Military Review

Secret concessions. What prompted the Japanese to conclude a neutrality agreement with us in 1941?

34
In 1941, Japan dominated the Far East, which then occupied Korea and Manchuria. The center of industrial production, which included mining, and gigantic production at that time, was among the Japanese in this region, and in our country, far in the European part. From the point of view of military power, both sea and land, we could only proceed from the fact that in the event of Japanese aggression we could only hold out until reinforcements from the western part of our country arrived.


We have a widespread opinion that the samurai kept our victories on Hassan and Khalkhin Gol from starting a war. In part, this is so, intoxicated by the chain of continuous military triumphs, our neighbors for the first time knew then the bitterness of defeat. But look at these events from the position of Tokyo. They were presented to the Japanese people as a victory: many photographs were taken of the captured Soviet prisoners of war and captured, latest weapons samples at that time. And only in a secret report to the emperor it was said about losses, but again, the numbers were downplayed at times, if not by an order of magnitude. So, in the understanding of the majority of politicians and the public, the samurai sword at the end of 1930 — the beginning of 1940’s was not broken.

Add to this and other border incidents, in which the Japanese were able to win the upper hand. Their essence in brief is as follows. In the summer of 1937, near Blagoveshchensk, the Japanese managed to push Sennukh and Bolshaya on the Amur River from the Soviet border guards who landed there ten days earlier, sinking our armored ship and damaging several more ships. A day later, another Soviet border ship was sunk on Amur. The Japanese government undertook a demarche, and the USSR was forced to agree to withdraw its troops from both islands to their previous positions, although before that it had been a question of preparing hardly an entire Soviet division for combat operations. The Japanese here managed to get around us both on the military front and on the diplomatic front.

So, believing that we were able to “convince” our island neighbors not to start a fight on our Far Eastern borders, showing our strength, are true, but only partially.

The most capacious level of the military capabilities of the two countries was reflected by the Japanese historian Fujiwara Akira. He pointed out that “a comparison of the armies of the two countries should be carried out taking into account the entire number of troops that the parties could use in the event of war. For the USSR, a very serious problem was the large length of the railway from Europe to Siberia, which, moreover, had only one track. On the other hand, surrounded by the seas, Japan could concentrate troops using sea routes. This provided her with a decisive advantage. In addition, the main part of Japan’s investment in Manchuria was for the construction of strategic railway lines leading to the Soviet border, which ensured the rapid deployment of troops. In Japan, there was a plan to concentrate in the border area for three to four months after the outbreak of the war the millionth group. Given this, the Soviet Union was forced to increase the number of deterrent forces in the Far East as early as the peace period. ”

Some of our historians came to believe that the impossibility of obtaining reliable intelligence information by the Japanese was one of the deterrent factors. It is alleged that after the fall of 1937, when Koreans were evicted from the Far East, among which Japanese reconnaissance agents might have disappeared, the samurai did not have a single chance to get accurate information about the condition of our troops and the situation in the adjacent territories. It looks logical, but too easy ...

With a more rigorous analysis, you begin to understand that something is wrong here. The "islanders" had plenty of agents among the many immigrants of old Russia in Northeast China, and nobody canceled the technical intelligence and capabilities of several Japanese consulates on Sakhalin and Kamchatka.

However, our opponents had a trump ace up their sleeve: in 1938, Heinrich Lyushkov, the top Chekist in the entire Far East, came to them!
The Japanese dubbed this incident “the escape of the century” - so much valuable information, including mobilization plans and even radio codes in this region, was provided by the defector.

In the end, convincing evidence of the fact that our opponents have military plans for the USSR is the indication of the Japanese Army’s General Staff dated 1942: to be ready to “get ahead of the enemy in preparation for the war and create a position that allows you to strike first at a moment favorable to resolution of the northern problem. "

So what prompted the Japanese to conclude a neutrality agreement with us in 1941? The answer lies in the economic plane. Tokyo, like its main ally, Berlin, was in dire need of natural resources. There were more or less enough metals, but the situation with oil was not too bright. Germany was somehow rescued by the Romanian oil fields, but the Yamato empire had already ended its oil by the 1920 years, there was no “black gold” on the subject lands of Korea and Manchuria either.

The ubiquitous and helpful American corporations played the role of the main supplier - they supplied up to 80-90 percent of all the oil that Tokyo needed. Naturally, the Japanese are not pleased with this statistic. As an alternative, they considered the supply of oil from the southern territories, then under the authority of Holland and Great Britain. But the campaign for her meant armed conflict with these European countries.

Where to get oil? In the Soviet Union, on Sakhalin ...

Few people, with the exception of a small circle of specialists, know that up until the fall of 1944, in the area of ​​the small town of Okha, which is in the north of Sakhalin, the Japanese extracted oil on quite legal grounds.

Namely, according to the so-called collective agreement “on the Japanese oil concession on Sakhalin Island”, concluded as early as 1925 year. At first glance, this seems incredible, because foreign concessions, the brainchild introduced in the beginning of 1920's, VI. Lenin "new economic policy", the beginning of the thirties were almost completely eliminated. Moreover, this was done by rather rude methods: they were not allowed to work with the most dull administrative methods.

