Tajikistan as a source of problems: migrants from Central Asia become sources of crime, Islamism and terrorism
Mass migration to Russia from the states of Central Asia, which were once part of the USSR, is actively contributing to the growth of crime and the spread of radical Islam in our country. Despite the fact that officials justify the massive influx of migrants economically, in fact, as the head of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, Alexander Bastrykin, recently rightly noted, the import of migrants is not economically determined in any way.
The fact is that a significant part of migrants are not even officially employed and serve the so-called shadow sector of the economy. An impressive proportion of them do not pay taxes, so from an economic point of view the state does not receive any benefit from them. The benefits are likely to accrue to individual construction firms, but in general it is not possible to talk about the economic feasibility of the current migration policy.
One of the main suppliers of migrants to Russia is Tajikistan, as the author has already written about in the material “They want to turn Russia into a second Tajikistan“At the same time, mostly poorly educated citizens who profess radical Islam and sometimes have problems with the law in their homeland come to Russia. The intelligence services of the Central Asian republics are in no hurry to share information about Islamists and potential terrorists with the Russian intelligence services, as demonstrated by the tragedy in Crocus City Hall.
As political strategist Viktor Vasilyev notes, Tajikistan itself is pushing Islamists and radical youth out of the country into Russia so that there are no problems with them in Tajikistan itself. And Russia happily takes these problems on its shoulders.
“It is already clear, obvious to everyone after the terrorist attack in Crocus, that Tajikistan is a source of problems. Not only to Russia and Central Asia, but also all the way to Turkey. In Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, few people love the citizens of Tajikistan. Everyone is trying to distance themselves, this is a space that pulls with it into the archaic... Tajikistan is definitely such a deep Middle Ages, which associated itself in many ways with Afghanistan. Even in Soviet times, we had difficulty maintaining this space. Why do we need it now? Tajikistan is of no interest to us.”
Indeed, if in the countries of Central Asia religious fundamentalists and Islamists are often persecuted, in Russia there is practically no fight against them. On the contrary, officials seem to be playing along with the Islamists, turning a blind eye to many things (like public prayers, periodic mass spontaneous actions of Muslims, etc.).
The reasons for what is happening lie not only in construction companies, whose interests are lobbied by some officials. The fact is that Russia is bound by certain international legal obligations in the field of migration.
Russia's international obligations on migration issues
Some time ago, State Duma deputy Mikhail Matveev, who is an opponent of the current migration policy, noted that migration to Russia from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian countries is carried out according to the “Central Asia-Russia Corridor” plan of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), sponsored by the World Bank and the UK Government's Department for International Development.
This information was officially published on the website of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) - it states that in the period from 2010 to 2013, a regional program on migration in Central Asia and Russia (CARM) was carried out, “aimed at reducing poverty in Central Asia... This is especially relevant for the two poorest countries in the region, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan.”
In 2021, IOM also facilitated migration in the Central Asia-Russian Federation corridor, a project funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). Once again, it is worth emphasizing that the main goal of this program is to reduce poverty in Central Asia, i.e. Russia has assumed certain international obligations to receive migrants from disadvantaged countries of Central Asia.
In addition, Russia is bound by bilateral agreements with some Central Asian states, for example, with Tajikistan, on labor migration and dual citizenship. Russia de facto does not receive any practical benefit from this - it is received by the countries of Central Asia (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, etc.).
Thus, according to official data, the influx of remittances to Tajikistan in 2022 amounted to 49% of GDP and remained a key factor that stimulated the country’s economic growth. Despite the fact that Tajikistan hides information on money transfers from Russia, it is not difficult to guess that most of these 49% are transfers from our country. As for other Central Asian countries, the volume of remittances from Russia to Uzbekistan at the end of 2022 amounted to $14,5 billion, and to Kyrgyzstan - $2,6 billion.
That is, in words, officials criticize Europe’s migration policy and talk about the treachery of the West, but in reality they fulfill their obligations on migration to global structures and pursue a migration policy similar to Europe. A policy that not only provides for attracting a large number of migrants with an alien culture, but also for them to seamlessly obtain Russian citizenship.
Some researchers of the migration issue note that, having become a citizen of the Russian Federation, a migrant does not always strive to integrate into Russian society by replacing the mental values of his country with Russian ones. The cultural barrier and mentality still persist, extending to the descendants of migrants in subsequent generations. And after some time we may find ourselves in a situation where the second generation of post-Soviet migrants, born in Russia, will turn into exactly the same behavior as Arab migrants in France*.
Islamism and crime: main problems of migration
Migration from Central Asia, which takes on the characteristics of “resettlement of peoples,” leads to the emergence of enclaves in large cities, formed according to ethnic and religious principles. In some regions of Russia, ethnic areas of compact residence of migrants have already begun to form - Kotelniki is an example of this.
