"The Moment of Truth"

65
Shot from the movie "In August 44"


“We have never received really reliable data from our intelligence, which could have a serious impact on the course of the planned military operations ... The information obtained by the reconnaissance groups that managed to return had practically no real value ...”
Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel (Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the German Armed Forces).


"The Moment of Truth"
Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel


The Soviet counterintelligence, sadly admitting this, turned out to be little prepared for the expected war with Nazi Germany. By the beginning of the war, the special services were greatly weakened by the repressions of 1937-1939 and had practically no means and ability to resist the well-trained Nazi special services.

By May 1941, a powerful intelligence center "Headquarters Valley" was created in the Abwehr system, the purpose of which was to lead all sabotage and espionage operations on the future front. With all the German army groups, there were large units of the Abwehr (abwehr command), as well as bodies of the SD and the Gestapo.

In our first directive of the NGO Directorate of 22 on June 1941, after the outbreak of hostilities, Nazi Germany was not even mentioned as the main opponent, according to the directive, all attention should be paid to the detection of anti-Soviet elements in the Red Army. And only five days later, another directive came out on June 27, providing for all measures to counter an external enemy.

At the same time, during the offensive, a lot of secret information left in the occupied territory fell into the hands of the enemy; therefore, the strategic initiative at the beginning of the war was on the German side.

At the first stage, the main task of the army counterintelligence and counterintelligence of the state security organs was the fight against the subversive, sabotage activities of the German special services and the elimination of the deserters-traitors in the front line. At the same time, counterintelligence also had to manage to organize partisan detachments, camouflage echelons, and ensure relocation of important industrial facilities to the rear.

Even more work in counterintelligence came after the Germans began to parachute sabotage groups into the front-line zone. In the rear areas of the fronts and in the combat zone, special forces began to search for spies and saboteurs (the actions of one of these units were very well described in the book “The Moment of Truth” by V. Bogomolov). It was also organized to identify all possible points and routes of the saboteurs on the front line and in the front line, near which ambushes and posts were set up, by means of barrage services specially organized for these purposes. Resident agencies and operational groups were also created by state security forces. sabotage activities in the rear of the enemy.

In the first year of the war on the Western Front, military counterintelligence and NKVD troops detained more than a thousand spies and saboteurs, and in one period of the battle of Moscow more than 50 sabotage groups and over 300 agents were neutralized. And this is despite the fact that by the beginning of the war the secret services did not have time to complete the reorganization after the Yezhov purges. Attempts by the German intelligence service to disrupt the work of front-line and front-line communications and bring disorganization into the control of the Soviet troops failed.

By the end of 1942, all the difficulties that counterintelligence had encountered at the beginning of the war were overcome, the forces were restored, the system of operational and preventive measures to combat espionage, sabotage and other enemy intelligence and subversive activities was fully operational. Fascist intelligence services did not manage to obtain important information about the preparation of major offensive operations by the Red Army during the first years of the war.

In 1942, the German special services were especially zealous in the Kavkaz and the Stalingrad directions. In these directions, the bulk of well-trained German saboteurs were thrown, the purpose of which was the explosions of the crossings and the collapse of military echelons. In this region, from January to November 1942, 170 Fascist agents were exposed and captured.

In the same year 1942, our counterintelligence broke down the plans of Fascist Germany to start a chemical war. The first information about the development and cultivation by the Nazis of the bacteria cholera, plague and typhoid were obtained from the arrested officers of the German intelligence service. To check and confirm the data received, a special squad of security officers, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel of State Security Stanislav Vaupshasov, who managed to obtain information that the Nazi command was sending a test batch of chemical artillery shells to the front, was abandoned to the enemy, the whole world learned about the fascist criminal plans. Protest and warning on the response measures of the anti-Hitler coalition of the three countries - the USSR, the USA and the UK - did not allow Hitler to carry out his insidious inhuman plan.

After a crushing defeat near Moscow, the leadership of the German special services stepped up their intelligence work. In order to bring down the intelligence activity of the German intelligence service, as well as mislead the fascists and reveal the plans and plans of the Hitlerite command, the Soviet counterintelligence developed and carried out a large-scale special operation included in the textbooks on intelligence skills. This operation lasted almost the entire war and at different stages bore a different name "Monastery", "Couriers", and then "Berezino". This operation is still considered “aerobatics” in the intelligence work, everything was worked out cleanly, the last radiogram came from 103 5 Abverkomand-1945 in May XNUMX of the year, after the surrender of Berlin, completed this super-operation looked like this: “With a heavy heart, we have to stop helping you. Based on this situation, we also can no longer maintain radio contact with you. Whatever the future brings us, our thoughts will always be with you. ”



Thanks to the skillful work of the Soviet counterintelligence, the Abwehr actually worked in vain and was eliminated a few months before the end of the war. The activity of another fascist special service, Zeppelin, was slightly longer. The large operation developed by this office, which received the code name “Volzhsky Val”, had ambitious goals. With the help of saboteurs, it was planned to disable communications linking the front with the Urals, Siberia, Central Asia and other areas deep in the rear, as well as sabotage the most important industrial defense facilities and blow up bridges across the Ural and Volga rivers.



Some success of this special service was achieved, but as a result of the work of the Soviet counterintelligence, it suffered a complete failure of all its grandiose intentions.

For example, in May 1944 of the year, two saboteurs fell into the hands of our counterintelligence agents, who confessed that, feeling the hopelessness of their actions, they decided to surrender and gave the following testimony. They were abandoned to the rear as part of a group of fourteen people under the command of Lieutenant General of the German Army Agayev. The group includes well-trained Russians in the commando school of Lückenwalde, former prisoners of war. The tasks of the group include conducting reconnaissance and subversive work in the territory of Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and other Caspian regions of the USSR. Also, the detainees gave a complete alignment of the equipment and equipment of the group and the information that several more sabotage fascist groups were planned to enter.



A task force was sent to the area of ​​detention of saboteurs for the removal of caches, the seizure of another party of saboteurs and the cleansing of the territory. In the process of cleaning the nearby territory, five more Nazi spies were detained, who testified that the other seven had left for the oil pumping area. There they were met, the saboteurs refused the offer to surrender and opened machine-gun fire. During the shooting, five soldiers were killed and their commander, Ober-Lieutenant Agayev. But the radio operator of the group was captured and subsequently used in the operational game with the Berlin Intelligence Center. The next group of saboteurs fell into the hands of the security officers before they landed and this was yet another failure of the German intelligence, this time Zeppelin.

Trying to justify themselves in the eyes of their patron Himmler and the chief Nazi Hitler, the Zeppelin leadership developed another operation, Roman Number II. But this operation also failed, most of the saboteurs abandoned during this operation were destroyed, the rest were taken prisoner.

Of all the sabotage groups abandoned by Zeppelin, more than half were destroyed without proceeding with the tasks assigned to them. Heinrich Himmler, the patron of Zeppelin, acknowledged the complete failure of this intelligence intelligence service.