Obviously, the secret of the longevity of the Japanese company lies in the fact that no one sought to completely “shut off oxygen” to our neighbors. The Soviet government for several moves forward calculated all the possible actions of the Japanese. And for the latter, the oil deal with Soviet Russia immediately acquired special significance: the Joint-Stock Company of the North Sakhalin Oil Entrepreneurs included the grandees of this country's industry, including the well-known corporations Mitsui and Mitsubishi to this day. Its registered capital was 10 million yen, the amount at that time is simply astronomical. The head of the joint-stock company was Admiral Sigetsuru Nakasato, who personally signed a concession agreement with Felix Dzerzhinsky in Moscow in late 1925. It’s understandable: Sakhalin oil went to the needs of Japanese fleet.

Through the efforts of those interested in increasing their oil reserves of the Japanese, oil production increased by the middle of 1930-s to 180 thousand tons. That was almost twice as high as in the metropolis itself.

In addition to oil, up to 1939, again on concession, but already coal, the Japanese received from Sakhalin, up to 1939, also coking coal, which was supplied to steel mills that carried out military orders. The so-called convention on fisheries was also beneficial to the Japanese: according to its provisions, they had the right to fish for marine biological resources near the eastern coast of Kamchatka, in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and near Primorye.

The joint-stock company continued to exist, despite military conflicts. The reason is the special attention of the Soviet government. For example, 5 July 1938 Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V. Molotov signed the “Top Secret” vulture (removed only in 1990's, despite some objections), a decree thereby giving the green light to the continuation of the oil concession.

Very entertaining document. Well, in what kind of “paper” of this kind, and even signed at the very top, can we find an instruction on the construction of a nursery, baths and a soul? And why does the Sovnarkom understand if the Japanese concessionaires need or do not need a hydrometeorological station? Let me remind you: a little more than a year has passed since that moment since the incident near Blagoveshchensk, which took the lives of Soviet servicemen, events were already brewing in Khasan.

Be in the place of I.V. Stalin’s politician is smaller, he would definitely rush to “swing a sword” and in one fell swoop would close all concessions with the Japanese in retaliation for the death of his soldiers and provocations at the border.

Moreover, this kind of partnership with the Japanese was fraught with danger. The first is ideological losses. Concessions are an indication that you actually continue to conduct a recognized ineffective NEP policy. And if so, it means that all your statements about the new course, all the victims in the course of industrialization are in many ways an empty sound ... Stay in the Soviet leadership, right or left deviationists, they would surely remember that to the leader of all nations. The second: the work of the concessions actually promoted the capitalist way of life. The Japanese delivered all the best to the north of Sakhalin, which, against the background of the Soviet supply system, which tried to import food and goods from the mainland by no means always of high quality and first freshness, looked simply fantastic. It is not for nothing that stories about how the Soviet workers employed in the oil and coal concessions lived freely in Sakhalin almost until the end of the eighties. And now some residents of the northern part of the island compare the then North Sakhalin with Singapore. Third moment. The concessions provided the Japanese with an excellent opportunity to collect data on the internal life of the Soviet Union, as well as on military construction. Of course, the NKVD dealt with this issue, as evidenced by the arrests among the Japanese employees of this joint venture, but no one knows how many intelligence officers continued their work.

Of particular importance to the Japanese oil concession acquired at the beginning of 1940-x: then it became clear that after the creation of the axis Rome-Berlin-Tokyo, war with the United States is inevitable and, therefore, the supply of American oil will stop. This was one of the reasons why Tokyo was encouraged to conclude a neutrality treaty. During the preparatory contacts in the autumn of 1940, the head of the Japanese diplomatic mission spoke to the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs V. Molotov: “If an agreement is reached between Japan and the USSR, the Japanese government is convinced that this will have a favorable impact on fishing and concession issues.” Translation from an elaborate diplomatic language sounds like this: “We give you a treaty of neutrality, and you give us the preservation of concessions.” And we went to the Japanese conditions, although the political costs for Moscow, caused by the signing of the treaty with the arsonist of the war in the Far East, were considerable. For example, we had to explain a long time to the Chinese, against whom the Japanese army waged war, that we were still on their side.

It is clear that with the beginning of the war with the United States, Sakhalin oil for the Japanese became worth its weight in gold. Under these conditions, to meet Berlin’s repeated proposals to unleash a war against the USSR would mean an economic hara-kiri for Tokyo.

And only in 1944, when it became clear that we had coped with Nazi Germany, was the Japanese oil concession eliminated.

... Probably, many will start blaming the then leadership led by I.V. Stalin in that, in this way, he deliberately pushed Tokyo into conflict with Washington. However, it has long been known that politics is the art of the possible, and the use of such a powerful lever of influence as Sakhalin oil was not only possible but vital in those conditions.

