Low birth rate is one of the key problems of the national security of modern Russia
One of the most pressing problems for the national security of the Russian state is the demographic situation in the country. It is known that the birth rate in modern Russia, despite a certain improvement associated with a relative increase in the standard of living in the 2000-s (compared to the 1990-s) and some state measures in the direction of stimulating demographic growth, remains at a rather low level. At least, it is hardly possible to say that the Russian birth rate currently covers the need for replenishing the country's population. Russian citizens are rapidly aging, especially in the “Russian” regions of the country where the lowest birth rate is observed.
Causes of the demographic decline
A strong demographic decline was observed in Russia throughout almost the entire twentieth century and was associated not only with changes in the socio-economic and socio-cultural foundations of the Russian state, but also with the fact that during the years of wars, revolutions, collectivization and industrialization, political repression the Russian state lost 140 -150 million people. Accordingly, since a significant part of the dead and the dead were people of both sexes of childbearing age, as well as children and adolescents, the number of potential newborns who could have been born to victims of global cataclysms decreased by tens of millions of people. stories.
However, no less significant role in the demographic crisis in Russia was also played by the decrease in the number of children of the average Russian woman. According to A. Vishnevsky - one of the largest domestic specialists in demography, for the period from 1925 to 2000. the birth rate declined, on average, for a woman's 5,59 per woman (A. Vishnevsky, Demography of the Stalin era). Moreover, the most active decline in birth rates occurred in the period from 1925 to 1955. - that is, for periods of industrialization and collectivization, World War II, the post-war restoration of Soviet infrastructure. The population of modern Russia is annually decreasing by about 700 thousand people, which makes it possible to speak of the country as gradually dying out (yes, that’s not embarrassed by these words, President Vladimir Putin himself described it back in the 2000 year, and later 6 in the 2006 year - he said that the population of Russia by the end of the XXI century may be halved, if not taken drastic measures to improve the demographic situation in the country).
Very often in everyday judgments about the causes of declining birth rates there is an explanation of low birth rates by social conditions, first of all, insufficient material well-being of the population, lack of high-paying work for parents, separate and large housing, and infrastructure of kindergartens and schools. However, when compared with third world countries or the same pre-revolutionary Russia, such arguments do not stand up to scrutiny. We see the conditions in which the majority of the Central Asian population lives, not to mention the Africans or the inhabitants of South Asia. However, overcrowding, poverty (and sometimes outright poverty), the lack of social prospects do not prevent people from having children, and in quantities of “from five and above”.
In fact, the causes of declining birth rates in Russia in the twentieth century lie more in the ideological plane. Their main stimulus is the devaluation of traditional values and the destruction of the way of life of the Russian and other peoples of the country during the revolution and, especially, the post-revolutionary Stalinist transformations. It is impossible not to pay tribute to the Stalin era as a period of maximum development of industry, defense, security of the Soviet state, the spread of universal literacy of the population, the availability of medical care (albeit not highly qualified, but still significant).
However, for a rapid breakthrough in the economy of the USSR, mobilization of the largest possible number of citizens, the involvement of virtually the entire working population of the country, including both men and women, was required. According to A. Vishnevsky, "the very methods by which the Stalinist leadership of the USSR achieved - and achieved - a" great breakthrough "in the life of the people were such that they recklessly destroyed the whole system of traditional values, including family values" (A. Vishnevsky in the Stalin era).
Despite the fact that Stalin and his entourage negatively assessed the activities of the “leftist” wing of the Bolshevik Party, insisting in the first post-revolutionary years of the complete destruction of the institution of the family, which promoted the sexual freedom of men and women, the freedom of abortions, in fact the “left communists” had a lot borrowed. And, first of all, a specific model of the organization of family relations. It can be called proletarian, since it was from the proletariat as a class of wage workers, mainly living in cities and employed in factory production, that such family organization became possible. In the farmer, the number of children did not matter much; moreover, having many children was in favor, since children are future hands, where you can feed two, always feed three, and so on. The peasants also had the possibility of placing numerous offspring in their hut, in the case of growing children - in the hut, built nearby, in the annex.
In contrast, the urban proletarians, huddled in the rooms and apartments of apartment buildings, could not afford numerous offspring. And because of the lack of places for accommodation, and because of the different nature of labor activity, the proletarian worked for wages and the child became just another feeder, reducing the well-being of the family without any return (when he grew up, he did not work in his father’s household, like a peasant son, but he went on his own "bread", that is, did not bring direct material returns to the parental family). Moreover, in urban proletarian families, women, as a rule, went to work. Women-workers, who found themselves in a situation of independent choice of labor activity, place of residence, had a completely different model of sexual behavior. First, they depended to a much lesser extent on the opinions of those around them than the peasant women. Secondly, being self-employed workers, they could afford the behavior that they considered necessary. Naturally, for them, having many children was an obvious obstacle - after all, it directly interfered with factory work.
