The change of state formation entails large-scale changes in all spheres of public life. This was fully experienced by the citizens of Russia when, after the collapse of the USSR, the main state institutions were fundamentally smashed. A similar fate and system of military security of our Motherland did not pass. In a quarter of a century, military reform went through so many stages that a whole generation of officers grew up and went to the reserves, who did not know what the stable development of the army was, targeted combat and operational training, and a balanced legislative framework in the field of defense construction.
The endless drafts of documents regulating combat and daily activities, “Temporary instructions”, “Refinements and supplements” to them, did not keep pace with tracking the intricate zigzags of transformations. From the inconvenience of recognizing the endlessness of this process, the very term “military reform” was replaced by the phrase “giving the Armed Forces a new look”.
Finding the answer to the eternal question "What to do?" professionally engaged in the new Minister of Defense Sergei Kuzhugetovich Shoigu. Having a desire to rectify the situation, the head of the military department has already done a lot. The suspension and subsequent cancellation of a number of ineffective decisions of the predecessor, measures taken to strengthen the military-industrial complex, ongoing checks of the combat readiness of the troops of the military districts, the begun re-equipment of the army and fleet on new models of weapons and military equipment - global affairs. But behind these problems pitfalls are not always visible, at first glance small, but hindering forward movement. There are many of them and everyone deserves close attention.
However, we limit the subject of conversation, highlighting only one group of small obstacles. Those that have accumulated in the educational and scientific complex of the Ministry of Defense. More specifically - in the military schools of the country. More specifically, let us assess what prevents military academies from maintaining the backbone of scientific schools and strengthening the prestige of the profession of a military teacher, scientific employee.
To remove obstacles, you need to know about their existence. To do this, let us present the problem not as seen from above, but from the inside, from the perspective of ordinary specialists who encounter it in the process of their daily professional activities. Let us highlight the most dangerous trends in the structure of this problem.
The first trend is the existing and growing staff hunger of military schools.
No, from the point of view of filling staff-official lists (DDS) everything is smooth here. "Cells" are not empty, candidates for emerging vacancies are. But those professionals who can really train students and cadets in the art of winning remain less and less. But where do they come from?
Even some 15 – 20 years ago, a team of departments of operational art, tactics of the kind of troops, type of support for military operations and others consisted of two categories of teachers. The former gained invaluable experience in commanding or engineering positions, showed themselves in staff work, and reached significant heights in their career. These are practices that have training grounds behind them, live firing, and exercises. They know how to plan combat operations, and know how to control military formations in the process of armed struggle. Having received a certain teaching practice, such professionals became brilliant teachers of the military academy, military school. Among them were commanders of regiments and brigades, deputy chiefs of operational units of associations, chiefs of headquarters of formations, chiefs of branches of armed forces and other experienced officers. The latter showed the ability to research even while studying in a higher military educational institution. Their competitive military-scientific works, inventions and publications served as admissions to the adjunct. Next - the defense of Ph.D. and doctoral theses. Accumulated knowledge combined with methodological skill, the ability to speak publicly and express thoughts on paper, to generate and substantiate useful ideas - these are the components of the success of the future military theorist and teacher.
Both categories of teachers mutually complement each other in the department. The experience of the former and the knowledge of the latter not only contributed to the harmonious development of the students, but also enriched each member of the university team.
How was it possible to achieve such a representative complete set of staff list of the Academy?
The profession of a teacher of a military school was prestigious.
Firstly, in the military academy only the primary position corresponded to the category “Lieutenant Colonel”. Starting with the senior lecturer (and in the leading departments and with the teacher) all the posts were colonel. Therefore, transferring, say, a regiment commander, a brigade commander, or the chief of the operational section of the headquarters of the association from the troops to the academy did not become a career failure for him. Moreover, having defended a thesis, having reached the head of the main department or the deputy head of the university, the officer got a chance to put on the general's uniform.
Secondly, the monetary allowance of a military academy teacher (military man) was greater than the monetary allowance of the regiment commander, the senior instructor's monetary allowance was greater than the brigade commander, etc. Therefore, there was a competition for the vacant positions in higher education institution and there was someone to choose .