The situation is partly repeated today. After the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant in March 2011 of the year and the sharp increase in the share of CHP in the energy mix that followed, Japan was forced to significantly increase its hydrocarbon consumption. Sakhalin oil and gas is once again considered as one of the most important sources. Maybe this is just one of the reasons why Japanese politicians started talking about “entering bilateral relations to a new stage”. So, Moscow should make maximum use of the “hydrocarbon factor” in relations with Tokyo.
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  1. Leisure
    Leisure 23 July 2013 07: 21
    10
    And what prevented the Japanese from capturing the crafts on Sakhalin for personal use? If in your opinion, the USSR could hold out on the Far East only until the arrival of forces from the West, and cutting the Trans-Siberian Railway is not a big task. There are contradictions.
    1. Greyfox
      Greyfox 23 July 2013 08: 19
      +6
      It is clear that with the beginning of the war with the United States, Sakhalin oil for the Japanese became worth its weight in gold. Under these conditions, to meet Berlin’s repeated proposals to unleash a war against the USSR would mean an economic hara-kiri for Tokyo.

      Also noticed a contradiction. The author of the article speaks of the war between Japan and the United States as a settled matter. Although the Japanese hesitated for a long time and if the Americans didn’t make the oil embargo to the Japanese, it is still unknown how the case would turn out. Take Japa Sakhalin, cover it with your fleet (many times superior to the Pacific Fleet) and ours could only watch powerlessly ..... All the same, it was not only the oil concession that kept them from a big war with us.
      1. Beck
        Beck 23 July 2013 08: 35
        0
        Quote: Greyfox
        and if the Americans didn’t make the oil embargo to the Japanese, it is still unknown how things would turn out.


        Why did the US impose an oil embargo? And then they sold, they sold oil, and then the embargo.

        Japan since 1937 waged a predatory war in China, as the first stage in the colonization of the entire Pacific region. The world community in the person of the League of Nations and the United States have repeatedly called on Japan to end the war in China. Japan continued to wage war. In the end, the United States imposed a ban on its companies on oil trade with Japan until it ceases hostilities against China.
        1. Greyfox
          Greyfox 23 July 2013 09: 43
          -1
          So I say that if the Americans imposed on the "principles of democracy" (although of course they were primarily concerned about the strengthening of Japs, they wanted to sneeze at the Chinese) in favor of profit, then the oil embargo would not take place. And it is not known on whose bank they would crawl out. owners of samurai swords from ships ...
    2. sevtrash
      sevtrash 23 July 2013 10: 16
      +9
      The Japanese chose the general direction of their expansion and adhered to it on two fronts, which is logical, they did not dare to act, resources were limited. They expected the defeat of the USSR, given the reputation of the German army, this was more than likely. After this, there would have been no particular difficulties in capturing the Far East.
      So no special contradictions are visible. They fought in their direction, waited, at the same time received some kind of benefit.
      The article is good, it showed new that, for example, I did not know at all. Although the value of supplies from Sakhalin seems exaggerated to me, I need to compare the needs and how much the Japanese received from other places. In particular, from the Dutch East Indies, the cessation of oil supplies from which was one of the reasons for the beginning of the expansion of Japan.
    3. anip
      anip 23 July 2013 12: 37
      +5
      Yes, I also thought about it. It was entirely possible for the Yapons to capture the Sakhalin deposits.

      And yet: the role of Sakhalin oil for Japan in the article is too exaggerated, especially since there is:
      By the efforts of the Japanese interested in increasing their oil reserves, oil production rose by the mid-1930s to 180 thousand tons.

      And even though it was
      ... was almost twice as high as that in the metropolis itself.

      All the same, Sakhalin oil for war is negligible. Especially when you consider:
      Annual oil requirements in 1939-1940 amounted to 5 million tons. Due to domestic production, they were covered by no more than 10 percent
      http://www.istorya.ru/book/ww2/128.php

      In addition, Japan during the war years produced 5,2 million tons of oil (this can be found in Google) That is, in principle, the Japanese could well do without 180 thousand tons per year of Sakhalin oil.
      In addition, in 1941
      Oil reserves were created - 5 674 thousand tons, bauxite — 254,7 thousand tons, scrap iron - 4 468 thousand tons. Under existing norms, oil consumption would be enough for about a year of war, bauxite - for nine months.
      http://protown.ru/information/hide/5064.html

      And in the same place:
      Of particular concern to the government was the fuel situation. Armed forces and industry of Japan spent mainly pre-war oil reserves. By April 1942, they decreased to 5154 thousand tons. In connection with the rapid depletion of fuel reserves, the Japanese command, conducting amphibious operations in oil-bearing areas, took measures to preserve industrial equipment. Together with troops, groups of engineers, technicians, and workers landed at oil production sites to restore and commission production facilities. From the countries of the South Seas in the fiscal year 1942/43, 1415 thousand tons of oil and refined petroleum products were imported to Japan.
      Synthetic fuel production in the country was developing slowly. Of the 1054 thousand tons of synthetic fuel planned for the 1941/42 budget year, 165 thousand tons were produced.