The concept of "new woman" and fertility
The ideology of the family policy of Soviet Russia was shaped by the concepts of the “new woman”, which began to take shape in the 19th century in the works of both domestic and foreign writers and revolutionary-democratic philosophers. In Russia, the “new woman” was written primarily by N.G. Chernyshevsky. In the West, the idea of women's emancipation was much more developed. The ideology of feminism has been formed, which currently includes many branches - liberal, socialist, radical, lesbian, and even “black” feminism. The consequences of the spread of feminism in the countries of Western Europe are not to be recalled, this situation is rather pitiable for European societies and is the cause of significant contradictions between various groups of the European population.
In Russia, feminist ideas, including the concept of creating a “new woman,” found grateful supporters among representatives of revolutionary parties and movements, first of all - the Social Democrats. The Socialist-Revolutionaries - the “populists” were, nevertheless, to a greater degree, they were soil scientists, although similar theoretical constructs were spread among them. In the revolutionary years, Alexandra Kollontai became the main theorist of the “new woman” concept. This amazing woman - a politician, a diplomat, a revolutionary - managed not only to form his own concept of family-sex relations in a socialist society, but also with his own biography to largely demonstrate what the image of the “new woman” represents.
According to Kollontai, the traditional image of women from time immemorial was associated with humility, a focus on a prosperous marriage, lack of initiative in building your own life and life independence. A traditional woman is such a specific addition to a man, his companion and comrade, deprived of, in fact, her own “I” and, often, self-esteem. In contrast to the traditional image of a woman, Kollontai put forward the concept of a “new woman” - self-sufficient, active politically and socially, treating a man as equal and really equal to him in building her own independent life.
The image of the “new woman” is, first of all, the image of a woman unmarried. Let's add - and, as follows from the disclosure of this image, childless - because having a child, especially two or three, not to mention five, deprives a woman of her independence in the understanding of Alexandra Kollontai. She calls the three main principles of building new love-marriage relations: equality in mutual relations, mutual recognition of the rights of the other without a claim to full control of the heart and soul of a partner, comradely sensitivity to her love partner (Kollontai A. Dear a winged erost. 1923. ).
Already in the middle of 1920's. Kollontai's works were officially criticized in the Soviet Union. Gradually, it was forgotten and its concept - they chose to keep silent about it. Moreover, with the strengthening of Soviet statehood, the country's leadership had no options other than a partial return to traditional values. In the official press, literature, and cinema of the Stalin era, a type of Soviet woman was promoted who managed to combine the features of Kollontai's “new woman” in terms of party and social activity, labor feats, and the traditional family behavior of the mother and wife. However, it is not difficult to guess that the ideology of the Soviet state differed from the actual practice of organizing family and demographic policy. Motherhood was formally promoted, divorce was assessed negatively, in 1936, the Soviet government banned abortion, but in fact the social policy of the Soviet state was not aimed at actually strengthening the demographic foundations of the country.
The decline in the birth rate in the Stalin era shows that the measures taken to ban abortions did not give the desired result. Firstly, in the Soviet Union, women in the bulk were employed. Those who received higher and secondary vocational education, after graduation, were sent to work on distributions - often to completely different regions of the country. Their chances of a quick marriage decreased. And the system of state propaganda itself, to a large extent, did not focus women (like men) on family values.
Although the Soviet state needed numerous workers' hands, soldiers and officers, new engineers and scientists, and really took tremendous steps in this direction (just look at the number of educational institutions of all levels that appeared in the Stalin era, the number of children "from the people", received high-quality professional education and achieved heights in various fields of scientific, military, industrial, cultural activities), something turned out to be irretrievably lost. And this “something” was the very meaning of childbearing and creating a strong full-fledged family. The family was deprived of its economic, economic, social content, although it was proclaimed a “cell of society”. It was possible to raise children in kindergarten, change their husbands or wives periodically (if they didn’t arrange any nuances of living together, or simply “tired”), there was practically no economic significance for a man and a woman living together in a city apartment.
After the departure of Stalin and the "de-Stalinization" of the Soviet Union, even those measures to preserve the birth rate that Stalin tried to introduce by banning abortions were canceled. Despite the fact that after the war there was even a certain increase in population, it was not possible to reach the birth rate that would allow to increase the population of the Soviet state many times over time. What happened in the post-Soviet period should not be reminded. In 1990, economic factors also played a role, and, to an even greater degree, the final destruction of traditional values and their replacement by a westernized surrogate. Moreover, if in the Soviet model of family-sex policy, women at least oriented themselves, if not to family life, then to creative activity “for the good of the homeland and the party”, then in the post-Soviet period the values of personal material well-being were finally eclipsed by all other life orientations.
As motherhood and marriage ceased to be regarded as real values by the majority of Russian youth, a global “lack of children” was formed.
