America vs England. Part of 10. Fight Leviathans
Austrian Federal Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg
Currently, when the border between England and America is practically leveled out (51 state: Britain can become completely dependent on the United States // http://russian.rt.com/article/36632#ixzz35C4OBvAB), and modern Anglo-Saxons of New and The Old World is almost universally perceived by Siamese twins, few people remember their past antagonism. “Hatred and deep enmity, fierce, bloody wars - such was the situation in which relations between England and the United States first developed” (Avarin V.Y. Fight for the Pacific Ocean // http://flot.com/publications/books/ shelf / avarin / 3.htm). The United States achieved its independence as a result of two fierce fratricidal civil wars with Great Britain, and during the “forgotten war of 1812 of the year” British troops took and burned Washington, along with the White House and the Capitol.
After the defeat of Napoleon, "the British did not have any rivals capable of confronting them on a global scale." However, already in 1823, the dominance of England, first on the American continent, and then around the world, was challenged by the United States, which proclaimed rapidly transforming “from the regional principle of domination” into the instrument of establishing world domination of the Monroe Doctrine. In particular, on January 22, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson, declaring that "the Monroe Doctrine is a universal principle for the whole world and humanity, ... thereby proclaimed the US claims to establish world hegemony. ... Under the banner of this doctrine, the United States has taken three historical attempts to establish world hegemony. The first - after the end of the First World War, the second - after the end of the Second World War, and the third - now, after the end of the Cold War. True, the United States failed to achieve world domination after the First World War ”(Panarin I. Information War and Geopolitics // http://www.e-reading.ws/chapter.php/123890/18/Panarin_-_Informacionnaya_voiina_i_geopolitika.html).
After the end of the Great War, “the British Empire in the Mediterranean was threatened by Italy, in Asia by Japan, and the United States around the world” (May E.R. Strange Victory / Translated from English. - M.: AST; AST MOSCOW, 2009. - C. 49). "The severity of the contradictions between the two powers reached such a level that by the end of the 20-s the world actively discussed the possibility of an Anglo-American war" (Zolov A.V. USA: the struggle for world leadership (Towards the history of American foreign policy. XX century): Educational allowance: In 2 hours - Part 1 - Kaliningrad, 2000. - S. 20). A new round of confrontation between England and America was connected with the efforts of America through Nazi Germany to impose England on the overthrow of the political Olympus, the Anglo-Italo-German Union and England in order to maintain the existing status quo impose the Anglo-Franco-Italian-German alliance on Germany.
“During the first months of 1937, Hitler sent influential emissaries to Rome to treat Mussolini. Germany was somewhat embarrassed by Italy's flirtation with England. On January 2, Ciano signed a "gentlemen's agreement" with the British government, in which both sides recognized each other's vital interests in the Mediterranean. Germany was aware that the question of Austria remained very delicate for Rome. On January 15, Goering met with the Duce and told him bluntly about the inevitability of the Anschluss in Austria. According to German translator Paul Schmidt, the easily excitable Italian dictator shook his head violently. Ambassador von Hassel reported to Berlin that Goering's statement about Austria “was greeted coolly” (W. Shearer. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich // http://www.litmir.net/br/?b=39596&p=150).
At the beginning of 1937, W. Churchill, who was at that time "only an ordinary member of parliament, but to a certain extent a prominent person" met with the German ambassador to England von Ribbentrop. According to him, the essence of von Ribbentrop's speeches “boiled down to the fact that Germany wants friendship with England. He told me that he had been offered the post of German Foreign Minister, but that he had asked Hitler to let him go to London in order to achieve an Anglo-German alliance. Germany would protect all the greatness of the British Empire. The Germans, perhaps, will ask to return the German colonies to them, but this, of course, is not a cardinal question. It was more important that England should give Germany a free hand in eastern Europe. Germany needs a lebensraum, or living space, for its growing population. Therefore, she is forced to swallow Poland and the Danzig corridor. As for Belarus and Ukraine, these territories are absolutely necessary to ensure the future existence of the German Reich, numbering over 70 million souls. One cannot agree to less. Thus, the only thing the Germans asked from the British Commonwealth and Empire was not to interfere. ...
