N. S. Trubetskoy "On the peoples of the Caucasus"
Returning to Moscow, he published a number of articles on North Caucasian folklore studies, problems of Finno-Ugric languages and Slavic studies. He was an active participant in the Moscow linguistic group, where, along with issues of linguistics, along with scientists and writers, he seriously studied and developed mythology, folk science, ethnography, and cultural history, closely approaching the future Eurasian topic. After the events of 1917, N. Trubetskoy's successful university work was interrupted and he went to Kislovodsk, and then taught for some time at Rostov University. Gradually, he came to the conclusion that the Slavs in the spiritual sense were more closely connected with the East than with the West, where, in his opinion, contacts were made primarily in the field of material culture.
In 1920, N. Trubetskoy left Russia and moved to Bulgaria, and began research and teaching activities at Sofia University as a professor. In the same year he released his famous work "Europe and Humanity", which brings him closely to the elaboration of the Eurasian ideology. In the future, N. Trubetskoy's activity developed in two directions: 1) purely scientific, dedicated to philological and linguistic problems (the work of the Prague Circle, which became the center of world phonology, then the years of research in Vienna), 2) cultural and ideological, associated with participation in the Eurasian movement . N.Trubetskoy approaches with P.N.Savitsky, P.P.Suvchinsky, G.V. Florovsky, is published in "Eurasian periodicals" and "chronicles", periodically gives reports in various cities of Europe. In the development of Eurasian ideas, the main merits of N. Trubetskoy include his concept of the “top” and “bottom” of Russian culture, the doctrine of “true nationalism” and “Russian self-knowledge”.
By virtue of their psychological characteristics, N. Trubetskoy preferred quiet, academic work to politics. Although he had to write articles in the genre of political journalism, he avoided direct participation in organizational propaganda and regretted when Eurasianism made a bias in politics. Therefore, in the story of the newspaper Eurasia, he took a uniquely irreconcilable position in relation to the left wing of the movement and left the Eurasian organization, resuming publications in updated editions only a few years later.
The last years of his life N. Trubetskoy lived in Vienna, where he worked as a professor of Slavic at the University of Vienna. After the Anschluss of Austria, he was harassed by the Gestapo. Much of his manuscripts were confiscated and subsequently destroyed. According to the testimony of L.N.Gumilev, who received this information from P.N.Savitsky, N.Trubetskogo was not arrested just because he was "a prince, an aristocrat, but in his apartment there were repeated, and very rude searches, which resulted in myocardial infarction and early death. " 25 July 1938, at the age of 48, N.Trubetskoy died.
Article written in 1925g.
Ps. 117, 10
In the Transcaucasus there are: Armenians who have always been and will adhere to the Russian orientation, whatever the Russian government. There can be no serious Armenian separatism. It is always easy to come to terms with Armenians. But the bet on the Armenians would be a mistake. Strong economically, concentrating in their hands the leadership of the entire economic life of Transcaucasia, they at the same time have a general antipathy, reaching the hatred of their neighbors. To solidify oneself with them would be to incur this antipathy and hatred. An example of the policy of the pre-revolutionary period, which ultimately led to the fact that the Russians remained with Armenians alone and turned against all the other nationalities of Transcaucasia against themselves, should serve as a lesson. In addition, the Armenian question is to a certain extent an international question. The attitude of the Russian government to the Armenians in the Caucasus should be coordinated with relations between Russia and Turkey.
Since the February Revolution, Georgians have achieved recognition of their rights, at least for autonomy, and these rights cannot be challenged. But at the same time, since this provision gives rise to the emergence of Georgian separatism, every Russian government is obliged to fight it. If Russia wants to preserve Baku oil (without which it is hardly possible to hold not only the Caucasus, but also the North Caucasus), it cannot allow an independent Georgia. The difficulty and complexity of the Georgian problem lies precisely in the fact that it is now practically impossible not to recognize a certain degree of independence of Georgia, and to recognize its full political independence is not permissible. Here a well-known middle line should be chosen, moreover, one that would not give rise to Russophobic sentiments in the Georgian environment ... It should also be understood that Georgian nationalism takes on harmful forms only insofar as it is penetrated by well-known elements of Europeanism. Thus, the correct solution of the Georgian question can be achieved only under the condition of the emergence of true Georgian nationalism, that is, a special Georgian form of Eurasian ideology.