Although many sociological surveys of young Russians show that the family for Russian youth remains the most important life value (or, at least, second in importance), the discrepancy between what is desired (what Russians answer to sociologists) and real is obvious. The latter is not encouraging - the level of divorces is extremely high in the country - 50% of marriages are falling apart, which keeps Russia among the world leaders in the number of divorces. As for childbearing, only in the 2000-s, after the introduction of real material incentives, citizens began to give birth to more children (however, some skeptics explain the relative increase in the birth rate in the country in the 2000-ies by the fact that the generation of the “demographic boom” entered the child-bearing age "1980-ies, and the socio-economic conditions of life in the country relatively stabilized).
The introduction of so-called payments played an important role here. “Maternity capital”, which is paid at the birth of the second child and attaining the age of three years. The decision to start paying maternity capital was made in 2006, while, in order to prevent representatives of marginal groups from using it for mercenary purposes, it was decided not to issue it in cash, but to issue a special certificate allowing it to purchase housing for a certain amount. , close a mortgage loan, pay for the child’s education.
Currently, the maternity capital is about 430 thousand rubles. The sum is rather big - in some regions of Russia you can buy your own housing for it, or at least really improve your living conditions. Discusses the conditions and the emergence of other possibilities of spending the funds of the parent capital in the interests of the family and children. However, only material motivation can not increase fertility. Especially, if we take into account the fact that to obtain maternity capital, it is still required to have a first child. Therefore, some sociologists evaluate the very idea of material incentives for fertility very skeptically, referring to the fact that only representatives of marginalized population groups or migrant diasporas will give birth in order to receive assistance from the state in the amount of 430 thousand rubles. That is, even in this case, the problem of the demographic security of the Russian state will not be solved.
Abortion threatens demographics
Another problem in Russia in the field of fertility is abortion. Officially, abortions were resolved in Soviet Russia immediately after the October Revolution. In the 1920 year, the RSFSR allowed termination of pregnancy not only for medical reasons, becoming the first country in the world to legalize abortion. In 1936, abortions were banned and re-legalized only in 1955, following the “de-Stalinization” policy. Between 1990 and 2008 in post-Soviet Russia, according to official data, 41 million 795 thousands of abortions were produced. This number covers the real needs of the Russian state in the workforce (about 20 million people in the specified period), which allows many public and political figures to consider abortion as a direct threat to the demographic security of the Russian state.
About half of the country's population today speaks against abortions in Russia. Opinion polls show a gradual reduction in the number of supporters of abortion - from 57% of respondents in 2007 to 48% in 2010 (Levada Center. On the reproductive behavior of Russians). The views of opponents of abortion are expressed, as a rule, by nationalist political movements and religious organizations. Among them are both absolute opponents of any abortions, including even medical abortions, and moderate opponents of abortions, recognizing the possibility of their performing in justified cases (medical indicators, rape, social disorder, etc.).
First of all, Russian public figures and traditionalist philosophers oppose the practice of abortion. For them, abortions are not only a threat to the national security of the Russian state, one of the reasons for reducing the potential population of the Russian Federation, but also a challenge to religious values, traditional ideological orientations, which are inherent in almost all nations of the world, but collapse in the process of de-traditionalization of modern society, learning individualistic and consumer values of modern western capitalism. After all, the childe fries ideology - voluntary childlessness, erected in the valor of modern “creacles” and aimed at imitating by dim-minded consumers, is a purposeful imposition of anti-Russian fundamentally principles of not giving birth to children, creating a full-fledged family in the name of “own realization”, which often just a possibility of everyday and carefree "hanging out", shopping, and even just idleness, drunkenness and drug addiction.
The decline in fertility is one of the goals of the numerous associations of “family planning” that originally arose in Western European countries on the initiative of feminist movements and are sponsored by the international financial community interested in reducing the population — primarily in developed countries, since here a large population means growth of social responsibility and economic burdens on capitalists. Therefore, it is more expedient to “reduce” the number of indigenous people while simultaneously importing foreign migrants from backward third world countries who will be ready to do hard work without social guarantees and any requirements for improving their situation (now the experience of modern Europe shows that this is far from not so many migrants do not work at the new place of residence, but they even require social guarantees and all sorts of privileges, but it’s no longer possible to change the situation. possible for most western states).
Philosopher Oleg Fomin-Shakhov, one of the most convinced opponents of abortion in modern Russia, stresses that “the problem of abortion in today's Russia is primarily a problem of demographic security. At the International Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo 5 – 13 in September 1994, an action program was adopted, which essentially represented voluntary-compulsory sanctions for self-abridgement for Russia. The program stated that for sustainable regional and global socio-economic development it is necessary to take measures to reduce the birth rate, primarily through the development of family planning services (contraception, sterilization, abortion “in adequate conditions”) ”(O. Fomin-Shakhov. Russia without abortion. The newspaper “Tomorrow.” The electronic version of 5 June 2014 g.).
