, and, worst of all, it finally made you unable to do anything afterwards." This battle convinced the Allies to launch a new powerful bombardment of Sevastopol, which they carried on almost until the last assault on the sea fortress.
Prehistory Plans of the Russian command
The Russian emperor Alexander II in the first months of his reign considered it his filial duty to continue the policy of the deceased father. Therefore, he continued the war and defense of Sevastopol, although he was an opponent of the defense of Sevastopol at any price and did not believe in the possibility of avoiding defeat in the war. Alexander wanted to get out of the war as soon as possible and with minimal losses. The indisputable and brilliant success of the Russian army in repelling the assault on Sevastopol 6 (18) in June did not convince the king that the war could continue. Bombing the enemy led him to believe that the garrison of Sevastopol was doomed, and recruiting could not change the situation, that Sevastopol must be surrendered.
Alexander II believed that it was better to conduct a decisive battle in the field by trying to defeat the enemy and lift the siege from Sevastopol. And if this attempt fails, then with a calm conscience it can be said that everything that was in the human power and Sevastopol was done, after which peace negotiations begin. Therefore, St. Petersburg put pressure on the commander of the troops in the Crimea, Mikhail Gorchakov, with the aim of a decisive attack on the enemy. Gorchakov himself did not share this idea. He also considered the situation hopeless, but did not want to attack a strong opponent under such unfavorable conditions.
But the royal court demanded battle, and Gorchakov, by his nature, was not used to arguing with the monarch. Alexander insistently suggested that Gorchakov take decisive action. In a letter from 6 (18) in June, the king said that he had received information from Brussels that the French were sending reinforcements to 24 under Sevastopol thousand people, as well as information about the Allies' assumption to move to Perekop, that is, to cut off the Crimea from the rest of Russia . Alexander wrote: “... I hope that until that time you will be quite able to start offensive actions, which you mention in your last letter of the 29 number. If God bless your intentions and you succeed in delivering a strong blow to the enemy, then things can take another turn in time and then you can hardly fear for Perekop. ”
13 (25 of June) the king returns to this thought: "More than ever, I am convinced of the need to launch an offensive on our part, because otherwise all the reinforcements coming back to you, following the example of the previous ones, will be partly absorbed by Sevastopol as a bottomless barrel." Alexander said that, according to the new information received by him, the general assault and attack from the sea would be resumed by the enemy in early August: “Therefore, it is highly desirable that with the advent of 4 and 5 infantry divisions, you would not hesitate to take decisive action. They will not do without a significant loss, but with God's help they can also have an important result ... " At the same time, the king made a reservation that placed the responsibility for the case on Gorchakov: “Here are my thoughts, which I convey to you with my usual frankness so that you can bring them into execution, if you consider it possible now or later, i.e. the arrival of the militia. " That is, the king kept Gorchakov's freedom in choosing the time of the battle.
20 July (1 August) the king sent a new letter to Gorchakov: “The daily losses of the invincible Sevastopol garrison, which increasingly weaken your troops, which are barely replaced by newly arriving reinforcements, lead me even more to the conviction expressed in my last letter about the need to "Or decisive, in order to put an end to this terrible slaughter, which may finally have a detrimental effect on the spirit of the garrison."
As a result, the old nobleman Gorchakov, who used to fulfill the will of Paskevich and Nikolai, and now Alexander, all his life, did not dare to prove his point that it was impossible to engage in an unequal battle with the superior forces of the enemy with an excellent position. That this risky undertaking can lead not only to a severe defeat, but to an acceleration of the fall of Sevastopol.
Gorchakov, before gathering the military council, decided to get the opinion of the head of the garrison of Sevastopol, Dmitry Osten-Saken. The commander of the garrison of Sevastopol, after the death of Nakhimov, lost faith in the success of the defense of Sevastopol, but considered it possible to continue resistance in order to cause the enemy as much harm as possible. But the open attack on the strong positions of the enemy Osten-Sacken considered a mistake. Osten-Sacken condemned “an unfortunate thought to aimlessly take Fedyukhin’s heights, on which, if lucky, from one of the enemy’s missiles and bombs, from near dominant terrain, from which every person could be counted, and several hours it was impossible to resist. " In addition, they did not know how to keep secrets in the Russian camp, and the enemy was ready for a Russian attack.