      The reason for Japan’s non-attack on the USSR is something else. And, most likely, a lot of different factors, small and not so, played a role here. But not Sakhalin oil.
      1. Papakiko
        Papakiko 23 July 2013 16: 36
        0
        Quote: anip
        The reason for Japan’s non-attack on the USSR is something else. And, most likely, a lot of different factors, small and not so, played a role here. But not Sakhalin oil.

        Categorically true comrade.
        In the aggregate of all the facts, we do not even know about the majority.
        And one of the main ones is the climate, and the Japonians are thermophilic.
        Even in our time, Sakhalin is not being developed at the same pace as in more prosperous regions in terms of climate.
        Fishing for crab and fish is more than enough evidence.
        1. Papakiko
          Papakiko 23 July 2013 16: 48
          +1
          I completely missed it.
          Therefore, it was not in vain that stories about how the Soviet workers employed in the oil and coal concessions freely lived on Sakhalin almost until the end of the eighties. And now, some residents of the northern part of the island compare the then Northern Sakhalin with Singapore.
          If there was such a CHOCOLATE, then what made this poverty so abruptly?
          Or ate in 10 gulps and everything in less than 10-15 years led to utter decay. Starting from fishing vessels and ending with houses, I am silent about roads.
      2. Pilat2009
        Pilat2009 23 July 2013 17: 03
        0
        Quote: anip
        The reason for Japan’s non-attack on the USSR is something else

        Until the 40s, they pissed alone to get involved, and then the United States was enough for them.
        vsezh human reserves of the USSR are much higher. If they seized Sakhalin for sole use and the United States would have a good reason to smash everything there
    4. lexe
      lexe 23 July 2013 17: 36
      0
      Yes, leaflets would throw Sakhalin from the air laughing
      Japanese take care of the equipment - we are sorry to bomb our materiel
      Well, the submariners would tighten-the enemy does not surrender our proud Varangian laughing
      Therefore, it was necessary to secure communications over the radius of oil production, and this is a full-blown conflict. And where is the guarantee that the Yankee scavengers will not catch up and forget about class enmity? laughing
    5. The comment was deleted.
    6. zvereok
      zvereok 24 July 2013 05: 23
      0
      Quote: Lazer
      And what prevented the Japanese from capturing the crafts on Sakhalin for personal use?


      “In the information received from Lyushkov, we were amazed that the troops that the Soviet Union could concentrate against Japan, as it turned out, had an overwhelming superiority. At that time, the forces that we could use against the Soviet Union numbered only 9 divisions. data received from Lyushkov, the 5th department of the General Staff came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union could use up to 28 rifle divisions against Japan, and, if necessary, concentrate from 31 to 58 divisions.

      The ratio in tanks and aircraft looked alarming. Japan could deploy only 2000 against 340 Soviet aircraft, and only 1900 against 170 Soviet tanks. Before that, we assumed that the Soviet and Japanese Armed Forces in the Far East were three to one. However, the actual ratio was found to be about five to one. This made it virtually impossible to implement previously drawn up plans for military operations against the USSR. "

      But, by the way, the Japanese were not inactive:

      "With the active participation of Lyushkov, and perhaps at his prompting, the Japanese General Staff launched preparations for a daring and unprecedented operation - the assassination of Stalin."

      Then there was an attempt to plant a time bomb in the Mausoleum.

      Both times, subversive groups were intercepted by border guards.
  2. shurup
    shurup 23 July 2013 08: 07
    +4
    The knowledge about Sevastopol and Port Arthur interfered. The Russians would have sat on Sakhalin to the last, and before leaving, they would have blown everything up, set fire to it and poured OM.
    Time is an expensive thing.
    1. sq
      sq 23 July 2013 12: 06
      +2
      Right. It would take time to restore the oil fields, but the Japanese did not have it.
      1. Jipo
        Jipo 23 July 2013 14: 42
        0
        The Japanese generally somehow waged a war - they attacked Pearl Harbor, somehow chaotically bombed outdated battleships, which were partially restored later, but they didn’t touch the huge oil base, although the Americans might have been very annoyed at the beginning of the war.
  3. Beck
    Beck 23 July 2013 08: 10
    -1
    In general, World War II marked the end of the colonial era in the history of mankind. And the end was accompanied by a purulent abscess 2MV.

    By the middle of the 20th century, the ambitious circles of developed countries such as Germany, Japan, Italy were dissatisfied with being late for the colonial division of the world. They had no colonies from where it would be possible to take minerals for free. And this slowed down economic development and put these countries in an unequal position with the colonial countries - England, Belgium, Holland, Portugal and others. For the redivision of the colonial world, for the new living space, Germany, Japan, Italy unleashed 2MB.

    Why was Japan needed Nonaggression pact? Because of sanity and simple logic. In Japanese ruling circles, they planned to seize raw materials and territories in the Pacific region, and Japanese politicians clearly understood that for this they would have to fight with England and the USA. And there was no reason in fighting with these countries to divert forces and funds to the third giant - the USSR, the more so the Pacific region of minerals was a tidbit than Eastern Siberia.