At the same time, Oleg Fomin-Shakhov proposes to take advantage of the American experience of the prolifer movement, that is, opponents of abortion and supporters of preserving human life in the womb. In the opinion of Oleg Fomin-Shakhov, the American proliferators for the first time transferred the subject of abortion to the plane of social problems, whereas before them abortion was regarded as a person’s personal sin or a crime against the laws of the state. The question was also raised about the essence of abortion as a tool of biopolitics for regulating the population of individual states. As for Russia, it is obvious that its vast territories and natural resources have long been the envy of a number of neighboring states. Throughout history, the Russian state has been faced with hordes of foreign conquerors, but today more far-sighted theorists and practitioners of the world financial oligarchy can afford to use such technologies as biopolitics, that is, regulation of childbearing in Russia, mortality rates, including propaganda mechanisms - propaganda of abortion, “free” lifestyle, all kinds of social deviations, criminal subculture, etc.
Another well-known philosopher Alexander Dugin in his article “Childbearing as a Philosophical Problem” links the lack of desire for childbearing to the destruction of traditional values of Russian society, the rejection of religious values and the assimilation of alien individualistic models aimed at the exclusive “self-worth” of man. Within the framework of this axiological model, childbearing becomes an obstacle to the “free”, but in reality - to the aimless and characterized only by consumerism - human life. “The system of dirty monstrous lies, undisguised Russophobia, aimed at the destruction of our cultural and physical code, leaves no desire to create an honest, cultural, Orthodox Russian family and raise a large number of wonderful Russian children. And it is far from obvious whether it will become an argument for young people that if it does not bear children, there will be no Russia, ”writes Dugin (A. Dugin. Childbearing as a philosophical problem).
Should abortion be banned in modern Russia? Of course, the total ban on abortion is hardly possible to go in modern conditions. And this step will not be really justified and understood by the population. However, strict control over the practice of abortion should be introduced - and this is one of the necessary measures in the direction of ensuring the demographic policy of the Russian state. First of all, all cases of abortion by Russian women should be strictly controlled, taking into account the reasons for their abortion. Thus, for medical reasons, in the interest of preserving the life of a woman, after rape (the criminal background of abortion) abortions should be allowed. Abortion should also be left to families who already have several children or have reasonable material difficulties.
However, the majority of abortions performed by young women, childless, middle-income or high-income, without visible health problems, should be prohibited. Note - there is no attempt on the personal freedom of women. It is enough to use contraception, not to have a promiscuous sex life, that is, to look after yourself and adhere to at least elementary moral and ethical principles - and the need to periodically run to an abortion will disappear by itself. After all, in most countries of the world - in almost all Latin American countries, countries in Africa, the Islamic East, in some Catholic countries of Europe, abortions are prohibited and these countries exist as it is, many are quite good.
Are there prospects?
The practice of material incentives for the birth rate, to which Russia passed during the years of V.V. Putin's represents a great significance for the development of fertility in the country. However, economic advances alone cannot inspire people to create families and give offspring - especially in modern society with its temptations and informational pressures of appropriate propaganda. A whole range of activities is needed - in the social, economic, cultural, educational and healthcare spheres, creating the prerequisites for the truly full-fledged education of young Russians and for their very birth. This includes paying decent childcare benefits, the possibility of introducing a “mother's salary” for women with many children who have decided to fully devote themselves to childcare, and help children's families to improve their living conditions (increase in living space depending on the growth in the number of children in the family) , and the provision of additional means of transport, household appliances for large families. All these activities should be carried out at the federal level and under the strict control of the relevant authorities.
In any case, without delving into specifics, it should be noted that the Russian state can find opportunities to organize such events in the direction of ensuring the country's demographic security. It will not be embarrassing to attract public organizations that have long been, at their own peril and risk, at their own expense, working among the country's population, promoting the values of family and childbirth, preventing the spread of Western values alien to Russian society. On the other hand, it is possible to use foreign experience, including inviting proven foreign experts for consultations in the direction of improving the demographic policy of the Russian state.
But the main focus of the state should be on outreach policies. While in the media, in cinema, consumer values are advertised, the model of the behavior of a “socialite” - a prostitute who has no children — is depicted as desirable for a woman - Russian men are shown to be unsuccessful, who cannot bear children, even a threefold increase in maternity capital, the introduction of additional childbearing benefits will not correct the situation in the sphere of the demographic security of the Russian state.
In the information sphere, the Russian state should take as a basis the propaganda policy of a strong and large family, the spread of the cult of fatherhood and motherhood, and an increase in respect for child men and women. Special TV shows, Internet sites, print media affirming family values should be created. Moreover, the activities of these projects should be adequate and in demand in modern conditions, which will require additional involvement of specialists in the field of psychology, television and radio broadcasting, journalists, cultural and art workers. Accordingly, the educational institutions should also implement a policy aimed at the approval of family values and the correct models of sexual and marital behavior. Mechanisms can be developed to support young mothers in the field of vocational or supplementary education for them on favorable terms. The Russian state must understand that there will be no state without people, without children - there will be no future. It is the people who are the main value of Russia and the Russian authorities should take care of their decent existence and reproduction.