Azerbaijanis by their numbers represent the most important element of Transcaucasia. Their nationalism is highly developed, and of all the peoples of Transcaucasia, they are most constant in their Russophobic attitudes. These Russophobic sentiments go hand in hand with Turkophile sentiments, fueled by pan-Islamist and Pantoran ideas. The economic importance of their territory (with Baku oil, Nukha sericulture and Mugan cotton plantations) is so great that they cannot be separated. At the same time, it is necessary to recognize some, moreover, quite a significant dose of independence for Azerbaijanis. The decision here depends largely on the nature of Azerbaijani nationalism, and sets as the task of paramount importance the creation of a national-Azerbaijani form of Eurasianism. In this case, Shiiteism must be put up against pan-Islamism.
Three national problems of Transcaucasia (Armenian, Georgian and Azerbaijani) are intertwined with problems of foreign policy. Turkophile policy could push the Armenians in the direction of the British orientation. The same result would have been obtained when betting on Azerbaijanis. England, in any sense, will intrigue in Georgia, realizing that independent Georgia will inevitably become an English colony. And in connection with the inevitability of this intrigue, in Georgia it is unprofitable to make Armenians with Anglophiles and thus strengthen the ground for the British intrigues in Transcaucasia. But even a stake on Armenians would lead to the Turkfilian orientation of Azerbaijanis and to the Russophobic mood of Georgia. All this should be considered when establishing relations with the peoples of the Caucasus.
The complexity of the national question in the South Caucasus is aggravated by the fact that certain nationalities are at enmity between themselves. Some of the reasons for hostility are eliminated with the kuzhno-multi-parliamentary system and the associated management technique. With this system, it is possible, for example, in a number of aspects of life to differentiate management not by territory, but by nationality, which weakens the severity of disputes as belonging to one or another autonomous unit of areas with a mixed population. For example, the question of the language of instruction in schools in such areas loses all its urgency: in the same locality there are schools with different languages in which instruction is given, and each of these schools is under the jurisdiction of the respective national council of public education. But, of course, there are a number of aspects of life, where management should naturally be based on a territorial, rather than a national principle. Not only the old division in the province, based on random and often artificial signs, but also the division into three main areas (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) should be abolished. The Transcaucasian ulus must be firmly divided into small districts, more or less corresponding to the former counties with the only difference that the boundaries of these districts must be more closely adjusted to the ethnographic, historical, household and economic boundaries.
The ancient motto of the imperialist statehood "Divide and rule" is applicable only where the government or the ruling nation deals with a hostile alien population. Where the task of state power is to create an organic association of the native population with the ruling nation to work together, this principle does not apply. Therefore, in the Caucasus one should not try to deepen tensions and contradictions between separate nationalities. With all the variety of shades of democratic culture and life in different regions of Georgia, it still represents a certain ethnographic whole, which cannot be artificially divided into parts. Since ancient times, the Georgian language, as the language of church and literature, has been the common language of the educated classes of Georgia, Mingrelia and Svaneti. Along with the existence of the Mingrelian and Svan languages and without hindering the development of literature in these languages, one should fully resist the artificial creation of some new, historically insufficiently justified, independent and independent (in relation to Georgia) national units.
From the foregoing, however, it does not yet follow that the desire of larger nations to absorb smaller ones can be encouraged. Such aspirations exist in some frontier regions between the Transcaucasus and the North Caucasus: there is a tendency to rotate Abkhazia and South Ossetia, to otatart the southern districts of Dagestan and Zakatala district. Since in these cases we are talking about the deformation of a certain national appearance, this phenomenon should be dealt with by supporting the national resistance of the respective nationalities.
