Why has it become fashionable to discuss the Stalinist modernization of the economy?
The farther into stories the so-called Stalinist times remain, the more in Russia there is a desire to discuss on the topic of the economic industrialization breakthrough that was observed in the Soviet Union in the thirties and early forties of the 20 century. The principal question here is why the “Stalinist economy” is being discussed with such eagerness and activity precisely at the present time. Why rarely was industrialization recalled in 90 and early 2000?
This question does not have a definite answer, but you can speculate on this topic. One of the reasons for the manifestation of interest in the development of the USSR economy of the 70-80-year-old sample is that statistical agencies have presented to us in recent years. The data of various kinds of economic monitoring suggests that with all the huge industrial and raw material potentials of Russia, the level of economic development declared today is, to put it mildly, not very impressive. The annual growth of the economy at the level of 3,5% with forecasts of a decline to 2,6% at the end of the current year is not adequate for the opportunities that a country like Russia has. People (both economic specialists and ordinary people) no longer understand why the level of annual GDP growth in those countries whose production develops mainly due to Russian energy resources is often significantly higher than the corresponding figure in Russia itself. People cease to understand why lately the bet has again been placed not on the development of the real economic sector, but on “Kudrinomics”. “Kudrinomics” is an economy based on total savings in every sense of the word: a frighteningly large percentage of budget revenues goes not to the opening of new jobs and enterprises in the production sphere, but to fill the “airbag”, which, as the global crisis has shown, it saves, perhaps, large banks and oligarchic circles that use public funds for their own purposes.
Naturally, some stagnation in today's Russian economic sector gives rise to a desire to look back and evaluate why the Soviet Union of the 30 era showed truly incredible economic growth rates, and modern Russia with far greater opportunities has to be content with 3% -nial addition.
To assess the economic growth of the industrialization era, it’s enough to look at the figures that were published by both domestic and foreign researchers of the history of the USSR economy of the Stalin era. The data presented in the publications of the well-known foreign editions of the Financial Times (Great Britain), Nation (USA) should be given at least so that readers do not think that the coverage is carried out exclusively from a one-sided position - on the basis of reports that their time was put on the Stalinist table by people responsible for translating the plans of the first Soviet five-year plans into reality.
So, according to the results of the first five-year plan alone (1928-1932 years), published in the above-mentioned publications, the industrial sector in the USSR grew by 96-97%! This is an incredible figure, which in annual terms corresponds to almost 19% growth. Such figures seem to be just astronomical, if only because over the past 7-8 years we have been consistently “treated” with data on Chinese growth, where 11-12% industrial output growth per year is almost a world record. However, the history of economics suggests that world records in this area do not belong to China at all ... 19% growth of industry per year is the figures of the USSR, which certain gentlemen would not like to make public, but ...
It is noteworthy that the industrialization plans of the first Soviet five-year plan, which a modern liberal economist could well be called populist, were not only fulfilled, but also executed on 8-9 months ahead of time! Well, in order to be somewhat clearer in approaching modern realities, you can give an example: imagine that all the Olympic facilities in Sochi, together with infrastructure projects, would have been implemented a couple of months ago (in February 2013), and the new stadium of FC Zenit in St. Petersburg should have been put into operation back in 2009, and with the level of costs that was originally registered in the budget ... It's hard to imagine, is it not ...
Someone will certainly say that it is foolish and unreasonable to compare the situation in the Stalinist and modern Russian economies, since in the industrialization era completely different methods were used than today: the use of actually slave labor and everything in this spirit. However, the words about total “slave labor”, which was allegedly used everywhere in the USSR, are now being questioned. Doubts on this score are intensified after familiarization with the historical materials of the Western press, which clearly did not have much respect for the USSR at the end of 20-x and the beginning of 30-s, in order to accuse it of covering the facts necessary for the USSR. For example, the Austrian newspaper “Neue Freie Presse” in 1930-1932 was engaged in a detailed coverage of Soviet industrialization, sending its journalists to work in the USSR literally on watch. Here is the data from the material that was published by the Austrian edition at the beginning of 30's:
Just a couple of phrases of Austrian researchers of the Soviet experience of industrialization debunks several myths at once. The first myth is that the success of the first five-year plans consisted only in the use of prison labor. The second myth is that the new Soviet economy did not take into account the financial and economic experience of the Russian Empire. The understatement (or better to say: complete silence) on these topics in Soviet publications caused the “terrible truth” to emerge, according to which the Soviet economic model was boiled in its own juice, resorting exclusively to the labor of Labor Code.