    Already having drawn up plans for a war with the USA and England, Japan also signed the Non-aggression Pact with the USSR on April 13, 1941, which was ratified on April 25, 1941. and was valid until April 25, 1946. By securing the rear in this way, Japan attacked the United States on December 7, 1941 with a Pearl Harbor attack. And Japan complied with the terms of the Covenant even in difficult times for the USSR, 1941-1942 and the success of Japanese weapons, in these years, in the Pacific Ocean.

    By the way, on the diplomatic side, the USSR unilaterally, without warning, violated this interstate agreement, having entered the war with Japan in August 1945. That is, almost a year before the expiration of the Nonaggression Pact.
    1. Uzoliv
      Uzoliv 23 July 2013 09: 08
      +4
      Quote: Beck
      By the way, on the diplomatic side, the USSR unilaterally, without warning, violated this interstate agreement, having entered the war with Japan in August 1945. That is, almost a year before the expiration of the Nonaggression Pact.

      On April 5, 1945, the Soviet government announced the denunciation of the neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan.
      On August 8, the USSR declared to the Japanese ambassador about joining the Potsdam Declaration and declared war on Japan.
      On August 9, hostilities began.
      The Soviet government in this case fully respected international law.
      1. Beck
        Beck 23 July 2013 12: 19
        -1
        Quote: Uzoliv
        On April 5, 1945, the Soviet government declared denunciations a neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan.


        And it is already necessary to look at the clauses of the contract. Whether the denunciation procedure was stipulated there, and if so, what time was allotted for it. There are many varieties of denunciation in international law. You can declare it, but according to the regulations, withdraw from the contract only after the expiration of the main term or in a year. And there are still options.

        I know for sure that after the expiration of the main term of the Covenant, the duration of the Covenant automatically lasted another five years.

        Found.

        According to paragraph 3, “This Covenant enters into force from the date of its ratification by both contracting parties and remains valid for five years. If none of the contracting parties does not denounce the pact one year before the deadline“It will be considered automatically renewed for the next five years.”

        N. Sato Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan) recalled that the pact is valid until April 13, 1946 and expressed the hope that this condition will be met by the Soviet side. Molotov replied that "in fact, Soviet-Japanese relations will return to the position they were in before the conclusion of the pact." Sato noticed that legally, this means cancellation, not denunciation of the contract. Molotov agreed with N. Sato, that from the point of view of the neutrality pact itself, being only denounced (and not annulled), it can legally retain its force until April 25, 1946
        1. Essenger
          Essenger 23 July 2013 14: 58
          +5
          I already wrote about this. Get the cons and that's it. Do not expect any arguments.
          1. Beck
            Beck 23 July 2013 16: 23
            +1
            Quote: Essenger
            I already wrote about this. Get the cons and that's it. Do not expect any arguments.


            Do not need. Business then. The master is the master. There, in the corner, god (icon), and there is the threshold. Free will - arrogant ambition.
      2. carbofo
        carbofo 23 July 2013 13: 03
        0
        What we have always been strong in, we never made any tricks, although the Japanese did not expect but everything was done very clearly.
        An ambassador was called and 2 hours before the appearance of our troops in Moscow time, it seemed, the Japanese ambassador was presented with a declaration of war.
        From the point of view of law, everything is clear.
        On the evening of August 8, 1945, the Soviet government, through the ambassador in Moscow, transmitted the following statement to the Japanese government:

        “After the defeat and surrender of Nazi Germany, Japan was the only great power that still stands for the continuation of the war.

        The demand of the three powers - the United States of America, Great Britain and China of July 26 this year for unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces was rejected by Japan. Thus, the proposal of the Japanese Government to the Soviet Union on mediation in the war in the Far East loses all ground ”{552}.

        The statement stated that the USSR was joining the Potsdam Declaration and accepting the Allies' proposal to participate in the war against the Japanese aggressors. “The Soviet Government believes,” it was emphasized, “that such a policy is the only way to bring peace closer, free peoples from further victims and suffering, and enable the Japanese people to get rid of the dangers and destruction that Germany experienced after its refusal from unconditional surrender.

        In view of the foregoing, the Soviet Government declares that from tomorrow, that is, from August 9, the Soviet Union will consider itself at war with Japan ”{http://protown.ru/information/hide/5454.html}.
        1. Beck
          Beck 23 July 2013 13: 25
          +1
          Quote: carbofo
          On the evening of August 8, 1945, the Soviet government, through the ambassador in Moscow, transmitted the following statement to the Japanese government:


          All is correct. And I'm about the same. The fact that Japan, during the defense of Moscow in November 1941 or during the Battle of Stalingrad in the fall of 1942, did not call the Soviet ambassador and did not officially declare that it would denounce, annul, break the Non-Aggression Pact and consider itself free in any actions.
          1. Uzoliv
            Uzoliv 23 July 2013 14: 03
            +2
            And during the Moscow battle, the Japanese, even if all of a sudden a general were bothered to declare war on the USSR, could not have done anything. The Moscow battle is a winter battle, and the Japanese were not ready to attack in winter, there was no logistics. That report to Sorge where he says that until the spring of 1942 the war will not be documented by historians now. The quantum army could not advance in the winter.
            1. Jipo
              Jipo 23 July 2013 14: 50
              +2
              Moreover, the Japanese made a good investment in the Navy, and the war with the USSR in the vast expanses, with a terrible climate, with backward tanks and hardly the best aircraft (after all, Zero was a deck aircraft with poor protection and lack of strength to please its light weight) was an adventure. Of course, if Hitler had taken Moscow, then the Japanese would have taken Primorye to themselves and would not have looked at the treaty, but it turned out how it happened.
          2. Beck
            Beck 23 July 2013 14: 10
            +1
            Quote: Beck
            breaks the Nonaggression Pact and considers himself free in any actions.