In an effort to prevent the separation of suburbs, one should take into account all the psychological factors feeding the separatist aspirations of the suburbs. At the same time, it is impossible not to notice that in simple people such aspirations are not at all developed or developed very poorly, and the main intelligentsia is the main bearer of separatist aspirations. An important role in the psychology of this intelligentsia is played by the principle “it is better to be first in the village than the last in the city”. Often the sphere of activity of some minister of the independent republic, replacing the former province, is no different from the sphere of activity of the former provincial official. But the minister is called more flattering, and, therefore, the minister holds on to the independence of his republic. When a gubernia is transferred to the position of an independent state, a number of new posts are inevitably created, which local intellectuals end up with, first of all forced to either be content with small posts of their own gubernia, or serve outside this gubernia. Finally, self-proclamation flourishes especially in areas where the local intelligentsia is relatively small and therefore the main contingent of officials was formerly composed of alien elements: when expelling an alien element that fell into the category of “foreign nationals”, in the young republic there is a lack of intelligent forces and every local It is very easy for an intellectual to make a career. Independence is very often the “class” movement of the local intelligentsia, who feel that she, as a class, has benefited from separatism. But, of course, the local intelligentsia carefully conceals this class nature of self-eminence and disguises it with “ideas”: they hastily invent “historical traditions”, local national culture, and so on. Undoubtedly, the population of this area suffers more damage from such a class-intellectual separatist. After all, this autonomy is directed, on the one hand, to artificially increasing the demand for intelligent labor, to increasing the number of people receiving government bills and living, thus, at the expense of taxes from the population, and on the other, to establishing competition of intellectuals from other areas, to reduce the field of competition, and consequently, to lower the quality of local officials. Naturally, therefore, the common people are often hostile to the separatist aspirations of the local intelligentsia and manifest centralist aspirations on which, for example, the Bolsheviks, of course, played upon the liquidation of the independence of the various republics of the Transcaucasus.
In the North Caucasus there are Kabardians, Ossetians, Chechens, small ethnic groups (Circassians, Ingush, Balkars, Karachais, Kumyks, Turukhmen and Kalmyks, and finally Cossacks).
Kabardians and Ossetians always quite firmly held the Russian orientation. Most small nations in this respect do not present any particular difficulties. Definitely Russophobes in the North Caucasus are only Chechens and Ingush. Russophobia of the Ingush is caused by the fact that after the conquest of the Caucasus by the Russians, the raids and robberies, which are always the main occupation of the Ingush, were severely punished; Meanwhile, the Ingush cannot switch over to other occupations, partly due to the atavistic non-habit of manual labor, and partly because of traditional contempt for work, which is considered to be exclusively women's work. An ancient Eastern ruler of the type of Darius or Nebuchadnezzar would simply have subjected this small predatory tribe, interfering with the peaceful and peaceful life of not only Russians, but of all his other neighbors, the total extermination, or would bring his population somewhere far away from their homeland. If such a simplified solution of the question is thrown back, then it remains only to try, through the formulation of public education and the improvement of agriculture, to destroy the old conditions of life and the traditional disregard for peaceful labor.
The Chechen question is somewhat more complicated. Since, firstly, there are five times more Chechens than Ingushes, secondly, Chechen Russophobia is caused by the fact that Chechens consider themselves financially bypassed: their best lands are taken by Cossacks and Russian settlers, and on their land Grozny oil is developed, which they do not receive any income. It is, of course, impossible to fully satisfy these Chechens' claims. Good neighborly relations, however, need to be established. This can be done again by setting public education, raising the level of agriculture and engaging Chechens in common with the Russians economic life.