Returning to the results of the same 1-th five-year plan in the USSR, you need to provide data on the number of industrial enterprises that were running in the country. Over the years from 1928 to 1932, more than 1400 industrial facilities were opened in various republics of the USSR: metallurgical plants, tractor plants and automobile factories. If in the 1927 year, the unemployment rate in the USSR was about 12% of the number of workers and employees (in absolute numbers - 1,24 million people), then already in 1931, industrialization activities could provide jobs to 90% of Soviet citizens from the specified number.
Naturally, speaking of the Stalinist economy of the epoch of the first five-year plan, one cannot but mention its flaws. Positive industrial plan hid problems in terms of domestic. There were big problems in providing citizens with housing, food, sanitation and hygiene items, clothes. There were almost no plans for the development of the domestic pharmacological direction, which led to an enormous percentage of infant mortality. However, it cannot be said that this is an exclusively Stalinist economy. These problems were inherited by the Soviet Union, so to speak, by inheritance. Although this unenviable legacy is also skillfully pushed into the background by current liberal historians and economists with the clear goal of "exposing the anti-human nature" of the Soviet economic model.
At the same time, few people say that if during the first Soviet five-year plan, in addition to a huge industrial breakthrough (steel production growth by 140%, oil production growth by 184%, increase in electric energy production by 3 times, 9 times, an increase in the number of units produced by vehicles - almost 30 times) would have been a social jerk, then we could even pray for the Soviet economy. So it turns out that the simultaneous rapid development of social projects with the rapid development of the manufacturing sector can only be in economic fairy tales.
Proceeding from this, it turns out that the determining factor in the inhibition of industrial development in modern Russia can be precisely the social environment: inflated wages and pensions with low labor productivity. Well, at least the same Mr. Kudrin, who exposes himself as some kind of economic messiah of modern Russia, is trying to convey just such a thought. But other economists (and in the Russian Federation there are other specialists in this matter besides Aleksey Leonidovich) state that the reasons for stagnation in the real sector are clearly not associated with the social policy of the state. Well, in fact, what kind of social policy that is hindering industrial growth can be discussed, for example, in Ingushetia or the Chechen Republic, where only official statistics expose 30-45% unemployment ... And what kind of social brake is the real sector of the Russian economy it is possible to talk if indicators of decent average wages in production are manifested only “due to” the fact that the leaders of these enterprises receive ten times more for their work than ordinary workers: turner or welder - 15 thousand per month, d Director, his deputies, assistants, accountants - for 70-100 thousand per month, which on average corresponds to “decent” 50 thousand rubles. But a good average salary at this plant, ”say those people to whom the corresponding report lays down on the table ... Maybe that’s why their productivity there is lame there, that workers are rowing along“ 50 thousand rubles, ”the same responsible people will say, isn’t it? to make cuts ... Further, a rhetorical question: the growth of whose wages at the enterprise is artificially slowed down: a director with a chief accountant or a turner with a welder? ..
It turns out that the social brake for the rapid development of the Russian economy is another myth that is beneficial to use for a certain circle of people. Far more obvious cause of problems with growth is corruption and excessive attachment of the Russian economy to foreign capital. The fact that such affection is present can be seen at least in the direction of investments in the Reserve Fund and the National Welfare Fund. So, the funds of these funds are held exclusively in foreign currency (dollars, pounds sterling and euros). So whose well-being support these funds? - a question to which in the epoch of the formation of the Soviet economy there was a definite answer. There is this answer today, but for some reason, any publications on this issue are being transferred to the regime that someone with these publications allegedly wants to strike at the prestige of Russia ... Well, if investing in the American and European economies at the prestige of Russia is in no way they do not beat, but talk about these investments is beaten, then ...
It is the dubious search for "scapegoats" in the downturn in the country's economic indicators by the "leading economists" and are forcing Russians to increasingly look to 30's industrialization spurts. Of course, the methods of those years, the ordinary citizen is not inclined to take into account, as he is not inclined to take into account the ideological component of the Stalinist industrialization, but the numbers are a stubborn thing. They are the ones who make you scratch your head in thought about how it was possible to transform a country into a world-class industrial giant in such a short period of time from virtually nothing. Whether these thoughts are ready to make the current Russian work with the productivity with which his grandfathers and great-grandfathers worked is a separate question. It is obvious that you and I have become so accustomed to life in a consumer society that no desire to launch a new industrial revolution will force us to abandon the benefits that we have. Having sat down on a consumer igloo, it’s difficult, continuing to use dubious jargon, to get off ... But the figures of the Stalinist economic era still force us to distract from our credit histories and think that if we wanted we would (bottom) hoo if they (top ) also hooh ... But the fact of the matter is that it is much easier to nostalgic for the times in which we did not even live than to make an industrial breakthrough, although at a single workplace ...