During the war years, the Germans did not manage to make any serious, successful sabotage.

“Based on the experience of the war, we considered the Soviet counterintelligence an extremely strong and dangerous enemy ... According to the data available to the Abwehr, almost none of our agents abandoned to the rear of the Soviet troops escaped the control of the Soviet secret services, for the most part all German agents were arrested, and if and came back, it was often supplied with misinformation materials. ”
(Lt. Gen. Bentheveni Former head of the Abwehr-3 department during the 28 interrogation in May of 1945)
65 comments
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  1. +12
    15 March 2013 07: 46
    Yeah, not so much now, they are catching the heroes of Russia for organizing a coup, just to show that we are also working. Shame! Glory to the Red Army! soldier
    1. yak69
      +11
      15 March 2013 09: 15
      "" "Soviet counterintelligence, sadly to admit, turned out to be unprepared for the expected war with Nazi Germany." ""

      Author, you're wrong !!
      I have not even read more stupidity. Our CD, SR and BP were very much even ready for any intrigues of the enemy. It is enough to read the book by VV Kondrashov "Knowing Everything About the Enemy" (published with the approval of VV Korabelnikov). The book analyzes historical documents of the pre-war and war period and convincingly shows that the enemy KNEW EVERYTHING AND PREPARED CAREFULLY.
      1. Vodila
        +3
        15 March 2013 09: 30
        And you can read the book "I have the honor" Pikul. We were not ready!
        1. avt
          +4
          15 March 2013 09: 41
          Quote: Vodila
          And you can read the book "I have the honor" Pikul. We were not ready!

          To study history, especially special services for Akunin and Pikul request ....... Try to start with “Moonzund” and check, at least, the losses of the opposing fleets, then we'll talk.
        2. +7
          15 March 2013 11: 43
          With all due respect to Pikul as a writer, it should be noted that citing his works to historical reality is of very relative value. It’s like, according to Dumas, studying the history of France and arguing about it. Of course, there are some coincidences, but no more, and the authors, I think, did not set other goals for themselves.
        3. yak69
          +6
          15 March 2013 12: 16
          Quote: Vodila
          And you can read the book "I have the honor" Pikul

          How would it be more polite to tell you, uh ... comparing a fiction writer with a real participant in the events of those years (V.V. Kondrashov, a participant in the Second World War who devoted his whole life to working at the General Staff of the Main Intelligence Directorate) is at least not entirely correct.
          1. +1
            15 March 2013 16: 46
            Something I read a whole bunch of comments, that I have to believe a book written by an active employee of the GRU GSH, and somehow it bothers me. Are you good people laughing or mocking? This book does not and cannot be a single grain of reliable information by definition! From institutions such as the GRU, they only retire with their feet forward.
            No actions that do not help solve the operational problem, these people do not take their whole life. Even the vile traitor Rezun convincingly shows this to all of us ... To read this book as a source of information means to show your obvious intellectual insufficiency, excuse me for being blunt. A book written by an officer of the GRU GSH can be written for one purpose - with the goal of influencing the enemy! This is an artifact made by printing, sharpened for a specific task. And you want to find information in it ... the naivety of some people has no limit ...
            1. yak69
              +1
              15 March 2013 21: 35
              Quote: Mikhail3
              This book does not and cannot be a single grain of reliable information by definition

              Immediately obvious - a real expert!
              Mature, not naive, knowing everything!
              Quote: Mikhail3
              To read this book as a source of information is to show your apparent intellectual inadequacy,

              Where are we to you, intellectuals .....
            2. wax
              0
              16 March 2013 01: 47
              One can argue to the point of screeching, but the facts speak of a successful neutralization of the fifth inner and "sixth" outer columns. Don't believe Kondrashov, can you believe Keitel?
        4. +1
          15 March 2013 20: 47
          Quote: Vodila
          And you can read the book "I have the honor" Pikul. We were not ready!

          I must admit that despite the fact that Valentin Savvich is one of my favorite authors, his works are fictional, not documentary! So the prototype of the protagonist of the novel "I have the honor" is Alexander Alexandrovich Samoilo. But according to the book, the hero's biography does not always correspond to the prototype. And the events of the book do not always correspond to reality.
          1. Yarbay
            +2
            15 March 2013 23: 29
            Quote: AlNikolaich
            I must admit that despite the fact that Valentin Savich is one of my favorite authors, his works are fiction, not documentary!

            I agree with you!
            Even too artistic !!
            If you read his book * Bayazet * then remember what nasty things was written about Ismail Khan Nakhchivansky in the film too !! But the truth was different !!

            On the morning of June 8, the Turks, under the command of the former commandant of the city of Kamal Ali, the Pasha launched a powerful attack on the citadel. Surrendering to panic, Lt. Col. Patsevich, with the consent of a number of other officers, including the commandant of the Shtokvich fortress, decided to surrender Bayazet. The fire was stopped and a white flag was hoisted above the walls of the fortress. Learning about this from the artillery officer, Lieutenant Nikolay Tomashevsky, who came to him, Colonel Ismail Khan, who at that moment was at the head of the seriously wounded son, the ensign of the Erivan horse-irregular regiment, Amanullah Khan Nakhichevan, ran out into the courtyard, where he saw crowded officers and officers on the fortress wall there is a pole with a developing white flag, near which stood Patsevich and several officers. Ismail Khan, in strong terms, reminded Patsevich, Stockwitch and other officers of the oath of allegiance to the Tsar and the Fatherland, ordered to tear down the white flag and open fire on the enemy, warning that anyone who does not obey the order will be immediately shot as a traitor. From that moment, essentially removing Colonel Patsevich, Colonel Ismail Khan Nakhichevan as senior in rank, on his own initiative, took command of the Bayazet garrison. Shooting resumed and one of the first was mortally wounded Patsevich, and he was wounded in the back. According to some reports, the shot was fired by one of the officers of the garrison. Joining the command of the garrison, Ismail Khan Nakhichevan organized the defense of the fortress and in difficult conditions, without water and provisions, held it until the approach of the main forces of the Russian army. When the next parliamentarian who arrived at the citadel and ran to the enemy after the outbreak of war declared Ismail Khan that if the garrison did not capitulate, he would be outweighed, Ismail Khan replied that the parliament would be hanged first, as a traitor, and this order was immediately executed.
            After lifting the blockade from the fortress, of all its defenders, Colonel Ismail Khan Nakhichevan was awarded the highest awards. Highest order from On December 19, 1877, “for military distinctions,” he was awarded the rank of Major General, and on December 31, 1877, “for the exemplary courage and discretion shown during the blockade of Bayezet in June 1877,” he was awarded the Order of “Holy Great Martyr and Victorious George IV Degree” .
        5. +1
          16 March 2013 21: 45
          Pikul read history ...] Especially interesting are moments such as: “Stalin lit his pipe and thought ...” Or something like that. Although I personally like to read it. But this is not historical research.
      2. zambo
        +5
        15 March 2013 10: 08
        “The Soviet counterintelligence service, sadly to admit it, turned out to be ill-prepared for the expected war with Nazi Germany. By the beginning of the war, the special services were greatly weakened by the repressions of 1937-1939 and had practically no means and capabilities to resist the well-trained Nazi special services.”

