Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part of 1. Counterattack and preemptive strike

- Hitler explained the war with the USSR by the fact that he allegedly beat Stalin. In Russia, you can also hear this version. What do you think?
- There is still no confirmation of this. But no one knows what Stalin really wanted.

Bernd Bonecht, German historian

The sleep of reason gives birth to monsters. In fact, having failed to respond in time to the challenge of time, the Soviet researchers of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War “overslept” the revival of the old monstrous Nazi myth of the Red Army’s readiness in the summer of 1941 to deliver a preventive strike on Germany. Moreover, the almost complete absence of serious studies of Soviet prewar planning and the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the summer of 1941, together with their closeness, allowed the old myth to gain wide popularity in a short time.

An attempt to combat it by refuting its individual elements, since "a fundamentally correct idea is sometimes supported by not very reliable, and sometimes simply erroneous considerations," did not bring success. Indeed, “it is not enough to criticize the arguments of the opponent in the dispute. This will show only that his position is poorly founded and shaky. To reveal its fallacy, it is necessary to convincingly substantiate the opposite position. ”

The poor knowledge of the events of the summer of 1941 provoked a heated discussion about the plans of the Soviet military and political leadership on the eve of World War II and their role in the catastrophic defeat of the Red Army in the summer of 1941. Three scenarios were proposed: the Red Army was preparing for defense, a preemptive attack on Germany, or the defeat of the Wehrmacht on the territory of the USSR. Currently, the discussion is at an impasse. The materials available to the researchers did not give an unambiguous answer, moreover, all three parties confirm the truth of their version of Soviet planning with the same documents.

In this paper, an attempt will be made to get out of the current stalemate through detailed study and rethinking of the documents of Soviet prewar planning introduced into the scientific circulation. The novelty of the work lies in the close examination of Soviet prewar planning, showing the development, opening its mechanism. Particular attention is paid to explaining the reasons for the military failures of the Red Army in the border battle of the summer of 1941. For the first time in detail and convincingly, with reference to specific documents, a plan for the defeat of Wehrmacht troops in the territory of the Soviet Union is shown.

The last plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army in the event of war was developed before the outbreak of World War II during the Czechoslovak crisis on March 24, 1938 after a statement by the USSR government about the readiness of the Soviet Union to help Czechoslovakia in the event of German aggression. The plan provided for the confrontation of two military blocs: on the one hand France, Czechoslovakia and the USSR, on the other - Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland, Finland, Estonia and Latvia. It was assumed that Italy would take part in hostilities solely by its naval fleet, Lithuania will be occupied by Germany and Poland in the early days of the war, and Romania and Turkey, under certain circumstances, may oppose the USSR.

It was assumed that Germany would deploy 14 divisions against France, Germany and Poland would deploy 33 divisions against Czechoslovakia, and against the USSR Germany, Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Finland would concentrate 144 divisions and 16 cavalry brigades, to which the USSR would oppose 139 divisions and 26 tank brigades. According to the plan of the command of the Red Army, the smaller number of Soviet troops was to be compensated for by their better mechanization.

In total, two options were developed for the Red Army in case of war. The first involved the deployment of the main forces of Germany, Latvia and Poland north of the Pripyat marshes, the second - the deployment of the main forces of Germany and Poland south of the Pripyat marshes. In both cases, it was envisaged that the enemy would be defeated with a frontal strike by the Soviet troops on the largest enemy grouping. In the first version, from 70 to 82, the Soviet divisions and 11 tank brigades (12 divisions of the RGK were supposed to defeat Estonian and Latvian troops north of the Pripyat swamps, had to break up German-Polish-Latvian forces to the north of the Pripyat swamps if they entered the war of Estonia and Latvia) divisions and 88 cavalry brigades on a wide front from Sventsyan to Baranavichy, ensuring the main strike on both banks of the Neman with strikes from Polotsk and Slutsk. The 3 Soviet divisions and the 38 tank brigades were to break up the 9 Polish divisions and the 40 cavalry brigades south of the Pripyat Marshes on a narrow front from Rovno to Brod (13 scheme).

In the second version, from 80 to 86 divisions and from 13 to 15, the tank brigades of the Soviet group (6 divisions and 3 tank brigades of the northern Soviet group should strengthen the Soviet grouping south of the Pripyat marshes) in case of neutrality of Finland, Estonia and Latvia the grouping of 86 divisions and 13 cavalry brigades on a broad front from Rivne to Ternopil, ensuring the main attack on Lublin with strikes on Kovel and Lviv, and the 37 of the Soviet divisions and 7 tank brigades were to oppose in Germany and Poland 62 divisions and 3 cavalry brigades on the narrow front from Oshmyan to Navagrudak (Scheme 2). The influence of the change in the number of groups on the tasks assigned to it: the increase in group increases and the decrease reduces the width of the front and the depth of impact.

The Munich agreement of England and France with Germany and Italy made it impossible to render military assistance to the USSR to Czechoslovakia. After the Munich guarantees of the new borders of Czechoslovakia, the military assistance of the Soviet Union of Czechoslovakia led to war with at least Britain, France, Germany and Italy, and at most with all of Europe. At the same time, the subsequent cooling of Germany’s relations with Britain and France predetermined its rapprochement with the Soviet Union. By concluding a non-aggression pact in 1939 and secretly dividing a part of Europe into spheres of influence, Germany and the USSR proceeded to redistribute borders in Europe in accordance with their agreements: Germany attacked Poland, occupied Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and part of France, While the Soviet Union regained Bessarabia, Western Belorussia and Ukraine, it annexed Northern Bukovina and pushed its border away from Leningrad. In the Far East, the Soviet Union, having defeated the Japanese provocateurs on the Khalkhin Gol River, for a long time repulsed Tokyo’s desire to wage a large-scale war with the USSR.

In the course of military operations in Poland, Finland, Romania and Mongolia, the Soviet Union gained invaluable combat experience: on the Khalkhin-Gol river — on encircling and defeating the enemy, on the Karelian Isthmus — on breaking through heavily fortified areas, in Western Belarus and Ukraine, and Bessarabia - maneuvering operations and the use of mechanized corps, and in Bessarabia - the use of airborne troops. The knowledge tested and tested during real military operations was used in August 1940 to develop a new strategic deployment plan, taking into account the increasing numbers of the Red Army and the new borders of the USSR.

As in the previous plan, Germany remained as the main enemy. There is nothing surprising or reprehensible in the development of a plan for waging war with friendly Germany for the 1940 year of the USSR. The USSR, as indeed any other country, did not have permanent friends, but there was a constant need to ensure the security of its borders, especially with such a non-permanent "friend" as Hitler's Germany. That is why, in the summer of 1940, I. Stalin decided to deepen the friendship of the USSR with Germany for the sake of dividing the Balkans into spheres of influence and putting the Black Sea straits at the disposal of the USSR so as not to repeat the unenviable fate of England and France, for whom friendship with Germany turned into open hostility, and giving Soviet diplomats freedom of action against Germany, at the same time demanded that their military provide security guarantees to the USSR against any surprises from Germany.

It was assumed that Germany, Finland, Hungary and Romania would deploy 179 divisions against the Soviet 14 divisions and 233 tank brigades on the border with the USSR. The concentration of the main grouping of Germany in the east was expected north of the Pripyatsky marshes for drawing from East Prussia either a strike on Riga and Polotsk, or a concentric strike from Suvalki and Brest on Minsk. In the area of ​​Liepāja and Tallinn, amphibious assault forces were expected: one for attacking the flank to the Soviet troops in the Baltic, the other for a concentric strike against Leningrad with the Finnish troops. South of the Pripyat swamps, 50 German divisions were expected to bypass the rear of the Lvov group of Soviet troops, and from the Botosani area - a strike of the Romanian troops on Zhmerinka.

To counteract the main group of the German Red Army in the west in the 107 7 divisions and armored brigades were concentrated north of the Pripet Marshes, 62 4 division and armored brigade - to the south of the Pripet Marshes and the 11 3 divisions and armored brigades - on the border with Finland. It was supposed to deliver a frontal strike on the fortifications of East Prussia by the forces of the troops of the North-Western Front and the strike of part of the forces of the Western Front, bypassing these fortifications. For the defeat of the Lublin group of German troops provided for a concentric strike troops of the Western and South-Western fronts. It was planned to firmly cover the USSR border with Hungary and Romania. The reserve of the High Command was supposed to be placed behind the possible strikes of the German army for the sake of drawing an effective counterstrike on the German troops breaking through into the USSR (3 scheme).