Thirdly, there was a reasonable salary differentiation. The teacher of the military academy had a larger salary than the teacher of the military school. The lecturer of the leading department had a larger salary than his colleague in the non-core department. And this is true.
Fourthly, the difference between the monetary allowance of the teacher-officer and the earnings of his civil colleague, explained by a number of additional hardships and military service, had a place to be, but still within reasonable limits.
Fifth, the transfer to a military school service promised life to a family in a big city, and not at a remote “point”, setting up a queue for permanent housing with a chance to wait for it (a military officer moving from garrison to garrison wouldn’t counted), the opportunity to get a degree and academic title right at his workplace, the ability not to look for work after being transferred to the reserve, remaining in the same team and practically with the same functional duties of a teacher that he mastered in recent years of service.
What do we have today?
The first. Irreparable blow to the scientific and pedagogical personnel. The faculty of military academies and colleges has been reduced seven times. These are not bus drivers or even lawyers who can be quickly recruited or trained as needed. A teacher of a military school is a piece product combining invaluable military experience, knowledge and culture. Among those left behind are doctors and candidates of science. They are not only skilled Methodists, but also carriers of the glorious traditions of the school. And this potential is easily dispersed in dacha plots, security companies, civil universities. Few are ready to return, even after the resumption of recruitment of students and cadets. For some, the idle time forced caused a feeling of insecurity and relaxation. Others got a grudge against injustice. It will take decades to grow a replacement for these teachers. This anti-state policy caused irreparable damage to the educational and scientific complex of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation for many years.
The second. In the remaining military schools of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation, the staff categories for those who teach the younger generation of homeland defenders have been drastically reduced. Today, the teacher (and in the military school, and in the military academy) is a major. Where does he come from? If from the troops, then from the post of the company commander (or approximately equal). To train a cadet (future lieutenant), he will probably be a reputable teacher. But captains, majors and lieutenant colonels, officers from the positions of commanders of battalions, divisions, squadrons, their deputies, and chiefs of staff enter the military academy. The position of a graduate of the military academy is deputy regiment commander. And the range of service levels for which the military academy is preparing is up to the deputy division commander, the brigade commander. What will he learn in the field of tactics, operational art, management, all-round support for military operations, an officer who himself did not eat his way and that in these posts?
Third. After a change in the payroll system in 2012, an officer serving in a military school was at a disadvantage compared to a military officer.
Today, the brigade commander receives in his hands (including all bonuses and allowances) about a hundred thousand rubles. It is a lot or a little - a debatable question. But at least the salary of a military officer, managing thousands of subordinates and having hundreds of units of modern military equipment, was equal to the salary of the driver of the Moscow Metro, who subordinated one assistant and was responsible for moving 10 cars in a closed space with passengers. Not trying to drive a wedge between representatives of different professions, we still note that young people with secondary education are admitted to engineering courses, as evidenced by the numerous advertising sheets in the subway trains. And in order to become a kombrig, one must enroll in a higher military school, go through a military service school, graduate from a military academy (this is another level of higher education). But even this is not important. The teacher of the future kombriga, a senior teacher of the military academy, has a monetary allowance of a little more than 50 thousand rubles. This is less than the salary of an assistant machinist of the same metro. The logical question is: according to what motivation will the brigade commander transfer to the academy in order to raise future generals with his experience?
Fourth. Even with such a modest increase, the difference between the remuneration of the teacher-officer and his civil colleague's wages increased sharply. The same senior lecturer, with the same responsibilities, but having removed the shoulder straps, today signs in a statement for 25 thousand rubles. He (in the material sense) turned out to be at the level of a cleaner of the metro station, who arrived to work from Uzbekistan.
The fifth. Not without completely inexplicable distortions in the system of military labor. For example, the "weight" of the sports category "Candidate Master of Sports" in monetary terms for a teacher of the physical training department turned out to be more than the same "weight" of the scientific degree "Candidate of Science" for a teacher of the department of tactics or operational art. The premium to the master of sports is higher than the doctor of science. But an 22-year-old graduate from a physical education university can come to a military academy or college as a teacher of physical training, and an officer who has passed through certain military posts, “completed” combat missions at training grounds, graduated from a military academy and defended a thesis can become a teacher of operational tactical disciplines. It turns out that the struggle for intelligence did not become a priority in the defense construction of our state? And this is the era of high-tech contactless wars!
