Ukrainian world
The completion of the active phase of hostilities in the Donbass after the second round of the Minsk agreements put the opposing sides in a rather difficult position. Now, instead of defensive and offensive problems, they needed to solve quite routine issues, among them improving life in the territory under their control. Moreover, it was typical for the Donetsk rebels and for Ukraine.
Although, of course, the threat of resumption of hostilities persists all the time, despite the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the line of contact. In the end, they can always be returned back as soon as possible. But since the main contradictions are not resolved, both the Ukrainian side and the rebels undoubtedly suspect each other of insidious intentions. Therefore, keep the powder dry. Moreover, from time to time they make statements about the aggressive intentions of the enemy - about the concentration of troops and equipment.
But at the same time, all local participants in the process understand that at this stage of the development of the internal Ukrainian conflict, despite the most belligerent statements, both in Ukraine and in the rebellious Donbas, the question finally moved to another level. Here, much already does not depend on the warring Ukrainian parties, here Russia and the European powers and the United States agree with each other. The latter today either support Ukraine or control it, the nuances of assessment depend on the personal position of each.
Actually, the paradox of the situation lies in the fact that today there is the same dialogue between the West and Russia on the future of Ukraine, the absence of which was spoken in Moscow during the events on the Maidan. The Russian side then often focused on the fact that it was not negotiating with Ukraine, its opinion was not taken into account, which, in general, led to such a sad result. Although in the West they can say that his opinion was not taken into account when the former President Viktor Yanukovych unexpectedly refused to sign an association agreement with Europe, which was the cause of the Maidan.
But now all this is not so important. Then there was the struggle of the interests of the great powers in the Ukrainian field, in which everyone, most likely, hoped to win, used, among other things, the forbidden methods of fighting, but in the end no one had won anything particularly. After the end of the active phase of the conflict, Russia and the West must now deal directly with issues of war and peace. At the same time, they help their protege as much as they can.
Naturally, each of the parties has different tasks in scale and strategic goals. The West needs to economically support a state with a population under 40 million, and at the same time push, and possibly force, its leadership to undertake the most serious structural reforms in stories independent Ukraine. At the same time, economic assistance from the West today clearly directly depends on the reforms carried out in Kiev.
In turn, Russia needs to resolve the question of what to do with the rebel territories in Donetsk and Lugansk with their population of four to six million people. It is also necessary to build a system of management of these territories and solve the problems of their economic support. On the one hand, this requires significantly less funds from Moscow than the West to maintain the economic situation of the whole of Ukraine, but on the other hand, Russia has less funds at all, and all of them are in the current complicated situation. Certainly the need to contain the Donetsk and Lugansk self-proclaimed republics is a serious challenge for Russia.
But both in Russia and in the West, a common headache is associated with their proteges putting order in their ranks and restoring controllability. In Lugansk and Donetsk, this was solved in simpler ways, too independent field commanders were forced to leave for Russia, the most radical of them were arrested. Here, the authorities sought to centralize. Can this be considered the influence of Russia or is it a natural reaction of local authorities, but the fact remains. In the rebellious East of Ukraine, a central power vertical is created according to the Russian model, which is engaged in bringing the Donetsk and Lugansk “Makhnovists” to a common denominator.
In Ukraine, everything is more complicated. Here the power after the Maidan is significantly decentralized. In addition to local Makhnovists, volunteer battalions fighting in the East, the Legal Sector, there are still quite a few other centers of influence, for example, local oligarchs, political parties and movements, including very radical ones, are also active. Naturally, they all put pressure on the authorities in Kiev. Moreover, this pressure sometimes takes a very serious character.
But in any case, the authorities in Ukraine, as well as the rebels in the territories torn from her, had to fulfill an important condition - to try to restore the state monopoly on violence. At the same time, the actions of the Ukrainian authorities and the difficulties they encountered, for obvious reasons, are much more visible from the outside. Still, an open information environment and many active participants in the process. In the Donbass, everyone was quietly built or even arrested. Here everything went according to the well-known logic of the development of such conflicts. For example, in Tajikistan, after the end of the active phase of the fighting in the local civil war of the beginning of the 1990, influential field commanders Sangak Safarov and Fayzuli Saidov were killed under unclear circumstances. Because after the war, no one any longer becomes no longer needed brutal commanders with a criminal past.