However, since I. Stalin expected the leading powers to struggle for influence in the Balkans, he was not satisfied with the proposed plan, and the leadership of the Red Army was instructed to develop a plan with the concentration of the main forces of the Red Army south of the Pripyat marshes. Already 18 September 1940 was presented for approval a new strategic deployment plan, in which the option of deploying the main forces of the Red Army north of the Pripyat marshes was supplemented with the option of deploying the main forces of the Red Army south of the Pripyat marshes.

The South-Western Front was planned by forces of 6 armies and 94 armored brigades brought together in 7 together with a part of the forces of the Western Front to break the enemy’s Lublin and Lviv projections into Kielce and Krakow. The North-West and part of the forces of the Western Front were tasked with delivering an auxiliary strike in the general direction of Allenstein. The plan proposed to deepen the blow of the southern grouping of Soviet troops to Breslau, but the number of the Red Army grouping on the border with Germany in the 162 division and 13 tank brigades was not designed for this (4 scheme).

Together with the strategic deployment plan of 18 September 1940, the Soviet political leadership was offered to consider a plan for the defeat of the Finnish armed forces by the Red Army. Since the military action was planned to be carried out at a friendly position of Germany proposed concentration against 18 Finnish divisions 63 Soviet divisions and 3 armored brigades: 11 infantry divisions LenVO, 2 - PribOVO, 5 - OTDR, 8 - CVM, 7 - HVO, 4 - UrVO, 2 - SKVO, 6 - PrivO, 1 - ArchVO, 2 tank and 1 motorized divisions, 3 tank brigades, as well as 14 rifle divisions RGK from POVO and KOVO. It was planned to create two fronts - the North and North-West. The Northern Front 15 divisions, coming out in the Petsamo-Naoussi and Kemi areas to the Norwegian and Swedish frontiers, were supposed to stop the international assistance of Finland, while the 32 divisions and the 3 tank brigades of the North-Western Front, as well as the 2 divisions of the WGW, with two concentric strikes and the landing forces were to smash the main forces of the Finnish army and go to Tampere and Helsinki, as well as occupy the Aland Islands (5 scheme).

In a speech on October 1 radio, Winston Churchill stated: “Given security considerations, Russia cannot be interested in Germany settling on the shores of the Black Sea or occupying the Balkan countries and conquering the Slavic peoples of Southeast Europe. This would contradict Russia's historically established vital interests. ” Already 5 October 1940 was proposed for consideration, and 14 October approved the final strategic plan of the Red Army in the West with the main forces of the Red Army south of the Pripyat marshes as the main option. The composition of the South-Western Front, in order to ensure a guaranteed strike on Breslau, was increased to 126 divisions (including the 23 divisions of the WGCs) and 20 tank brigades, which had to be planned to increase the Red Army from the 226 divisions and 25 tank brigades to 268 divisions and 43 tanks (6 schema). Two circumstances draw attention to themselves. First, since the increase was planned to take place after the outbreak of hostilities for a whole year, it is not possible to talk about planning a preventive strike by the Red Army on Germany at this stage. We can talk exclusively about the application of a counterblow to the aggressor who invaded the territory of the USSR.

Secondly, since the plan envisaged the development of additional plans for conducting military operations with Finland, Romania and Turkey, he was preparing, no doubt, in the hope of deepening relations with Germany, jointly with her dividing the Balkans into spheres of influence, joining Finland, Southern Bukovina to the USSR and the Black Sea Straits. On the basis of this plan, in October 1940, a new plan for the mobilization deployment of the Red Army was adopted, proposing an increase in its membership to the 292 divisions and 43 brigades.

The increased number of the Red Army allowed the 134 divisions and 20 tank brigades to be concentrated within the South-Western Front and bring the Soviet units from the Lvov salient to the Baltic Sea coast in order to encircle and then destroy almost the entire Wehrmacht group in the East. After adopting the plan for concentrating the Red Army and the mobplan, the KOVO headquarters was instructed to develop a plan of action for the district troops in accordance with the October plan for concentrating the Red Army, and for the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District to develop a plan for Operation “With. 20 ”(“ revenge in the North-West ”), which was based on a plan from 18 of September 1940, taking into account the planned increase in the composition of the Red Army.

However, all these truly ambitious plans did not come true. In the Leningrad Military District the instruction of the Red Army Command to develop a plan for the final defeat of Finland “N-З. 20 "development has not received. In contrast to the Leningrad Military District, at KOVO, an action plan for the troops of the South-Western Front, according to the deployment plan for 1940, was already developed in December of 1940. The plan provided for the concentration of already 7 armies, 99 divisions and 19 tank brigades in the South-Western Front. The enemy was supposed to be defeated in three stages - mobilization, the destruction of the main enemy forces and his pursuit in the direction of Breslau to the Opeln-Kreisburg-Petrkov area by 5, 19, 6, 26 and 12 armies of the Southeast forces -West and part of the forces of the Western Fronts, as well as the defeat of the Romanian army by the concentric attack of the 18 and 9 armies on Iasi and the output of the 9 army units on the Bulgarian border (7 scheme). In full accordance with the October strategic deployment plan and the KOVO plan in January 1941, in connection with the appointment to the North Caucasus and the subsequent planned transfer to the western border, Tymoshenko told I. Konev: “We are counting on you. You will be a strike force if you need to strike. "

After a meeting of the top commanders of the Red Army in December 1940 of the year, two military-strategic games on the cards in January 1941, and the approval of KOVO commander G. Zhukov in February 1941, M. Kirponos was appointed head of the General Staff of the Red Army. Upon his arrival at KOVO, the developed cover plan was submitted to the new district commander, who at the beginning of February 1941 ordered the KOVO commanders to order 15 in March 1941 to develop army plans to cover the border. In mid-March, 1941, these plans were ready, and, according to the testimony of the head of the operational department of the KOVO headquarters, I. Baghramian, while "no major alterations were needed."

The General Staff of the Red Army monitored the development of the plan by the headquarters of the KOVO and “shortly after the Nazi occupation of Yugoslavia began ... gave instructions to introduce a number of significant amendments to the plan for covering the state border. The district command was ordered to significantly strengthen the troops advanced to the border. Four mechanized corps, four rifle divisions and a number of formations and units of special forces were additionally pulled here. ... The military council of the district, after carefully studying the new cover plan, approved it without delay. ” However, in early May 1941, the plan was rejected, and the KOVO command was ordered to develop a new plan for covering the border. To understand the reason for the refusal of the Red Army leadership from the KOVO plan, which became the pinnacle of the development of the strategic plans for the Red Army from August 19, September 18 and October 14 to October 1940, it is necessary to return to November 1940.

With the failure in November 1940 of the negotiations of V. Molotov with I. von Ribbentrop and A. Hitler, as well as the beginning of the diplomatic war between Germany and the USSR over Bulgaria, the issue of defeating Germany went from a theoretical plane to a practical one. Obviously, in this situation, the political and military leadership of the USSR decided, without giving up the initiative to the enemy, to defeat his armed forces, anticipating their mobilization and inflicting a preventive strike on Germany. In this situation, the agenda raised the question of increasing the composition of the Red Army to deliver a guaranteed and all-destructive preemptive strike by the KOVO grouping from the border of southern Poland to the Baltic coast, and a preventive strike demanded an increase in the composition of the Red Army in the pre-war period. Thus, the October strategic plan for the 1940 strategic deployment of the year, followed by the mobplan, the KOVO plan and the plans to defeat Finland, Romania and Turkey were canceled overnight and forgotten.

In December 1940, a meeting of the top commanders of the Red Army was held, at which new forms and methods of combat use of troops were considered taking into account the combat use of the armed forces of Germany, England and France in 1939-40. In early January, 1941 held two military-strategic games on the maps to determine the most effective preventive option of the Red Army in Germany - north or south of the Pripyat marshes to the Baltic Sea, bypassing the fortifications of East Prussia from Belostok and Lviv ledges, respectively. The development of a preemptive strike is indicated by the fact that both games began with offensive actions of the “Eastern” (USSR), while their actions to refine the reflection of the “Western” aggression were limited to a short and extremely vague preamble. In the first game, the “Eastern”, led by Pavlov, was struck around the fortifications of East Prussia, but the “Western”, inflicting a short counterstrike at the base of the “Eastern” offensive, questioned its effectiveness (8 scheme). At the game's analysis, the decision of D. Pavlov, who played for the “Eastern”, was recognized as correct, but with the proviso that for the success of such a deep strike, it is necessary to attract more forces and means.