After hearing all this, W. Churchill “immediately expressed confidence that the British government would not agree to give Germany a free hand in Eastern Europe. Although we - according to W. Churchill - really were on bad relations with Soviet Russia and hated communism no less than Hitler hated it, Ribbentrop should know for sure that even if France were completely safe, Great Britain would never would lose interest in the fate of the continent enough to allow Germany to establish its dominance over Central and Eastern Europe. We were standing in front of the map when I said this. Ribbentrop turned sharply away from the map and then said: “In that case, war is inevitable. There is no other way out. The Fuehrer decided on this. Nothing will stop him and nothing will stop us "(W. Churchill. The Second World War. - Moscow: Military Publishing, 1991 // http://militera.lib.ru/memo/english/churchill/1_12.html).
Despite such a seemingly unsatisfactory start to the year for Germany, soon after this conversation, the situation changed dramatically. According to M.I. Meltyukhova "since February 1937, it was about the creation of a united German-Polish-Hungarian anti-Czechoslovak front" (Meltyukhov MI Soviet-Polish wars. Military-political confrontation 1918-1939. - M .: Veche, 2001 // http: //militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov2/02.html). And in March 1937, Ernst Hanfstaengl (Putzi), who did “so much for the Reich”, “left for America in secret, allegedly having come into conflict with Hitler’s entourage and feeling a threat to his life. “During World War II, Hanfstaengl will work ... as an adviser to President Roosevelt! ... It is no longer necessary to help, guide and prompt: the war, for which Hitler was sought, for which Hanfstaengl worked, is not far off. Or maybe the "contract" just ended? This is a dark story, like the entire rise of Hitler to power "(Starikov N. Who made Hitler attack Stalin? Hitler's fatal mistake. - Spb .: Leader, 2010. - pp. 86-87).
“At the end of April 1937 was appointed Henderson, one of the most active supporters of the agreement with Germany, by the British ambassador in Berlin. His appointment was a testament to the stubborn aspiration of the British government to deal with Hitler. This is confirmed by A. Eden in his memoirs ”(The History of USSR Foreign Policy. In 2, Vol. 1 Volume. - M .: Nauka, 1976. - C. 339). In May, 1937, Stanley Baldwin resigned as British Prime Minister and Neville Chamberlain took his place. The Germans were pleased with the message that the new prime minister would be more active in foreign policy than his predecessor, and that he intends to achieve, if possible, mutual understanding with Germany, and the Minister of War Nazi Germany Blomberg “ordered the preparation of a military invasion plan for Austria - Plan "Otto" (May E.R. Decree. Op. - C. 47).
Following Britain, it again intensified its anti-Soviet activities, which, having “well-known interests directly in Russia, for example in Ukraine,” abandoned its “former foreign policy line of balance between East and West in favor of a clear offensive against the East.” “This was reflected, in particular, in the ... plans to create a block of countries headed by Poland, located between the Baltic and Black Seas. They meant to turn the countries of this bloc into allies of Germany for the war against the Soviet Union. At the same time, this bloc would have made it impossible for the Soviet Union to render assistance to Czechoslovakia and France in the event of an attack on them by Germany.
The Polish envoy in Bucharest, A. Artsishevsky, argued to the Romanian king that Hitler Germany was stronger than the Soviet Union and that in the event of war, Poland would enter a bloc consisting of Germany, Italy, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Austria and Bulgaria; Poland would welcome Romania to join this bloc, and with it Yugoslavia and Greece. In July, 1937, the heads of the general staffs of Poland and Romania concluded an agreement according to which, in the event of war with the USSR, Poland pledged to deploy 350 to thousands of soldiers and Romania — to 250 thousand soldiers.
