Sergey Gorshkov, an assessment of the Soviet Navy at the 2 performance on November 1985.

In fact, this was the last, at the same time, more than two hours, the speech of the aged commander-in-chief before the leaders of the fleets on practically all the problems of the Soviet Navy for 1984-1985. The performance took place on November 2, 1985 from 15 hours 15 minutes to 17 hours 50 minutes without a break. These were the results of two years of activity at all fleets USSR, as well as it was a detailing of the instructions of the USSR Minister of Defense for the next two years - 1986 and 1987. The central idea was what measures should be taken and what should be done to develop the ability to fight.

It should be immediately noted that in the speech of SG Gorshkov, only negative examples of the state of affairs on ships, in formations and in general in the Navy prevailed. Of the global positive, only a general formulation was heard that, in general, ships and units of fleets successfully solved tasks, and of specific facts, only the replenishment of fleets in 1984-1985 was given. nuclear submarines of the third generation.

What was the main thing in the shortcomings and shortcomings in the fleets, according to the commander in chief, who, of course, knew that in four weeks he would leave his post? Here are some examples from the speech of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. Gorshkov:
- standards of maintenance in the system of permanent readiness ships are not maintained. So, on the Pacific Fleet they are violated in three divisions of the nuclear submarine and one division of diesel submarines;
- the terms of repairing ships are not maintained, since fleet commanders and fleet technical directorates could not organize the development of allocated funds for repairs;
- Two times a year, the technical condition of ships is audited and malfunctions are always found on many ships.

Separately, the problem of combat service was highlighted. For 1985, 494 was hike boats and surface ships! However, before leaving, changing the composition of the crews. So, on one of the submarines for 15 days before the release, 20% personnel and even ... the commander were replaced! And in such a composition the boat left the Pacific Fleet base in the Indian Ocean. Result: 2 people died, the submarine had to be returned to the base as unprepared.

In the Atlantic and the Pacific, the fleets were not able to open up patrol areas of the American submarines of the Ohio type, but their Trident missiles were aimed at the USSR. But even in the area of ​​our waters, recognized by the commander in chief, we cannot control the submarine of the likely enemy, they freely penetrate the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. He further stressed that the percentage of breakdowns in nuclear submarines due to personnel increased in military service. For example, September 29 1985 on the K-175 submarine (commander captain 2-rank VV Kondakov) during routine maintenance in the port of Aden due to the fault of the crew, the power engineer completely failed (NPI of both sides). The boat had to be towed to the base.

SG Gorshkov was singled out and a low level of operational training in the fleets: operations are planned routinely, there is no element of surprise. Operator operators poorly know the tactics of the likely enemy. The general conclusion was made sad: to conduct modern operations and fleets to fight at sea are not ready. Something similar sounded on combat training. The point is that the commanders of the ships are not prepared for the conduct of a sea battle. And referring to tactical training, the commander-in-chief emphasized that she did not become the main component of the training: the plans for going to sea were simplified, just to pass the course tasks, and not to learn the ability to fight. The outdated tactics are used when using new ships, the effectiveness of reconnaissance during the actions of the KUG does not increase, little attention is given to EW.

A high percentage of accidents, a low level of practical preparedness of personnel in the struggle for survivability (they don’t even use Ipi, do not perform NBJ, etc.), low discipline were noted in the speech. As a result, said the commander in chief, before 2 November 1985 (for less than a year) 306 people died, 1325 sailors were convicted. According to him, for the past year and a half, 500 officers and 1000 midshipmen were fired from the Navy due to drunkenness.

Kostev IG, Kostev GG The submarine fleet from Stalin to Putin: in the 2's books. - M .: Soneks-center, 2008. - Book 1. Page 340-341

Igor Georgievich Kostev - Captain of rank 1
Georgy Georgievich Kostev - Rear Admiral, Candidate of Naval Sciences, Professor, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Military Sciences

Comments

[Gadfly]

Hmmm ... with the beginning of perestroika, it became fashionable to pour dirt .. On the other hand, it is not always clear where the dirt is and where the truth is. And Gorshkov, in his speech, actually acknowledges the failure of his 20-year-old work on creating a large ocean fleet of the USSR ...