        I also disagree with the author. This is from the same soap opera of anti-Stalinist liberals. Command led by Stalin from 1935-36. knew and prepared for the upcoming war, the only thing that was not enough for Us was time, because a lot of effort was spent on fighting the "fifth column" inside the country.

        Moreover, the author contradicts himself: "the special services were greatly weakened by the repressions of 1937-1939 and practically did not have the means and capabilities to resist the perfectly trained Nazi special services " and at the end of the article: "During the war years, the Germans did not manage to commit a single serious, successful sabotage. "
      3. vyatom
        -2
        15 March 2013 13: 24
        Quote: yak69
        The author, you are wrong !! I have not even read any more stupid things. Our CD, SR and BP were very much even ready for any intrigues of the enemy. It is enough to read the book by VV Kondrashov "Knowing Everything About the Enemy" (published with the approval of VV Korabelnikov). The book analyzes the historical documents of the pre-war and war period and convincingly shows that the enemy KNEW EVERYTHING AND CAREFULLY PREPARED

        Patriotism, of course, is a good and necessary thing, but the main thing is that it does not come to hatred. If everyone knew, then why did the 41st year happen, and the subsequent defeats? In the 39th year there was no exact scheme of the Mannerheim line, which led to large losses. And in the 42nd Germans outplayed us near Kharkov? So it is very controversial that we all knew about the enemy.
        1. yak69
          +2
          15 March 2013 14: 53
          Quote: vyatom
          If everyone knew, then why did the 41st year happen, and the subsequent defeats?

          "41st" should have happened anyway, we were already "sentenced" to war by the world behind the scenes This time.
          It is impossible to know EVERYTHING in principle, and it is clear that this is such a figure of speech (we don’t know everything about ourselves). But we knew more about the Germans than they did about us. These are two.
          As a rule, the loss of troops, the lack of respect for the soldiers, and some combination of circumstances lead to heavy losses. These are three.
          But to wage a long war and not be defeated in any operation is impossible. These are four.
          Quote: vyatom
          it is very debatable that we all knew about the enemy.

          The word "very" has the effect of reinforcing the dominant of speech in the dialogue and in this case it is absolutely inappropriate, because the war was won by us, not by the Germans. And therefore, to challenge the statement "knew-did not know" is even silly. It's five.
        2. 0
          16 March 2013 21: 52
          I already had to write on this site that ... Stalin knew that there would be a war. But he didn’t dare to start mobilization. Put the whole country on its hind legs! It clearly meant that the Union was starting a war. That's what pulled. This is one of the reasons the most understandable one. And there were still hundreds of others that we don’t understand. And now we know that the combat readiness order left the districts on time. Literate commanders did everything right. One Sevastopol is worth it. Or the Northern Fleet.
        3. 0
          16 March 2013 23: 31
          The Germans outplayed us in the Crimea too. Although there were such "Sailors" here! Everything has its time. And they pushed them back quite hard.
      4. Grishka100watt
        0
        15 March 2013 14: 23
        So this is mentioned in the context of the Stalinist repressions, do not forget) For the sake of just mentioning, you can even insert a bald line in the second part of the phrase)))
    2. Indigo
      +20
      15 March 2013 11: 53
      Well, what can I say?
      1. yak69
        +7
        15 March 2013 12: 23
        I look at the poster and just beast !!
        Lord, give me patience, do not get to assault! And so I want to "go" in the face of a high-ranking bastard, who still sees nothing and hears nothing .. and who can only say that "" the guilt must first be proved! "
        1. +2
          15 March 2013 13: 48
          If you remove the first phrase of the article - I agree with the rest unconditionally. One gets the impression that he started the article one, and finished the other.
          One wonders what other special services of the world would be able to do at least a tenth of the counterintelligence of the Red Army in the first year of the war on the eastern front?
          You can give negative examples, but they will never spoil the overall picture and the significance of the contribution of counterintelligence to the Victory's piggy bank.
  2. +12
    15 March 2013 07: 47
    The Moment of Truth is a gripping book and a powerful film. It rarely happens when watching a movie is no less interesting than reading a book. In this case, exactly so.
    1. Yashka Gorobets
      +3
      15 March 2013 12: 51
      I disagree with you about the film. The authors tried very hard to convey the book accurately, even the poster at the barbershop did not forget, but it is simply not possible to convey the spirit of the book. "Moment of Truth" is the greatest book about war, even against the background of such giants as "The Dawns Here Are Quiet "and" Not on the lists. "
      P.S. Mironov played brilliantly.
      1. +3
        15 March 2013 17: 43
        Everyone has their own opinion, but personally, the film did not cause me a trace of disappointment. A book can never be the same as a movie in perception. Reading a book, the human mind itself creates images, and while watching a movie, he perceives only what he is shown. And very often, the images created while reading a book do not coincide with what a person later sees on the screen. But, I repeat again, I personally really liked the film.
        1. Yashka Gorobets
          +2
          15 March 2013 20: 26
          I did not say that the film is bad, I said that this book cannot be transferred to the movie format, because. it half consists of the thoughts of the heroes. By the way, after watching the movie, Bogomolov forbade his name to be used as the author, because he didn’t like the film, but on the other hand, he had previously banned two screen versions altogether, and this film was released, which speaks about him quality. hi
          1. 0
            16 March 2013 22: 00
            Read "17 Moments of Spring" At least take it in your hands. A brochure. And a film word for word. 11 episodes !!! Lioznova is a smart girl. Thanks to her forever! the screenwriter solved the most difficult task, and was able to convey the spirit of this cool book. I know it by heart, to the word, and the film coincided with my vision of the topic. Thanks to the authors. They did it.
        2. +5
          15 March 2013 20: 28
          I apologize for the interference, but Bogomolov was absolutely right in removing his name from the authors. Of course, the film will always be different from the work itself, and one of its claims that cars in '44 could not move around the rockets with burning headlights, in my opinion, is not fundamental. The reason is that they tried to fit a rather voluminous work into this timekeeping, throwing out a lot of material, seemingly insignificant. And because of this, integrity is lost ..., the role of some characters, for example, the assistant commandant, performed by Boyko becomes completely incomprehensible. ... And in the novel itself, its hero, a whole chapter is assigned and all his thoughts, actions and their motivation are described in detail. Ideally, it would have to be 2, or maybe more serial, with offscreen text from the author, as in "17 Moments". This is of course purely my opinion (especially since I first watched the film, and then found the book), but nevertheless, the book brighter, more accurately and most importantly conveys the atmosphere of the events described in more detail. IMHO
          1. Yashka Gorobets
            +1
            15 March 2013 22: 03
            Yes, the assistant commandant, the most striking example of the lack of openness of the character. In the film, he looks like a fool, and according to the book he is a very positive hero, all of whose actions were seriously motivated.
            1. +1
              15 March 2013 23: 45
              That's right. Although the film is good, in my opinion it did not completely reflect the complexity of the work of counterintelligence agents, their conscientiousness and responsibility. And all democrats were shown evil by not evil bloodthirsty tormentors whom they would like to see, who beat confessions and shoot innocent people , and courageous and intelligent people dedicated to their work, patriots and professionals.
              So who wants to have the full picture is just a book.
          2. 0
            16 March 2013 22: 03
            That's right. A person who has not read the book is unlikely to understand the film to the end. But I wrote a little higher about "17 Moments of Spring". It's unrealistic to squeeze such a volume into 120 minutes of screen time. But here it worked. At least in part. A plus for the film!
        3. +2
          16 March 2013 11: 07
          I disagree! After watching "The meeting place cannot be changed." I read "The Era of Mercy." The film and the book are one to one except for the finale! "Moment of Truth: August 44th" I read in 4th grade. The film reflects the beginning and end of the book! And what else to expect from a one-part film!
    2. +1
      16 March 2013 10: 48
      Quote: aleks-s2011
      about preparation read about Starinov Ilya Grigorovich. The Great Patriotic War