It was decided that if the newly acquired territory was in their hands, then it would be divided between them: the region south of the line Vinnitsa - Kiev - r. Desna, including Odessa, will go to Romania, and to the north of this line, including Leningrad, to Poland ”(V.Ya. Sipols, Diplomatic Struggle on the Eve of World War II. - M .: International Relations, 1979 // http: // militera.lib.ru/research/sipols1/03.html). “On August 31, 1937, the Polish General Staff issued directive No. 2304/2/32, which states that the ultimate goal of Polish policy is the destruction of all Russia, and incitement of separatism in the Caucasus, Ukraine and Central Asia is named as one of the real instruments for achieving it. using, in particular, the capabilities of military intelligence "(Secrets of Polish politics. 1935-1945. Declassified documents of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation. - M .: RIPOL classic, 2010. - P. 5).
“On June 24, 1937, the Minister of War of Germany V. Blomberg approved a directive to prepare an invasion of Austria under the code name“ Otto's plan ”(V.Ya. Sipols, ibid.). “Experiencing resistance from France and England in all his aspirations - in Ethiopia, Spain and the Mediterranean Sea, Mussolini accepted Hitler's invitation to visit Germany. September 25, 1937 ... Mussolini crossed the Alps and arrived in the Third Reich. ... He returned to Rome, convinced that in the future his place was next to Hitler. Unsurprisingly, a month later, when Ribbentrop traveled to Rome to obtain Mussolini's signature on the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Duce informed him during a November 6 reception that Italy had lost interest in Austrian independence. “Let events (in Austria) develop as they should,” Mussolini said. This was the signal for action that Hitler was waiting for ”(W. Shearer, ibid.).
“In June 1937, Edward and Wallis got married in France, and in October they were invited to Germany to go on a long tour of the Reich; Duke and Duchess everywhere waited for the enthusiastic welcome and greetings of “Heil!”, to which Edward responded with a Nazi salute. 12 October 1937, the day after arriving in Germany, Edward, in the house of Robert Leigh, head of the Nazi labor front, was introduced to Himmler, Goebbels and Hess - for this meeting British intelligence had been preparing the prince for two and a half previous years ”(Preparata GD Hitler, Inc. How Britain and the United States created the Third Reich // http://litrus.net/book/read/103531?p=82).
At a meeting of political and military leaders of Germany on November 5, 1937, on the development of German foreign policy, A. Hitler declared the need for the Czech and Austrian issue through Germany's invasion of these countries. At the same time, he showed confidence in England's ensuring France's non-intervention in the Eastern conflict. The terms of the Anglo-German alliance were “clearly set out in a secret memorandum dated November 10, drawn up by Baron von Weizsacker, then Secretary of State for the German Foreign Office.
“From Britain we need colonies and freedom of action in the East. ... Britain needs peace of mind. It would be appropriate to know what she is willing to pay for this peace of mind ”(W. Shearer, op. // http://www.litmir.net/br/?b=39596&p=151). On November 15, 1937, on the eve of his visit to Berlin, Lord Halifax, in a conversation with the German Ambassador to Great Britain I. Ribbentrop, announced the ultimate goal of his visit - reaching an agreement between England, Germany, France and Italy for the sake of ensuring peace in Western Europe at the expense of Eastern Europe.
At a meeting between Lord Chairman of the Council of Great Britain E. Halifax and A. Hitler, the question of rapprochement between England and Germany and the conclusion of an Anglo-German-Franco-Italian agreement was discussed. While negotiating with Germany as a great and sovereign power, E. Halifax expressed his conviction of the need to correct the mistakes of the "Versailles dictate", proposing that A. Hitler "through peaceful evolution" resolve the issues of Danzig, Austria and Czechoslovakia and making the issue of colonies dependent on support Germany "a new course and a general solution to all difficulties."
Referring to good relations with Poland, A. Hitler considered it possible to peacefully settle the German-Polish and German-Austrian issues and "expressed the hope that a reasonable solution could be found in Czechoslovakia as well." France's agreement with the gradual expansion of Germany in Austria and Czechoslovakia peacefully and depending on the "general settlement" is stated in a letter from the German ambassador to Austria von F. Pappen to the head of the political department of the German Foreign Ministry E. Weizsäcker on December 4, 1937.