At the same time, there were also stories with similar figures in Kiev at the time. Suffice it to recall the story of radical nationalist Sasha White, who was killed shortly after the victory of the Maidan while being detained during a police operation. But this character was completely out of control and discredited power, and she took the risk of direct elimination.
And although the period of active hostilities in the Donbass led to the emergence of a large number of volunteer battalions and their brutal commanders, they were generally able to integrate into state institutions. The battalions were partially disbanded, partly incorporated into the army and the police. The last was the so-called corps of the Right Sector, led by nationalist Dmitry Yarosh. In the spring of 2015, he was included in the army as a separate brigade. It is clear that this is not a solution to the problem, but still the first approach to it.
But the main problems of the central authorities in Kiev arose with the famous Ukrainian oligarch and at the same time the governor of the Dnipropetrovsk region, Igor Kolomoisky. The conflict between them arose because of the state company "Ukrnafta", which was under the control of Kolomoisky. When Kiev dismissed the company's management, close to the Dnepropetrovsk governor, the people of the latter tried to forcefully prevent the loss of control over it.
This story was of great importance due to the fact that Kolomoisky is probably the most influential oligarch of Ukraine. He played an important role in that Dnipropetrovsk region in the first half of 2014, opposed the pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine. At his disposal were various volunteer formations, which by the beginning of 2015 had been a small private army. That is, Kolomoisky with his people and the whole area under control actually represented a mini-state within Ukraine.
Ukraine in general, the last 20 years was a demonstration of how, with weak state institutions, the oligarchs become the dominant force. Moreover, democratic procedures create additional opportunities for oligarchs. They can compete with each other through parties, newspapers. To a certain extent, it is also a democracy. Although it does not resemble the classic modern Western democracy. Rather, it is possible to draw parallels with the aristocratic (oligarchic) republics, for example, medieval Italy. This is when several rich families manage the republic with the help of loyal support groups, the so-called clients. If such aristocratic families agree, then they replace each other in power, for example, it was the case in the Venetian Republic. If the relationship between them is complex, then their customers figure out the relationship on the streets.
Actually, the Ukrainian oligarchs were striving for something similar in their organization to an aristocratic republic. In principle, in the spaces of the former USSR, any oligarchs want something like that. Here you can recall the same Russian oligarch Khodorkovsky, who on the eve of his fall directly influenced some political parties in the State Duma.
So Kolomoisky, most likely, believed that his role in the defense of Ukrainian statehood in the east of Ukraine would provide him with an exclusive position in the future state system. In addition, he could count on some dividends from the redistribution of property and advantageous positions in the state apparatus, which previously belonged to representatives of the disgraced Donetsk clan of former President Yanukovych. From the point of view of the former logic of the development of Ukrainian statehood, this was quite natural. The winner was supposed to get everything. Moreover, the president eventually became another oligarch — Petro Poroshenko, and, accordingly, Kolomoisky could count on sharing zones of influence with him. From his point of view, the replacement of management in Nafta is a redistribution of property in favor of other oligarchs, the same Poroshenko, hence the nervous reaction with the use of armed people.
It is possible that it would have been if Ukraine had not been in a situation that was sufficiently new for it. The country is reformatting the entire system. And this reformatting is carried out under serious external influence. At the same time, it is clear that in the West they would not want the situation of 2005 of the year to be repeated in Ukraine, when after the local “orange revolution” there was a conflict between pro-Western politicians (then-President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko) for property distribution. Actually, this is why Tymoshenko, after the Maidan, has ceased to be a favorite of political life in Ukraine.
Therefore, in the dispute between Kolomoisky and Poroshenko, the final advantage was on the side of the central authorities in Kiev. Although Kolomoisky retained his influence in the Dnipropetrovsk region, as his former deputy Oleinik remained in the local administration. Nevertheless, President Poroshenko has achieved his. Although the question of the future role of the oligarchs in the political life of Ukraine is still open. They still have serious money, impressive human resources, practically private armies, and in the situation of general uncertainty and weakness of state institutions, this is usually the key condition for ensuring the influence of oligarchs in the country and their struggle with their own kind. Still, Poroshenko, too, to some extent an oligarch. So the main question is: will Ukraine still be able to form state institutions in the end?