Osten-Sacken, confident of the failure of the business being pursued, filed a special report to Gorchakov on July 26. In it, he noted that although, indeed, Fedyukhin height - the weak point of the enemy, but from there he can move to Sapun-mountain. In general, the Allies occupy a concentrated position in the dominant terrain and strengthened their positions for ten months. Therefore, the enemy command can safely send almost all of its forces to any point, since with small barriers well-fortified positions can only be taken by assault and with heavy losses. Osten-Saken believed that the offensive was better to lead to Chorgun and the Baidar valley, but not to Fedyukhin heights.
29 July (10 August) 1855 was a military council. Only Osten-Sacken decided to oppose the planned operation. According to him, the Russians both in Sevastopol and in the field army near the r. Black has 90 thousand soldiers, and the enemy 110-120 thousand people and he is awaiting reinforcements. Obviously, wherever Russian troops go on the attack, the enemy will always have an advantage. Even if, at the cost of great losses, the Russians succeed by the combined forces of the garrison of Sevastopol and the field army, they can take Sapun Mountain, then the enemy can easily occupy Sevastopol or the next day attack and smash the weaker Russian army. At the same time, Saken noted the enormous losses of the garrison of Sevastopol that soon there would be no gunpowder, no shells, or even less food for horses, and if there were no winter premises for the sick and wounded and roads that were damaged by the time of year for their transportation, they would be killed ". Thus, it is no longer possible to defend Sevastopol and it is necessary to leave the South side.
Gorchakov rejected this idea. The rest of the council members, except for Khrulev, who spoke in favor of attacking the enemy, were silent. They presented their opinions in writing: Kotzebue, Liprandi, Buturlin, Vice-Admiral Novosilsky, Buchmeyer and Sergputovsky supported the offensive, Ushakov, Semyakin - against the offensive. It is noted that many of those who voted for the offensive stipulated that they considered the full success unlikely, that is, the capture of Sapun-Gory and the lifting of the blockade from Sevastopol. Many wrote that the Feduhins of the mountains to be attacked are impregnable, that our transport means are unsatisfactory, and the banks of the Black River are very fireboxes, that we have very few long-range guns for firing enemy positions, and so on.
Gorchakov himself understood the entire deplorable state of his army. On the eve of the battle, on the evening of August 3 (15), Gorchakov wrote to the Minister of War: “Do not be deceived, I am going to the enemy in disgusting conditions. His position is very strong, on his right flank almost steep and very fortified Gasfortova mountain, on the right hand of Fedyukhina mountain, in front of which there is a deep canal filled with water, through which it will be possible to cross only bridges brought under the direct fire of the enemy. I have 43 thousands of people; if the enemy is sane, he will oppose 60 thousands to me. If, for which I hope a little, happiness will favor me, I will take care to benefit from my success. Otherwise, you will need to obey God's will. I will retreat to the Mekenziev mountain and try to evacuate Sevastopol with the least possible damage. ”
Battle
The main role in the battle was to be played by the troops of Read and Liprandi, who formed the right and left flanks of the army. Read had two infantry divisions (12-I and 7-I reserve), one cavalry regiment and 62 guns. With his two divisions, he had to settle down near the Fedyukhiny Mountains, start an artillery battle with the enemy, but not attack enemy positions without special orders from Gorchakov. General Liprandi with two other divisions (6 and 17) had to take the height from Chorgun and then take Gasfortovo mountain. Then Read’s infantry was supposed to reinforce Liprandi, and the artillery under the cover of artillery would remain against the Fedyukhiny Mountains, continuing shelling, without storming enemy positions. In reserve there were two divisions (4-I and 5-I), all the cavalry (4 regiment of dragoons and 2 ulan) and artillery reserve. At the same time, Gorchakov was not sure of his actions and instructed Read to be ready to attack the Fedyukhiny Mountains if Gasfortovskiye heights were occupied by Russian troops. In this case, Read was supposed to support the troops of General Liprandi.