A. Hitler was somewhat alarmed by the restoration of relations with England. According to him, he had two options: either to fully implement his plans, or to crash. "I will implement them - and I will go down in history as one of its greatest creators, I will pat the collapse - and I will be condemned, hated and damned" (A. Speer. Memories. - Smolensk: Rusich; Moscow: Progress, 1997 // http: / /militera.lib.ru/memo/german/speer_a/text.html#02). The British were satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations. According to V.Ya. Sipolsa "Halifax came to Germany in awe of the Nazi leaders, and above all because they were all" mortal enemies of communism. " On November 24, he made a report on his voyage at a meeting of the British government. Having listened to him, N. Chamberlain noted that the purpose of the trip was to clarify the position of the Germans on the issue of the possibility of reaching an Anglo-German agreement, and expressed deep satisfaction with the results of the visit ”(Sipols V.Ya. Ibid).
“Chamberlain wrote in his diary:“ The visit (of Halifax) to Germany, in my opinion, was successful because it achieved its goal - an atmosphere was created in which it is quite possible to discuss practical issues of pacification in Europe with Germany ”(Shearer W. Tam same). E. Halifax himself "in a written report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ... reported:" The German Chancellor and others give the impression of people who will not embark on adventures with the use of force and will not start a war. " According to Charles S. Tanzill, Halifax told Chamberlain that Hitler “does not intend to act in the near future, partly because of the disadvantageousness of such actions, partly because he is busy with internal German affairs ... Goering assured him that not a single drop of German blood will not be shed in Europe if Germany is not forced to do so. It seemed to him (Halifax) that the Germans intended to achieve their goals peacefully ”(Shearer W. Ibid.).
After this conversation between E. Halifax and A. Hitler, the British government turned a blind eye to A. Hitler's steps towards the annexation of Austria to Germany and began to put pressure on France and Czechoslovakia in order to renounce their obligations to the Soviet Union in order to fulfill the demands of A. Hitler concerning the annexation of the Sudetenland to Germany.
For greater assistance in concluding an Anglo-German agreement for the assistance of W. Bullitt FD Roosevelt sent to Europe J. Kennedy, the father of the future President of the United States, John Kennedy. “9 December 1937 was officially announced the appointment of Kennedy as ambassador to London. ... From the very beginning, Kennedy made it clear that, in contrast to other ambassadors who received his post as a reward for political merit and used it only to strengthen his position in society, he intends to participate in shaping American foreign policy.
In London, Kennedy soon became very popular, his relaxed, typically American demeanor contributed to the fact that he soon tied up a large circle of acquaintances, became a regular guest in Cliveden, in the Astor family estate. It was from Astorov that Kennedy became closely acquainted with N. Chamberlain, S. Choir, D. Simon, and gray cardinal H. Wilson. Kennedy and Chamberlain immediately established trusting, friendly relations, the basis for which was the identity of their political views.
Already at the very beginning of Kennedy’s diplomatic career, it became clear that the two goals that he set for himself — a career and a desire to pacify Germany — were completely compatible and feasible. Kennedy assumed the role of superpower on the European continent, which has the right to make decisions independently. In London, Kennedy did not part with the idea of visiting Berlin and meeting in person with Hitler, on the basis of which the German Foreign Ministry concluded that the Americans wanted to establish stronger ties with Germany. The German ambassador to London, Herbert von Dirksen, reported to Berlin that Kennedy sympathized with Germany. Kennedy was a supporter of the Munich Agreement.
Everything happened exactly as he predicted six months ago, having just arrived in England. In one of his personal confidential messages he wrote: Germany will get everything she wants in Czechoslovakia - and she will not have to send her soldiers to do this. Famous Soviet diplomat and historian I.M. Maisky points out: When now, many years later, you read Kennedy's reports to Washington, published in official documents of the United States, you can see to what extent he was inspired by Chamberlain’s spirit on Munich days ”(Mokhovikova GV American diplomats in Europe on the eve of World War II) Wars. NEWS OF THE NOVGOROD STATE UNIVERSITY 1998. No. 9 // http://admin.novsu.ac.ru/uni/vestnik.nsf/All/FEF11D3250EBFEA9C3256727002E7B99).