      Since June 28, 1941 of the year is the head of the operational group of barriers on the Western Front. Since July 13, concurrently - Head of the Operational and Training Center of the Western Front. He reported directly to the front commander D. G. Pavlov, then - A. I. Eremenko. Engaged in barriers.
      At the end of September - head of the operational-engineering group of the South-Western Front. At his disposal were 5 battalions and 5 operational groups. Barriers were carried out, mining of railways and highways, of especially important facilities near Kharkov and in Kharkov was carried out. Starinov was directly subordinate to the Military Council of the front. They destroyed the headquarters of the 58 division led by Lieutenant General Georg von Braun and blew up Lieutenant General Beinecker in a mine. [1]
      From November 17 to 1941 of the year - Deputy Chief of Staff of the Engineering Forces of the Red Army (Chief of Staff - K. S. Nazarov). They mined, set up barriers, and destroyed bridges and roads near Moscow, on the Kalinin and Western fronts - from Serpukhov to Kalinin.
      Since December 1941 - the head of the operational-engineering group on the Southern Front near Rostov. He had five battalions at his disposal. Established barriers, mined. Mines were produced in the workshops of Rostov State University. In February 1942 of the year, ice trips across the Taganrog Bay.
      Since April 1942 of the year - the commander of the 5-th separate special forces brigade on the Kalinin Front in the Torzhok area. At the disposal are 5 battalions (about 4 of thousands of soldiers and officers). They produced anti-personnel and anti-tank bands from Rzhev to Surozh - only about 400 km.
      In August 1942, he was appointed head of the Higher Special Purpose Operational School of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TsShPD), which was at the disposal of the commander-in-chief of the partisan movement KE Voroshilov. The school was located at st. Bykovo. They trained specialists and commanders of the highest class, planned operations, tested new sabotage equipment.
      Since September 1942 of the year - assistant to the chief of staff for sabotage at P.K. Ponomarenko. Compiled instructions, developed plans of operations. He was on business trips in the Caucasus, in Rostov and Novorossiysk. He organized partisan operations.
      Since March 18, 1943 of the year is a member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front. He organized the training of guerrilla groups for casting behind enemy lines.
      Since May 1943 of the year - Deputy Head of the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan sabotage movement T. A. Strokach. He created sabotage services at headquarters and in partisan formations.
      Since April 1944 of the year - Deputy Chief of the Polish Headquarters of the partisan movement A. Zavadsky. He was engaged in the organization of partisan struggle, interaction with Soviet partisans on the border with Poland. At this time, for the dissertation written before the war, he received the title of candidate of technical sciences.
      Since June 1944, he was the chief of staff of the Soviet mission in Yugoslavia (located in Bucharest). They were engaged in organizing interactions between the Soviet Army and the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (NOAU). He met and talked with Marshal Tito many times.
      Since February 1945, he has been the head of the operational and engineering group for clearing roads and railways in the liberated territory of Germany. He obeyed Marshals R. Ya. Malinovsky and I. S. Konev. They worked north of Budapest, in the Potsdam area, in cities on the Rhine.
      Victory Day met in Berlin.
      [edit]

      He also fought in Spain!
  3. +12
    15 March 2013 07: 54
    “The Soviet counterintelligence service, sadly to admit it, turned out to be unprepared for the expected war with Nazi Germany. By the beginning of the war, the special services were greatly weakened by the repressions of 1937-1939 and had practically no means and capabilities to resist the well-trained Nazi special services.”
    The author takes a strange position and issued a tirade about the lack of preparedness of our counterintelligence and immediately gives Keitel’s quote that their intelligence has screwed up in half.
    Dear author, it never crossed your mind that German intelligence screwed up due to counterintelligence activities conducted by our special services. And repression has nothing to do with it. All the years the USSR was a country where the activities of intelligence services of other states were very difficult.
    As far as I know, German sabotage groups acted less or less successfully in the first months of the war when ours retreated. It is understandable in the conditions of chaos that they could afford. But, over time, all of their reconnaissance and sabotage forces abandoned to our rear were eliminated. All groups !!! Abwehr screwed up in a war with us. Not a single sensible operation. And before the war they did not know what was in service with us! Hence the surprise of the sight of tanks and Katyusha fire!
    1. +6
      15 March 2013 08: 07
      Soviet counterintelligence, sadly to admit it, turned out to be poorly prepared for the expected war with Nazi Germany. By the beginning of the war, special services were greatly weakened by the repressions of 1937-1939 and had virtually no means and capabilities to withstand well-trained Hitler special services.

      Quote: Nagaibak
      The author takes a strange position and issued a tirade about the lack of preparedness of our counterintelligence and immediately gives Keitel’s quote that their intelligence has screwed up in half.

      Given that:
      “We have never received really reliable data from our intelligence, which could have a serious impact on the course of the planned military operations ... The information obtained by the reconnaissance groups that managed to return had practically no real value ...”
      Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel (Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the German Armed Forces).