However, from the very beginning of the battle the plan was disrupted. In the morning the Russian artillery set off a battle, the troops of Liprandi and Reada engaged in a battle. Due to the erroneous, premature order of Prince Gorchakov "to start the battle," Read launched an attack on the Fedyukhiny Mountains. Almost simultaneously, Liprandi occupied the heights of Chorgun, but could not move further. After the battle, Gorchakov tried to blame the dead General Read. They say that the general didn’t understand the order of the commander-in-chief, but, on the contrary, having understood the order, for no apparent reason immediately began to act consciously contrary to the order. Gorchakov allegedly ordered only the firing of enemy positions, although he had begun a long time ago.
The Russian offensive on the strong positions of the enemy ended in disaster. Division Reada went on the attack. The artillery could not be transported across the river, as a result, the Russian batteries operated from the bottom up, being located in the valley of the Black River. The artillery reserve only descended from the mountain (the descent from Mekenzievoy mountain was difficult) and did not have time to take part in the battle. Therefore, it was not possible to strengthen the artillery, and its fire could seriously help our troops. One by one, the Russian battalions crossed over draw-bridges, and the French mowed down their murderous fire, remaining behind cover and bearing much smaller losses.
Reada was sent to the aid of the 5 division, which was in reserve, and three regiments from Liprandi. 12-I and 7-I divisions, one after another, were thrown into the attack. The 12 Division went first and, crossing the Stone Bridge and the ford to the left of the Stone Bridge, overturned the chain of French riflemen, took the rubble arranged by the enemy on the way to the height. However, our soldiers were met with powerful fire and could not resist, they began to retreat. In the two regiments the regimental commanders were killed and many of the battalion and company commanders were killed or wounded. The 7 Division almost simultaneously crossed the river, to the right of the 12 Division, and suffered the same fate. The 5 Division, which Gorchakov sent to reinforce the 12 and 7 Divisions, arrived when the Read divisions were already drained of blood and disorganized. Because she could not support them.
Before the battered 12 and 7 divisions came to the aid of the 17 Division from Liprandi, the French received strong reinforcements. The Allied Command pulled together significant reinforcements to the Fedyuhin Mountains and the battle area, deploying 50 thousand. Two divisions arrived at the French, and the commander of the French forces, Jean-Jacques Pélus, arrived with guards regiments.
Thus, our troops entered into battle in parts, and the French troops received a huge advantage over the Russian forces in this sector. All attempts by the Russian troops to continue the attack failed. When the reinforcements were sent by Gorchakov and Liprandi, Read's troops were already thrown from the mountains and suffered heavy losses. There was no point in continuing to fight, the battle ended with the defeat of the Russian army.
The advancing Russian troops suffered huge losses. The Odessa regiment, marching in the head of the 12 division, rushed first to the Black River, captured the bridgehead, and when it was raised, it was shot by enemy artillery at close range. “Later, French officers told me that when attacking the Odessa regiment, our whole chain lay down on the heights and could be counted every pair. There was not one who would leave his place, ”said the participant in the battle. The commander of the Odessa Regiment of Chasseurs, Colonel Skuderi, died along with his entire regiment. Scuders brought to the dressing station with three bayonet, four bullet and two caricature wounds. He passed away a few minutes later. The commander of the headquarters of the group of troops of Read, General Weimarn was killed. During the attack of the Galitsky regiment, Read, who was following the course of the battle, was killed by a grenade. Due to the haste of the retreat, his body was not even taken with him. Thus, the brave General Read died, who distinguished himself during the years of World War 1812, and successfully fought in the Caucasus.
Adjutant-General Vrevsky, who was sent by the king to cheer Gorchakov, was killed in battle. He visited the most dangerous places of the battle. A nucleus fragment killed a horse under him, and he fell to the ground, but remained on the battlefield. Another nucleus tore off his cap with the movement of air and contused him. Vrevsky did not leave the battlefield. The third core broke his head.
Russian General Nikolai Andreevich Read
Results
Thus, due to the mistakes of the main high command (Alexander) and the command of the troops in the Crimea, the Russian army suffered heavy losses and was defeated. The Allied Command cheered up and launched a new bombardment of Sevastopol, which ended with the fall of the sea fortress. The will to resist the leadership of Russia was broken, the war was lost.