In the second game, the "eastern" (USSR), striking south of the Pripyat marshes, quickly defeated the "southern" (Romania), "South-Western" (Hungary) and began a rapid advance into the territory of the "western" (Germany). That's it, this deployment option was approved as the main one (9 schema). Thus, for the second time, the southern version of the concentration of the Red Army in the West triumphed over the northern option. According to the results of the games, he led the "eastern" troops G. Zhukov in the second operational game on the maps by being appointed new chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to design and deliver a preemptive strike by the Red Army on Germany.

The fact that the strike was supposed to be exactly preventive, clearly indicates the appointment of J. Stalin to the start date of the March plan of G. Zhukov on 12 June 1941, as M. Meltyukhov and I. Stalin quite rightly noted, the date of the USSR attack on Germany could be appointed, and the date of the German attack on the USSR is not. In February, the 1941 of the year adopted a new mobilization plan providing for the transfer of the Red Army to the 314 divisions staff before the war (the 292 divisions deployed from the 22 tank brigades were added to the previous 43 divisions). In addition, apparently, everything was ready for the formation of a few dozen more divisions with the start of military operations.

11 March 1941, after the introduction of German troops in Bulgaria, and the British in Greece, the Soviet Union adopted a new strategic plan for the deployment of the Red Army, providing for the concentration of 144 divisions in the South-Western Front and in the North-Western and Western Fronts 82 division. This plan envisaged Germany striking the Baltic states on Riga and Daugavpils, Belarus on Volkovysk and Baranovichi with concentric strikes from Suvalki and Brest, and Ukraine on Kiev and Zhmerinka, with the aim of encircling and defeating the Lvov group of Soviet troops (10 scheme).

Fully March 1941 plan of the year has not been published anywhere else, however, it probably assumed a preemptive strike by the troops of the South-Western Front across Germany to the Baltic coast, with the aim of encircling and defeating the entire group of German forces in the East at once. The main difference of the March 1941 plan from the September and October 1940 plans is an increase in the grouping of the South-Western Front and the depth of the strike on Germany up to the Baltic coast, its mobilization and concentration in the pre-war period, the assumption is a decrease in the depth of Germany’s strike on the USSR in Belarus - not to Minsk, but to Baranavichy, and also, apparently, a strong link to the actions of the Anglo-Greek-Yugoslav-Turkish troops in the Balkan allies of Germany - Bulgaria, Italian Albania, Romania and Hungary.

The beginning of the development of plans for the introduction of troops into Iran by the USSR and England in March 1941 suggests the existence of some kind of agreement or agreement between them - England refuses the complete defeat of the Italians in North Africa and sends its troops to Greece from there to attack the Balkan allies of Germany and thus ensuring the unhindered defeat by the Red Army of the German grouping in the East, in exchange for protecting India from the attack of the troops of the German African Corps, Italy and France from North Africa and the Middle East East through Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Iran and further on to India (11 scheme). One thing is undoubtedly - in creating the Balkan front, Winston Churchill really sought to "cause a serious and favorable reaction in Soviet Russia."

Germany’s rapid defeat of Yugoslavia and Greece cooled I. Stalin’s determination to attack Germany. The March 1941 plan of the year was canceled. Evidently, Stalin denied friendship with W. Churchill and began to restore his relations with A. Hitler. Indicative in this regard is Stalin's categorical refusal of G. Zhukov’s proposal to be the first to attack Germany in accordance with plans of May 15 and June 13 of 1941.

The plan proposed by I. Stalin G. Zhukov on 15 of May 1941 of the year provided for a preemptive strike on Germany and Romania by the forces of 8 armies and 146 divisions of the South-Western Front and part of the forces of the Western Front with access to the Ostroleka-Olomouc line at the first stage, at the second - to the coast of the Baltic Sea in order to surround the East Prussian Wehrmacht group in the East. The reserve of the High Command of the Red Army behind the Western and Southwestern Fronts was to strike a counterattack on enemy units breaking through to Vilnius and Minsk, as well as to Kiev and Zhmerynka. The two armies of the RGK, stationed in the area of ​​Sychevka, Vyazma, Yelny and Bryansk at the junction railway stations, were to strengthen the troops of either the Western or South-Western fronts if necessary.

The German offensive was planned to be parried by letting the German assault groups out to Minsk and Kiev: they divided the Pripyat swamps and presented absolutely no threat to the Red Army, while at the same time guaranteeing the safety of the offensive of the Southwestern Front from the counterattack of the German troops. At the same time, a reliable cover of the USSR border with Germany in the region of East Prussia prevented the Germans from breaking into the Baltic and surrounding the troops of the Western Front in the Baranavichy region (12 scheme). The plan from 13 June 1941 of the year, slightly different from the May plan in individual details, exactly repeated this scheme (13 scheme).

13 June 1941 of the year to the German government through diplomatic channels was transmitted published in the Soviet press 14 June 1941 of the TASS message about the absence of tension between Germany and the Soviet Union. To understand the motivation of I. Stalin, who finally and irrevocably refused to deliver a preemptive strike on Germany, let us return to December 1940 of the year to a meeting of the top commanders of the Red Army.

Thus, we found out that after the establishment of a new state border, the General Staff of the Red Army developed a new plan for the deployment of the armed forces of the Red Army. The initial strike of the 94 divisions and the 7 tank brigades from the Lvov ledge to Krakow (40% of the 226 KA divisions) was deepened by the 126 divisions and 20 tank brigades first to Breslau (47% of 268 divisions) and then 134 divisions, and by the 20, I’m set out one another, I’m going to be a bit more comfortable with Breslau (BNLX) 46 divisions and 292 tank brigades first to Breslau (XNUMX% from XNUMX divisions) and then XNUMX tank divisions from XNUMX KA divisions from XNUMX KA divisions from XNUMX KA divisions from XNUMX KA divisions from XNUMX KA divisions from XNUMX KA divisions. coast (XNUMX% of XNUMX divisions). Since the expansion of cooperation with Germany was envisaged, the planning was “just in case”. The priority was the question of the division of spheres of influence in the Balkans and the liberation of Finland, the remainder of Bukovina and the Straits.

The situation changed dramatically after the collapse of the negotiations of V. Molotov with the German political leadership in November 1940. The liberation campaign was canceled. On the agenda was the question of a preemptive strike on Germany. The size of the Red Army was promptly increased to the required state by the summer of 1941, planning was worked out, but the plan for a preventive attack on Germany was not accepted for implementation.
1 schema. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations according to the deployment plan of March 24 from 1938 (Northern variant). Compiled by the note of the NGS KA BUT the USSR K.E. Voroshilov on the most likely opponents of the USSR // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 pr. Prince 2 / Appendix № 11 // www.militera.lib.ru


2 schema. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations according to the deployment plan dated March 24 from 1938 (Southern variant). Compiled by the note of the NGS KA BUT the USSR K.E. Voroshilov on the most likely opponents of the USSR // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 pr. Prince 2 / Appendix № 11 // www.militera.lib.ru


3 schema. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations in accordance with the deployment plan of 19 in August of 1940. Compiled according to a note by the NO of the USSR and NGS KA in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov on the basics of the strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in the West and in the East on 1940 and 1941 years // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 pr. Prince 1 / Document No. 95 // www.militera.lib.ru


4 schema. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations according to the 18 September plan for 1940 deployment. Compiled according to a note by the NO of the USSR and the National Space Directorate of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) - I.V. Stalin and V.Molotov on the basics of deploying the armed forces of the Soviet Union on West and East on the 1940 and 1941 years // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 pr. Prince 1 / Document No. 117 // www.militera.lib.ru


5 schema. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army against Finland in accordance with the 18 September plan for 1940 deployment. Compiled according to a note by the NO of the USSR and the Space Forces NGSH in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) - I.V. Stalin and V.Molotov on the basics of deploying the armed forces of the Soviet Union War with Finland // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 pr. Prince 1 / Document No. 118 // www.militera.lib.ru


6 schema. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations according to the 5 plan of October 1940 from the deployment. Compiled according to a note by the NO of the USSR and NGS KA in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) - I.V. Stalin and V.Molotov on the bases of deployment of the armed forces of the Soviet West and East for 1941 years // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 pr. Prince 1 // www.militera.lib.ru


7 schema. The actions of the troops of the South-Western Front according to the deployment plan for 1940 year. Compiled from a note by NS KOVO. December 1940 of the Year // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 pr. Prince 1 / Document No. 224 // www.militera.lib.ru


8 schema. The initial situation and the decisions of the parties on the first strategic game, held in the General Staff of the Red Army in January 1941. Copied by: Zakharov M.V. On the eve of great trials / General Staff in the pre-war years. - M., 2005. C. 366-367.