      So, maybe they were not repressions at all? Maybe it really was a purge of intelligence from German agents and agents of other countries? Is it possible? It seems that this was so, judging by the results of further intelligence work.
      1. +1
        16 March 2013 05: 34
        Quote: anip
        Maybe it really was a purge of intelligence from German agents and agents of other countries

        So after all, in the "files" it was indicated - a German spy, communication with foreign intelligence, etc. But then they shouted: "What spies! That's all lies!" And not only about the repressed military, but also about civilian engineers and even workers. Although, by and large, the same railway trackman - the lineman could very well work for foreign intelligence.
        1. +1
          16 March 2013 08: 38
          That's right, it was indicated in the cases. But the liberals have been howling for 20 years about unreasonable "repressions", shouting about fabricated cases, brainwashing those who do not want to think about anything at least a little. Likewise, in the case of intelligence, the results of the subsequent work of which, after supposedly "repressions" (in fact - cleansing the ranks of foreign agents, spies), it is clear that these were not repressions. But for some reason, few people think about it.
      2. +1
        16 March 2013 11: 17
        Even in the West they recognized that one of the important factors in the victory of the USSR in the Second World War was the liquidation of the 5 column before the war!
    2. Fox
      +1
      15 March 2013 08: 16
      Quote: Nagaibak
      Nagaibak

      you ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++. ahead of me ... the same questions to the author. the author’s strange logic ... or regrets, what abwehr prosral?
  4. 0
    15 March 2013 07: 55
    “The Soviet counterintelligence service, sadly to admit it, turned out to be unprepared for the expected war with Nazi Germany. By the beginning of the war, the special services were greatly weakened by the repressions of 1937-1939 and had practically no means and capabilities to resist the well-trained Nazi special services.”
    The author takes a strange position and issued a tirade about the lack of preparedness of our counterintelligence and immediately gives Keitel’s quote that their intelligence has screwed up in half.
    Dear author, it never crossed your mind that German intelligence screwed up due to counterintelligence activities conducted by our special services. And repression has nothing to do with it. All the years the USSR was a country where the activities of intelligence services of other states were very difficult.
    As far as I know, German sabotage groups acted less or less successfully in the first months of the war when ours retreated. It is understandable in the conditions of chaos that they could afford. But, over time, all of their reconnaissance and sabotage forces abandoned to our rear were eliminated. All groups !!! Abwehr screwed up in a war with us. Not a single sensible operation. And before the war they did not know what was in service with us! Hence the surprise of the sight of tanks and Katyusha fire!
  5. +1
    15 March 2013 08: 33
    Good article
  6. +3
    15 March 2013 08: 51
    It's time to get rid of the imposed cliches, friends talked about the purges that weakened the red army, and that's enough, but I liked the article and liked the film based on the book "The Moment of Truth" too!
  7. +5
    15 March 2013 09: 00
    Soviet counterintelligence, like the NKVD as a whole, was commanded by L.P. Beria. It was his border guards who died without any order of 227 ...
    It is a pity that the author knows our enemies well, but little about ours (judging by the article) That's the whole moment of truth ...
    For the author - "Why Lavrenty Palych was recorded as demons": http://klin.hutt.ru/viewtopic.php?id=445#p731
    1. zambo
      +7
      15 March 2013 10: 26
      Boris55. unfortunately, brainwashing about the cult of personality of Stalin (and Beria) in the period since 1953. to this day has not been in vain for our country.
      By my own example: school, university - I was not that an ardent anti-Stalinist, but studying from those textbooks, I could not say anything good about Stalin, and only matured, after reading a lot of different liters, I began to analyze, compare facts and speculations about activities I. Stalin and L. Beria, and approached his current, already held opinion.

      I repeat, unfortunately, a lot of the brains of the inhabitants of Russia are "brainwashed through and through" and cannot be treated.
    2. vyatom
      0
      15 March 2013 13: 26
      Quote: Boris55
      It is a pity that the author knows our enemies well, but little about ours (judging by the article) That's the whole moment of truth

      What is true is true
    3. vyatom
      0
      15 March 2013 14: 09
      What does his border guards mean? They swore allegiance to the USSR, not Beria.
      1. 0
        16 March 2013 22: 11
        We all swore allegiance to the USSR. But the NKVD was a separate caste. And there was Beria keruval. And he did the right thing. And at the same time he supervised the missile and nuclear program of the USSR. And quite successfully, similar. And all these stories about "the road that does not lead to the temple." it's time to throw it in the trash.
  8. _Igor_
    0
    15 March 2013 09: 38
    "contacted the best die like everyone else"
  9. +2
    15 March 2013 10: 56
    Yes, they were ready! With regard to espionage. And as for sabotage, they are not ready. Here is one of 2. Either not all the villains were imprisoned or shot, or the "territorial acquisitions" of 1939-40 went to harm from this point of view. Simply, on this side of the border there was a mass of ready-made traitors to the Poles and Bandera with the Balts. Many received Soviet passports, and there was no time to trip them.
    1. 0
      16 March 2013 11: 33
      Moreover, it was a statistical mistake to send conscripts from the liberated territories to serve in the western districts (after the war in the SA, conscripts served far from home)! Until the fall of 1941, about 500000 prisoners from these areas were dismissed to their homes! Then this practice was abruptly stopped, due to labor shortages in Germany.
  10. avt
    +2
    15 March 2013 11: 08
    Quote: misterwulf
    Yes, we were ready! In terms of espionage. And as far as sabotage is concerned, they’re not ready.

    In general, when such a dispute begins, the question arises: What exactly is meant by not ready? Should have caught everyone on the fly? The Germans were such suckers or what? There was a war, with varying degrees of success, with a very serious enemy, well mobilized and ready for war. And to argue from the position of Akunin or Pikul is silly. Reality is not a movie "Spy" is not a TV series "Saboteurs" and not even "The Moment of Truth"
    1. 0
      15 March 2013 11: 56
      Yes, I meant that even now no one is ready. :) So many things ... climbing. Although, this is a problem for all continental countries. It was easier for England to "localize the problem" (the island after all). Paradox, but geography takes place
  11. Gari
    +7
    15 March 2013 11: 29
    Abwehr - The organ of military intelligence and counterintelligence in Germany in 1919-1944. Since 1, headed by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris
    In 1941, Canaris appeared near Moscow. There he realized how inaccurate the ideas about the strength and reserves of the Red Army were. He warned the High Command that German forces "may never reach Moscow." He issued a similar warning the following year before the start of the offensive in the Caucasus. Hitler ignored his opinion, but "took note of Canaris."
    And then how to understand it-

    The Soviet counterintelligence, sadly admitting this, turned out to be little prepared for the expected war with Nazi Germany. By the beginning of the war, the special services were greatly weakened by the repressions of 1937-1939 and had practically no means and ability to resist the well-trained Nazi special services.