Causes of the demographic decline
A strong demographic decline was observed in Russia throughout almost the entire twentieth century and was associated not only with changes in the socio-economic and socio-cultural foundations of the Russian state, but also with the fact that during the years of wars, revolutions, collectivization and industrialization, political repression the Russian state lost 140 -150 million people. Accordingly, since a significant part of the dead and the dead were people of both sexes of childbearing age, as well as children and adolescents, the number of potential newborns who could have been born to victims of global cataclysms decreased by tens of millions of people. stories.
However, no less significant role in the demographic crisis in Russia was also played by the decrease in the number of children of the average Russian woman. According to A. Vishnevsky - one of the largest domestic specialists in demography, for the period from 1925 to 2000. the birth rate declined, on average, for a woman's 5,59 per woman (A. Vishnevsky, Demography of the Stalin era). Moreover, the most active decline in birth rates occurred in the period from 1925 to 1955. - that is, for periods of industrialization and collectivization, World War II, the post-war restoration of Soviet infrastructure. The population of modern Russia is annually decreasing by about 700 thousand people, which makes it possible to speak of the country as gradually dying out (yes, that’s not embarrassed by these words, President Vladimir Putin himself described it back in the 2000 year, and later 6 in the 2006 year - he said that the population of Russia by the end of the XXI century may be halved, if not taken drastic measures to improve the demographic situation in the country).
Very often in everyday judgments about the causes of declining birth rates there is an explanation of low birth rates by social conditions, first of all, insufficient material well-being of the population, lack of high-paying work for parents, separate and large housing, and infrastructure of kindergartens and schools. However, when compared with third world countries or the same pre-revolutionary Russia, such arguments do not stand up to scrutiny. We see the conditions in which the majority of the Central Asian population lives, not to mention the Africans or the inhabitants of South Asia. However, overcrowding, poverty (and sometimes outright poverty), the lack of social prospects do not prevent people from having children, and in quantities of “from five and above”.
In fact, the causes of declining birth rates in Russia in the twentieth century lie more in the ideological plane. Their main stimulus is the devaluation of traditional values and the destruction of the way of life of the Russian and other peoples of the country during the revolution and, especially, the post-revolutionary Stalinist transformations. It is impossible not to pay tribute to the Stalin era as a period of maximum development of industry, defense, security of the Soviet state, the spread of universal literacy of the population, the availability of medical care (albeit not highly qualified, but still significant).
However, for a rapid breakthrough in the economy of the USSR, mobilization of the largest possible number of citizens, the involvement of virtually the entire working population of the country, including both men and women, was required. According to A. Vishnevsky, "the very methods by which the Stalinist leadership of the USSR achieved - and achieved - a" great breakthrough "in the life of the people were such that they recklessly destroyed the whole system of traditional values, including family values" (A. Vishnevsky in the Stalin era).
Despite the fact that Stalin and his entourage negatively assessed the activities of the “leftist” wing of the Bolshevik Party, insisting in the first post-revolutionary years of the complete destruction of the institution of the family, which promoted the sexual freedom of men and women, the freedom of abortions, in fact the “left communists” had a lot borrowed. And, first of all, a specific model of the organization of family relations. It can be called proletarian, since it was from the proletariat as a class of wage workers, mainly living in cities and employed in factory production, that such family organization became possible. In the farmer, the number of children did not matter much; moreover, having many children was in favor, since children are future hands, where you can feed two, always feed three, and so on. The peasants also had the possibility of placing numerous offspring in their hut, in the case of growing children - in the hut, built nearby, in the annex.
In contrast, the urban proletarians, huddled in the rooms and apartments of apartment buildings, could not afford numerous offspring. And because of the lack of places for accommodation, and because of the different nature of labor activity, the proletarian worked for wages and the child became just another feeder, reducing the well-being of the family without any return (when he grew up, he did not work in his father’s household, like a peasant son, but he went on his own "bread", that is, did not bring direct material returns to the parental family). Moreover, in urban proletarian families, women, as a rule, went to work. Women-workers, who found themselves in a situation of independent choice of labor activity, place of residence, had a completely different model of sexual behavior. First, they depended to a much lesser extent on the opinions of those around them than the peasant women. Secondly, being self-employed workers, they could afford the behavior that they considered necessary. Naturally, for them, having many children was an obvious obstacle - after all, it directly interfered with factory work.