Military researchers note the fatal mistakes of the Russian command: an attack in the forehead of the enemy’s well-fortified positions, which have a force one and a half times larger than the forces of the attackers; putting troops in parts, first thrown into 12, then 7, then 5, 17 division, throwing regiment after regiment, battalion after battalion into battle, not coordinating their actions; lack of support from the army command; insufficient artillery support.
According to official data, the Russian army lost more than 8 thousand killed and wounded (according to other sources, the loss reached 10 thousand people). The Allied forces (the bulk of the casualties were in the French army) lost more than 1700 people. The higher losses of the Russian troops are due to the fact that the French held excellent positions and were well protected from the artillery and rifle fire of our troops.
All noted the heroism of the Russian troops, who were dying, but tried to attack and did not retreat even in the most terrible conditions. So, a soldier approached Reada, put the gun down with his right hand and said: “Your Excellency, give us a reserve!” - “Who sent you?” - “Comrades”. “Where are the officers?” “They are killed.” Read told the soldier that he had no reserves, and when he came, he would send them right away. "The soldier threw his gun on his shoulder and went back to his comrades behind the river."
When Weimarn died, his orderly Stolypin (he was also wounded) took three soldiers to transfer Weimarn's body, but the soldiers began to ask to release them to their battalion, who was dying at that moment under a canister. The soldiers said that "their duty is to return to the battalion." When Redad died and his entire headquarters was killed, when many battalions were left completely without commanders, the soldiers did not want to leave and ranks behind the line, covering the heights of Fedyukhin with corpses. Stolypin never forgot the impressions of the Black River: “The troops fought well and carried out heroically all the agony and severity of the war; they would endure, perhaps, more than it seemed possible to expect from human power. ”
Sources:
Bogdanovich M.I. Eastern War 1853-1856 In 4-x. // http://www.runivers.ru/lib/book3058/.
Svechin, A. A. The evolution of military art. Volume II. Chapter I. The Eastern War 1853 — 56 M. - L., 1927 // http://www.runivers.ru/lib/book3181/10130/.
E. V. Tarle. The Crimean War: in 2's. M. - L.:, 1941-1944 // http://militera.lib.ru/h/tarle3/index.html.
Prehistory Plans of the Russian command
The Russian emperor Alexander II in the first months of his reign considered it his filial duty to continue the policy of the deceased father. Therefore, he continued the war and defense of Sevastopol, although he was an opponent of the defense of Sevastopol at any price and did not believe in the possibility of avoiding defeat in the war. Alexander wanted to get out of the war as soon as possible and with minimal losses. The indisputable and brilliant success of the Russian army in repelling the assault on Sevastopol 6 (18) in June did not convince the king that the war could continue. Bombing the enemy led him to believe that the garrison of Sevastopol was doomed, and recruiting could not change the situation, that Sevastopol must be surrendered.
Alexander II believed that it was better to conduct a decisive battle in the field by trying to defeat the enemy and lift the siege from Sevastopol. And if this attempt fails, then with a calm conscience it can be said that everything that was in the human power and Sevastopol was done, after which peace negotiations begin. Therefore, St. Petersburg put pressure on the commander of the troops in the Crimea, Mikhail Gorchakov, with the aim of a decisive attack on the enemy. Gorchakov himself did not share this idea. He also considered the situation hopeless, but did not want to attack a strong opponent under such unfavorable conditions.
But the royal court demanded battle, and Gorchakov, by his nature, was not used to arguing with the monarch. Alexander insistently suggested that Gorchakov take decisive action. In a letter from 6 (18) in June, the king said that he had received information from Brussels that the French were sending reinforcements to 24 under Sevastopol thousand people, as well as information about the Allies' assumption to move to Perekop, that is, to cut off the Crimea from the rest of Russia . Alexander wrote: “... I hope that until that time you will be quite able to start offensive actions, which you mention in your last letter of the 29 number. If God bless your intentions and you succeed in delivering a strong blow to the enemy, then things can take another turn in time and then you can hardly fear for Perekop. ”
13 (25 of June) the king returns to this thought: "More than ever, I am convinced of the need to launch an offensive on our part, because otherwise all the reinforcements coming back to you, following the example of the previous ones, will be partly absorbed by Sevastopol as a bottomless barrel." Alexander said that, according to the new information received by him, the general assault and attack from the sea would be resumed by the enemy in early August: “Therefore, it is highly desirable that with the advent of 4 and 5 infantry divisions, you would not hesitate to take decisive action. They will not do without a significant loss, but with God's help they can also have an important result ... " At the same time, the king made a reservation that placed the responsibility for the case on Gorchakov: “Here are my thoughts, which I convey to you with my usual frankness so that you can bring them into execution, if you consider it possible now or later, i.e. the arrival of the militia. " That is, the king kept Gorchakov's freedom in choosing the time of the battle.