Poland, of course, did not remain aloof from what was happening. "Beck and company had nothing against the Anschluss, but at the same time they decided to hit the jackpot themselves and annex Lithuania." “On January 13, 1938, J. Beck told German Foreign Minister von Neurath that he considered the destruction of Bolshevism“ the main goal of his policy ”(Sipols V.Ya. Ibid.), And on January 14, 1938, during a visit to Berlin,“ agreed with plans to eliminate Czechoslovakia "(Meltyukhov MI September 17, 1939. Soviet-Polish conflicts 1918-1939. - M .: Veche, 2009. - P. 190). On February 23, 1938, Beck, in negotiations with Goering, reiterated Poland's readiness to reckon with German interests in Austria and emphasized Poland's interest in the Czech problem. In February 1938, at the initiative of Chamberlain, Italy and Britain began negotiations to conclude an agreement as a payoff for the recognition of Italy and the Anschluss by Germany and Austria.
On February 4, 1938, on the eve of the Anschluss, significant changes took place in the leadership of Nazi Germany. "AND. Hitler appointed I. Ribbentrop Minister of Foreign Affairs instead of K. von Neurath. On the same day, A. Hitler dismissed the Minister of War, Field Marshal V. von Blomberg, and abolished the post of Minister of War. Commander in chief of the Wehrmacht instead of gene. V. von Fritsch was appointed regiment general. Von Brauchitsch, Chief of the General Staff - General. V. Keitel. A. Hitler himself became the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ”(Anschluss of Austria 1938 // http://www.hrono.ru/sobyt/1938avst.html). Franz von Papen did his job and was dismissed from his post as German ambassador to Austria.
On February 7, Hitler signed a protocol establishing German control over the foreign policy of Austria and invited Austrian Chancellor K. Schuschnigg to his residence in Berchtesgaden. On February 12, at the "negotiations", Hitler presented K. Schuschnigg with demands for the release of the Austrian Nazis from prison. the appointment of their leader A. Zeiss-Inquart as the Minister of Internal Affairs, the head of the police and security service; and the inclusion of the Austrian NSDAP in the government coalition "Fatherland Front". Despite the threat of military intervention, K. Schuschnigg achieved a three-day delay and left for Vienna without signing an agreement.
On February 14, 1938, A. Hitler warned the Polish government about reunification with Austria and in response to the agreement of the K. Schuschnigg government on February 16 with the terms of the ultimatum, on February 20, he declared in the Reichstag that “Germany cannot remain indifferent to the fate of 10 million Germans, who live in two neighboring countries [Austria and Czechoslovakia] ”and that“ the German government will seek the unification of the entire German people ”. On the same day, in protest against the foreign policy of the N. Chamberlain government, British Foreign Secretary A. Eden and his deputy, Lord Crenborn, resigned from their posts.
In the next two days, Finance Minister D. Simon and Prime Minister N. Chamberlain alternately stated that Great Britain had never given special guarantees of Austria's independence and that it could not count on the protection of the League of Nations: “We must not cheat, let alone to reassure small weak states by promising them protection from the League of Nations and appropriate steps from our side, because we know that nothing like this can be done. " On February 24, Chancellor K. Schuschnigg announced the German demands for an Anschluss in Austria, and on February 25, Lord E. Halifax was appointed British Foreign Secretary.
On March 3, British Ambassador Henderson proposed that Hitler settle Germany's colonial claims and assured him that Britain would not obstruct Austria's Anschluss. “Trying to seize the initiative, on March 9, Schuschnigg announced on the next Sunday, March 13, 1938, a plebiscite on the question of Austrian independence. The only question on it should have been: do the people want to have a "free and German, independent and social, Christian and their own Austria", and the forms - contain only a circle "yes" (Anschluss // http://ru.wikipedia.org) ... On March 10, after E. Halifax confirmed to I. Ribbentrop the guarantees of non-intervention of Great Britain and France, A. Hitler, who was "afraid of rejection of the idea of unification at the plebiscite," issued an order to start the implementation of the Otto plan. On March 12, 1938, German troops entered Austria, “and a day later Austria was included in the German Reich” (History of USSR Foreign Policy. Decree. Op. - p. 341).