[Russian]

If then, having a powerful fleet, we could not control the enemy, then what now?

[starshina78]

To call the creation of the USSR ocean-going fleet a failure is wrong, to put it mildly. Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov became Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy after the dismissal of N.G. Kuznetsov by Marshal Zhukov G.K. ... He could not forgive Kuznetsov for independence in decision-making and the skirmish that took place in the presence of Stalin, after which Stalin supported Kuznetsov. Zhukov simply kicked Kuznetsov out of the fleet, demoted him to vice admiral. Which fleet did Gorshkov receive? Old, finished after the war. new ships have just begun to be built. And what was left after the death of Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov? Oceanic fleet, presence in all oceans, nuclear boats and ships, powerful coastal base, strong marines. I served at the TF and saw with my own eyes what ships and nuclear submarines came to the fleet. Yes, not everything worked out, but our opponents also clapped their ears, letting our nuclear submarines pass to their shores, without even realizing that they were there. We had the youngest 1st rank captain in Kamchatka, he was 30 years old, he commanded a missile nuclear submarine, so they sat near San Francisco for almost a month, for which he received the "Hero Star". And the fact that the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy called the shortcomings does not mean that the fleet was weak and weak, it could not do anything. No wonder, according to the Americans themselves, at that time, our fleet was one of the most powerful and efficient. Not a single country in the world conducted exercises like "Ocean - 72", which were held under the command of SG Gorshkov. The exercises took place in three oceans: Indian, Pacific, Atlantic, with the involvement of all fleets and flotillas, strategic aviation, and the Strategic Missile Forces. How! And you say failure!

[yurta2013]

And then, and now the situation is about the same. In a matter of hours, we could guaranteedly destroy each other, and at the same time our entire planet.

[Nuar]

Quote: starshina78

No country in the world has conducted exercises like "Ocean - 72"

Here is a plus for you. And for tomorrow - we are waiting for an article about these teachings (with pictures!)

[yurta2013]

The so-called "dirt", upon closer examination, as a rule, turns out to be 99% true. If we learned to adequately perceive this "dirt" and take measures to cleanse, we would have gotten rid of it long ago.

[rumatam]

Yes, do not pour on the deceased, he commanded the Navy perfectly, with him he grew up in the ocean! In his years, this is a great achievement for you to envy, with good envy, you cannot achieve this.

[ttttt]

The charter should be written in black and white that the military is prohibited from drinking alcohol. Generally. I chose the path of military service, you can forget about alcohol. There will be no normal combat training either. Whatever they say, but there was drunkenness in the SA, it also thrives in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and the most dangerous thing is in the middle command link. This is the main scourge of the army.

[yurta2013]

You need to be realistic. Neither in the army nor in the navy do we have and did not have non-drinking officers (and admiral generals). So there is no one to accept such changes in the charter.

[Nuar]

I know at least three.

And I remember veterans of the Great Patriotic War, who recalled "once before the attack I drank and understood ... and I never took it again until the end of the war."

[yurta2013]

Unfortunately, exceptions always only confirm the rule. Maybe you can name completely non-drinkers among the current top leadership of the army and navy?

[Fuzeler]

Quote: Gadfly

M-yes ... with the beginning of perestroika it became fashionable to pour dirt ..

Gorshkov, of course, is still a master (we recall how Khrushchev arranged a demonstration of a ballistic missile when an atomic boat sank and a diesel boat shot from under the water), but Segrey Georgievich was the creator of our fleet, and only thanks to him, as a manager, in the current Russian Federation there is at least something.
By the way, this report, I believe, was navy, and was addressed not to the media, but to officers of the USSR Navy. So the criticism was not in order to whitewash itself, but to tarnish others, but in order to make it appear.

[rate]

Honestly and self-critical.

[savoj]

He told the truth before a kick in the ass ..... like most.