    In 1942 alone, the Abwehr sent about 20 thousand agents to the territory of the USSR. However, the bet on "total espionage" does not justify itself: out of 150 reconnaissance and sabotage groups trained from October 1942 to September 1943 by "Abwehr command-104", only two are returning back. The rest are either successfully caught by Smersh, or after being dropped they come to the NKVD themselves.
    In 1942, a special headquarters was created to combat the partisan movement in the occupied territory. In the same year, the position of Canaris was further shaken after the failure of operations Hawthorn (uprising in South Africa), Tiger (Afghan-Indian conflict), Shamil (uprising of the highlanders in the Caucasus). But the real storm broke out during Canaris' report to Hitler on the situation on the Russian front in February 1944. Listening to the report of Canaris, the Führer first closely watched him, and then, knocking over the table, rushed to the admiral and grabbed his uniform. "Are you trying to prove to me that I lost the war ?!" - Hitler shouted hysterically. He immediately removed Canaris from his post. At the same time it was done with the Abwehr
    That's how the Soviet counterintelligence actually worked
    SMERSH (short for "Death to Spies!") -
    The Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "SMERSH" in the People's Commissariat of Defense (NPO) of the USSR is military counterintelligence, the head is V. S. Abakumov. Reported directly to the supreme commander of the armed forces
    I.V. Stalin.
    They couldn’t work with such a commander in another way.
    1. Kostya pedestrian
      +1
      15 March 2013 18: 00
      All the same, the fascists are cowards and a mischief to our Spirit. There are their commanders, whom they did not execute, and in the casemates the general epaulettes did not heal, and they bleated like sheep before the healer. How many military forgivenesses did Hitler make in front of his Abwehr and headquarters, with their quiet connivance, that they will glimpse something that does not work out very well, but still carry out obviously unsuccessful maneuvers.

      But Zhukov and Tymoshenko saved, and leveled the front - fearing neither Stalin nor the NKVD, and roared at Stalin so that he quietly left the headquarters, ceasing to interfere with real professionals in military strategy and tactics, which led to a sharp improvement on the fronts.

      And how Rokossovsky defended his point of view.

      But so is Comrade. Stalin should be given credit that, as a wise politician, he realized that it is better to win the war than, as a blitzkrikovite Hitler, to pretend that he is almost a god of war and "vasche" "builder".

      Yes, the Fritz are weaklings. We got used to it even from the Crusades that they were all urging them, and so Hitler brought their Wehrmacht under the monastery.



      PieS: But the Germans, only when, no matter how ridiculous it sounds, under the USSR, but now they began to live better under Putin. Nobody is dripping on their brains, except NATO, but NATO needs to resettle refugees, they can be understood the same way - not everyone wants to live underneath, while NATO cleans up warehouses.
  12. +2
    15 March 2013 13: 48
    Abwehr really screwed up. Many prisoners of war agreed to cooperation only for the sake of appearance, they did not see any other way out.
  13. +1
    15 March 2013 13: 51
    Quote: anip
    So, maybe they were not repressions at all? Maybe it really was a purge of intelligence from German agents and agents of other countries? Is it possible? It seems that it was so


    No need to say stupid things.
    Agents in the organs of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence penetrated extremely rarely. The reasons are clear - tightly closed borders, total control and verification.
    The purges in the army, in the organs are the protection of the authorities from a potential threat. Who by the mid-30s could pose a threat to Stalin, the Party and the course ?? - only the army and the authorities. So they cleaned them up quickly and mercilessly.
    Cons - the old cadres took away with them their work experience (hence the loss of counterintelligence at the beginning of the war, Abver literally hosted our territory)
    Plus, continuity was not lost, and no one destroyed the service as such,
    new devotees came. young, quickly trained cadres, and by the year 42 they began to replay the vaunted German intelligence.
  14. jjj
    +2
    15 March 2013 15: 35
    They cleaned out those who made acquaintances without the permission of the leadership of the main defendants in the pre-war processes. Looking back, you understand what a huge role the security agencies played in the fate of the country. But now this role is thoroughly smeared with mud
  15. Rrrrr
    0
    15 March 2013 16: 38
    And the receivers continue to work, and here, probably, 20-30 percent are knocked not only with fingers. Pouring hung in the ears ... Receivers are being prepared. Yes kids? How is bulk, beeps, Germans ...? Where are the ribbons that are white, which are made?
    1. 0
      16 March 2013 22: 18
      Well, office plankton? I wanted a bright future again. Now and right away? Knit white ribbons, it will be easier to wet you!
  16. ABV
    +1
    15 March 2013 17: 10
    Yes, there were no repressions! how many Khrushchev’s tales can be heard .... they fired drunkards and gouging, planted several hundred (yes even a couple of thousand) commissars, who did not know military science, climbed into command and control. And the fact that troop control was lame .... that is always the case with us - look at the modern generals, they didn’t see repressions ...
    But the people of Stalin respected how new historians write the loss, because they planted thieves and grabbers, they valued professionals. If Putin had planted the same Serdyukov now, he would have been more respected ...
    1. 0
      15 March 2013 18: 19
      Quote: ABV
      Yes, there were no repressions!

      Well, why do we have so _ Either black or white.
      Well, at least read Wasserman's comments on some points in the history of the USSR.
      I'm sorry.
      Glory to the soldiers of Russia!
      drinks
      1. 0
        16 March 2013 22: 19
        I read it. I respect this brow. Real things are grit.
  17. s1н7т
    0
    15 March 2013 18: 49
    ... "did not allow Hitler to carry out his insidious inhuman plan."