The concept of "new woman" and fertility
The ideology of the family policy of Soviet Russia was shaped by the concepts of the “new woman”, which began to take shape in the 19th century in the works of both domestic and foreign writers and revolutionary-democratic philosophers. In Russia, the “new woman” was written primarily by N.G. Chernyshevsky. In the West, the idea of women's emancipation was much more developed. The ideology of feminism has been formed, which currently includes many branches - liberal, socialist, radical, lesbian, and even “black” feminism. The consequences of the spread of feminism in the countries of Western Europe are not to be recalled, this situation is rather pitiable for European societies and is the cause of significant contradictions between various groups of the European population.
In Russia, feminist ideas, including the concept of creating a “new woman,” found grateful supporters among representatives of revolutionary parties and movements, first of all - the Social Democrats. The Socialist-Revolutionaries - the “populists” were, nevertheless, to a greater degree, they were soil scientists, although similar theoretical constructs were spread among them. In the revolutionary years, Alexandra Kollontai became the main theorist of the “new woman” concept. This amazing woman - a politician, a diplomat, a revolutionary - managed not only to form his own concept of family-sex relations in a socialist society, but also with his own biography to largely demonstrate what the image of the “new woman” represents. According to Kollontai, the traditional image of women from time immemorial was associated with humility, a focus on a prosperous marriage, lack of initiative in building your own life and life independence. A traditional woman is such a specific addition to a man, his companion and comrade, deprived of, in fact, her own “I” and, often, self-esteem. In contrast to the traditional image of a woman, Kollontai put forward the concept of a “new woman” - self-sufficient, active politically and socially, treating a man as equal and really equal to him in building her own independent life.
The image of the “new woman” is, first of all, the image of a woman unmarried. Let's add - and, as follows from the disclosure of this image, childless - because having a child, especially two or three, not to mention five, deprives a woman of her independence in the understanding of Alexandra Kollontai. She calls the three main principles of building new love-marriage relations: equality in mutual relations, mutual recognition of the rights of the other without a claim to full control of the heart and soul of a partner, comradely sensitivity to her love partner (Kollontai A. Dear a winged erost. 1923. ).
Already in the middle of 1920's. Kollontai's works were officially criticized in the Soviet Union. Gradually, it was forgotten and its concept - they chose to keep silent about it. Moreover, with the strengthening of Soviet statehood, the country's leadership had no options other than a partial return to traditional values. In the official press, literature, and cinema of the Stalin era, a type of Soviet woman was promoted who managed to combine the features of Kollontai's “new woman” in terms of party and social activity, labor feats, and the traditional family behavior of the mother and wife. However, it is not difficult to guess that the ideology of the Soviet state differed from the actual practice of organizing family and demographic policy. Motherhood was formally promoted, divorce was assessed negatively, in 1936, the Soviet government banned abortion, but in fact the social policy of the Soviet state was not aimed at actually strengthening the demographic foundations of the country.
The decline in the birth rate in the Stalin era shows that the measures taken to ban abortions did not give the desired result. Firstly, in the Soviet Union, women in the bulk were employed. Those who received higher and secondary vocational education, after graduation, were sent to work on distributions - often to completely different regions of the country. Their chances of a quick marriage decreased. And the system of state propaganda itself, to a large extent, did not focus women (like men) on family values.
Although the Soviet state needed numerous workers' hands, soldiers and officers, new engineers and scientists, and really took tremendous steps in this direction (just look at the number of educational institutions of all levels that appeared in the Stalin era, the number of children "from the people", received high-quality professional education and achieved heights in various fields of scientific, military, industrial, cultural activities), something turned out to be irretrievably lost. And this “something” was the very meaning of childbearing and creating a strong full-fledged family. The family was deprived of its economic, economic, social content, although it was proclaimed a “cell of society”. It was possible to raise children in kindergarten, change their husbands or wives periodically (if they didn’t arrange any nuances of living together, or simply “tired”), there was practically no economic significance for a man and a woman living together in a city apartment.
After the departure of Stalin and the "de-Stalinization" of the Soviet Union, even those measures to preserve the birth rate that Stalin tried to introduce by banning abortions were canceled. Despite the fact that after the war there was even a certain increase in population, it was not possible to reach the birth rate that would allow to increase the population of the Soviet state many times over time. What happened in the post-Soviet period should not be reminded. In 1990, economic factors also played a role, and, to an even greater degree, the final destruction of traditional values and their replacement by a westernized surrogate. Moreover, if in the Soviet model of family-sex policy, women at least oriented themselves, if not to family life, then to creative activity “for the good of the homeland and the party”, then in the post-Soviet period the values of personal material well-being were finally eclipsed by all other life orientations.
As motherhood and marriage ceased to be regarded as real values by the majority of Russian youth, a global “lack of children” was formed.
Although many sociological surveys of young Russians show that the family for Russian youth remains the most important life value (or, at least, second in importance), the discrepancy between what is desired (what Russians answer to sociologists) and real is obvious. The latter is not encouraging - the level of divorces is extremely high in the country - 50% of marriages are falling apart, which keeps Russia among the world leaders in the number of divorces. As for childbearing, only in the 2000-s, after the introduction of real material incentives, citizens began to give birth to more children (however, some skeptics explain the relative increase in the birth rate in the country in the 2000-ies by the fact that the generation of the “demographic boom” entered the child-bearing age "1980-ies, and the socio-economic conditions of life in the country relatively stabilized).
