Ukrainian lesson of the Russian elite
The Russian elite should be concerned with reducing social tensions, capturing information and intellectual superiority, and creating a controlled organization of protest layers.Ukraine is the closest republic of the post-Soviet space to Russia not only territorially, but also ethnically, psychologically and culturally. Therefore, the analysis of recent events in Ukraine is extremely important to ensure the stability of our country. What is happening now with our neighbors may become a rehearsal for chaos in Russia.
The most important and obvious lessons from the Ukrainian drama are:
The West is not our partner, but the most cruel and merciless enemy. And if today NATO Tanks do not rattle their tracks in our cities and villages, this is a merit not of liberal demagogues, but of Russia's nuclear missile potential;
It’s time for everyone in Russia to understand that the Western elite are not “fighters for democracy”, but a gathering of unprincipled, ambitious and narrow-minded people who are ready to break any agreement. They have no friends, but only interests, and selfish ones. The phrase “to betray in time is to foresee” is for them a guide to action. Even those who are loyal to them, they, using in their own interests, are ready to betray and destroy. The ghosts of Gaddafi, Milosevic and Hussein remind us of this. At one stage or another, they all tried to flirt with the West.
The revolution was prepared by the Ukrainian elite
Blowing up a stable state without serious internal contradictions and with an authoritative strong authority is almost impossible. Conditions for a social crisis were created by the Ukrainian authorities themselves.
It was the power elites of Ukraine that formed deep social contradictions in the country, based on the critical stratification of society according to property and clan system of government with absolute dominance of a limited number of clan and criminal structures in the economy. The situation was aggravated by a decrease in the general intellectual level of the ruling class. The latter, in particular, was expressed most clearly in the extremely inconsistent foreign and information policy of the leadership of Ukraine, when for several years the idea of salvation was instilled in the country's population due to rapprochement with the EU, followed by a lightning turn in the opposite direction. This, naturally, could not but provoke a protest reaction. In general, it can be stated that the majority of the population of Ukraine opposes itself to the ruling class, submitting to it by virtue of coercion both in the west of the country and in the east.
It should be particularly emphasized political groups that play a key role in the development of the Ukrainian crisis. These are primarily radical nationalist movements and their associations mainly from the western regions of Ukraine, such as the Right Sector and the Trident. Having a certain amount of support throughout the entire period of the existence of the Ukrainian state, they were able to form highly efficient structures, which included teams of well-trained militants. It was this force that became the factor that determined a different direction for the development of the Ukrainian crisis than its organizers had supposed.
An important factor contributing to the development of the crisis in Ukraine is the high dependence of the Ukrainian ruling elites on the West, both in terms of property (huge amounts in personal accounts in Western banks, expensive real estate) and in person (children and relatives of many Ukrainian leaders lived in Western countries, were trained or worked there). This created favorable conditions for exerting effective pressure on the Ukrainian authorities.
Presumably, it was the pressure of the West, and not the indecisiveness of Yanukovich, that some experts believe was the reason for the actual refusal of the effective use of force by the Ukrainian authorities against the opposition, which turned to armed opposition to law enforcement forces, by forceful interception of power by seizing administrative buildings and creating alternative bodies authorities.
Significantly weakens the position of the Ukrainian ruling elite split within itself, passing between akin clan of Yanukovych with structures close to him and other oligarchic groups in Ukraine.
An unbiased analysis of the state of affairs in Russia shows that the situation in our country is structurally identical to that of Ukraine. The main threat is a deep split between the elite and the bulk of the population. At the same time, the actions of the ruling elite aggravate the already difficult situation in the state. Unreasoned reforms in key areas of society, in particular education, worsening the situation of the majority of the Russian population, amnesty, affecting only corrupt officials and fraudsters, but not affecting those people who in the eyes of the politically active part of the population look like “fighters for the people”, harsh sentences for them ridiculous grounds (for example, long prison sentences for very elderly people - Kvachkov and Khabarov) against the background of mockingly insignificant punishments for secondary figures in the Oboronservice case in The bloody demonstration of the untouchability of those who actually organized this Oboronservis deepens the conflict between the elite and the people, bringing it closer to the critical line.
Therefore, another lesson that our elite should have learned from the Ukrainian events is that, to prevent them, social contradictions should be smoothed out as much as possible, rather than trying to solve issues with repressions that only aggravate them. The key factor is the balance of social policy, which can be achieved only with the support of highly efficient think tanks, of truly intellectual analysts. Unfortunately, judging by the actions of the Russian authorities, she does not have any.
Information excellence - the key to success
Actually, events in Ukraine were prepared and carried out not by protest layers of the population, but by specific representatives of the political and economic elite, mostly from “offended” by power clans. They control significant material resources, have a great influence on state and regional authorities, rely on foreign political, informational and material support, and also dominate the Ukrainian information environment.
The following lesson follows from this: the assets of large proprietors opposed to power must be nationalized in the interests of stability of the country.
Intellectual superiority combined with domination in the information sphere allowed the opposition elite to gain dominance in the moral and psychological sphere at the first stage, which knocked the tools of soft power out of the hands of power, leaving only power levers extremely unpopular in such a situation.
Hence another lesson to be drawn from the events in Ukraine: the main condition for the stability of political power in the presence of a powerful and influential elite political opposition is to gain superiority in the information sphere by conducting active offensive actions, anticipating possible actions of the enemy, forcing him to defend self-justification.