9 schema. The initial situation and the decisions of the parties on the second strategic game, held in the General Staff of the Red Army in January 1941. Copied by: Zakharov M.V. On the eve of great trials / General Staff in the pre-war years. - M., 2005. C. 370-371.


10 schema. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations according to the strategic deployment plan of March 11 from 1941. Reconstruction of the author. Compiled according to the note of the USSR BUT and NGS KA // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 pr. Prince 1 / Document No. 315 // www.militera.lib.ru


11 schema. Joint actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army and Great Britain in accordance with the strategic deployment plan of March 11 in 1941. Reconstruction of the author. Compiled according to the note of the USSR BUT and NGS KA // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 pr. Prince 1 / Document No. 315 // www.militera.lib.ru; Shtemenko S.M. General Staff during the war. In 2 pr. Prince 1 / 2-ed., Corr. and add. - M., 1975. - S. 20-21; Encyclopedia of the Second World War. Battle in the south: May 1940-June 1941 / Trans. from English - M., 2007. - S. 70 — 71.


12 schema. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations in accordance with the deployment plan of 15 in May of 1941 Stalin with considerations on the strategic deployment plan of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 pr. Prince 2 / Document No. 473 // www.militera.lib.ru


13 schema. Grouping of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations according to the deployment plan of 13 in June 1941. Compiled according to the certificate of the deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in case of war in the West // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 pr. Prince 2 / Document No. 550 // www.militera.lib.ru

Comments

[nikkon09]

I do not consider the leadership of the USSR of that time to be suicides ... Hitler already had the whole of Europe, and after this read nonsense, the whole world would turn against our country, no logic. Lord in a blind rush of groaning .... do not turn off your brains then ...

[vladimirZ]

Article is nonsense. The leadership of the USSR, soberly assessing its strength, could not be the first to start a war. "Military strategists" in the General Staff, not burdened with knowledge of politics and diplomacy, could "draw" arrows on maps.
But the first leader of the USSR, Stalin I.V., who was well versed in the international alignment of forces, strove by all means to avoid a military conflict. He knew that the Army was not prepared, this was shown in particular by the Winter War between the USSR and Finland.
In addition, Stalin I.V. was not a fool, he was well-versed in the international environment. The leadership of the USSR was well informed about the position of the leadership of the United States, the main potential force that decided the outcome of World Wars.
Stalin knew that F. Roosevelt's message to Congress on January 6, 1941, formulated the official goals of American foreign policy, which revealed the main foreign policy strategy of the ruling circles of the United States - "to wage war with someone else's hands, seeking the maximum weakening of the belligerents to the ultimate benefit of the United States." , and who will "provide the most resolute support to those peoples who will fight against aggression."
He knew the position of the US Congress, which was later expressed by Senator G. Truman, who said: “If we see that Germany is winning, then we should help Russia, and if Russia is winning, then we should help Germany and thus let them kill like as much as possible. "
Under these conditions, substitute the USSR as an aggressor in the war with Germany, Stalin I.V. He couldn’t, he understood that then not only the whole of Europe, but the whole world would fight against our country, which meant the inevitable death of the USSR.
Therefore, all these articles and authors preaching the theory of "first strike" from the USSR are incredible stupidity and distortion of real historical events.

[Cynic]

Quote: vladimirZ

Article is nonsense. The leadership of the USSR, soberly evaluating their forces, could not be the first to start a war.

Are you an idealist?
Such are the plans and the real staff games and are needed to demonstrate the absurdity of some great ideas!

[Cynic]

Quote: nikkon09

and after this read nonsense the whole world would turn against our country

You might think he (the whole world) was not against the USSR then.
You have a respected nikkon09 what was the story?
Yes, do not recall how the whole world turned against the USSR after the Finnish war?

[zmey_gadukin]

Quote: Cynic

Yes, do not recall how the whole world turned against the USSR after the Finnish war?

Well, yes, the moral embargo is a serious thing)))

[Cynic]

Quote: zmey_gadukin

the moral embargo is a serious thing

And then, in the price of the goods, money is still included to overcome it. Moral flour compensate.

But more like

[carbofo]

Cynic
I made myself such a picture on a T-shirt
http://cdn58.printdirect.ru/cache/product/c7/80/1645676/tov/all/480z480_front_15
0_0_0_0_6e36894e357fcc30cd525c558a394628.jpg?rnd=1286476624

[Mikhail Zubkov]

The GRU gave Stalin twice the number of tanks in Germany in September 1939, after the defeat of Poland - not less than 3500 in fact, and more than 7300. In 1940-41. The GRU regularly reported that the Germans had 10 airborne divisions, while they did not have a single (!), There was only a regiment of saboteurs "Brandenburg". Since 1940, in the reports of the GRU, Stalin had been sniffing about 10 Wehrmacht divisions in Bulgaria, while there were up to 10000 Germans in total throughout the war. In 1941, in the reports of the GRU, more than 10 enemy submarines scoured the Black Sea, while there was only one faulty Romanian submarine under repair in their port. There were also reports of 37 transports with an assault force to the Crimea, allegedly leaving the ports of Romania and Bulgaria. In Romania, there were 35 divisions in total, while the military maximum from there was 17,5. Instead of 3 German divisions in Norway and Finland, the GRU drew 7, instead of 3 Hungarian divisions, they scared the 7th, for Slovakia and Italy they also persistently overestimated the figures by two or three times. If you have such a RI, what plans could the future marshals Vatutin and Sokolovsky draw in our General Staff, having a party order for a war "with little blood on foreign territory" ?! One drew a counterattack on the border, and the other - a counterattack little in the depths. The result was the defeat of June 1941 as a result of the "conspiracy of generals and marshals of 1938". That year, by the way, there was also a poor harvest and famine in a number of regions of the USSR. What kind of "preventive war" and who could think in the General Staff of the Red Army in 1941? Only those who wanted the USSR to be defeated on foreign territory, and the most crushing defeat. Zhukov wrote these proposals in his secret notebook in the office of the People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Tymoshenko, literally under his dictation. One dictated, the other wrote, and knew for sure that if he didn’t write a dictation, he would be devoured with giblets on the “party affair” of 1938. That's the whole alignment of “professional strategic planning” in the General Staff of the Red Army.

[smersh70]

.good for staff workers - they draw and draw everything)))) ... but in fact, some kind of machine gun, platoon or battalion can make such introductory notes that it won’t seem enough

[poquello]

Quote: smersh70

.good for staff workers - they draw and draw everything)))) ... but in fact, some kind of machine gun, platoon or battalion can make such introductory notes that it won’t seem enough

Do you know that the Germans took Brest twice? The first among the Poles in 1939. So about staff

On the morning of September 21, the advanced units of the 29th tank brigade of Semyon Krivoshein approached Brest from the north. Krivoshein personally met with Guderian and after lengthy negotiations they signed an "Agreement with Soviet officers on the transfer of Brest-Litovsk"

...

At 23:30, the commander of the Belarusian Front, Mikhail Kovalev, sent the following telegram to Moscow:

"The established border on the Bug river in the city of Brest-Litovsk is extremely unprofitable for us for the following reasons: the city of Brest is divided into two parts by the border - the western bypass of the forts goes to the Germans, when the border is close it is impossible to use the richest barracks fund in Brest; and the city itself will be in the sphere of machine-gun fire; the crossings on the Bug river will not be covered by the necessary territory. The wonderful airfield in Malashevich will go to the Germans. The front commander asks to reconsider the borders in the Brest-Litovsk area "[8]

On October 3, the answer came:

"The border in Brest was established by agreements and it is impossible to change it" [8]

But, in order to preserve the entire Brest Fortress, the Soviet troops blocked the Bug and launched water along the bypass channel in front of the Terespol fortification. Then the Soviet representative gave this channel to the Germans for the Bug’s bed.along which the border was drawn. [8]

http://nado.znate.ru/%D0%9E%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B0_%D0%91%D1%80%D0%
B5%D1%81%D1%82_%281939%29

[Velez]

A lot of text, which is not so rare on this topic. At first I read it for thought, re-read it, then I just read it, now I run through my eyes and close the book / page because all this is profanity. And people writing texts are far from understanding what war is and what it means to rule a country. Perhaps the school years are affecting, where we were hammered by what the then CPSU needed, and we, at a mature age, continue to try to build the correct theories on incorrect assumptions.