Completion of the Soviet era?
This is actually a very big question, and the Ukrainian elites do not seem to be too sure about this themselves. Hence the desire to break off ties with the Soviet past in the most decisive manner. On April 9, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a very tough law on de-communization, which condemned the communist and national socialist regimes in Ukraine as criminal, prohibited the public denial of their criminal nature, as well as the use and propaganda of their symbols. In addition, it was decided to publish all the Soviet archives and legalized all those who fought for Ukraine, including the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).
It is clear that the main purpose of the Ukrainian law was precisely the Soviet Union and its symbolism. Largely because modern Russia has made the former USSR one of its symbols. That is, the new law is a continuation of the global confrontation between Ukraine and Russia. The current Ukrainian elites deny everything that unites them with Russia and its history. Therefore, all who fought with the Soviet Union, become its heroes.
Obviously, the deputies of the Verkhovna Rada who have adopted the law are thus counting on making it impossible to restore the influence of Russia and all those who support it in Ukraine. They believe that this is a sure way to make a civilizational choice in favor of the West, to build a kind of “Berlin Wall” between Russia and Ukraine. In addition, the Ukrainian deputies want to finally marginalize those political forces that rely on the nostalgia of a part of society on the Soviet past and are oriented toward Russia, and make it impossible for them to return to power. Probably, such radical steps seem to be a simpler solution than the routine work of creating new institutions - first of all, the legal system and a more efficient state administration apparatus.
But like any revolutionary action, the law was very crude, the consequences of its application were unpredictable. For example, after April 9 it was not clear what to do with the military awards of the Soviet era, because they also fell under the category of Soviet symbols. Another problem was with diplomas and certificates issued prior to 1991, because they also feature Soviet symbols. In addition, there are also tombstones, monuments to fallen soldiers, museum expositions, collections of collectors. Therefore, April 23 Verkhovna Rada made changes to the law. Now its action does not apply to all the above characters. Another problem was the renaming of cities and towns, many of which in Ukraine bear Soviet names, the same Dneprodzerzhinsk.
But all this is not as important as the legalization of all those who fought with the Soviet authorities. Among them were not only ideological nationalists who were noted by the struggle with the USSR, and at the same time with Nazi Germany, the same Stepan Bandera was sitting in a German concentration camp. Still, quite a lot of people in Ukraine served in police formations, including the protection of concentration camps. Naturally, it causes a very negative reaction from many former Soviet citizens. To a certain extent, this helps the Russian propaganda, which is based on the idea that “junta” and “Nazis” came to power in Kiev.
A very interesting discussion was on one of the Ukrainian sites. Here one of the authors carefully collected all the information about those who came from Russia who fought on the side of the Nazis. They turned out to be quite a lot, besides the well-known Vlasovites, there were also the Cossack SS corps, the SS guard battalions. In addition, an impressive part were the so-called "Hiwis", former Soviet prisoners of war, who voluntarily fought as part of the German units. The latter at different times, there were up to half a million people. On this basis, the author concluded that, in accusing Ukrainians of supporting the Nazis in World War II, Russia did not want to see their historical problems.
However, the problem here is not how much, who exactly and by what circumstances served fascist Germany. The question is that the service of this state is recognized as criminal according to the Nuremberg Tribunal. Therefore, one can only sympathize with the same Latvians who served in the SS forces when they fought against the USSR. They may say anything, but it is a stigma. Probably, it would be better for Latvians not to surrender to the Soviet troops in 1940, but to resist them, as the Finns did. And today the Finns have nothing to be ashamed of their military past.
In addition, in Russia they have forgotten about their SS in general; for modern society, this is definitely a black page in history. Therefore, it is more difficult for Ukrainians, it is easier to criticize them and it is more difficult for them to explain all the circumstances of the past history.
Moreover, with all the rigidity of the Soviet regime under Stalin and the presence of common features with Nazi Germany, he has an important difference. Still, in the USSR there was no ideological concept of the superiority of one ethnos and the destruction of undesirable ethnic groups. While the Soviet Union basically remained international and during repression, it concerned "victims and executioners."