            I will add. All this does not mean that the USSR did something completely wrong. So the circumstances and history ordered. The question was an edge and up ... sing.

            If only everyone knew. At the Tehran Conference of 1943, none of the allies knew when the war in Europe would end. It is possible that the USSR assumed that the war would not end until April 25, 1946, and made a promise to enter the war with Japan without violating the Covenant. But the United States did not know how the Manhattan project for creating atomic weapons would end. If the United States knew that in a year and seven months it would possess nuclear weapons, the United States would not have insisted on the Tehran Conference joining the USSR in the war in the Pacific.

            A story to thread your mother.
    2. Leisure
      Leisure 23 July 2013 09: 09
      +5
      I agree with you. Including the development of the Japanese armed forces, the priority of the Navy and the residual development of the ground forces (this can be seen by equipment). It makes it clear that the goal of the Japanese is not the forests of the Far East and Siberia, but the expanses of the Pacific Ocean.
      1. Gato
        Gato 23 July 2013 12: 20
        +2
        Quote: Lazer
        Including the development of the Japanese armed forces, the priority of the Navy and the residual development of the ground forces

        And this is generally a very interesting question, if we take into account, to put it mildly, strange for Europeans relations between the Japanese army and navy.
        Nevertheless, despite the fact that Japan has become a world power, feudal clan traditions have remained very strong - in the army this is one group of former samurai, in the navy - another. And when choosing the direction of the strike, the naval group won. This, of course, is not the main reason, but it cannot be ignored either.
    3. kotvov
      kotvov 23 July 2013 19: 58
      -3
      By the way, on the diplomatic side, the USSR unilaterally, without warning, violated this interstate agreement, having entered the war with Japan in August 1945. That is, almost a year before the expiration of the Nonaggression Pact.
      dear here you are wrong, read the beginning of the war with Japan.
      1. Beck
        Beck 23 July 2013 21: 12
        0
        Quote: kotvov
        dear here you are wrong, read the beginning of the war with Japan.


        I read it more than once and a long time ago. And you first read all of my komenty on this page before reproaching me for being right.
      2. Yoshkin Kot
        Yoshkin Kot 3 August 2013 18: 38
        +1
        Well, Japan at one time blocked the Varangian in the port, before the declaration of war, and nothing
  4. Terrible ensign
    Terrible ensign 23 July 2013 08: 14
    +2
    Very interesting. I heard earlier that Japanese concessions existed on Sakhalin during the war, but I got a full picture only thanks to this article.
  5. knn54
    knn54 23 July 2013 08: 24
    0
    -The oil concession acquired special significance for the Japanese in the early 1940s: then it became clear that after the creation of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis, war with the United States was inevitable ...
    Let me continue - WHY JAPAN WAR ON TWO FRONTS?
  6. Whole
    Whole 23 July 2013 08: 42
    +1
    Japan’s attack on the USSR did not take place for a variety of reasons, and not just because of oil. And did the Siberian divisions stationed on D.V.? More than a million soldiers were involved.
  7. Hort
    Hort 23 July 2013 08: 43
    +2
    there are many factors. Starting with the battles at Hassan and Khalkhin Gol, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which caused disagreements between Tokyo and Berlin, and ending with the economy
  8. MakSim51ru
    MakSim51ru 23 July 2013 09: 00
    0
    But here is what I can’t understand. Since 1925 there has been a concession, yeah, right up to the 44th. And in 1938, the battles of Hassan, a little later, Khalkin goal. And oil is produced jointly. Rave. Where is the logic. Little of. If we get involved in battles with the USSR, then why in the region of Mongolia? Isn’t it easier to take Sakhalin right away? Or was Japan sure that Stalin would not support Choibalsan?
  9. svskor80
    svskor80 23 July 2013 09: 02
    0
    Japan chose a war in the Pacific Ocean, which is why there is also a reason for discussion, and fighting on 2 fronts is unrealistically difficult even for countries at the level of the USA and the USSR. I agree with the comments above - if it was only oil, it would be possible to capture Sakhalin without problems, and they would not have time to destroy anything there.
  10. Volkhov
    Volkhov 23 July 2013 09: 29
    +3
    Tokyo had a half-hearted policy in the war of systems and excessive cruelty in China - if they were a humane technical leader for the Chinese - would have helped, not an endless war, would have fought together with Germany - would have cut off 49% of Lend-Lease and would have received Magadan gold without much war, not to mention Sakhalin oil.
    The Japanese were afraid of geography - planes from the USSR easily reached Japan - the entire war in the Pacific Ocean went beyond the aerodrome range, but the B-29 did not leave a chance, as did the gradual capture of the islands by the US fleet.
    Nevertheless, despite all the failures, Japan has preserved culture, industry, science and is potentially sovereign, despite American bases - we were less fortunate because our emperor was not preserved, and the proletariat is a toy of alien elites with a red flag and a striped .
  11. ed65b
    ed65b 23 July 2013 09: 33
    0
    all the same, the passage about the lessons of the halkin goal is closer to me. Something does not fit with Nefnyankai.
  12. Gomunkul
    Gomunkul 23 July 2013 10: 00
    +2
    Correct me if I overlooked something: the incident on Lake Hasan was a reconnaissance battle for Japan, they (the Japanese) were waiting for Germany to fulfill its obligations after signing the anti-Comintern treaty and declare war on the USSR, but Germany did not fulfill these agreements. Hence the conclusion that Japan after that ceased to trust Germany and postponed its territorial claims to the USSR until better times, switching to solving topics that were more relevant to it at that time. hi
  13. Son
    Son 23 July 2013 10: 29
    0
    Thanks to the author ... Informative. Ah, then Sorge, Sorge ...
    BABLO ..! Ah, not Sorge ...
  14. Uzoliv
    Uzoliv 23 July 2013 10: 59
    +2
    If you believe the author, then 180 thousand tons were mined on Sakhalin, as I understand it, this is a year. And in the Dutch East Indies in 1940, 9 million tons of oil were produced. Just incomparable quantities. Therefore, a blow to the south is more rational for the Japanese. And for this strike it was necessary to cover the rear - hence the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. Moreover, the agreement was not an ironclad guarantee against attack. The Japanese simply waited for the moment when the USSR would be defeated and the Far East and part of Siberia could be taken, as they say "without noise and dust." Plans for such an event were prepared.
  15. Black
    Black 23 July 2013 13: 03
    +2
    Quote: Beck
    Why did Japan need the Nonaggression Pact? Because of sanity and simple logic.