This question does not have a definite answer, but you can speculate on this topic. One of the reasons for the manifestation of interest in the development of the USSR economy of the 70-80-year-old sample is that statistical agencies have presented to us in recent years. The data of various kinds of economic monitoring suggests that with all the huge industrial and raw material potentials of Russia, the level of economic development declared today is, to put it mildly, not very impressive. The annual growth of the economy at the level of 3,5% with forecasts of a decline to 2,6% at the end of the current year is not adequate for the opportunities that a country like Russia has. People (both economic specialists and ordinary people) no longer understand why the level of annual GDP growth in those countries whose production develops mainly due to Russian energy resources is often significantly higher than the corresponding figure in Russia itself. People cease to understand why lately the bet has again been placed not on the development of the real economic sector, but on “Kudrinomics”. “Kudrinomics” is an economy based on total savings in every sense of the word: a frighteningly large percentage of budget revenues goes not to the opening of new jobs and enterprises in the production sphere, but to fill the “airbag”, which, as the global crisis has shown, it saves, perhaps, large banks and oligarchic circles that use public funds for their own purposes.
Naturally, some stagnation in today's Russian economic sector gives rise to a desire to look back and evaluate why the Soviet Union of the 30 era showed truly incredible economic growth rates, and modern Russia with far greater opportunities has to be content with 3% -nial addition.
To assess the economic growth of the industrialization era, it’s enough to look at the figures that were published by both domestic and foreign researchers of the history of the USSR economy of the Stalin era. The data presented in the publications of the well-known foreign editions of the Financial Times (Great Britain), Nation (USA) should be given at least so that readers do not think that the coverage is carried out exclusively from a one-sided position - on the basis of reports that their time was put on the Stalinist table by people responsible for translating the plans of the first Soviet five-year plans into reality.
So, according to the results of the first five-year plan alone (1928-1932 years), published in the above-mentioned publications, the industrial sector in the USSR grew by 96-97%! This is an incredible figure, which in annual terms corresponds to almost 19% growth. Such figures seem to be just astronomical, if only because over the past 7-8 years we have been consistently “treated” with data on Chinese growth, where 11-12% industrial output growth per year is almost a world record. However, the history of economics suggests that world records in this area do not belong to China at all ... 19% growth of industry per year is the figures of the USSR, which certain gentlemen would not like to make public, but ...
It is noteworthy that the industrialization plans of the first Soviet five-year plan, which a modern liberal economist could well be called populist, were not only fulfilled, but also executed on 8-9 months ahead of time! Well, in order to be somewhat clearer in approaching modern realities, you can give an example: imagine that all the Olympic facilities in Sochi, together with infrastructure projects, would have been implemented a couple of months ago (in February 2013), and the new stadium of FC Zenit in St. Petersburg should have been put into operation back in 2009, and with the level of costs that was originally registered in the budget ... It's hard to imagine, is it not ...
Someone will certainly say that it is foolish and unreasonable to compare the situation in the Stalinist and modern Russian economies, since in the industrialization era completely different methods were used than today: the use of actually slave labor and everything in this spirit. However, the words about total “slave labor”, which was allegedly used everywhere in the USSR, are now being questioned. Doubts on this score are intensified after familiarization with the historical materials of the Western press, which clearly did not have much respect for the USSR at the end of 20-x and the beginning of 30-s, in order to accuse it of covering the facts necessary for the USSR. For example, the Austrian newspaper “Neue Freie Presse” in 1930-1932 was engaged in a detailed coverage of Soviet industrialization, sending its journalists to work in the USSR literally on watch. Here is the data from the material that was published by the Austrian edition at the beginning of 30's:
The labor of prisoners in the USSR is used poorly. The main reason for the refusal of the Soviet authorities from the labor of prisoners during the first five-year plan is to study the materials of the experience of tsarist Russia, according to which forced labor cannot provide a substantial percentage of economic growth.
Just a couple of phrases of Austrian researchers of the Soviet experience of industrialization debunks several myths at once. The first myth is that the success of the first five-year plans consisted only in the use of prison labor. The second myth is that the new Soviet economy did not take into account the financial and economic experience of the Russian Empire. The understatement (or better to say: complete silence) on these topics in Soviet publications caused the “terrible truth” to emerge, according to which the Soviet economic model was boiled in its own juice, resorting exclusively to the labor of Labor Code.