    But they didn’t stop us from testing a tank near Stalingrad. Weapons - tularemia, if sclerosis does not lie. laughing
    1. wax
      +2
      16 March 2013 02: 19
      We did not need to experience anything: due to outbreaks of tularemia in the southern regions of the USSR, the disease and sources of infection were well studied. There was a vaccine. The invention that in 1942 the German and allied units near Stalingrad were infected through rodents with tularemia was not confirmed and is generally doubtful. In the memoirs it is mentioned that cases of tularemia were also frequent in parts of the Red Army in the Stalingrad region. The magnitude of the epidemic was large due to the breeding of rodents as a result of harvest, and the conditions of camp life, unsanitary conditions. It is clear that the life of rodents in besieged Stalingrad was less comfortable than in the steppes occupied by the enemy. And the offensive took place in the deep of winter, when the rodents had no time for fat. So, near Stalingrad, nature also worked on our side.
      By the way, how do you imagine they delivered infected mice to the Germans deep behind the front line? Shells? Or did the mice themselves run past our soldiers behind the front line?
    2. 0
      16 March 2013 22: 20
      Tuleriamia is not uncommon even now.
  18. 0
    15 March 2013 18: 56
    The author of the article is very far from the topic that he undertook to cover, put a minus
    1. +1
      16 March 2013 22: 22
      Yes, in vain. The topic is still interesting. Thanks to the author, but it’s not the Academy of Sciences.
  19. +1
    15 March 2013 19: 10
    The article in my opinion is about nothing. The author tried to talk about the work of the counterintelligence of the Smersh NGO, but lumped everything together. Stanislav Vapshausov worked on line 4 of the NKVD Directorate (intelligence and sabotage) with Sudoplatov and had nothing to do with military counterintelligence, also the operation "Monastyr" began in the line of counterintelligence of the state security, subsequently, with the exit of the Red Army to the state border, the further operation under the name "Berezino" was transferred to the jurisdiction of the GUKR "Smersh". Also with the German special services - "Zeppelin" was not an independent special service, but like the "Valley Headquarters" was a structural subdivision of the Abwehr.
    April 9 marks the 70th anniversary of the creation of the counterintelligence service of the Smersh non-commercial organization. As stated in the Regulations on the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence Smersh, only his orders. " Let's pay attention to the words: "only him"! The following provision is directly related to this: “Smersh bodies are a centralized organization: at the fronts and in the districts, the“ Smersh ”bodies (the“ Smersh ”departments of the NCO fronts and the“ Smersh ”departments of the NCOs of the armies, corps, divisions, brigades, military districts and other formations and institutions of the Red Army) are subordinate only to their higher bodies. "
    The structure of counterintelligence bodies corresponded to the structure of the Armed Forces, existing in parallel with it. Note that for the first time in its history, military counterintelligence has gone from double subordination. But at the same time she left the subordination of the state security and internal affairs bodies - the People's Commissar Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria had only the Smersh Counterintelligence Division of the NKVD.
    The lack of double subordination, and above all the fact that Smersh was locked directly only on Stalin, radically distinguished the new system from the previous 3 Directorate of NPOs, when in 1941 the military counterintelligence agencies were part of the People’s Commissariat as one of the directorates. Now it was a completely different level, different principles. By the way, the formidable and unambiguous name of the counterintelligence agency was invented by Joseph Vissarionovich himself.
    “The leaders of the front-line special departments recall that at a meeting with Stalin, where the draft decision on the transfer of army KGB organs to the NPO system was discussed, the question arose about their name. The offers were different. Most were inclined to make this name as concise as possible and to compose it from the initial letters of the then widely known slogan "Death to German spies!". It turned out something like "Smernesh." In conclusion, Stalin remarked:
    - And why, in fact, should we talk only about German spies? Don't other intelligence work against our army? Let’s call “Death to Spies,” abbreviated as “Death.” (S.Z. Ostryakov “Military Chekists.” M., 1979).
  20. +2
    15 March 2013 19: 13
    On the eve of the counterattack near Stalingrad, the High Command Headquarters brought strategic misinformation to the Germans regarding the direction of the main attack of the Red Army on the Western Front. The appearance of Zhukov on the Western Front disoriented the German military command, which considered that it was here that the Red Army was planning to launch a counterattack. Fresh divisions from France were not directed against Stalingrad, which played an important role in the defeat of the Paulus group.
    Regarding the 1943 summer campaign, the Germans were misinformed that the Soviet command was planning to carry out military operations north of Kursk and on the Southern Front. As a result, the transfer of Soviet troops in the Kursk and Orel region to strategic defense, and then to the offensive, was unexpected for the Germans ...
    On the eve of the counterattack near Stalingrad, the High Command Headquarters brought strategic misinformation to the Germans regarding the direction of the main attack of the Red Army on the Western Front. The appearance of Zhukov on the Western Front disoriented the German military command, which considered that it was here that the Red Army was planning to launch a counterattack. Fresh divisions from France were not directed against Stalingrad, which played an important role (if not decisive) in the defeat of the Paulus group.
    Regarding the 1943 summer campaign, the Germans were misinformed that the Soviet command was planning to carry out military operations north of Kursk and on the Southern Front. As a result, the transfer of Soviet troops in the Kursk and Orel region to strategic defense, and then to the offensive, was unexpected for the Germans ...
    In 1945, part of our troops that defeated the Nazis in Europe was transferred to the Far East, where it dealt an unexpected blow to the Kwantung Army. Only thanks to military counterintelligence was it possible to conceal the massive redeployment of troops.
    Young SMERSH actually did not know any serious setbacks, "outright" outplaying "ZUBROV" from the Reich and Japanese special services !.
  21. +2
    15 March 2013 19: 14
    “In fact, the Smersh counterintelligence service of the NCO was solving the same tasks as the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR. Officially, they were defined as follows:
    a) the fight against espionage, sabotage, terrorist and other subversive activities of foreign intelligence in units and establishments of the Red Army;
    b) the fight against anti-Soviet elements that penetrated the units and command of the Red Army;
    c) the adoption of the necessary intelligence-operational and other (through command) measures to create conditions on the fronts that exclude the possibility of impunity for enemy agents to pass through the front line in order to make the front line impenetrable to spy and anti-Soviet elements;
    d) the fight against betrayal and treason in the units and institutions of the Red Army (switching to the enemy’s side, harboring spies and generally promoting the work of the latter);
    e) the fight against desertion and self-mutilation on the fronts;
    f) verification of military personnel and other persons who were captured and surrounded by the enemy;
    g) fulfillment of special tasks of the People’s Commissar of Defense.
    The tasks are the same, but they were solved on a larger scale, at a higher level and, so to speak, more creatively.
    UNDER emergency wartime conditions, Smersh bodies were vested with broad rights and powers. They carried out a full range of operational-search measures using all the operational forces and assets characteristic of the special services. Military counterintelligence agents could carry out seizures, searches and arrests of military personnel and related civilians suspected of criminal activity.
    The relationship of military counterintelligence with the military command was determined as follows: “Smersh organs,” the Regulation stated, “inform military councils and the command of the corresponding units, formations and institutions of the Red Army about their work: about the results of the fight against enemy agents, about penetrated anti-Soviet elements into the army, on the results of the fight against treason and betrayal, desertion, self-mutilation ".
    The structure of the headquarters was as follows:
    - 1-th department - intelligence and operational work on the central organs of the Red Army - the departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense.
    - 2-th department - work among prisoners of war of interest to the Smersh organs, verification of Red Army soldiers who were captured and surrounded by the enemy.
    - 3-th Division - the fight against enemy agents, thrown to our rear.
    - 4-th department - counterintelligence work on the side of the enemy in order to identify channels of penetration of enemy agents in the units and institutions of the Red Army.
    - 5-th department - management of the work of the Smersh bodies of military districts.
    - 6-th department - investigative.
    - 7-th department - operational accounting, statistics.
    - 8-th department - operational-technical.
    - 9-th department - searches, arrests, installations, external surveillance.
    - 10-th department "C" - work on special tasks.
    - 11-th department - cipher communication.
    In total, along with the secretariat, the AHO, and personnel as part of Smersh, the NPO had 14 departments. Approved staff of 646 people.
    On the ground, the Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" of fronts was organized, as well as the departments of counterintelligence of armies, districts, corps, divisions, brigades, reserve regiments, garrisons, fortified areas, and institutions of the Red Army. The structure of these bodies was established in relation to the structure of the Smersh SACR and approved by the People's Commissar. To ensure operational work, the Smersh bodies in the field were assigned units of the Red Army: front-line command - a battalion; army department - company; Division of the corps, division, brigade - platoon.
    The staff of the UKR "Smersh" front, which included more than five armies, was determined in the number of 130 people, less than five - 112, the OKR "Smersh" of the army - 57 people, the military district - from 102 to 193. "
    A quote from a study by member of the Writers' Union of Russia, Colonel Reserve Alexander Bondarenko, “Military Counterintelligence. 1918-2010. "
  22. Mr.Net
    0
    15 March 2013 19: 50
    At the beginning of the article, the author writes that “The Soviet counterintelligence service, sadly to admit it, turned out to be unprepared for the expected war ...
    blah ... blah ... blah further "we practically did not have the means and capabilities to resist the well-trained Hitlerite special services."
    the whole article says that the Germans, by their own admission, were powerless
    in front of our "poorly prepared" intelligence: how!
    The Germans were only worth the small border guards who were the NKVD troops. the author is just
    idiotwassat
  23. Kubanets
    +2
    15 March 2013 20: 08
    The author of the article highlighted such an extensive topic very superficially. The emphasis is placed on the glorious activities of the front-line operatives SMERSH, although in reality great successes were achieved in conducting radio games: "Borisov" "Riddle" "Friends" "Aryans" "Landing" "Janus" is not a complete list. And speaking about the work of SMERSH, one should honestly name the name of the head of counterintelligence (V.S. Abakumov) and not shyly keep silent about the name of a person of great personal courage and outstanding talent of the organizer.
  24. +2
    15 March 2013 21: 08
    I read the article, comments. I thought a lot. Here you are arguing, but facts are stubborn things. And only our descendants will know the whole truth. I would like to note that in a difficult time for the Motherland, the system of organs for fighting the "invisible enemy" was expanded, and their work was coordinated. A serious collection and analysis of the incoming information and its use was carried out. An invisible shield was formed over the country! Therefore, I believe that the work of the authorities was successful, and its results are no less important than the feat of the soldiers at the front!
  25. aleks-s2011
    +2
    15 March 2013 21: 36
    about preparation read about Starinov Ilya Grigorovich. The Great Patriotic War