According to their social structure, the peoples of the North Caucasus are divided into two groups: peoples with an aristocratic system (Kabardians, Balkars, some Circassians, Ossetians) and people with a democratic system (some Circassians, Ingushs and Chechens). On the one hand, the old group enjoyed the highest prestige of the first group, and on the other, the Muslim clergy. The Bolsheviks are systematically working on the destruction of both social systems. If they succeed in this matter, the peoples of the North Caucasus will be deprived of such groups and classes that would be authoritative in the eyes of the masses. Meanwhile, according to the characteristics of their characters, these people, without the guidance of such authoritative groups, turn into wild gangs of robbers, ready to follow any adventurer.
The North Caucasus includes the Cossack regions - Terek and Kuban. There are no special Cossack questions for the Terek region: Cossacks and non-residents live in harmony, conscious of themselves as a single nation, opposed to foreigners. On the contrary, in the Kuban region Cossack question is very acute. Cossacks and nonresident feuding with each other.
In the east and in the west of the Caucasus there are areas that cannot be fully attributed either to Transcaucasia or to the North Caucasus: in the East it is Dagestan, in the West it is Abkhazia.
The position of Dagestan is such that it needs to be granted a very wide autonomy. At the same time, Dagestan is not very popular both in its ethnic composition and in its historical division. Before the conquest of the Russians, Dagestan was divided into a number of small khanates, completely independent of each other and not subject to any supreme power. The traditions of this former crushing have been preserved in Dagestan even at this time. The administrative unification of Dagestan is strongly hampered by the lack of a common language. the former time it came to the point that official correspondence and records management were conducted in Arabic, and Russian government announcements were published in the same language. There are too many native languages: in the Andean region, 70 is spoken in different languages throughout the 13 versts downstream of the Andean Koisu; total native languages in Dagestan around 30. There are several "international" languages that serve to communicate the highlanders of different villages with each other. These are the languages of Avar and Kumyk in the north and Azerbaijani in the southern part of Dagestan. Obviously, the official language should be made exactly one of these "international". However, it does not matter which of the languages to choose for this purpose. Kumyk language is “international” of almost the entire North Caucasus (from the Caspian Sea to Kabarda, inclusive), Azeri dominates most of the Transcaucasus (except the Black Sea coast) and, moreover, in Turkish Armenia, Kurdistan and Northern Persia. Both of these languages are Turkic. It should be borne in mind that with the intensification of economic life, the use of "international" languages takes on such a value that it crowds out the native languages: many of the villages of the southern districts of Dagestan have already completely "Azerbaijanized." It is unlikely in the interests of Russia to allow such a Turkization of Dagestan. After all, if the whole of Dagestan is Turkized, then there will be a continuous mass of Turks from Kazan to Anatolia and Northern Persia, which will create the most favorable conditions for the development of Panturanian ideas with a separatist, Russophobic bias. Dagestan should be used as a natural barrier to the turkization of this part of Eurasia. The northern and western districts of Dagestan, the situation is relatively simple. Here it should be recognized as the official language of the Avar, which is already the native language for the population of Gunibsky and Hunzaksky districts and the international language for Andiysky, Kazikumuhsky, part of Darginsky and part of Zakatalsky districts. The development of Avar literature and the press should be encouraged, and this language should be introduced into all lower schools of the listed districts, as well as into the corresponding secondary schools as a compulsory subject.
The situation is more complicated in other parts of Dagestan. Of all the South Dagestan tribes, the largest is the Kyurinsky, occupying almost the entire Kyurinsky district, the eastern half of the Samursky and the northern part of the Cuban district of the Baku province. Of all the non-Turkic native languages of this part of Dagestan, the Kyurin language is the simplest and easiest; it is closely related to some other native languages of the same region. Therefore, it could be made for this part of Dagestan “international” and official. Thus, in terms of language, Dagestan would turn out to be divided between two native languages, Avar and Kyur.
Abkhazia should recognize the Abkhaz official language, encourage the development of the Abkhaz intelligentsia, and instil in it the awareness of the need to combat Georgianization.
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