Returning to the results of the same 1-th five-year plan in the USSR, you need to provide data on the number of industrial enterprises that were running in the country. Over the years from 1928 to 1932, more than 1400 industrial facilities were opened in various republics of the USSR: metallurgical plants, tractor plants and automobile factories. If in the 1927 year, the unemployment rate in the USSR was about 12% of the number of workers and employees (in absolute numbers - 1,24 million people), then already in 1931, industrialization activities could provide jobs to 90% of Soviet citizens from the specified number.
Naturally, speaking of the Stalinist economy of the epoch of the first five-year plan, one cannot but mention its flaws. Positive industrial plan hid problems in terms of domestic. There were big problems in providing citizens with housing, food, sanitation and hygiene items, clothes. There were almost no plans for the development of the domestic pharmacological direction, which led to an enormous percentage of infant mortality. However, it cannot be said that this is an exclusively Stalinist economy. These problems were inherited by the Soviet Union, so to speak, by inheritance. Although this unenviable legacy is also skillfully pushed into the background by current liberal historians and economists with the clear goal of "exposing the anti-human nature" of the Soviet economic model.
At the same time, few people say that if during the first Soviet five-year plan, in addition to a huge industrial breakthrough (steel production growth by 140%, oil production growth by 184%, increase in electric energy production by 3 times, 9 times, an increase in the number of units produced by vehicles - almost 30 times) would have been a social jerk, then we could even pray for the Soviet economy. So it turns out that the simultaneous rapid development of social projects with the rapid development of the manufacturing sector can only be in economic fairy tales.
Proceeding from this, it turns out that the determining factor in the inhibition of industrial development in modern Russia can be precisely the social environment: inflated wages and pensions with low labor productivity. Well, at least the same Mr. Kudrin, who exposes himself as some kind of economic messiah of modern Russia, is trying to convey just such a thought. But other economists (and in the Russian Federation there are other specialists in this matter besides Aleksey Leonidovich) state that the reasons for stagnation in the real sector are clearly not associated with the social policy of the state. Well, in fact, what kind of social policy that is hindering industrial growth can be discussed, for example, in Ingushetia or the Chechen Republic, where only official statistics expose 30-45% unemployment ... And what kind of social brake is the real sector of the Russian economy it is possible to talk if indicators of decent average wages in production are manifested only “due to” the fact that the leaders of these enterprises receive ten times more for their work than ordinary workers: turner or welder - 15 thousand per month, d Director, his deputies, assistants, accountants - for 70-100 thousand per month, which on average corresponds to “decent” 50 thousand rubles. But a good average salary at this plant, ”say those people to whom the corresponding report lays down on the table ... Maybe that’s why their productivity there is lame there, that workers are rowing along“ 50 thousand rubles, ”the same responsible people will say, isn’t it? to make cuts ... Further, a rhetorical question: the growth of whose wages at the enterprise is artificially slowed down: a director with a chief accountant or a turner with a welder? ..
It turns out that the social brake for the rapid development of the Russian economy is another myth that is beneficial to use for a certain circle of people. Far more obvious cause of problems with growth is corruption and excessive attachment of the Russian economy to foreign capital. The fact that such affection is present can be seen at least in the direction of investments in the Reserve Fund and the National Welfare Fund. So, the funds of these funds are held exclusively in foreign currency (dollars, pounds sterling and euros). So whose well-being support these funds? - a question to which in the epoch of the formation of the Soviet economy there was a definite answer. There is this answer today, but for some reason, any publications on this issue are being transferred to the regime that someone with these publications allegedly wants to strike at the prestige of Russia ... Well, if investing in the American and European economies at the prestige of Russia is in no way they do not beat, but talk about these investments is beaten, then ...
It is the dubious search for "scapegoats" in the downturn in the country's economic indicators by the "leading economists" and are forcing Russians to increasingly look to 30's industrialization spurts. Of course, the methods of those years, the ordinary citizen is not inclined to take into account, as he is not inclined to take into account the ideological component of the Stalinist industrialization, but the numbers are a stubborn thing. They are the ones who make you scratch your head in thought about how it was possible to transform a country into a world-class industrial giant in such a short period of time from virtually nothing. Whether these thoughts are ready to make the current Russian work with the productivity with which his grandfathers and great-grandfathers worked is a separate question. It is obvious that you and I have become so accustomed to life in a consumer society that no desire to launch a new industrial revolution will force us to abandon the benefits that we have. Having sat down on a consumer igloo, it’s difficult, continuing to use dubious jargon, to get off ... But the figures of the Stalinist economic era still force us to distract from our credit histories and think that if we wanted we would (bottom) hoo if they (top ) also hooh ... But the fact of the matter is that it is much easier to nostalgic for the times in which we did not even live than to make an industrial breakthrough, although at a single workplace ...
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