The second trend is that the intellect and abilities of a scientist in educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense are not used effectively enough.
In the state of any military educational institution there are scientific divisions. Specialists serving in positions in these units have one task - to conduct scientific research on topics defined above (in the line of the General Staff, the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the headquarters of the armed forces) or in the initiative-identified relevant areas.
The professional activities of the faculty of the university MO RF consists of three components. Firstly, this is educational work (preparation and conduct of classes on a schedule, consultations with trainees, etc.). Secondly, methodological work (writing lecture notes, developing teaching materials, visual aids, assignments, etc.). Thirdly, scientific work. Here we will dwell on the latter.
Any research officer, any teacher has knowledge and experience in his field. If he is also a scientist, he is able to contribute to science. For one, this contribution is minimal, for example, if the teacher occasionally speaks at scientific conferences, writes reviews for submitted abstracts, leads a military-scientific circle in a group of trainees, and so on. The second one has a significant contribution. His product output is research and development work on given topics, military theoretical works, monographs, articles for the central organ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. He provides scientific guidance to future candidates of science. What is the difference between these functionaries?
In terms of motivation, there is almost no difference (if not to take into account the limited possibilities of the management of the department, the university on the variation of awards). And he and the other are sitting on the salary (monetary allowance) and receive the same salary per month. And if so, then few are ready to get involved in serious work.
The solution to this problem is simple. It is necessary to motivate universities and interest scientists, putting them in equal conditions with employees of self-supporting, commercial and other research institutions that fulfill orders of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.
The third trend is the unjustified restriction of universities in the preparation of future teachers and researchers.
It is not enough to preserve the existing scientific and pedagogical potential. It is necessary to fill its shortage. Veterans do not just leave military academies for the reasons explained above. They, alas, are aging, leaving life. With the normal rhythm of the school functioning, their students come to replace the veterans. They become teachers for those who make the first steps in science: adjuncts, doctoral students and applicants. Thus, in three generations, the main principle of the development of a scientific school is realized - continuity.
After a three-year stagnation in the military education system, when there was no recruitment at the academy of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, there was a failure in personnel. Adjunctures were practically disbanded. Dissertation councils worked from time to time. And today between the generation of veterans and the youth there was a personnel breach. The need for scientists and teachers has increased significantly.
But the staffing system for adjuncts was inflexible. When recruiting for adjunct and doctoral studies at a military academy, one cannot exceed certain limits. They are not established from the actual needs of the faculty and academic staff of the institution, but on the basis of the staff list of the educational institution. In turn, the number of teachers in the FTS is a derivative of the number of students trained and students. What follows from this?
For example, after a long break, the military academy produced a set of trainees for the first year. They are relatively few. Next year (taking into account the presence of two courses already) there will be twice as many students and cadets. And only in five years the university will reach its full capacity, when it will simultaneously begin to issue specialists and receive applicants. It means that only in five years he will receive full SPS and the right to have a full adjunct. But after all, scientists needed cadres for all these five years, and in an inverse relationship: in the first year, the adjuncts should be over-rated in order to eliminate the resulting failure in qualified personnel as soon as possible, and later reduce the reception of reports. This is a sound logic in terms of public interest. But she is resisted by a military bureaucratic machine.
The fourth trend is a decrease in the effectiveness of the interaction of military academies with military authorities.
In the Soviet and early post-Soviet periods, military schools were interested in training qualified specialists for the type of troops or branch of the Armed Forces to which they regularly belonged. And the authorities of these structures of the Ministry of Defense were interested in the quality of the “product” at the output of these institutions, since the effectiveness of solving military and everyday tasks by military formations depended on the level of training of university graduates.
Such mutual interest, and most importantly, the understanding of mutual conditionality between those who teach and those for whom training is organized, created a prerequisite for interaction. The general staff headquarters of the Armed Forces clearly formulated the qualification requirements for graduates in each specialty. The military academy developed curricula and programs in accordance with these qualification requirements. The learning process was focused. A subsequent monitoring of the passage of military service graduates in the posts of destination allowed to make adjustments to it.