On the evening of March 11, Hitler, having received a message that B. Mussolini had no objections to the Austrian Anschluss, exclaimed joyfully: "Tell the Duce that I am truly, sincerely grateful to him and will never, never forget this!" On March 16, B. Mussolini said that he had never promised to support the independence of Austria "either directly or indirectly, not in writing or orally" and recognized the annexation of Austria by Germany. England recognized the Anschluss of Austria as Germany on April 2, America - 6 (Anschluss of Austria 1938 Ibid).
Convinced of Italy's non-interference in Austro-German affairs, Britain fulfilled its promise and "on April 16, 1938, Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano and British Ambassador Sir Eric Drummond (later Lord Perth) signed an Anglo-Italian agreement in Rome" confirming all previously reached agreements on various controversial issues, including the declaration of January 2, 1937 concerning the Mediterranean Sea and recognizing the capture of Abyssinia by Italy. A particularly important article for Italy was the confirmation by Great Britain of the complete freedom of passage through the Suez Canal for Italian ships under all conditions.
In accordance with the agreements with Italy, on May 12, 1938, Lord Halifax submitted to the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations a proposal for the recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia. Representatives of the USSR, China, Bolivia and New Zealand opposed Halifax's proposal. After that, the Council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution in which individual members of the League of Nations were given the freedom to decide on the recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia. According to this resolution, the British government recognized Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia ”(Anglo-Italian agreement (1938) // http://ru.wikipedia.org). The Anglo-Italian agreement entered into force on November 16, 1938 after France concluded an alliance with Germany, similar to Germany's alliance with Britain and the final registration of the Anglo-French-German-Italian alliance.
Although "the lock and the march of German troops in Austria passed without a single shot", due to the rough pressure of A. Hitler on the Austrian Chancellor K. Schuschnigg, he "ultimately ... went down in the history of international politics as an act of violence" (Weizsäcker E. Ambassador of the Third Reich / Per. FS Kapitsa. - M .: Tsentrpoligraf, 2007. - P. 130), and only the wide support of the Austrians for the idea of joining Germany temporarily saved the "German people from harvesting the bitter fruits of the amateurish policy of their leader" (Papen F Vice-Chancellor of the Third Reich / Translated English - M .: Tsentrpoligraf, 2005. - P. 421).
Meanwhile, “on the night of March 11, Polish border guards provoked an incident on the Polish-Lithuanian border in order to create a pretext for the invasion of Polish troops into Lithuania. The then Polish rulers viewed the capture of Lithuania as "compensation" for supporting Germany's aggressive plans against Austria. ... At the Lithuanian border, large forces of Polish troops were concentrated, and at any moment their invasion of Lithuania could be expected. Poland and Nazi Germany acted in closest contact. ...
In the same terms in which the Poles gave their consent to the capture of Austria by Germany, Goering announced Germany's consent to the capture of Lithuania by Poland, making a reservation only in relation to Klaipeda. ... At the same time, German troops were also preparing to invade Lithuania. ... The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht Keitel prepared a special map with the German-Polish demarcation line on the territory of Lithuania, according to which German troops were to occupy, along with the Klaipeda region, some other regions of Lithuania.
Lithuania faced mortal danger simultaneously from two aggressors - Poland and Germany, who acted in close contact. Only the support of the Soviet Union saved the Lithuanian people from enslavement by foreign invaders. On March 16, 1938, the USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs summoned the Polish ambassador to Moscow V. Grzybowski and made him a statement that the seriousness of the situation compels the Soviet government to draw the attention of the Polish government to the fact that the Soviet Union could not have remained indifferent if Lithuania was under threat ”(Sipols V.Ya. Ibid).
