Visa regime with Tajikistan: why Russia won’t follow Turkey’s example
A few days ago, Türkiye introduced a visa regime for citizens of Tajikistan; the corresponding decree was issued by the country's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. It will begin to operate in Turkey on April 20; Tajikistan has already received official notification from Ankara.
This happened after it became clear that the organizers of the terrorist attack in Crocus City Hall arrived from Turkey, and their accomplices were detained in Istanbul - a citizen of Tajikistan and a citizen of Kyrgyzstan. In addition, large-scale raids were carried out against ISIS supporters in Turkey. A completely adequate reaction on the part of the state to the terrorist threat.
However, in Russia, where this terrorist attack took place, they don’t seem to even think about a visa regime with Tajikistan. On the contrary, all those who put forward such proposals are accused of xenophobia, “inciting ethnic hatred,” “fascism,” etc. There are even those who accuse critics of migration policy of “Ukrainianism.”
Why is what is considered the norm in Turkey condemned in Russia?
Why can't Moscow take similar steps regarding Tajikistan?
National policy in the USSR and the Russian Federation: continuity
First of all, I would like to note that a significant problem on the way to introducing a visa-free regime is the national policy pursued by the Russian Federation. Therefore, first of all, I would like to do a small historical remark.
The national (or rather multinational, as government officials constantly call it) policy of the Russian Federation has a fairly close connection with the postulates and practice of Soviet national policy.
After the Bolsheviks came to power in the 1920s, Russia began to pursue a policy of developing ethnocultural diversity, which was accompanied by a tough struggle against the natural dominant position of Russians in the country. V.I. Lenin, using the formula of the French writer Marquis Astolphe de Custine “Russia is a prison of nations,” focused exclusively on the oppressed position of the “non-Russian” peoples of the Russian Empire.
According to the fair remark of a modern French researcher, “one of the tasks of the Bolsheviks... was the desire to avoid any revival of Russian identity”. Party documents of that time repeatedly indicate that Great Russian chauvinism is an enemy for the Soviet Union more dangerous than any form of local nationalism* (the author has already raised this issue in the material “Indigenization" and "the fight against Great Russian chauvinism": national policy in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and its results").
Communist ideology considered national self-awareness and national feelings to be evil and sought to eradicate them. The official goal was to create a new identity of “Soviet man”, overlapping and displacing national identities. In practice, this often turned into a policy of positive discrimination against national minorities at the expense of Russians.
After all, while criticizing traditional ethnic culture and concentrating on the formation of a multinational state-political community, Soviet ideological discourse also included nationalist rhetoric itself. It took place in the context of the theory of defensive nationalism of non-Russian peoples, which appeared in response to the policy of so-called “Great Russian chauvinism.”
As a result, the ill-conceived Soviet national policy, due to a lack of understanding of the significance of the ethnic factor in the dynamics of social processes, led to an explosion of peripheral nationalism and the collapse of the USSR.
Some features of the national policy of the USSR in the Russian Federation were preserved: for example, this concerns the “great compromise” - national-territorial entities within the Russian Federation. Russia turned a blind eye to the formation of ethnocratic regimes in some republics, showing impressive compliance. Moreover, in some national republics of the Russian Federation the practice of “positive discrimination” continued.
In addition, in the formula “multinational people of the Russian Federation”, included in the preamble of the 1993 Constitution, echoes of the former slogan about the “multinational Soviet people”** are clearly heard.
However, it should be noted that the national policy of the Russian Federation is carried out even worse than in the USSR in a number of respects.
Firstly, if the previous policy combined carrots and sticks, the current one has been replaced by the uncontrolled distribution of carrots, pandering and bribery of ethnic groups.
Secondly, if “multinational people” in Soviet times meant the concept of “Soviet people,” then what “multinational people of the Russian Federation” means is not known for certain.