In order for the military academy to be a successful forge of personnel, its activity was supervised by specially created units of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the headquarters of the armed forces. Officials responsible for working with military schools not only performed control functions, but also delved into problems and provided comprehensive assistance. The Military Academy has always received in a timely manner fresh guidelines on the preparation and use of the Armed Forces, combat regulations, manuals, instructions, directives, orders. The availability of these documents to the teacher was a guarantee that the developed textbooks, lectures, group exercises, command and staff trainings and other teaching materials will not fall behind the time, will be relevant and useful in content. The availability of the same materials to the researcher, adjunct, doctoral student allowed to conduct research on the modern operational-tactical background, to contribute to science and to develop useful recommendations on the preparation, use and comprehensive support of the troops. The military authorities also took care of supplying educational institutions with modern weapons, simulators, and technical training aids.
The unsuccessful experiment to remove the military department from the management of the military education led to the disruption of this interaction. The Ministry of Education and Science determined the general state educational standards without taking into account the purpose of the future specialist to the profession - to protect the Motherland. The Department of Education at the Ministry of Defense was staffed by civilian employees who did not always represent the nature of the future activities of the officer-graduate of the military academy.
Such abandonment of universities affected the entire system of training military professionals. It happened that officers from the troops were sent to advanced training courses in educational institutions that were not ready to carry out this task qualitatively. According to reviews of some of them, it was wasted time.
Some academies stopped receiving the necessary documents, or it happened with a long delay.
With the advent of the new defense minister to the military department, military schools were returned to the subordination of the main commands (commands) of the types (types of troops) of the RF Armed Forces. But it is too early to talk about the full restoration of the interaction between the customer and the performer in the field of military education.
The fifth trend is the transition to unproductive methods for determining the staff of the faculty of military schools.
More recently, the calculation of the necessary composition of teachers was carried out on the basis of the volume of their labor. And this work is not only in conducting classes according to the approved schedule. The teacher (senior lecturer, associate professor, professor) develops curricula, thematic plans, conducts consultations, leads the development of course and diploma works, writes textbooks, teaching aids, lecture notes, shares his pedagogical skills at scientific and methodological conferences, etc. Plus obligatory scientific work, as mentioned above. Even if one student studied at the academy, all this should be done.
The new methodology at the head of the assessment of the staff of the faculty has put not the actual teaching and methodological and scientific burden on the teaching staff (PPS), but the number of students in a military educational institution. What is the risk of such an approach?
Take just one example. Each year, each military academy holds a command-and-staff war game with the teaching staff. The purpose of the event is to improve the operational and tactical level of knowledge and skill of the teacher. Hundreds of teachers have been involved in CSWI for several weeks - from the development of the concept and the distribution of roles to the summing up of the game and the writing of a research report. But the event is held without the involvement of students and cadets. However, even if they were attracted to the CSWI, this would not change anything, since the number of students will not be affected by this. Therefore, there is activity, but it is not as if. This does not affect the staff of the faculty.
And that's not it. In recent years, PPP has been civilized. Not in the sense that civilian personnel has increased in the departments of military academies. It just became less military personnel educators. If we turn to the same example of the organization of CSWI with PPP, then there are not enough people in uniform to fill the main “game posts”. And the commanders of the unions, the commanders of the formations, the chiefs of the branches of troops and services, reporting their decisions in civilian jackets, look rather ridiculous. Who needs such a study?
Moreover, attracting civilian personnel to operational and tactical activities (the same war games, military exercises, working out unexpected tasks of higher headquarters), the head of the university balances on the verge of the law, since such activities are not provided for by the employment contract concluded with the employee, contrary to with the Labor Code and materially not stimulated by the Ministry of Defense (the civilian personnel of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation does not receive a premium for tensions, although its work is no different from what it does acting officer).
The listed and many small problems of the educational and scientific complex not raised in the article add up to one big obstacle that stands in the way of the constructive development of military education and military science. The obstacle is artificial. Its elimination does not require in-depth research. You just have to look: how was it once? It needs very little - to make work on the bugs, as taught in the old Soviet school.