    All is correct. And do not look for some far-fetched reasons. The USSR did not want to fight on two sides, but is Mikado stupid?
  16. Uncle lee
    Uncle lee 23 July 2013 13: 28
    +7
    Due to all these factors, Japan did not attack the USSR. And because of Sakhalin oil, too. The leadership of the USSR was wise!
  17. Takashi
    Takashi 23 July 2013 13: 43
    0
    Good article. I did not know about concessions - in the textbooks on the History of the USSR / Russia there is no such thing.
    I read and immediately appeared a lot of inconsistencies.
    1. On the one hand, the USSR is at war with Germany and Japan with its concessions
    2. Japan is at war with the USA.
    3. The United States helps the USSR Lend-Lease.

    butter-buttered.

    but about: "Even now, some residents of the northern part of the island compare the then Northern Sakhalin with Singapore." - dear author, come to us .. on Sakhalin (Okha, Nogliki, Douai) waiting for refutation of this garbage
  18. Gur
    Gur 23 July 2013 15: 07
    +1
    Somehow I looked about this situation with "the chief security officer Genrikh Lyushkov" So the question was raised in the programs, was there a boy? In general, all the garbage boiled down to the fact that this "chekist" was a fictional character and the Japanese were ridden for misinformation, and on such a scale (redeployment of troops, the quantitative and qualitative composition of troops, etc., etc.) that this played one of the important reasons for Japan's non-aggression against THE USSR.
  19. Trapperxnumx
    Trapperxnumx 23 July 2013 15: 27
    0
    In the context of this article, I want to say - but was it not for this very reason that the GDP began to drive Sphrax oil to China? Like, it’s better to buy cheap at a cheaper price, is it more profitable than fighting? And so - both treasury profits and friendship with a neighbor (for now).
  20. asadov
    asadov 23 July 2013 15: 56
    0
    Controversial article, a lot of disagreements and contradictions
  21. Avenger711
    Avenger711 23 July 2013 16: 21
    0
    And only in a secret report to the emperor was it talked about losses, but again, the numbers were downplayed at times, if not an order of magnitude.


    There can be no lies and understatements in documents of this level; the high command, on the basis of these data, plans the course of the war.

    Given this, the Soviet Union was forced to increase the number of deterrence forces in the Far East as early as the peace period.


    The total number of the Soviet group throughout the war was 1.5 million people. Nobody was counting on an approach from the west, which was basically impossible for the entire period from 22.06/07.12 to XNUMX/XNUMX, but the Japanese, despite the Germans' successes and withdrawal, albeit secretive of the most combat-ready units from the Far East, continued to sit and wait.

    The Japanese delivered all the best to the north of Sakhalin


    Who was supplied to? To your employees? Yes, and Japanese goods were then Chinese now, cheaply and for a week.

    therefore, the supply of American oil will cease. This was one of the reasons that prompted Tokyo to propose the conclusion of a treaty of neutrality.