20 July (1 August) the king sent a new letter to Gorchakov: “The daily losses of the invincible Sevastopol garrison, which increasingly weaken your troops, which are barely replaced by newly arriving reinforcements, lead me even more to the conviction expressed in my last letter about the need to "Or decisive, in order to put an end to this terrible slaughter, which may finally have a detrimental effect on the spirit of the garrison."
As a result, the old nobleman Gorchakov, who used to fulfill the will of Paskevich and Nikolai, and now Alexander, all his life, did not dare to prove his point that it was impossible to engage in an unequal battle with the superior forces of the enemy with an excellent position. That this risky undertaking can lead not only to a severe defeat, but to an acceleration of the fall of Sevastopol.
Gorchakov, before gathering the military council, decided to get the opinion of the head of the garrison of Sevastopol, Dmitry Osten-Saken. The commander of the garrison of Sevastopol, after the death of Nakhimov, lost faith in the success of the defense of Sevastopol, but considered it possible to continue resistance in order to cause the enemy as much harm as possible. But the open attack on the strong positions of the enemy Osten-Sacken considered a mistake. Osten-Sacken condemned “an unfortunate thought to aimlessly take Fedyukhin’s heights, on which, if lucky, from one of the enemy’s missiles and bombs, from near dominant terrain, from which every person could be counted, and several hours it was impossible to resist. " In addition, they did not know how to keep secrets in the Russian camp, and the enemy was ready for a Russian attack.
Osten-Sacken, confident of the failure of the business being pursued, filed a special report to Gorchakov on July 26. In it, he noted that although, indeed, Fedyukhin height - the weak point of the enemy, but from there he can move to Sapun-mountain. In general, the Allies occupy a concentrated position in the dominant terrain and strengthened their positions for ten months. Therefore, the enemy command can safely send almost all of its forces to any point, since with small barriers well-fortified positions can only be taken by assault and with heavy losses. Osten-Saken believed that the offensive was better to lead to Chorgun and the Baidar valley, but not to Fedyukhin heights.
29 July (10 August) 1855 was a military council. Only Osten-Sacken decided to oppose the planned operation. According to him, the Russians both in Sevastopol and in the field army near the r. Black has 90 thousand soldiers, and the enemy 110-120 thousand people and he is awaiting reinforcements. Obviously, wherever Russian troops go on the attack, the enemy will always have an advantage. Even if, at the cost of great losses, the Russians succeed by the combined forces of the garrison of Sevastopol and the field army, they can take Sapun Mountain, then the enemy can easily occupy Sevastopol or the next day attack and smash the weaker Russian army. At the same time, Saken noted the enormous losses of the garrison of Sevastopol that soon there would be no gunpowder, no shells, or even less food for horses, and if there were no winter premises for the sick and wounded and roads that were damaged by the time of year for their transportation, they would be killed ". Thus, it is no longer possible to defend Sevastopol and it is necessary to leave the South side.
Gorchakov rejected this idea. The rest of the council members, except for Khrulev, who spoke in favor of attacking the enemy, were silent. They presented their opinions in writing: Kotzebue, Liprandi, Buturlin, Vice-Admiral Novosilsky, Buchmeyer and Sergputovsky supported the offensive, Ushakov, Semyakin - against the offensive. It is noted that many of those who voted for the offensive stipulated that they considered the full success unlikely, that is, the capture of Sapun-Gory and the lifting of the blockade from Sevastopol. Many wrote that the Feduhins of the mountains to be attacked are impregnable, that our transport means are unsatisfactory, and the banks of the Black River are very fireboxes, that we have very few long-range guns for firing enemy positions, and so on.