[Kortik]

Somehow I came across material describing how Gorshkov helped merge his predecessor Kuznetsov, although Kuznetsov, just before the Second World War, saved him from death by standing up for him before Stalin. It seems like Gorshkov stole the ship, which at that time he commanded and there were casualties among the crew. I don’t remember exactly what the reason is, but at that time they put it to the wall for less, so the sentence was already obvious. I'll try to look for material, if I find it, I'll post it. But Kuznetsov still has more respect. He was a very talented and innovative military leader, how many things he introduced and had to implement. There are a lot of written revolutionary works on the introduction of new types of ships, tactics of ship actions, the creation of naval sabotage units, coastal defense forces, various engineering and technological solutions, etc.

[vostok1982]

The commander should do so - to reveal shortcomings and poke them with the nose of subordinates. And it’s better to even embellish the situation so that they run like scalded ones. After all, he is not a journalist in order to sing the praises of the party and personally to every Communist !!!

[slava_sherb]

such a story was throughout the Soviet army, and not just the fleet

[bubble82009]

in our army and it is now present

[slava_sherb]

and now it's terrible

[saturn.mmm]

In 1985, 494 trips of boats and surface ships were made!
It turns out almost 1,5 campaigns per day, the current fleet did not even dream of it. It's good that at least there was criticism.
A. S. Pavlov provides the following data on the composition of the USSR Navy at the end of the 1980s: 64 nuclear and 15 diesel submarines with ballistic missiles, 79 submarines with cruise missiles (including 63 nuclear), 80 multipurpose torpedo nuclear submarines (all data on submarines as of January 1, 1989), four aircraft-carrying ships, 96 cruisers, destroyers and missile frigates, 174 patrol and small anti-submarine ships, 623 boats and minesweeper, 107 landing ships and boats. A total of 1380 warships (not counting auxiliary vessels), 1142 combat aircraft (all data on surface ships as of July 1, 1988).

[yurta2013]

Nevertheless, the surface fleet was still inferior to the Americans anyway, although the submarine, on the contrary, was ahead.

[sso-xnumx]

Dear interlocutors!
The situation outlined by the Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov in the fleet is the same as that of the land men. Instead of studying and servicing weapons and military equipment, live firing and high-quality repairs after campaigns and exercises, there are constant party meetings and summaries on missile defense.
The commanders were afraid once again to bring someone to court so that the discipline indicators would not be spoiled, and the politicians in their bulk would knock on them - they say we are working our best, and the commanders of the subdivisions pear around. The healthy initiative of those wishing to serve on the conscience of the officers was in every way suppressed, but all the mold from the bastards bloomed in a double color and climbed to the top. The army was turned into a collective farm by cultivating subsidiary farms and planting work with a freehand method and demobilization chords. But it’s one thing when the obstacle course and various special simulators were built, like in the Troops at the Commander-in-Chief of the Airborne Forces, Army General Vasily Filippovich Margelov, and quite another, a guest house at the commander of some sort of castrated division to receive inspectors from the Ministry of Defense and General Staff.
And rot she crawled from one place throughout the USSR Armed Forces. And those facts announced by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy are only an attempt by S.G. Gorshkov to somehow awaken in the officers of the fleet the consciousness that, if one serves this further, then the good will not end.
So it happened ...

[Nuar]

the terms of ship repair are not maintained, since fleet commanders and fleet technical departments could not organize the development of allocated funds for repair

Serdyukov - would read and laughed. (yes just that and not only him)

[xomaNN]

Just an example of the fact that in the years called "stagnation and varnishing of reality", they also played not only with fanfare And just Gorshkov skillfully picked up the banner of the Navy after Commander-in-Chief N. Kuznetsov. Remember at the same time the leapfrog of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Navy in the 90s and "zero" years.

[xomaNN]

Just an example of the fact that in the years called "stagnation and varnishing of reality", they also played not only with fanfare And just Gorshkov skillfully picked up the banner of the Navy after Commander-in-Chief N. Kuznetsov. Remember at the same time the leapfrog of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Navy in the 90s and "zero" years.

[govoruha-otrok]

494 campaigns and an example of an unsuccessful ONE! In 1985, I happened to participate in military service and a campaign in the joint venture. This year was the peak of the heyday of the Soviet Navy. A year later, K-219 died and the collapse began.