[Avdy]

IMHO, the "deployment plans" presented are the usual KSHU on the maps, of which there are a great many. But even a cursory glance is enough to understand that most of them are not offensive, but counter-offensive. Perhaps I am mistaken, do not judge strictly, I did not finish the Academy of the General Staff :) However, the article smacks of Rezun :), I gave the author a "+" for his works, but I do not share his opinion.

[Avdy]

For "minus" I will try to argue my answer ...

The full March 1941 plan of the year has not yet been published anywhere, however, it probably implied a preventive strike by the troops of the Southwestern Front on Germany towards the Baltic coast, with the goal of encircling and defeating the entire group of German troops in the East.

There have always been and will be a great many such plans (offensive operations with the aim of a preventive strike) carried out at various command and control posts, as I wrote in a previous post. For, within the framework of strategic and operational-strategic planning, all options for the strategic deployment of troops should be calculated at a given probability of the development of the military-political situation. However, if

The plan proposed by I. Stalin G. Zhukov on 15 of May 1941 of the year ... preemptive strike against Germany and Romania

was implemented in the summer of 1941 - this would be the biggest strategic mistake of the Soviet leadership! The Soviet Union would be immediately recognized by all countries as an "aggressor", and a war would be launched against us with the support of the USA, Great Britain, etc.
But you yourself probably understand it yourself :)
My idea is that all plans for a preemptive strike against Germany (which, undoubtedly, were developed by the General Staff in those years) could not be approved and accepted for execution; and were only analytical in nature.
If I offended you by comparing with Rezun, I'm sorry

[Cynic]

Quote: Avdy

plans for a preemptive strike against Germany (which were undoubtedly developed by the General Staff in those years)

Sorry, but personally, for example, I was always amazed and amazed at the hysteria of the reaction of some individuals in general to the presence of such plans!
Caesaris uxoris suspici non est.

[Avdy]

Quote: Cynic

Sorry, but personally, for example, I was always amazed and amazed at the hysteria of the reaction of some individuals in general to the presence of such plans!

So I am about the same!
All headquarters of all armies of all countries of the world constantly conduct various "card games" and not always within the framework of the official military doctrine of the state, but this does not mean direct planning of aggression against other countries. Of course, if information about these plans leaks out, you can dream up as much as you like, up to a pretext for war.

[washi]

Complete nonsense.
Cards are a guide for idiots. So never do it.
But the fact that not all of the "Trotskyists" were purged from the Red Army is a fact.
One NGS what it cost.

[Volkhov]

I tried to lose the beginning of the war for the Germans and Russians - a convenient month to start is only March.
If the Germans - the main blow on the Kola Peninsula, auxiliary in the interfluve of the Danube and the Dniester, in April - the Baltic states, then the advance from north to south with borders along the Z. Dvina and Dnieper, July - the line Lovat, Ilmen, Volkhov, access to the Belomorkanal. August - landing on Kanin’s nose, the mouth of the Ob, the mouth of the Yenisei and Norilsk.
If the USSR - an offensive on the right bank of the Danube, access to Yugoslavia, Greece, Hungary. July - Vistula-Oder operation, then everywhere.
What happened in reality is more genocide than war - a wide front, no lines of planned defense, no cutting of allied communications. The war of "opponents" was clearly composed in one headquarters, taking into account the maximum devastation of Europe, which was achieved.

[Bigriver]

Quote: Volkhov

I tried to lose the beginning of the war for the Germans and Russians - a convenient month to start is only March.
If the Germans - ..., in April .., August - ...
If the USSR - an offensive on the right bank of the Danube, access to Yugoslavia, Greece, Hungary. July - Vistula-Oder operation, then everywhere ....

In all this there is no sense whatsoever. WWII became a war. But, the Germans planned the COMPANY in 2-4 months.

1. The war could not be planned until the summer-fall of 1940.
2. Even if planned, the military could not concentrate by March 1941.
3. The Germans believed, and justifiably, that it is possible to start a DB in the east due to the condition of the roads NOT earlier than mid-May. You named the most "dull" period of March-April. Not a single strategic operation in the Second World War began either by us or by the Germans at that time in Russia.
In relation to the USSR-aggressor.
The country did not have such opportunities. We will drop strategy, economics and politics and take only the military aspect.
The Red Army was in the process of reorganization and rearmament, which were supposed to be completed by the end of 1942.
Although, if you hold the leadership of the USSR for clinical idiots, then anything is possible.

[Avdy]

Quote: BigRiver

Regarding the USSR-aggressor ... if you hold the leadership of the USSR for clinical idiots, then anything is possible.

The fact of the matter is that the supporters of this idea are trying to convey this to us! In parallel with other ideas, such as "USSR is an evil empire", "Stalin is a bloody tyrant", etc. All in order to tarnish the history of our great country ...

[Volkhov]

Quote: BigRiver

considered, and justified, that it is possible to start the DB in the east due to the state of the roads NOT earlier than mid-May. You named the most "dull" period of March-April. Not a single strategic operation in the Second World War began either by us or by the Germans at that time in Russia.

This translation of the template is a debauchery and is necessary to ensure the offensive at strategic points. It provides defense in passive sectors (most of the front) and allows the fleet, aviation, naval and airborne assault forces to operate freely. If the main blow is at Kola, then there is no dirt in the sea, in Norway any lake is an airfield, only clear the ice from the snow. The German fleet is 100 times stronger than the North Fleet, and the transfer along the Belomorkanal in March is impossible, and the delivery of replenishment from Arkhangelsk by sea is also possible. And the capture of Kola itself blocks supply and communication across the Atlantic, that is, it divides the allies.
The mirror situation in the south - if the Soviet Union is approaching, the Black Sea Fleet is 100 times stronger than the Romanian fleet, Crimean airfields are always ready, and access on the right bank of the Danube to Yugoslavia gives a strategic gain.
But in reality, they were engaged not in strategy but in genocide - everything was stereotyped and with maximum losses.

[Bigriver]

Quote: Volkhov

This translation of the template is a debauchery and is necessary to ensure the offensive at strategic points. It provides defense in passive sectors (most of the front) and allows the fleet, aviation, naval and airborne assault forces to operate freely ...

Okay, let's say your qualification is above Paulus :-)
But, I just have a breakthrough of questions. I'll start small ...
1. You have spread the entire course of the company with small forces with dubious possibilities of supplying strike groups for several months. What for? Are you an agent of the Kremlin? :-)
You deprived the Wehrmacht of its operational-tactical know-how - to beat on a narrow front with powerful mobile groups DEEP and FAST. And using the maximum supply capabilities. That is why the Germans did so well against Pavlov. There is a dense railway network. And do you propose starting with Kola ?: // Give the USSR the opportunity to mobilize .., prepare a theater.
What damn landings, air force and navy? These operations will defeat the Red Army before the Dnieper in the shortest possible time?

[Volkhov]

On the contrary, the whole company is a series of operations on a narrow front (operations), with each operation having a strategic goal - Kola (March) - separation of allies and seizure of the port, Baltic (April) - seizure of the coast to Z. Dvina and ensuring the offensive by mechanized forces in May from north to south with a flank along the Z. Dvina and the Dnieper with the support of their infantry units from west to east. At the same time, the mechanized units travel a long way along the rivers, and the infantry ones - a smaller one in the transverse direction. The supply of tank groups at the same time is not from behind (which is impossible in speed and range), but from the side - from Germany and Poland, and the roads mainly lead there. As a result of the company in 41, there is a line along the rivers Dnieper, Lovat, Volkhov, Belomorkanal, the White Sea and bases on Kanin, the mouth of the Ob, the mouth of the Yenisei and Norilsk - that is, the transport blockade of the center of the USSR.

[Bigriver]

Quote: Volkhov

... the whole company is series of operations on a narrow front (operations), while each operation has a strategic goal - Kola (March) - separation of allies and seizure of the port, Baltic (April) - capture of the coast to W. Dvins and provision of an offensive by mechanized forces in May from north to south with a flank along the Z. Dvina and Dnieper with the support of their infantry units from west to east. At the same time, the mechanized units travel a long way along the rivers, and the infantry ones - a smaller one in the transverse direction.