Gorchakov himself understood the entire deplorable state of his army. On the eve of the battle, on the evening of August 3 (15), Gorchakov wrote to the Minister of War: “Do not be deceived, I am going to the enemy in disgusting conditions. His position is very strong, on his right flank almost steep and very fortified Gasfortova mountain, on the right hand of Fedyukhina mountain, in front of which there is a deep canal filled with water, through which it will be possible to cross only bridges brought under the direct fire of the enemy. I have 43 thousands of people; if the enemy is sane, he will oppose 60 thousands to me. If, for which I hope a little, happiness will favor me, I will take care to benefit from my success. Otherwise, you will need to obey God's will. I will retreat to the Mekenziev mountain and try to evacuate Sevastopol with the least possible damage. ”
Battle
The main role in the battle was to be played by the troops of Read and Liprandi, who formed the right and left flanks of the army. Read had two infantry divisions (12-I and 7-I reserve), one cavalry regiment and 62 guns. With his two divisions, he had to settle down near the Fedyukhiny Mountains, start an artillery battle with the enemy, but not attack enemy positions without special orders from Gorchakov. General Liprandi with two other divisions (6 and 17) had to take the height from Chorgun and then take Gasfortovo mountain. Then Read’s infantry was supposed to reinforce Liprandi, and the artillery under the cover of artillery would remain against the Fedyukhiny Mountains, continuing shelling, without storming enemy positions. In reserve there were two divisions (4-I and 5-I), all the cavalry (4 regiment of dragoons and 2 ulan) and artillery reserve. At the same time, Gorchakov was not sure of his actions and instructed Read to be ready to attack the Fedyukhiny Mountains if Gasfortovskiye heights were occupied by Russian troops. In this case, Read was supposed to support the troops of General Liprandi.
However, from the very beginning of the battle the plan was disrupted. In the morning the Russian artillery set off a battle, the troops of Liprandi and Reada engaged in a battle. Due to the erroneous, premature order of Prince Gorchakov "to start the battle," Read launched an attack on the Fedyukhiny Mountains. Almost simultaneously, Liprandi occupied the heights of Chorgun, but could not move further. After the battle, Gorchakov tried to blame the dead General Read. They say that the general didn’t understand the order of the commander-in-chief, but, on the contrary, having understood the order, for no apparent reason immediately began to act consciously contrary to the order. Gorchakov allegedly ordered only the firing of enemy positions, although he had begun a long time ago.
The Russian offensive on the strong positions of the enemy ended in disaster. Division Reada went on the attack. The artillery could not be transported across the river, as a result, the Russian batteries operated from the bottom up, being located in the valley of the Black River. The artillery reserve only descended from the mountain (the descent from Mekenzievoy mountain was difficult) and did not have time to take part in the battle. Therefore, it was not possible to strengthen the artillery, and its fire could seriously help our troops. One by one, the Russian battalions crossed over draw-bridges, and the French mowed down their murderous fire, remaining behind cover and bearing much smaller losses.
Reada was sent to the aid of the 5 division, which was in reserve, and three regiments from Liprandi. 12-I and 7-I divisions, one after another, were thrown into the attack. The 12 Division went first and, crossing the Stone Bridge and the ford to the left of the Stone Bridge, overturned the chain of French riflemen, took the rubble arranged by the enemy on the way to the height. However, our soldiers were met with powerful fire and could not resist, they began to retreat. In the two regiments the regimental commanders were killed and many of the battalion and company commanders were killed or wounded. The 7 Division almost simultaneously crossed the river, to the right of the 12 Division, and suffered the same fate. The 5 Division, which Gorchakov sent to reinforce the 12 and 7 Divisions, arrived when the Read divisions were already drained of blood and disorganized. Because she could not support them.
Before the battered 12 and 7 divisions came to the aid of the 17 Division from Liprandi, the French received strong reinforcements. The Allied Command pulled together significant reinforcements to the Fedyuhin Mountains and the battle area, deploying 50 thousand. Two divisions arrived at the French, and the commander of the French forces, Jean-Jacques Pélus, arrived with guards regiments.