    Since June 28, 1941 of the year is the head of the operational group of barriers on the Western Front. Since July 13, concurrently - Head of the Operational and Training Center of the Western Front. He reported directly to the front commander D. G. Pavlov, then - A. I. Eremenko. Engaged in barriers.
    At the end of September - head of the operational-engineering group of the South-Western Front. At his disposal were 5 battalions and 5 operational groups. Barriers were carried out, mining of railways and highways, of especially important facilities near Kharkov and in Kharkov was carried out. Starinov was directly subordinate to the Military Council of the front. They destroyed the headquarters of the 58 division led by Lieutenant General Georg von Braun and blew up Lieutenant General Beinecker in a mine. [1]
    From November 17 to 1941 of the year - Deputy Chief of Staff of the Engineering Forces of the Red Army (Chief of Staff - K. S. Nazarov). They mined, set up barriers, and destroyed bridges and roads near Moscow, on the Kalinin and Western fronts - from Serpukhov to Kalinin.
    Since December 1941 - the head of the operational-engineering group on the Southern Front near Rostov. He had five battalions at his disposal. Established barriers, mined. Mines were produced in the workshops of Rostov State University. In February 1942 of the year, ice trips across the Taganrog Bay.
    Since April 1942 of the year - the commander of the 5-th separate special forces brigade on the Kalinin Front in the Torzhok area. At the disposal are 5 battalions (about 4 of thousands of soldiers and officers). They produced anti-personnel and anti-tank bands from Rzhev to Surozh - only about 400 km.
    In August 1942, he was appointed head of the Higher Special Purpose Operational School of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TsShPD), which was at the disposal of the commander-in-chief of the partisan movement KE Voroshilov. The school was located at st. Bykovo. They trained specialists and commanders of the highest class, planned operations, tested new sabotage equipment.
    Since September 1942 of the year - assistant to the chief of staff for sabotage at P.K. Ponomarenko. Compiled instructions, developed plans of operations. He was on business trips in the Caucasus, in Rostov and Novorossiysk. He organized partisan operations.
    Since March 18, 1943 of the year is a member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front. He organized the training of guerrilla groups for casting behind enemy lines.
    Since May 1943 of the year - Deputy Head of the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan sabotage movement T. A. Strokach. He created sabotage services at headquarters and in partisan formations.
    Since April 1944 of the year - Deputy Chief of the Polish Headquarters of the partisan movement A. Zavadsky. He was engaged in the organization of partisan struggle, interaction with Soviet partisans on the border with Poland. At this time, for the dissertation written before the war, he received the title of candidate of technical sciences.
    Since June 1944, he was the chief of staff of the Soviet mission in Yugoslavia (located in Bucharest). They were engaged in organizing interactions between the Soviet Army and the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (NOAU). He met and talked with Marshal Tito many times.
    Since February 1945, he has been the head of the operational and engineering group for clearing roads and railways in the liberated territory of Germany. He obeyed Marshals R. Ya. Malinovsky and I. S. Konev. They worked north of Budapest, in the Potsdam area, in cities on the Rhine.
    Victory Day met in Berlin.
    [edit]
    1. +1
      15 March 2013 22: 42
      It is certainly great that you recalled the superdiversant I.G. Starinov, his contribution to the Victory is invaluable, but I want to note that the article is about those who opposed the German Starinovs and Stirlitz, i.e. about counterintelligence.
  26. ISO
    ISO
    +1
    15 March 2013 21: 51
    Of course, the successes of our counterintelligence are significant, but as in the article, everything is smooth and rosy. As if there were no targeting gunners in Leningrad, sabotage on railway transport and the whole fake building part that was only covered after the war. The discussion of not only achievements but also misses does not detract from the greatness of the ancestors, but allows you to draw objective conclusions
  27. Volkhov
    0
    16 March 2013 00: 55
    The article somehow does not fit in with the reality - all German intelligence agents were caught ... except
    - pairs of millions who served the Germans in the Wehrmacht, police, etc. didn’t they tell the Germans everything they knew
    - Beria and the Chekists who conducted the "Monastery" (arrested only after Beria fled to Argentina)

    Intelligence knew everything, only
    - about the war upon the start
    - on nuclear weapons upon their use

    The most interesting thing is that intelligence now knows about the Reich - there are plenty of agents in the world, but what kind of penguin was introduced to them?
    1. wax
      -1
      16 March 2013 02: 29
      - on nuclear weapons upon their use

      Truman also considered that Stalin had no idea about the work on nuclear weapons in the United States.
      - about the war upon the start

      this heresy can not comment
  28. pinecone
    0
    16 March 2013 06: 06
    "Fascist special services, Zeppelin" as such did not exist. This name was given to a large-scale operation designed and carried out by the Imperial General Security Office.

    Details at http://www.protown.ru/information/hide/7047.html