“I won’t take anyone except Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians”
Cavalry unit of the German army, recruited from collaborators, in the North Caucasus. 1942
Educational work
The Soviet military-political leadership had to make titanic efforts and spend large resources to ensure the security of military units in which many representatives of small nations fought (“The mixed national composition of divisions creates enormous difficulties”). In 1942–1943 The Soviet leadership had to urgently rectify the situation.
In addition to the disbandment of such units, the main organizational measures were aimed at an information (agitation and propaganda) campaign among non-Russian nationalities in order to increase their civic responsibility, patriotism, etc. Propaganda materials, brochures, leaflets were widely published, rallies and radio broadcasts were organized in local languages etc. Even previously unclaimed and persecuted religious figures began to be attracted to the side of the authorities.
The Main Political Directorate of the Red Army (GlavPURKKA) issued Directive No. 12 “On educational work with Red Army soldiers and junior commanders of non-Russian nationality” by the head of GlavPURKKA A. N. Shcherbakov dated September 17, 1942.
The results of the implementation of this directive were summed up in his speech at a meeting of agitators by the head of GlavPURKKA Shcherbakov on August 5, 1943. During the Patriotic War, Shcherbakov said, the Red Army became truly multinational. This is the result of the party’s work, its national policy.
The collaborator is a volunteer of the Karachay cavalry squadron, created on the territory of the Malokarachayevsky district of the Karachay Autonomous Region occupied by the Wehrmacht. 1942
Restrictions for "non-European peoples"
The reality was actually not so rosy.
In particular, the The Kremlin is ending the mass conscription into the army of representatives of those nationalities whose political loyalty, as well as their combat stamina during modern warfare, has raised serious doubts. A number of secret decrees of the State Defense Committee, orders of the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO) and directives of the head of the Main Directorate for the formation and staffing of the Red Army (Glavupraforma) are issued, aimed at restrictions on conscription and military service in relation to non-Slavic and non-European peoples. Among them were part of the Transcaucasian peoples, the peoples of the Middle Caucasus and Central Asia.
It is worth noting that already in 1941, such restrictions were introduced for a number of nationalities that lived on the border and historically were previously part of the Persian and Turkish empires. These included the Kurds, Adjarians, Khevsurs, Svans, etc. In April 1942, the headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District received a directive from the head of the Head of the Glavupraform) Army Commissar of the 1st Rank E. A. Shchadenko, according to which all military personnel were ordered to Private and junior officers from Chechens and Ingush should be transferred to the reserve. In August 1942, representatives of the indigenous peoples of Dagestan were transferred to the reserve.
Thus, despite a broad information campaign “on the friendship of peoples,” “internationalism of the Red Army,” etc., the Soviet leadership had to take drastic measures to limit the conscription of “non-Slavic and non-European” nationalities. The “War of Motors” showed their inability to combat.
Termination of conscription
The issue was eventually resolved in a radical way.
Directive of the Glavupraform No. M/1/1493 of October 9, 1943 exempted the peoples of the North Caucasus from service. Conscripts born in 1926 from among the “local nationalities” of the South Caucasus (Armenians, Georgians and Azerbaijanis) and Central Asia (Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen and Kyrgyz) were also exempt from conscription. In November 1943, the conscription of conscripts of “indigenous nationalities” from the Central Asian republics into the active army was stopped.
The total number of nationalities that were not drafted into the army reached 1943 at the end of 43. This practically coincided with the number of nationalities that were not drafted into the army of the Russian Empire. The circle is closed.
Soviet leadership in many areas, including the army, returned to the practices of the tsarist government. De facto, Moscow recognized that most of the peoples of the national outskirts have not yet grown up to the “war of engines”; people lived there in the past.
It is worth noting that in the fall of 1944, the conscription of recruits of “indigenous nationalities” of Transcaucasian peoples into the Red Army was partially restored. But conscripts from the South Caucasus born in 1926 entered the army along with so-called conscripts. “European” nationalities (Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians and Jews) born in 1927, after intensive training in general education subjects, the Russian language and military affairs.
By the Decree of the State Defense Committee of October 25, 1944, conscripts born in 1927 of the Transcaucasian and Central Asian republics, Dagestan, Kabardian, North Ossetian Autonomous Republics, Adygea and Circassian Autonomous Regions were exempted from conscription.
They tried to compensate for the refusal of conscription of indigenous nationalities by other measures. In particular, volunteers were recruited into the army. But they turned out to be few. For example, in Checheno-Ingushetia there were so few volunteers that the campaign had to be curtailed.
Also, the Soviet leadership tried to use conscripts from Central Asia and the Caucasus for work in the rear. However, sending labor contingents from Central Asia to factories, factories and mines of the RSFSR turned out to be not the best solution.
Workers from Central Asia had problems with the Russian language, did not have the qualifications and skills to work at military-industrial complex enterprises and in construction, could not withstand harsh, unusual working and living conditions, etc. As a result, they did not meet production standards and often got sick , there were many deserters among them, etc. A significant number of Central Asian workers had to be sent home based on the conclusion of medical commissions.
As a result, on the “labor front” the authorities first had to resolve basic issues: mass propaganda work, studying general education and specialized subjects, improving the production skills of workers, improving their living conditions, etc.
Exceptions
It is interesting that in a number of regions of the USSR the creation of national formations and units was not a problem. This concerned the European peoples of the USSR.
In 1941, Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian divisions were formed. They were replenished with mobilized conscripts, evacuated from the Baltic states, from the party and Soviet activists, fighters of workers and extermination battalions, police officers and NKVD workers of local nationalities. That is, if some of the local residents actively collaborated with the Nazis, joining the ranks of punitive and police units, then the other part honestly served in the Red Army.
During the war, the 130th Latvian Rifle Corps of the Order of Suvorov, the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps and the 16th Lithuanian Rifle Klaipeda Division were formed. These formations went through the entire war, liberated their small homeland and ended the war in Courland.
True, Soviet commanders assessed their combat effectiveness as low. Thus, the commander of the Kalinin Front, General (in the future - Marshal) A. Eremenko, noted in his diary dated July 28, 1943:
The same thing happened with the 5th Guards Don Cossack Cavalry Corps and the 4th Guards Kuban Cossack Corps. They were formed on a volunteer basis from the Cossacks of the Don and Kuban in 1942. Cossack corps fought bravely and ended the war in Austria and Czechoslovakia. Although the Cossacks of the Don and Kuban suffered greatly during the Civil War, the policy of decossackization and collectivization, they showed high combat effectiveness and loyalty to the authorities.
In principle, this should not be surprising - these were Russian Cossacks, and not “indigenous nationalities”. Russian military class.
Thus, the truth is much more complex and contradictory than Soviet ideology and propaganda about the “friendship of peoples” portrayed. The policy of indigenization has failed.
National formations and units of the Red Army were incapable of combat, and it happened that they were politically hostile.
It turned out that Colossal work (for several generations) is needed for Russification, the development of the urban, industrial civilization of the national outskirts.
Information