Thus, our troops entered into battle in parts, and the French troops received a huge advantage over the Russian forces in this sector. All attempts by the Russian troops to continue the attack failed. When the reinforcements were sent by Gorchakov and Liprandi, Read's troops were already thrown from the mountains and suffered heavy losses. There was no point in continuing to fight, the battle ended with the defeat of the Russian army.
The advancing Russian troops suffered huge losses. The Odessa regiment, marching in the head of the 12 division, rushed first to the Black River, captured the bridgehead, and when it was raised, it was shot by enemy artillery at close range. “Later, French officers told me that when attacking the Odessa regiment, our whole chain lay down on the heights and could be counted every pair. There was not one who would leave his place, ”said the participant in the battle. The commander of the Odessa Regiment of Chasseurs, Colonel Skuderi, died along with his entire regiment. Scuders brought to the dressing station with three bayonet, four bullet and two caricature wounds. He passed away a few minutes later. The commander of the headquarters of the group of troops of Read, General Weimarn was killed. During the attack of the Galitsky regiment, Read, who was following the course of the battle, was killed by a grenade. Due to the haste of the retreat, his body was not even taken with him. Thus, the brave General Read died, who distinguished himself during the years of World War 1812, and successfully fought in the Caucasus.
Adjutant-General Vrevsky, who was sent by the king to cheer Gorchakov, was killed in battle. He visited the most dangerous places of the battle. A nucleus fragment killed a horse under him, and he fell to the ground, but remained on the battlefield. Another nucleus tore off his cap with the movement of air and contused him. Vrevsky did not leave the battlefield. The third core broke his head.
Russian General Nikolai Andreevich Read
Results
Thus, due to the mistakes of the main high command (Alexander) and the command of the troops in the Crimea, the Russian army suffered heavy losses and was defeated. The Allied Command cheered up and launched a new bombardment of Sevastopol, which ended with the fall of the sea fortress. The will to resist the leadership of Russia was broken, the war was lost.
Military researchers note the fatal mistakes of the Russian command: an attack in the forehead of the enemy’s well-fortified positions, which have a force one and a half times larger than the forces of the attackers; putting troops in parts, first thrown into 12, then 7, then 5, 17 division, throwing regiment after regiment, battalion after battalion into battle, not coordinating their actions; lack of support from the army command; insufficient artillery support.
According to official data, the Russian army lost more than 8 thousand killed and wounded (according to other sources, the loss reached 10 thousand people). The Allied forces (the bulk of the casualties were in the French army) lost more than 1700 people. The higher losses of the Russian troops are due to the fact that the French held excellent positions and were well protected from the artillery and rifle fire of our troops.
All noted the heroism of the Russian troops, who were dying, but tried to attack and did not retreat even in the most terrible conditions. So, a soldier approached Reada, put the gun down with his right hand and said: “Your Excellency, give us a reserve!” - “Who sent you?” - “Comrades”. “Where are the officers?” “They are killed.” Read told the soldier that he had no reserves, and when he came, he would send them right away. "The soldier threw his gun on his shoulder and went back to his comrades behind the river."
When Weimarn died, his orderly Stolypin (he was also wounded) took three soldiers to transfer Weimarn's body, but the soldiers began to ask to release them to their battalion, who was dying at that moment under a canister. The soldiers said that "their duty is to return to the battalion." When Redad died and his entire headquarters was killed, when many battalions were left completely without commanders, the soldiers did not want to leave and ranks behind the line, covering the heights of Fedyukhin with corpses. Stolypin never forgot the impressions of the Black River: “The troops fought well and carried out heroically all the agony and severity of the war; they would endure, perhaps, more than it seemed possible to expect from human power. ”
Sources:
Bogdanovich M.I. Eastern War 1853-1856 In 4-x. // http://www.runivers.ru/lib/book3058/.
Svechin, A. A. The evolution of military art. Volume II. Chapter I. The Eastern War 1853 — 56 M. - L., 1927 // http://www.runivers.ru/lib/book3181/10130/.
E. V. Tarle. The Crimean War: in 2's. M. - L.:, 1941-1944 // http://militera.lib.ru/h/tarle3/index.html.
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