The introduction of so-called payments played an important role here. “Maternity capital”, which is paid at the birth of the second child and attaining the age of three years. The decision to start paying maternity capital was made in 2006, while, in order to prevent representatives of marginal groups from using it for mercenary purposes, it was decided not to issue it in cash, but to issue a special certificate allowing it to purchase housing for a certain amount. , close a mortgage loan, pay for the child’s education.
Currently, the maternity capital is about 430 thousand rubles. The sum is rather big - in some regions of Russia you can buy your own housing for it, or at least really improve your living conditions. Discusses the conditions and the emergence of other possibilities of spending the funds of the parent capital in the interests of the family and children. However, only material motivation can not increase fertility. Especially, if we take into account the fact that to obtain maternity capital, it is still required to have a first child. Therefore, some sociologists evaluate the very idea of material incentives for fertility very skeptically, referring to the fact that only representatives of marginalized population groups or migrant diasporas will give birth in order to receive assistance from the state in the amount of 430 thousand rubles. That is, even in this case, the problem of the demographic security of the Russian state will not be solved.
Abortion threatens demographics
Another problem in Russia in the field of fertility is abortion. Officially, abortions were resolved in Soviet Russia immediately after the October Revolution. In the 1920 year, the RSFSR allowed termination of pregnancy not only for medical reasons, becoming the first country in the world to legalize abortion. In 1936, abortions were banned and re-legalized only in 1955, following the “de-Stalinization” policy. Between 1990 and 2008 in post-Soviet Russia, according to official data, 41 million 795 thousands of abortions were produced. This number covers the real needs of the Russian state in the workforce (about 20 million people in the specified period), which allows many public and political figures to consider abortion as a direct threat to the demographic security of the Russian state.
About half of the country's population today speaks against abortions in Russia. Opinion polls show a gradual reduction in the number of supporters of abortion - from 57% of respondents in 2007 to 48% in 2010 (Levada Center. On the reproductive behavior of Russians). The views of opponents of abortion are expressed, as a rule, by nationalist political movements and religious organizations. Among them are both absolute opponents of any abortions, including even medical abortions, and moderate opponents of abortions, recognizing the possibility of their performing in justified cases (medical indicators, rape, social disorder, etc.).
First of all, Russian public figures and traditionalist philosophers oppose the practice of abortion. For them, abortions are not only a threat to the national security of the Russian state, one of the reasons for reducing the potential population of the Russian Federation, but also a challenge to religious values, traditional ideological orientations, which are inherent in almost all nations of the world, but collapse in the process of de-traditionalization of modern society, learning individualistic and consumer values of modern western capitalism. After all, the childe fries ideology - voluntary childlessness, erected in the valor of modern “creacles” and aimed at imitating by dim-minded consumers, is a purposeful imposition of anti-Russian fundamentally principles of not giving birth to children, creating a full-fledged family in the name of “own realization”, which often just a possibility of everyday and carefree "hanging out", shopping, and even just idleness, drunkenness and drug addiction.
The decline in fertility is one of the goals of the numerous associations of “family planning” that originally arose in Western European countries on the initiative of feminist movements and are sponsored by the international financial community interested in reducing the population — primarily in developed countries, since here a large population means growth of social responsibility and economic burdens on capitalists. Therefore, it is more expedient to “reduce” the number of indigenous people while simultaneously importing foreign migrants from backward third world countries who will be ready to do hard work without social guarantees and any requirements for improving their situation (now the experience of modern Europe shows that this is far from not so many migrants do not work at the new place of residence, but they even require social guarantees and all sorts of privileges, but it’s no longer possible to change the situation. possible for most western states).
Philosopher Oleg Fomin-Shakhov, one of the most convinced opponents of abortion in modern Russia, stresses that “the problem of abortion in today's Russia is primarily a problem of demographic security. At the International Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo 5 – 13 in September 1994, an action program was adopted, which essentially represented voluntary-compulsory sanctions for self-abridgement for Russia. The program stated that for sustainable regional and global socio-economic development it is necessary to take measures to reduce the birth rate, primarily through the development of family planning services (contraception, sterilization, abortion “in adequate conditions”) ”(O. Fomin-Shakhov. Russia without abortion. The newspaper “Tomorrow.” The electronic version of 5 June 2014 g.).