You name the SECONDARY goals that matter in a LONG WAR, as a result of the failure of the blitzkrieg.
Let's get back to the tasks that the Germans set:
"The operation will have meaning only if we crush the entire state with one swift blow entirely. It is not enough just to seize some part of the territory. "(A. Hitler)
To accomplish this, the Germans had a mechanism in the form of tank groups capable of operating deeply and independently, and infantry armies with a well-developed and perfected system of interaction with aviation and artillery.
For 1941, no one in the world had such a perfectly tuned mechanism.
But he had one drawback! He could act effectively only for a limited number of months and in collision with an unprepared enemy. Those., unexpectedly, quickly, concentrating all the forces in the first blow, deep.
Let's get back to the idea of ​​Barbarossa:
“To split the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of the country, fast and deep blows of powerful mobile groups to the north and south of the Pripyat swamps and, using this breakthrough, to destroy the fragmented groups of enemy troops. "

1. How, having driven an expeditionary infantry corps into the forest-tundra of the Kola Peninsula (your main blow), which will move in a stream along one or two roads to the south, can you shake the main forces of the Russian armies in front of the Dnieper to the base?
2. What will the main and decisive forces of the Wehrmacht — the tank groups of Kleist, Guderian, Goth, Gepner — do at this time? More truly not so. I guess they will smoke bamboo, but - where?

[Volkhov]

You either did not understand what was written or pretend.
3 The Reich allegedly fought with a group of states, and for success in the classical war these states must be divided - for this, the Kola operation.
Tank groups at this time partially operated in Moldova, pushing the line of defense of Romania, and mainly began to operate in April in the Baltic states and from there attack the south.
In fact, the 3rd Reich was created by the same banks as the USSR and the "war" carried out the task of genocide of Russians and partly Germans, so Hitler and Paulus were not going to win at all, they just carried out the scenario on their part, and Zhukov with other bank employees - with the other side.
The Germans at that time were building the 4 Reich secret from banks (successfully), the Russians and Stalin tried to reform the USSR (unsuccessfully, because Stalin did not find support because of the illiteracy of the environment).
The arguments attributed to Hitler about the defeat of "the entire state as a whole" are nonsense, since The USSR was made in the USA and it is necessary to defeat the entire system of Zionism in the USA, the British Empire, China ... and not only the western regions of the USSR, as practice has shown.
An analysis of hostilities shows the absence of a classical war and the chimera of the 3rd Reich, which partially served Zionism and fulfilled the order for genocide, and partially - Nazism and ensured the creation and evacuation of the 4th Reich.
Both tasks were completed - tens of millions were killed and 4 Reichs were created - over the past six months they have drowned the entire fleet of the Russian Federation ... so that an analysis of the past responds in the present and shows a near future.

[Bigriver]

Quote: Volkhov

You either did not understand what was written or pretend.
3 The Reich allegedly fought with a group of states, and for success in the classical war these states must be divided - for this the Kola operation ...

No, it’s you who know the realities poorly and, moreover, don’t want to hear what I’m saying (in the top posts).
There was simply no question of any classical war in the East. I repeat: the CAMPAIGN was planned, which was supposed to end by a maximum of November 41 years. For no reason - political, economic, demographic, etc., Germany could not afford a full-scale war. The calculation was for a fleeting campaign of the sample Poland-France.
Already in the winter of 1941, the Wehrmacht was supposed to go on partial demobilization and a large aviation program, sharpened by the bending of England, was to start.
In these realities there was a side effect - is the USSR part of the anti-Hitler coalition or not. As you may know, the first Lendliz brook flowed into the Soviets only in the fall of 1941. That is, then, when the campaign was supposed to end by the destruction of a member of the very anti-Hitler coalition - the USSR. So why fool yourself with the concentration of some army corps in the forest-tundra, in order to divide the FUTURE allies, if you can quickly destroy one of the allies with a quick blow to the shortest direction?
I repeat, sorry for importunity. Under no circumstances could Hitler in the realities of 1941 be able to plan, as you put it, a classical war and think about some kind of division. The rapid folding of the neck of the USSR to a large extent solved the problem of America. Since with the departure of the Union into oblivion, Japan would have significantly strengthened in the Asia-Pacific region. She would have bound the states, while Germany in 1942 would have done away with England, bending them to the world.

[Volkhov]

The USA and the USSR have been allies since 17, all industrialization is an American project and neither industrial nor military activity is possible without the supply of materials - only peasant farming. And deliveries - 25% Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, 49% through the Far East - for that and the landing on Kola and the mouth of the Yenisei.
But then the Germans were not independent and executed the American script.

[Bigriver]

Quote: Volkhov

The USA and the USSR have been allies since 17, all industrialization is an American project ...

Well, speaking of investments, they went from America to Germany too.
You can google the Dawes Plan.
Here you have to choose one thing. Either we are talking about real military planning, or - about controversial conspiracy theories. There is a difference between them, as between the Soviet lunar program and the work "Dunno on the Moon".
The real military planning of Germany, its strategic tasks are confirmed by hundreds of authentic documents and certificates.
The task is formulated very clearly by Hitler a few days after the signing of the surrender by France in June 1941: defeat of Soviet Russia in a fleeting campaign before the war against England is over. " Everything, period. Then I went to write Brauchitsch and Halder's "kitchen".
For the German planning of "Barbarossa" I recommend reading Alfred Filippi "The Pripyat problem".

[ingvar69]

Of course, people with a military education will find a lot of flaws in this article. And I liked it. In the end, the army should always have plans. And if there are no defense plans, then what is? They say the whole world would be against us, perhaps. But how could this world prevent us in the summer of 1941. America was just beginning to mobilize. England came to its senses after "Dunkirk", "Crete" and "Battle of Britain". Japan is bogged down in China. Plus "Khalkhin Gol 1939". But after JUNE 22, what became better for us?

[Takashi]

Finally, someone tried to scientifically explain what happened before the start of the WWII!

Article clearly +

Would like to note:
"The poor knowledge of the events of the summer of 1941 provoked a heated discussion about the plans of the Soviet military and political leadership on the eve of the Great Patriotic War and their role in the catastrophic defeat of the Red Army in the summer of 1941."

Not weak studied. NO. Just Silence. If you turn to most memoirs, as well as to the textbook of the History of Russia.
That WoW begins on June 22. And what happened to the country and the heroes up to this point - as if the memory had disappeared.

[poquello]

Quote: Takashi

Finally, someone tried to scientifically explain what happened before the start of the WWII!
Article clearly +

yes, also set +, but so to speak for the labors, before the start of WWII WWII was already going on in which Hitler tamed Europe as he wanted

[oracul]

In this presentation, the story really takes on the taste of Rezun. There are military subtleties that professional people should understand. Too many divorced as newly-minted historians, such as Akunin, and overt anti-advisers, such as Pivovarov, who interpret their interpretations, their vision, their understanding, their hatred of the Soviet past, of the people as the ultimate truth.

[Igarr]

Hello colleagues...
I liked the comments.
But the article - no, I didn’t like it.
Such a violent beginning .... just about the whole truth, the uterus will trample out, just about the most super-duper secret plans will be made public ...
I was delighted.
I read it - I did it ..... well, for a long time, I think we’ll get such a nonsense ... under the brand name - The Newest, Secret, Secret.
What is clear from this work?
But it is clear that the General Staff of the Red Army did not have any worthwhile plans !!!
If the strategic deployment plans change every quarter, if each plan is tied to yet another increase in the number of divisions, if Churchill's sneezing and Ribbentrop’s bouts cause seizures of Zhukov’s aggression and yet another alteration of Bagramyan’s STRATEGIC plans (which plans to overturn like two fingers on asphalt) - this is not a study .
This is an attempt take hold as a researcher by the author.
.......
Strongly did not like it.
...
Rezun just said - the Soviet Union was ready to tear Europe into rags.
And I, for my part, will say - well, let them tear it apart ... it would not bother me at all. Because the USSR is my homeland.
..
And I don’t like all sorts of bells and whistles.
And, such another question .... and if the counterattack was struck two hours earlier (or a day) than the enemy attacked ..... is that what?

[zmey_gadukin]

Plus for your comment!

[Power]

History teaches only that which teaches nothing.

[SIT]

Quote: Igarr

And, such another question .... and if the counterattack was struck two hours earlier (or a day) than the enemy attacked ..... is that what?

This is what Hitler justified his actions.

[Snoop]

I read, at first interested, a really interesting topic for study and discussion. But ... nothing new, and I did not understand the author’s conclusions, some kind of wagging. And the fact that the General Staff had a lot of plans for waging war with Germany is by itself. If you delve into it, you can probably find a bunch of draft options with different versions of the start of the war.

[EvilLion]

The fact that the strike was supposed to be precisely preventive is unambiguously indicated by the appointment by I. Stalin of the start date for the implementation of the March plan of G. Zhukov on the 12 of June 1941 of the year — as M. Meltiukhov quite correctly noted

What kind of nonsense? Any date can be set, but it will be a preventive strike, or not, not decided by Zhukov. From the point of view of the technology of warfare, there is no difference, but the strike must somehow be justified before the world community, Hitler attacked without making claims of the USSR, as a result he was beaten together, fight like that of the USSR, and for some advantage in the beginning, they could already beat him.