    That is, they were shaking because of Sakhalin, although it was easy to seize the whole thing, but to fight in South Asia against the whole world, this is not weak for them. Or maybe the truth is that the share of these deliveries was so small that the Japanese simply didn’t make sense to arrange something there, and you can get a hat, the Soviet army surpassed the Kwantung one and a half times, and immediately climbed into South Asia.
    1. anip
      anip 23 July 2013 17: 00
      0
      Quote: Avenger711
      Or maybe the truth is that the share of these deliveries was so small that the Japanese simply did not make sense to arrange something there, and you can get a hat, the Soviet army was one and a half times higher than the Kwantung

      That's right. I have already cited some figures in the comments above.
      And the Soviet troops in the Far East also somehow did not have ...
  22. lexe
    lexe 23 July 2013 18: 00
    0
    However, our opponents had a trump ace up their sleeve: in 1938, Heinrich Lyushkov, the top Chekist in the entire Far East, came to them!

    Yes ... All the same, I marvel at Stalin. Outlawed almost all power.
    Although maybe it was a controlled drain.
    So it means that the concessions were under Comrade Stalin ... with full household goods. Yes ... communism clearly went to state capitalism. laughing
    The article is very interesting and for many it will be a revelation.
    The East is very afraid of the West (with its breakthrough technologies) and only in Russia
    The East sees the sane face of a Westerner.
    So with all the fears, the East is a shield and not an ax on our heads.
    I will add that after the border conflicts, the Japanese compared the fighting spirit of the Russian and Red Army, they examined us, so to speak. The choice was not in favor of the red ... This is another argument, they could cut but did not want to.
    Article +
    1. valokordin
      valokordin 23 July 2013 22: 27
      -1
      Quote: Lexi
      I will add that after the border conflicts, the Japanese compared the fighting spirit of the Russian and Red Army, they examined us, so to speak. The choice was not in favor of the red ... This is another argument, they could cut but did not want to.

      Oh, you're a White Guard, the Red Army was no worse than the Russian, ideologically motivated.
      1. lexe
        lexe 23 July 2013 23: 28
        +1
        Oh, you're a White Guard, the Red Army was no worse than the Russian, ideologically motivated.

        I don’t understand your anger. This is the enemy’s assessment. They had something to compare with.
        Do you think that there was no motive in the tsarist Russian army? There were at least slogans. And for me, the red army is Russian.
  23. Master Taiga
    Master Taiga 23 July 2013 18: 26
    -1
    Like it or not, a violation of the nonaggression pact with Japan does not paint the USSR. And a treacherous stab in the back, too. AT
  24. tilovaykrisa
    tilovaykrisa 23 July 2013 20: 01
    +1
    A treacherous stab in the back, "the crown chip of the United States", the destruction (genocide) of the indigenous population, concentration camps (the same yapi), atomic bombing of peaceful cities, this is what the USA paints, but here are the simple pragmatic considerations of the two formerly warring states, and from the USSR, human treatment with prisoners, and the settlement of territorial claims, the absence of occupation, the preservation of statehood, that is what paints the USSR, and if we had not come, you would have made a second Vietnamese out of yapi and would not have rocked a king in the states and walked with your feet.
  25. dustycat
    dustycat 23 July 2013 21: 51
    0
    Maybe I don’t remember what, but until 1945 half of Sakhalin was Japanese.
    And from 1920 the whole island was Japanese.
    What could prevent the capture of the second half or millet not to give?
    With such a fleet and the presence of troops in this fleet ?!
    Nothing.
    Moreover, "for five years after the end of the current war," continue to supply Japan with 50000 tons of crude oil per year.
    With whom was Japan fighting in the Pacific?
  26. valokordin
    valokordin 23 July 2013 22: 23
    +1
    Once again, everyone could see how wise I.V. Stalin and his associates, the Trotskyist Khrushchev, do not count. Our bullshit is not suitable for him.
  27. roma-belij
    roma-belij 23 July 2013 22: 57
    +1
    It is difficult to guess about the true reason for neutrality. Uncle Stalin was a very cunning horseman. A lot of documents are still kept classified and it is not known when the truth will emerge ...
  28. Selevc
    Selevc 24 July 2013 00: 02
    +2
    I think the reason for Japan’s neutrality in 1941 lies on the surface ... They were preparing for war with their main enemy in the region - and this is the USA !!! It was futile to fight the USSR with Dubin in the form of the American Navy over his head ... They would not be able to defeat the USSR - at best, they would have captured the uninhabited taiga, and then what? Moreover, they were very bogged down in China and in Indochina they still lacked Russian open spaces ...
  29. Tykta
    Tykta 25 July 2013 21: 01
    +1
    more than one million soldiers and commanders were always stationed in the Far East, the units themselves provided the Eastern Front with cadre officers and cadets who had undergone training, and there was a constant rotation. Therefore, the Japanese were afraid to attack, again the Japanese were not ready to wage a land war deep into the mainland, their medium tanks were equal in characteristics to our light tanks, and having a strong fleet and carrier-based aircraft, they could not afford to disperse into a heavy continental war, where they were occupiers and any foreign invasion could be supported by the occupied population.