On March 17, Warsaw informed Berlin about its readiness to take into account the interests of the Reich in the context of a "possible action". It meant that Polish and German troops would enter the respective regions of Lithuania at the same time. According to V.Ya. Sipols "the then Polish rulers considered the capture of Lithuania as" compensation "for supporting the aggressive plans of Germany in relation to Austria" (Sipols V.Ya. Ibid). “The anti-political idea was thwarted only by the Soviet warning” (Falin MV On the background of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany // Score of World War II. Who and when started the war? - M .: Veche, 2009. - P. 69).
According to the chief of the French General Staff M. Gamelin, “already by its location Czechoslovakia ... is an obstacle to the plans of German energy to the East,” therefore, as the British conservative politician Macmillan admits in his memoirs, “after Austria it was clear that Czechoslovakia was next on the list victims "(History of foreign policy of the USSR. Decree. op. - S. 342). In this situation, a tangled tangle of contradictions has emerged between the world's major powers.
“Having hardly finished with Austria, the Hitlerite government began to prepare the seizure of Czechoslovakia” (History of USSR Foreign Policy. Ibid.). Moreover, in full accordance with "Mein Kampf", Hitler intended to offer England to surrender positions to America, either in an amicable way, having lost some of its power, or in a bad way, having lost everything. “In the first case, A. Hitler offered England an alliance to defeat the Soviet Union on the condition of Italy's participation in it and the destruction of France, which allowed Germany, together with Italy, to control England, neutralized its importance and allowed the United States to take the first positions in the political sphere. In the second case, A. Hitler threatened England with an alliance of Germany with the Soviet Union for the sake of its complete destruction "(Lebedev S. America against England. Part 2. From the Great War to the Great Depression // http://topwar.ru).
France, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, as you might guess, were quite satisfied with the option of defeating Germany and Poland in the event of their attack on Czechoslovakia. Ultimately, France benefited from the alliance of England, France and Italy directed against Germany, familiar to us from Stresa (Lebedev S. America against England. Part 8. Long pause // http://topwar.ru).
England, as before, was advantageous to send European countries to the Soviet Union with the vanguard in the person of Nazi Germany and the order of the order from England, France and Italy behind her back. The decisive link in this scheme was the peaceful surrender of Czechoslovakia and Germany in order to prevent France from declaring war on Germany and preventing interference in the conflict of the Soviet Union. This plan, as we remember, revealed in connection with the conclusion of the Covenant of the Fourth in November 1933, the then Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia Edward Benes:
“The world, in his view, should be secured by dividing the entire globe. This section provided for Europe and its colonies to form four zones of influence. England had an enormous empire; France maintained her colonial possessions and mandates; Germany and Italy divided Eastern Europe into two large zones of influence: Germany established its dominance in Belgium and Russia, Italy received a sphere that included the Danube countries and the Balkans. Italy and Germany believed that with this large section they would easily agree with Poland: it would give up the Corridor in exchange for a part of Ukraine ... "(S. Lebedev America against England. Part of 5. At a crossroads // http: // topwar. ru).
In turn, America arranged for Germany to defeat first Czechoslovakia, and then France, with the aim of weakening Britain, concluding the Anglo-German-Italian alliance and surrendering leading positions on the world stage to the United States of America. The inter-imperialist contradictions were supposed to be subsequently removed by dividing the territories of the Soviet Union. That is why Roosevelt, on the threshold of the Czechoslovak crisis, believing that Czechoslovakia without external help would quickly fall under the blow of Germany demanded non-interference from France in its defeat.
In particular, in a letter to 20 from May 1938 of Mr. Bullitt to President Roosevelt, “noted that France should not be allowed, if it came out in defense of the Czechs, to attack the Siegfried Line between Strasbourg and Luxembourg, which is viewed by the French General Staff as the most convenient position to attack. Bullitt considered this an unspeakable tragedy and offered to do everything possible to organize a meeting of leaders of European countries in order to resolve these issues. The American diplomat pathetically declared his desire to save European civilization from destruction. The Czechoslovak 1938 crisis became the most important episode in the history of Europe - and one of the most prominent periods in Bullitt’s diplomatic activities. He played a fairly significant role in preparing Munich, particularly during the May 1938 events and later during the Munich crisis itself.