Concentration according to the southern variant, or according to the north, was decided according to the situation, it was easier to advance in the south, concentration was one and a half times longer, in the north there were problems with actions in East Prussia. There is no need to rush through the open door and do not know what, the general staff also cannot foresee everything and just develop the most probable scenarios, the choice between which will be determined by the situation.

[poquello]

Quote: EvilLion

... Hitler attacked without claiming the USSR, in the end he was beaten together ...

Did Japan beat him too?

[Moore]

The author of the material, if I'm not mistaken, set out not to leave a stone unturned from the statements of the "opponents" about the preparation of a preventive strike by the Red Army against Germany?
Well, yes, well, yes ... The proposed article seems to me to be nothing more than another reincarnation of the "immortal" doctrine of Rezun - "Suvorov".
At least, the date 12.06.41 (at Rezun 13.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX) appears on both of them as the beginning of some actions of the Red Army to prepare an attack on Germany. Well, for example, as the beginning of the mass advance of troops to the borders.
The question of the need to create a group of troops of the Red Army, at least somehow equal to the German one (we consider the divisions in the first echelon), is arrogantly rejected by the resident in principle.
Conclusion: the goals set at the beginning of the article are directly opposite to the statements in the subsequent text.
With all further conclusions regarding the author.

[Avdy]

Quote: Volkhov

What was in reality - more genocide than war - a wide front, neither the frontiers of planned defense nor the cutting of allied communications.

Military historians have said / written a lot about the insolvency of the Barbarossa plan.

[Volkhov]

The comments are about non-independence war plan on both sides.

[karavay1982]

Again hysteria began - the USSR and the preemptive strike on Germany, but it cannot be, as you might think -SSSR -GRESSOR. God forbid, only liberals and unfinished Trotskyists could write such a thing about the USSR.
Maybe we’ll stop ...
Maybe we will remove the emotions and still figure it out ... Of course the story is written for posterity and no one wants to get into it with a black mark.
The question is - during the First World War, in accordance with the plan, Russian troops went on the offensive in East Prussia, but did not concentrate on the border and would wait for the Prussians.
NOBODY IS DRYING THAT THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE WAS AN AGGRESSOR. The "staff officers" drew up a plan according to which Russia was to win, but, as always, they did not take into account many factors and, as always, the caprice prevailed.
You yourself know what the result was.
Why is it so shameful that the USSR had a plan of a preventive strike against Germany. Or we have a victorious strategy - to lure the enemy deep into the territory of Russia and closer to Moscow "pile" on him.
So what???
Why DO NOT we have a preventive plan to strike at a possible enemy ?!
Someone forbade us this. Why, for example, the Americans publicly declared how much they want to bomb Soviet cities with nuclear bombs. Nobody showed them something to the "goat".
And then the USSR was about to attack Germany.
Oh God!!! The Bolsheviks are generally "beasts", and the 3rd REICH is such a sweetheart.
It would be naive to wait for the enemy to come to his native land and look at the global community to see if he would threaten his finger.
I’ll write the obvious thing after the bombings oh how difficult it is to restore the economy.
and IT IS CORRECT THAT SUCH A PLAN WAS. But the question is, what SPECIFICALLY prevented him from realizing - the political weakness of the Soviet leaders, the betrayal of "CERTAIN PERSONS" and whether he was realizable by the Red Army in those conditions.

[Moore]

Preventive war (fr. Préventif, from lat. Praevenio - I’m advancing, warning) is a war that is launched, believing that a future conflict is inevitable, and whose main goal is to get ahead of aggressive actions on the part of the enemy.
This is how the concept of "preventive" is interpreted. Those. if we are talking about the original plan of the first (preemptive) strike on the alleged to the enemy - this is one case.
When someone, already forerunner real the adversary - who has declared war and launched hostilities - in terms of concentration and maneuver (the case of 1914 in East Prussia), inflicts a planned peaceful strike in order to achieve victory - this is, after all, something else.
The pre-war action plans of the Red Army from the same plans of the Republic of Ingushetia did not differ much - only in the places of strikes (counterattacks).
Hence, there is no point in talking about preventive action, as such.

[Bigriver]

Quote: Moore

... Hence, there is no point in talking about preventive measures, as such.

Good point. I also wanted to say about it, but did not happen.
According to those ideas, the war SHOULD start in a different way. And we were waiting for such a development. First: the presentation of claims, requirements, then - the declaration of war, then the border battle under the guise of which was to be mobilized, concentrated, deployed.
All in all, it was really a shock! Without any declaration of war, the maximum of motorized forces thrown into a deep breakthrough in narrow sections of the front.
A strike can be considered preemptive even after the declaration of war, but before concentration and deployment. Or, for example, at the time of concentration.
On the eve of the war, we fairly accurately calculated all the accumulating forces of the aggressor, but considered that they were not enough and the process would go further.

[SIT]

Quote: BigRiver

According to those ideas, the war SHOULD start in a different way. And we were waiting for such a development.

And why actually expected that everything will be different? Blitzkrieg theory was developed in 1911. There was already a defeat of Poland, there was already a Gelb operation, already the commander of the French army was transferred to the Soviet embassy, ​​analyzed by Soviet intelligence and Zhukov was informed of a thorough analysis of the defeat of France. Blitzkrieg had already been put on stream and it was clear that it could not be avoided.

[Bigriver]

Quote: SIT

And why actually expected that everything will be different? The Blitzkrieg theory was developed in 1911. Poland was already defeated, Gelb was already under operation, the commander of the French army was transferred to the Soviet embassy, ​​analyzed by Soviet intelligence and Zhukov was given a thorough analysis of the defeat of France. Blitzkrieg had already been put on stream and it was clear that it could not be avoided.

Blitzkrieg is not a war without a declaration of war, it is a theory of conducting a lightning war, in fact, one continuous strategic operation.
Before the German attack on Poland, there was a long threatened period. There were territorial claims of Germany to Poland, there was a long prehistory. And, by the way, Poland was the first to refuse a peaceful resolution to the conflict and went in the spring to mobilize and prepare for war.
In France. This campaign was preceded by a months-long "strange war" declared by France and Britain to Germany after the attack on Poland.
Germany had no complaints against Soviet Russia, but there was a Pact.

[SIT]

Quote: karavay1982

Why DO NOT we have a preventive plan to strike at a possible enemy ?!

According to Goebbels’s propaganda, Barbaross was just such a plan.

[Khrushchev]

what you are talking about is the end result of rotten Stalinist propaganda. any sane person understands that in those conditions one is not preparing for a future war, this is insanity or a crime. But Comrade Dzhugashvili has such a storyteller. In Europe, you understand peace and tranquility reigned, and then suddenly abasratushki. And the court propagandists were FSUs. not only for historical accuracy, but even for everyday plausibility, the main thing is that the boss is not angry. So they drove the perfect bullshit, and the comrades like the rezun then did not make bad money by "refuting" this lie with another lie. this is how Byzantine is a la Kadyrov style The communes seem to be turning in a coffin, looking at such twists of ideologists of the 3rd Rome and indescribable d.zm

[Bigriver]

Quote: Avdy

... Military historians have said / written a lot about the failure of the Barbarossa plan.

This is already "candy" of afterthought :))) Barbarossa relied on the relevant information flows and analytics of that time.
We now know that they inadequately reflected the potential of the USSR.
Well, their theory of racial superiority failed nemchuru. They did not consider us equal to themselves in any, even unexpected scenario.
Throughout the war, poor people suffered from a mismatch between reality and their expectations

[zmey_gadukin]

Quote: BigRiver

Well, their theory of racial superiority failed nemchuru.

they were let down by stupidity, cowardice before Hitler and the complete failure of German intelligence in assessing the potential of the USSR.

[alone]

Quote: zmey_gadukin

they were let down by stupidity, cowardice before Hitler and the complete failure of German intelligence in assessing the potential of the USSR.

about cowardice, it is somehow doubtful, but the stupidity just consisted in assessing the potential of the USSR. Yes, and intelligence has nothing to do with it. Today it is known for a bit that the German ambassador Werner von der Schulenberg, as well as several generals and officers, in particular Krebs and Körsting, warned the authorities that the capabilities of the USSR were greatly diminished and were against the barbarossa plan. but the possessed Adolf would not have been Adolf if he had listened to this warning. The Reich was led by the lunatic and his regime. So war was inevitable.