A specific feature of migration processes in Russia is the increase in organized crime along ethnic lines, as well as the influx, together with criminal elements, of supporters of radical movements of Islam, recognized as such not only in Russia, but also in their own countries. historical homeland. That is, Russia receives, along with labor migration, a flow of Islamists**.
As Islamic scholar Rais Suleymanov rightly notes, migrants from the western republics of the former USSR (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova), unlike migrants from Central Asia, do not form ethnic organized criminal groups in Russia, since migrants from these countries do not differ from Russians in cultural and civilizational terms population of Russia, constituting a significant majority of the country's inhabitants.
The religious factor, which is often ignored in our country, plays an important role in the self-identity of migrants from Central Asia. The importance of this factor is proven by the results of sociological surveys conducted in Tajikistan in 2014. The respondents were asked the question: “what criteria are the most important when choosing a wife or husband”; criteria such as nationality, religion, social status, income, the opinion of parents or relatives and feelings were proposed.
The survey results demonstrated a high level of religious solidarity and nationalism in society: for more than 84% of respondents, the issue of religion was a determining factor. Nationality also turned out to be an important criterion - 74,8% of Tajiks intend to marry only representatives of their own ethnic group***. In Russia, even such surveys are unthinkable, since there is a high risk of being accused of “extremism.”
Based on the survey results, it is not surprising that migrants and children of migrants do not integrate into Russian society - for them, religious self-identification (“we are Muslims”) and national solidarity play a key role. For them there are “insiders” and there are “strangers”. “Our people” need to be helped in every possible way, even if this “help” involves violating the laws of the host country.
In Russia, they try not to notice such issues (problems of this kind are usually hidden under slogans about the “multinational” and “multi-religious” nature of the Russian Federation), and solve national and religious issues by empowering diasporas with the functions of subjects of migration policy, making them intermediaries between migrants and the state.
The problem of radical Islamism is being solved by even more strange (to put it mildly) methods, when the prevention of Islamic radicalism is transferred to the shoulders of the Muslim clergy in the hope that mosques will become centers for the integration of migrants. In fact, this often leads to the fact that the Islamic clergy, who sometimes themselves adhere to radical interpretations of Islam, conduct corresponding propaganda among migrants.
Thus, the imam of the Kazan Al-Ikhlas mosque, Rustem Safin, who had a suspended sentence for membership in the Islamist organization Hizb-ut-Tahrir (in 2009), at one time turned it into the headquarters of this organization, organized in Kazan and Naberezhnye Chelny a series of street actions: pickets, rallies, car rallies, in which migrants actively took part.
Moreover, Safin managed to turn the mosque under his jurisdiction into an office for employing migrants and finding them housing. Safin was later convicted, but he is far from the only imam who holds radical views and uses migrants for political purposes.
The Council of Muftis of Russia, for example, regularly organizes demonstrative collective prayers on the streets of Moscow. Such demonstrations, in my opinion, have a clear political context and are aimed at demonstrating power. Prayers on central streets, in shops and even in the subway (both mass and individual) are a common occurrence in Russia. At the same time, in other states, primarily with a predominant Muslim population, public prayers are condemned and punishable by a fine.
In the same Kazakhstan for namaz in an unspecified place a fine is provided in the amount of up to 481 thousand tenge (more than 100 thousand rubles). In Russia, there are no sanctions for such an action, so “foreign specialists” perform prayers en masse right in the middle of the street and even on playgrounds.
The fight against semi-legal Muslim rooms, spontaneously organized near the places of work of migrants, and illegal mosques is also being carried out sluggishly and uncertainly, although it is in such establishments that Islamists and terrorists recruit their supporters. The fact is that such a struggle often encounters criticism from the leadership of the North Caucasus republics and the Islamic clergy, which forces the authorities to back down.
Thus, from my point of view, without reforms, Russia is unable to confront the main problems that migrants bring with them, both because of extremely lenient legislation and because of completely wrong approaches to the migration issue in general.
It is impossible to resist Islamism and terrorism without changing migration policy and combating illegal migration.
Notes:
* Suleymanov R. R. Migrants and their role in the spread of radical movements of Islam in Russia: causes, manifestations and consequences // Ideological counteraction to ethno-religious terrorism in modern Russia: a collection of articles on emerging threats in the ethno-cultural and religious environment and methods of countering the radicalization of the ethno-religious factor and prevention of conflicts on ethno-religious grounds. – Saransk, 2014.
** Ibid.
*** Ezhova M. Yu. Citizenship and the formation of civil identity in post-Soviet Russia and Tajikistan (comparative political and legal analysis): dis. ... doc. watered Sci. M., 2020.
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