In this context, one of the most important information priorities is the demonstration by the government of its willingness to sacrifice, in the interests of social justice, the most odious part of the elite in the eyes of the population, guilty of neglecting the interests of the state for their own enrichment. In this regard, demonstratively harsh punishments of the top officials of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation of the Serdyukov era who were involved in the organization and activities of Oboronservis and the reforms of the Armed Forces, which led to the undermining of the country's defense capability, would be very useful steps.
The real opposition party as a factor of stability
An analysis of the developments in Ukraine showed that the protesting part of the population, which is unable to solve their personal problems under the current political regime, became their main driving force. These layers are prone to any forms of protest and are ready to support a force that will oppose the current government and the ruling elite.
In the absence of an internal basis for the organization, representatives of these layers very quickly join any capable organizations opposing the current government, quickly increasing their numbers and power to the level when they become able to overthrow the existing regimes.
As a rule, low ideological and political training of representatives of the majority of the protest population does not give them the opportunity to make the right choice - who should they go to in the spectrum of political forces opposing the ruling elite. Therefore, most of them follow those who have a higher organization, a clearer ideological platform (at the level of slogans, which most fully reflects the political interests of the protest population), who are more aggressive than others against the ruling elite.
It is for this reason that in the events in Ukraine the already mentioned nationalist groups seized the initiative from the liberal pro-Western leaders. They became the main driving force of the opposition, which determines the direction of development of the Ukrainian crisis.
Distinctive features of these structures, which ensured the interception of initiatives in a critical situation, were:
1. The high level of organization, which allowed them to effectively coordinate the actions of their scattered tactical groups on an operational scale to cover almost the entire northwestern part of Ukraine, to act on a single plan and plan, anticipating the actions of power structures, to impose their own scenario on the authorities. In fact, in tactical and operational terms, they were able to make the power structures driven, forcing them to mainly respond to the actions of the opposition, and not to implement any of their own scenarios.
2. A clear system of ideological slogans, reflecting the interests of the majority of the protest population, tired of the Ukrainian oligarchy - both from the power and from the opposition.
3. The obvious presence of close contacts in law enforcement agencies and regional and local authorities in the north-western part of Ukraine. This was manifested in the absence of serious resistance to the seizure of administrative buildings and their prolonged retention without serious attempts by the authorities to return them under their control and prevent the formation of alternative authorities in them.
At the same time, the Ukrainian events clearly demonstrated the very limited operational capabilities of law enforcement agencies to counter the riots when they cover large regions of the country. It became clear that they were able to successfully resist unrest (if the supreme power allowed it) in one or two large cities. When the protests become massive and diffuse, the potential of power structures is not enough. In these conditions, only reciprocal organized popular force can stop the onset of chaos, as it happens in the eastern regions of Ukraine.
Therefore, another important lesson to be drawn from the events in Ukraine is that the main condition for the stability of political power and the preservation of the current political system with a sufficiently large protest potential among the population is the presence of a political party or movement dominant among the protest population headed by sane, fairly intellectually developed leaders, ready for a constructive dialogue with the authorities. In a critical situation, such a structure will be able to take control of the protest population, organize and direct it in a safe direction for the state. At the same time, the harsh critical rhetoric of the leaders of such a party or movement against the authorities and other elite structures should be perceived as mandatory, since otherwise they will not be able to attract and consolidate protest layers. Then these layers will become the basis for truly destructive forces - structures controlled by foreign special services, domestic opposition elites oriented towards the interests of other states and the criminal world.
The ideological orientation of such a movement is determined by the ideological priorities of the active protest part of the population. In Russia, this is primarily the growth of nationalist sentiment among the majority of the population. In addition, socialist ideas are becoming increasingly influential, especially among the active part of young people remote from the elite strata. By linking their relatively unenviable position and lack of social prospects with the restoration of capitalism in Russia, they perceive the positive aspects of socialist experience, ignoring the negative ones.
Active protest layers of modern Russia oppose themselves to the entire current elite, both liberal and one that seeks to build a new Russia based on market relations with significant state influence. At the same time, the opposition parties represented in the State Duma are perceived by these circles as part of the power elite. Therefore, they will not be able to act as organizers of such protest layers.
Thus, a political party (movement) that will be able to attract and consolidate active protest layers in the interests of increasing the stability of the country should, in the ideological sense, be moderately nationalistic, on the one hand, reflecting the general desire to increase the role of the Russian population in public life (but not to the detriment of other nations, for it is fatal for multinational Russia), but on the other hand, to be the bearer of the ideas of restoring social justice and the further development of Russia in the direction of any ormy socialist structure.
To form such a movement today is quite possible in a very short time (with some support from the state or representatives of nationally-oriented business) on the basis of the existing small parties and movements of state-patriotic, moderately nationalistic, socialist and communist orientation. The politicized military veteran organizations are the most suitable for the role of the organizational core.
At present, in Russia, the most important conditions for the “color revolution” are basically formed. These include:
the presence of sufficient number of protest segments of the population, much of which is represented by young people.
the existence of an opposition pro-Western political elite that controls significant material and informational resources, has a large (sometimes decisive) influence in government bodies and relies on foreign political, informational, material and intellectual support. This allows it to effectively compete with the ruling elite, in particular in the intellectual sense. In today's Russia, this is the liberal-democratic elite of the “first wave” of the 90-s with its supporting part of the oligarchy (mainly financial and raw materials), which is closely linked by economic interests with the West.
most of the government, starting with the government and the Legislative Assembly to district governments, to a certain extent lost the authority necessary for the stability of power among the population as a result of ill-considered and unpopular actions or simple dishonesty of officials. The authority of the ruling party United Russia is declining.
Ukraine can serve as a kind of detonator for similar events in Russia. Action needs to be taken urgently.
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