[zmey_gadukin]

How doubtful is this about cowardice? One must have the courage to defend one’s opinion with the highest authorities. Rokossovsky was not afraid to argue with Stalin himself.
And intelligence clicked. Clicked even the approximate quantity and quality of artillery, tanks, etc., etc. ...

[Igarr]

Damn, guys ....
Barbaross's plan clearly speaks of the end of the won by October.
Before the onset of frost ... !!!
Well, once again, no luck .. the aggressor ... as we are at this, 2014, New Year ...
And the fact that pedantic Germans from universities in Prussia were not lucky in the vastness of Russia ... well, we will not ...
I like the Germans from the Rhine Valley much more ... Prussians-Hochdeich ..
This is a pure opinion eee .....

[Falcon5555]

The fact that the strike was supposed to be precisely preventive is clearly indicated by the appointment by I. Stalin of the start date for the implementation of the March plan of G. Zhukov on June 12, 1941 - as M. Meltiukhov quite rightly noted, the date of the Soviet attack on Germany could be set, and the date of the German attack on the USSR is not.

After such a "historical" discovery that Stalin ordered an offensive on June 12, 1941, this entire historical problem - "what Stalin wanted" can be considered solved, and this page of historical science and journalism is closed. Historians will certainly polish the details, but they always do that. But here's the bad luck:
1. Where is the link to the source?
2. There is no source - and it is not clear in what context was this assigned? Just for playing cards? Or in reality?
3. Why did this not happen in reality?
4. What does Meltiukhov have to do with it? Where is the link at least to his work with the indication of its data, so there to look for clarifications?

The German offensive was planned to be fended off by letting the German strike groups to Minsk and Kiev: they, separated by the Pripyat swamps, did not pose any threat to the Red Army, at the same time guaranteeing the security of the offensive of the troops of the Southwestern Front against German counterattack.

For the first time I see such a nonsense. To let the enemy armies to the rear and they would not pose a threat ??? And after all, approximately this happened in reality. And led, as you know, to a catastrophe of unprecedented scale in history. How many were captured - 5, it seems, millions of soldiers? Shame on you! In the region of Kiev alone - 690 thousand. But we read further:

At the same time, reliable cover of the USSR-Germany border in the region of East Prussia prevented the Germans from breaking into the Baltic states and the encirclement of troops of the Western Front in the Baranavichy region (Figure 12). The plan of June 13, 1941, slightly differing from the May plan by individual details, exactly repeated this scheme (Scheme 13).

It turned out that the links are given under the schemes.
I was not too lazy and found them. It turned out that neither in the document to which the signature under Scheme 12, nor, respectively, 13 refers, there is any mention of the Germans' passage to Kiev or Minsk, and that this will not present "absolutely no urgoza."

[Falcon5555]

Typo: "there is no mention of the pass ..."

More interesting quotes from the article:

Three scenarios were proposed: the Red Army was preparing for defense, a preventive attack on Germany or the defeat of the Wehrmacht in the USSR.

And I thought that they were going to smash the enemy on foreign territory.

For the first time in detail and with reason, with reference to specific documents, a plan for the defeat of the Wehrmacht troops on the territory of the Soviet Union is shown.

The author is not in himself, or what?

That is why when in the summer of 1940 I. Stalin, deciding to deepen the friendship of the USSR with Germany for the sake of dividing the Balkans into spheres of influence and placing the Black Sea Straits at the disposal of the USSR, so as not to repeat the unenviable fate of England and France, for which friendship with Germany turned into open hostility, and giving Soviet diplomats freedom of action with respect to Germany, at the same time he demanded that his military provide security guarantees for the USSR from any surprises from Germany.

I don’t understand anything. Deepen friendship ... for the sake of separation ... so as not to repeat ... and giving, and what giving? - freedom to diplomats? but when did he give someone freedom? ... and at the same time demanded ... What is there for the sake of what and why? And giving ..?

With the failure of the negotiations of V. Molotov with I. von Ribbentrop and A. Hitler in November 1940, as well as the start of the German diplomatic war with the USSR over Bulgaria, the question of defeating Germany from the theoretical plane passed into the practical one. Obviously, in this situation, the political and military leadership of the USSR decided, without giving up the enemy’s initiative, to defeat his armed forces, preventing their mobilization and delivering a preemptive strike on Germany.

How did this become obvious to the author? Links, documents?
However, the question of links can be asked for each paragraph.

To understand the motivation of I. Stalin, who finally and irrevocably refused to launch a preemptive strike against Germany,

Where did the author get that Stalin refused something?

The situation changed dramatically after the failure of negotiations of V. Molotov with the German political leadership in November 1940. The liberation campaign was canceled. The issue of launching a preemptive strike on Germany was on the agenda.

And the liberation campaign could not take place immediately after the preemptive strike?

The document referenced by Scheme 12 is, as far as I know about it, long debates are going on, whether it is a description of the plan adopted by Stalin, or an unaccepted proposal, and whether Stalin saw him at all.

As far as I know, the first idea that Stalin's plans changed significantly over time was expressed by Solonin. But he does have a study with links to documents, not verbiage, as in this article.

[Zomanus]

Damn, give me the cards and I’ll draw a dofiga shooter too. But in fact, it turned out that our army was hated, there was no operational communication on the march and poor supply. By the way, all our puffed-up exercises only show that our equipment does not break immediately upon leaving the base and that our soldier officers are awesomely following orders. Nobody knows how it will actually be there. And again, the people were ideologically preparing for war. The TRP and other sporting events were sharpened so that if something happened, if the meat came to the army, then it was healthy and muscular. And now, who will go to war when the army is dusted? Fans of computers and yagi?

[Cpa]

The hasty deployment of URs on the western border in the spring of 1941 did not leave stone unturned from real plans for a preemptive strike against Germany. The Finnish war began because of the need to protect Leningrad from direct shelling and bombing of the Wehrmacht allies. Of course, plans could be developed, but in reality tried to gain a foothold in the newly acquired territories.

[Cynic]

Quote: KPA

, does not leave stone upon stone from

There is such a teaching as dialectics _ in which
recognized the formation and resolution of contradictions in the very essence of developing objects
So, from the standpoint of dialectics, the construction of SDs is an argument for and against.
Here, in fact, black humor among some skips about considering, in all seriousness, the projections on LUSHING THE SUPPOSTER at the first stage.
The doctrine "War with little blood on foreign territory" then dominated and go across it ...
Under Joseph Vissarionovich planted for less.
And by the way, if she is guided then the fate of the URs along the old border is not surprising. To leave them is to doubt this very doctrine!

[kaktus]

"Is there life on Mars, is there life on Mars ..." What happened has happened, regardless of the old plans and new "interpretations".

[Power]

Is it better now? "Unexpected teachings" that were reported in three days? or more? Like Obama or the Chinese will call our ruling henchmen three days before the strike, so that they have time to collect brahlyshko. That's why he and "a sudden lightning strike" so that they stay here, and everything acquired by "back-breaking labor" is there.

[Cynic]

Quote: Strength

"Unexpected teachings" that were reported in three days?

So I understand that you are an opponent of any kind of teaching?

Quote: Strength

That's why he and "a sudden lightning strike" so that they stay here, and everything acquired by "back-breaking labor" is there.

Ek, how anger makes you out.
And do not blame the power of those in your personal problems, they are up to you, to me ...
Usually, only yourself should be blamed for your failures, not counting of course the collapse of the USSR and the default of the 98th, the rest is not fatal.

what doesn't kill makes us stronger

[Power]

No, I just liked the "sudden" teachings that were warned about almost a week in advance.

[Cynic]

Quote: Strength

I just liked the "sudden" teachings that were warned about

Do you think this is the know-how of our powers that be?
But I liked it For three days ! Usually planned PER YEAR_I am !

[makeev.dmitry]

But in Martirosyan's book "The Truth of the Generalissimo" there is nothing about the plans of a preventive offensive. But there is a hint of the criminal arbitrariness of Zhukov and Timoshenko.

[msv]

The article is undoubtedly a plus for the topic and an attempt to delve into a very important issue. Despite the bulk of emotional comments, as well as a number of controversial statements and conclusions of the article, this is really an interesting question for me.
Because it lies on the same plane with questions about the causes of the defeats of 1941. Still, the discussion should be turned into the plane of thoughtfulness and calm analysis, without urapatriotism and idiocy.
I am pleased to read part 2.
makeev.dmitry
I gave you a plus. I did not read Martirosyan's work itself, but I did read some materials on the theme of June 22, 1941 and some generals, including those allegedly "innocently killed" by Stalin. Agree, many questions arise, to which there are no unambiguous answers today.