At the same time, Oleg Fomin-Shakhov proposes to take advantage of the American experience of the prolifer movement, that is, opponents of abortion and supporters of preserving human life in the womb. In the opinion of Oleg Fomin-Shakhov, the American proliferators for the first time transferred the subject of abortion to the plane of social problems, whereas before them abortion was regarded as a person’s personal sin or a crime against the laws of the state. The question was also raised about the essence of abortion as a tool of biopolitics for regulating the population of individual states. As for Russia, it is obvious that its vast territories and natural resources have long been the envy of a number of neighboring states. Throughout history, the Russian state has been faced with hordes of foreign conquerors, but today more far-sighted theorists and practitioners of the world financial oligarchy can afford to use such technologies as biopolitics, that is, regulation of childbearing in Russia, mortality rates, including propaganda mechanisms - propaganda of abortion, “free” lifestyle, all kinds of social deviations, criminal subculture, etc.
Another well-known philosopher Alexander Dugin in his article “Childbearing as a Philosophical Problem” links the lack of desire for childbearing to the destruction of traditional values of Russian society, the rejection of religious values and the assimilation of alien individualistic models aimed at the exclusive “self-worth” of man. Within the framework of this axiological model, childbearing becomes an obstacle to the “free”, but in reality - to the aimless and characterized only by consumerism - human life. “The system of dirty monstrous lies, undisguised Russophobia, aimed at the destruction of our cultural and physical code, leaves no desire to create an honest, cultural, Orthodox Russian family and raise a large number of wonderful Russian children. And it is far from obvious whether it will become an argument for young people that if it does not bear children, there will be no Russia, ”writes Dugin (A. Dugin. Childbearing as a philosophical problem).
Should abortion be banned in modern Russia? Of course, the total ban on abortion is hardly possible to go in modern conditions. And this step will not be really justified and understood by the population. However, strict control over the practice of abortion should be introduced - and this is one of the necessary measures in the direction of ensuring the demographic policy of the Russian state. First of all, all cases of abortion by Russian women should be strictly controlled, taking into account the reasons for their abortion. Thus, for medical reasons, in the interest of preserving the life of a woman, after rape (the criminal background of abortion) abortions should be allowed. Abortion should also be left to families who already have several children or have reasonable material difficulties.
However, the majority of abortions performed by young women, childless, middle-income or high-income, without visible health problems, should be prohibited. Note - there is no attempt on the personal freedom of women. It is enough to use contraception, not to have a promiscuous sex life, that is, to look after yourself and adhere to at least elementary moral and ethical principles - and the need to periodically run to an abortion will disappear by itself. After all, in most countries of the world - in almost all Latin American countries, countries in Africa, the Islamic East, in some Catholic countries of Europe, abortions are prohibited and these countries exist as it is, many are quite good. Are there prospects?
The practice of material incentives for the birth rate, to which Russia passed during the years of V.V. Putin's represents a great significance for the development of fertility in the country. However, economic advances alone cannot inspire people to create families and give offspring - especially in modern society with its temptations and informational pressures of appropriate propaganda. A whole range of activities is needed - in the social, economic, cultural, educational and healthcare spheres, creating the prerequisites for the truly full-fledged education of young Russians and for their very birth. This includes paying decent childcare benefits, the possibility of introducing a “mother's salary” for women with many children who have decided to fully devote themselves to childcare, and help children's families to improve their living conditions (increase in living space depending on the growth in the number of children in the family) , and the provision of additional means of transport, household appliances for large families. All these activities should be carried out at the federal level and under the strict control of the relevant authorities.
In any case, without delving into specifics, it should be noted that the Russian state can find opportunities to organize such events in the direction of ensuring the country's demographic security. It will not be embarrassing to attract public organizations that have long been, at their own peril and risk, at their own expense, working among the country's population, promoting the values of family and childbirth, preventing the spread of Western values alien to Russian society. On the other hand, it is possible to use foreign experience, including inviting proven foreign experts for consultations in the direction of improving the demographic policy of the Russian state.
But the main focus of the state should be on outreach policies. While in the media, in cinema, consumer values are advertised, the model of the behavior of a “socialite” - a prostitute who has no children — is depicted as desirable for a woman - Russian men are shown to be unsuccessful, who cannot bear children, even a threefold increase in maternity capital, the introduction of additional childbearing benefits will not correct the situation in the sphere of the demographic security of the Russian state.
In the information sphere, the Russian state should take as a basis the propaganda policy of a strong and large family, the spread of the cult of fatherhood and motherhood, and an increase in respect for child men and women. Special TV shows, Internet sites, print media affirming family values should be created. Moreover, the activities of these projects should be adequate and in demand in modern conditions, which will require additional involvement of specialists in the field of psychology, television and radio broadcasting, journalists, cultural and art workers. Accordingly, the educational institutions should also implement a policy aimed at the approval of family values and the correct models of sexual and marital behavior. Mechanisms can be developed to support young mothers in the field of vocational or supplementary education for them on favorable terms. The Russian state must understand that there will be no state without people, without children - there will be no future. It is the people who are the main value of Russia and the Russian authorities should take care of their decent existence and reproduction.
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