The behavior of Bullitt on the eve of Munich almost adequately reflects the position of President Roosevelt. ... A week before the Munich Conference, Roosevelt changed his point of view on events in Europe. First of all, he stated that he did not believe in the ability of Czechoslovakia to resist Hitler and that, if assistance was not provided, Czechoslovakia, in his opinion, would be defeated in three weeks. Second, Roosevelt insisted that the Western powers plan a defensive war. American strategists favored mass defense tactics. ...
From the point of view of Roosevelt, the war could be won only by standing up to the position of armed defense and organizing the blockade of Germany. The line of blockade was supposed to pass through the North Sea, the English Channel and close in the Mediterranean Sea, in the Suez region. Roosevelt promised to do everything possible in the organization of the blockade of Germany. The President noted that he cannot initiate the blockade policy, but it is his prerogative to assert that such a course will be effective. The president promised to do everything in his power to maintain the isolation of Germany. This position, from his point of view, was the most humane, for it was based on the desire to wage war with the least loss of human lives, with a minimum of suffering. Roosevelt believed that France should also wage a defensive war along the Maginot line. ...
4 September 1938, at the opening of the monument in honor of the landing of American soldiers in France at 1917, Mr. Bullitt delivered a speech - by the way, at the insistent request of French Foreign Minister J. Bonnet. The latter expected that Bullitt would declare support and guarantees from the United States. However, after consulting with Washington, Bullitt spoke in a slightly different spirit: Americans, like the French, eagerly want peace; but if war breaks out in Europe, no one can predict whether the United States will be involved in such a war. A few days later, President Roosevelt told the press that Bullitt’s speech did not impose any moral obligations on the United States, and, secondly, it would be one hundred percent wrong to interpret it in the sense that the United States is a united front with France and Britain against Hitler. ” (Mokhovikova G.V. Ibid.).
The Soviet Union strongly condemned Austria’s accession to Germany and, pointing to the possibility of new international conflicts, especially with regard to Czechoslovakia, proposed to the governments of Great Britain, France, the United States and Czechoslovakia to participate in collective actions, “which would have the aim of stopping the further development of aggression and elimination of the dangers of the new world war ”... Unfortunately for Czechoslovakia, the Western powers did not support the aspirations of the Soviet Union to save Czechoslovakia. On the contrary - they sold it to fascist Germany. ...
The United States did not respond, while Britain and France rejected the Soviet proposals. ... All this confirmed that the governments of Britain and France did not want to organize a collective response to the aggressor. ... The British government used the German claims to the Czechoslovak lands for their own selfish purposes - for secret negotiations on an English-German agreement that would guarantee the security of England and the inviolability of its colonial possessions. At the same time, it was intended to pay Hitler by issuing Czechoslovakia to him ”(History of USSR Foreign Policy. Decree. Op. - C. 341 – 432, 348).
Thus, after his coming to power, N. Chamberlain gave Germany the go-ahead to the Austria's Ansluz, promising Italy to accept the capture of Ethiopia as a compensation. Poland also warmly supported Germany in all its aggressive endeavors in exchange for the opportunity to profit at the expense of Lithuania and Czechoslovakia. After the Anschluis, the interested parties raised the question of the conclusion of the Anglo-German alliance, behind which, in fact, stood the struggle of England and America for world domination.
N. Chamberlain, not supporting the American plan to defeat Czechoslovakia and France, voiced by Hitler, put all his efforts on creating an alliance between England and Germany, including both Italy and France with a step-by-step, peaceful and controlled takeover of Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany. Moreover, for the sake of giving England a dominant position in the Anglo-German alliance, N. Chamberlain had to fly to Germany three times to meet with A. Hitler. Although, in fact, he should have done without intermediaries and negotiated directly with F.D. Roosevelt. However, as we remember, the British were not directly satisfied with the conversation with the Americans due to the fact that "the Americans were ready to negotiate with them only on the terms of surrender" (Lebedev S. America against England. Part 9. "She opened a mine of the abyss ..." http: //topwar.ru).
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