It is unknown for the reason that for some reason citizens of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, who have their own national states and are not among the indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation, are also considered “compatriots” in Russia. If indulging the national republics of the Russian Federation (which is also dangerous) can at least somehow be justified by the desire for multinational harmony, then how can we explain the groveling before the former republics of the USSR, which built their own national states?
How to explain uncontrolled migration and uncontrolled issuance of citizenship to residents of these countries?
If the Bolsheviks planted a bomb on the outskirts of Russia, then the current authorities are planting it directly in Russian cities, where hundreds of thousands of migrants arrive who barely understand the Russian language.
“Borders must be closed”
Unlike Russia, whose government does not miss a single opportunity to talk about “multinationality” and “friendship of peoples,” Turkey is not so concerned about such issues, and therefore the decision to cancel the visa-free regime with Tajikistan was made quickly.
But this is in Turkey.
And in Russia, the introduction of visas with the countries of Central Asia terrifies officials - in response to such proposals, both officials and experts begin to say that without the Tajiks, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, the Russian economy will supposedly collapse, and something will begin to happen in Central Asia scary. For example, one of these experts recently stated that Russia cannot break the agreement with Tajikistan, valid until 2026, on a visa-free regime and dual citizenship, because this could supposedly lead to “the opening of a second front in Asia.”
– said expert in the field of migration policy Mikhail Burda.
At the same time, experts of this kind turn a blind eye to the fact that in Tajikistan for many years they have been pursuing an anti-Russian policy. For some reason, no one is talking about the fact that in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan they have long been calling Russians “colonizers” in school textbooks, have pushed them out of all spheres of life in their countries, and are scolding their own officials if they make reports in parliament in Russian.
For example, in the textbook by M.K. Imankulov “History of Kyrgyzstan XX–XXI centuries.” talks about “the struggle of the Kyrgyz people against the colonialist policies of the Russian Empire.” Doctor of Political Sciences Larisa Khoperskaya, in her work “Untitled Destiny: Russian Compatriots in Central Asia,” who analyzed this book, notes that throughout the entire textbook the author uses such a “pedagogical” technique as opposition. The following pairs are clearly distinguished (and easily remembered by students): “people's fighters” - “Russian punitive detachments”; “advanced representatives of the national intelligentsia” - “Russian colonialists”; “patriotic group of the Kyrgyz intelligentsia” – “Russian chauvinists”, etc.***
A similar situation has developed in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. However, the question is not: what children are taught there in Tajikistan is none of our business. The question is, why should Russia be afraid of ruining relations with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and other countries of Central Asia and constantly make concessions to them in everything?
Why should Russia freely accept millions of citizens of foreign countries and uncontrollably distribute citizenship to them in a simplified form?
Journalist Andrey Medvedev считаетthat it is too late to introduce a visa regime, but a number of other decisions can be made.
What can the Russian government really do in the current situation?
Ideally, check the legality of obtaining Russian citizenship by migrants from Tajikistan.
And secondly... prevent the entry of radical Islamists and those who travel exclusively for social benefits.”
In fact, statements that “it is too late to introduce a visa regime” are disingenuous. It is never too late to introduce a visa regime, because, in my opinion, if this is not done, the situation with the uncontrolled entry into Russian territory of not only migrants, but also potential terrorists, will remain unchanged. Here it is difficult to disagree with State Duma deputy Mikhail Matveev, who in one of his last interviews said:
Of the four terrorists who were detained, all were unemployed, one of them was convicted in Tajikistan of pedophilia, and the second was a member of the terrorist family. The Tajik security services knew about this, since the family was under surveillance, but they did not tell us.
From this we can conclude that the borders should be closed and a visa regime should be introduced.”
Notes:
* See Achkasov V. A. “National revolution” of the Bolsheviks and “national policy” of modern Russia // Bulletin of St. Petersburg University. Political science. International relationships. 2018. T. 11. Issue. 1. pp. 3–14.
** Ibid.
*** Khopyorskaya L. Non-title fate: Russian compatriots in Central Asia. – M.: Moscow Bureau for Human Rights, Academia, 2013.
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