Therefore, for all the hostility of modern Ukrainians to Russia and the USSR, it will be very difficult to erase the Soviet page from history with one law. Especially since President Poroshenko has not yet signed it at the end of April, he faces a difficult decision.
Shot in the back
But the biggest problem for Ukraine today is a wave of political assassinations. Former members of a fleeing president Yanukovich team are being killed. However, the biggest resonance was the murder of Kiev intellectual Oles Buzin, who was known for his critical attitude towards the new Ukrainian authorities and was sympathetic to Russia. There were a lot of versions in connection with this murder. Some believed that he was killed for his pro-Russian views and this was done by the Ukrainian radicals. Others believed that, on the contrary, he was killed by pro-Russian radicals, who thus wanted to destabilize the situation in Ukraine.
Whatever it was, the situation of instability, aggression in society is extremely dangerous for famous people, especially journalists, writers, and publicists. Because their killing causes a resonance and unlike politicians nobody protects them. Elderberry fell victim to a dangerous time.
It's hard to be Transnistria
In general, the confrontation between Ukraine and Russia, although it has passed its “hot exacerbation stage”, continues in new directions. One of them was the unrecognized territory of Transnistria. In fact, this is a pro-Russian enclave on the borders of Moldova and Ukraine. Here, from the time of the Moldovan-Transdniestrian conflict at the start of the 1990s, the Russian military base is located. In addition, Gazprom supplies Transnistria with free gas, which, however, goes into the accounting of Moldova’s debt. The latter recognizes it, but does not pay. Well, and finally, Moscow directly provided financial support to Transnistria.
In the midst of Ukraine’s confrontation with Russia, first because of the Crimea, then because of the Donbass, many in Kiev feared that Moscow might want to occupy the entire Black Sea coast as far as Odessa. Thus, it could solve the issue of the land corridor to the Crimea and further to Transnistria. But the Russian authorities did not go so far, the fears turned out to be in vain, but Transnistria itself, as a result, found itself in a difficult situation.
Naturally, the Ukrainian authorities are suspicious of the Russian enclave near their western borders. They took measures to strengthen the border when they were afraid of a strike from the western direction. But the more serious consequences for Transnistria were its actual blockade.
For the past twenty years, Transnistria has lived through good relations with Ukraine and the use of Moldovan documents for export-import operations. Now Kiev is raising the issue of introducing Moldovan customs, and Ukrainians have also limited the import of excisable goods to Transnistria. Moldova, in turn, initiates criminal proceedings against enterprises of Transnistria, which are registered in Moldova in connection with the non-payment of customs duties and taxes. In addition, Russian citizens of military age are denied access to the territory of Ukraine, and in Transnistria there are thousands of 200 out of thousand of the total population of 750. If we recall that one of the organizers of the insurgents' security service in Donetsk was Transnistrian general Antyufeev, then Kiev’s concerns are quite understandable.
The difficulty for Transnistria arose due to the fact that Russia this year refused to allocate 100 million dollars. As a result, Transnistria was experiencing an acute shortage. The economic situation in the unrecognized republic has deteriorated sharply, discontent of the population began to grow.
Obviously, with the hostility of Ukraine, the position of Transnistria inevitably becomes critical. It is difficult to say how long the unrecognized republic will be able to hold out in the conditions of the blockade. But at the same time, Russia has its own possibilities for conducting counterplay in Moldova. In the elections for the head of the Gagauz autonomy, the pro-Russian politician Irina Vlach won. In the elections held in 2014, the pro-Russian forces could well have formed a coalition, if the popular politician Renato Usatii had not been eliminated on the eve of the elections. And, finally, the most serious banking scandal in Moldova, where 1 billion dollars went missing, could not help but hit the popularity of the pro-Western coalition of parties in power.
It’s a paradox, but for Moscow, with its own centralization of power, the liberal system becomes more profitable in those countries to which Russia is interested. Then Moscow will have the opportunity to use the potential of pro-Russian citizens, and indeed the chance to conduct its game on the domestic political field of countries such as Moldova.
In any case, we will long watch the large-scale confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. But it is already obvious that, most likely, there will be no military conflict, but there will be a competition between models of state structure and development results. The stakes here are extremely high for both Ukraine and the entire post-Soviet space.
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