Pakistan after the elections. A window of opportunity that can and should be used wisely
Remembering with love
On March 30, the Pakistani Embassy transmitted to the Russian TASS agency an official press release from the office of the Prime Minister of the Republic, which contained a description and results of the meeting between the Pakistani leadership and Russian Ambassador A. Khorev.
Its content turned out to be so interesting that it was even republished by the largest domestic media, which quite rarely pay attention to this foreign policy area.
In addition to the understandable wishes for cooperation in the field of “energy, trade and investment,” the press release contains the following phrases:
“Remembering fondly their meeting on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Samarkand in 2022, he (Prime Minister Sharif) reiterated his invitation to President Putin to make an official visit to Pakistan at the earliest opportunity.”
And also
“called on the Russian side to send a delegation to Pakistan to hold negotiations with their colleagues to determine ways to increase the existing level of trade and investment ties between the two countries.”
It is obvious that in this case we are not dealing with routine diplomatic play on words, but rather a very serious indication of intentions to qualitatively deepen cooperation.
At the present time, not every leader of a major power, even from the pool of those who are classified as “friendly-neutral” in our country, dares to address a message to Moscow with the words: “lovingly remembering the meeting.”
But in our country (according to a strange, although somewhat understandable tradition) Pakistan is considered almost a pro-Western outpost in Asia, which in recent years has been trying to look towards China.
Cooperation with Pakistan is dangerous, because the influence of the United States and Great Britain is strong there, there are influential radical groups, and in general, close relations with Islamabad will complicate work with India, a strategic partner.
This is only part of the narratives. At another time, reprints from the Indian media were popular, which said that Pakistan was supplying weapons and ammunition to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and I. Khan was removed from his post because of his visit to Moscow before the North Military District and in general for “anti-Americanism.”
Ammunition was not supplied either by I. Khan, or later by Sh. Sharif and during the interim government of A. ul Haq Kakar.
It should be noted that, surprisingly, no one even from the Western bloc insisted on such supplies. And the United States contributed to the removal of I. Khan not for anti-Americanism, but for its position on the Taliban (prohibited in the Russian Federation), which, however, was shared by few people at that time even among the Pakistani elites themselves.
A series of articles on VO on Pakistani issues* was called upon to somewhat improve this situation, where, as far as possible, the features of the political system and the regional context in which Pakistan is forced to work, as well as options for solutions that could be beneficial for Russian policy, were revealed.
One of the paradoxes (although the paradox here is imaginary and is caused rather by the peculiar presentation of this region in media expertise) is that it is possible and necessary to work with Pakistan, despite the fact that all three of its main political forces (two hereditary family ones - the Bhuttos and the Sharifs, and one new one - I. Khan) are closely connected with Great Britain.
This is really quite difficult to perceive, since in Ukraine, current London is one of the most implacable opponents of Moscow. The UK is trying to make the most of American problems and the “elite hornet’s nest” that the US has been raising for years in Europe. Its strategy and policies often move within the framework of projects, the orbits of which, if they intersect, do so at a rather distant point in space.
Where are the former Shah's elites of Iran? They live and work with the remainder of their capital in London.
Who has been helping current Tehran for years to circumvent sanctions and transport oil? Great Britain.
Who sponsored the operations in Syria against Iran’s ally, B. Assad, and where were and are the main media platforms associated with the opposition to B. Assad? In London.
Who is the main ally of the United States and who is building large-scale raw materials projects with China? Representatives of the island again.
A cartload of facts can be cited here, using examples of sanctions against Russia and our country’s work in the Middle East.
Expertise, which sooner or later tries to reduce foreign policy schematics to “linear models” using the “either-or” method, openly gives up on such methodology and such planning and “mentally overheats.”
It is possible to try to understand this, it is extremely difficult to work with it in traditional approaches, and it is impossible not to work at all in the current conditions - this intellectual hydra with its worldview “up is down and down is up” has spread a mycelium of interests and makes too many things alien hands.
Interesting incident
And Pakistan is that interesting case when interaction with it does not lead to tension at other conflict points. London does not contradict such a development of events, but rather will contribute, while the United States has brought Pakistani issues to the periphery.
What has been said is so contrary to the usual description of reality, and even taking into account the factor of Afghanistan, that we should try to figure it out.
The world economy, which “high minds”, disappointed in the results of the previous version of globalization, decided to push towards clustering and fragmentation into large pieces of value, produces a clash of interests and a series of small and large conflicts along the fault lines.
Not all of them, of course, are similar in severity to the Ukrainian one, where the fault goes through the living, but in general the situation is exactly like this. The fact that we do not always evaluate it in this way is rather a problem of coverage and information presentation.
For a long time, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh were viewed as foreign policy antagonists, but still representatives of one large economic space, which as a whole is rather integrated into the trade and production cycles of Western Europe.
And this situation in general, as we will see below, still persists. However, based on the signs that are recorded in trade trends and foreign policy, it becomes clear that while Washington foresaw a long-term and promising joint project for India, Pakistan was left without such strategic proposals.
We could observe this by how, after the forced resignation of I. Khan, Washington lost interest in interaction. They didn’t even strive to work with the army elite, which automatically entailed military contracts, and they stopped putting a spoke in the wheels in Baluchistan.
Those excesses that occurred with the shelling of the Iranian border or during the last elections are, frankly speaking, only a pale shadow of what Islamabad’s American counterparts could have done if they had used their full resources.
The United States did not exert pressure on the Ukrainian issue, although it is very important for them today. In the direction of Afghanistan, I. Khan was, as they say, “slapped,” but in general, even there he was more likely to be devoured (and not completely) by the British with their interests in the old elites of Pakistan than by the United States.
Why is that?
Pakistan does not fit into any of the major schemes of the United States, which, in general, reason quite logically that they will financially keep Afghanistan within the required framework. This can be seen in how differently representatives of “big finance” have worked over the past six months in relation to India, Pakistan and Turkey.
For India - almost “mega-level” projects, after all, the future core of a separate economic cluster; for Turkey, which is looking for additional money every year - a pool of transnational investment funds, since Ankara is finally integrating into the European economy.
And for Pakistan, alas, only tranches from the IMF, which traditionally cover only the most necessary expenses for nominal (and therefore very low) economic growth, and the head of the Ministry of Finance as a direct representative of the IMF to control these tranches.
In Turkey - direct investment, in India - direct investment, for Pakistan - funds from the IMF, tied up with a lot of conditions and restrictions.
At the same time, Pakistan’s foreign trade deficit is still significant: imports are $70 billion, exports are $32 billion. Imports: China - 22%, Arabian monarchies - 29%, Indonesia - 7% (Pakistan consumes a lot of palm oil) and USA - 4%. Exports: the European Union - 31%, the USA - 20%, but China - 8%. Other countries provide a lot of export contracts, but in small amounts.
Almost all exports are based on everything related to textile production: clothing, shoes, fabrics, leather, partly cotton and rice. In such a situation, instead of direct investments like India and Türkiye, getting IMF tranches for Islamabad is a so-so prospect.
Work Islamabad as you want, with the Chinese, Iranians, Arabs, Russians, spin as best you can, the IMF will not let you fall completely, the EU market is not closing, but there are no special prospects in sight. In big times, big people have no time for the periphery.
At the same time, as discussed in detail in one of the previous materials, Pakistan’s social structure is changing. There is a generational change, which has already brought politicians like I. Khan and his comrades in PTI to the top.
The old hereditary elites need to put “youth” forward, but how can they do this if the basic issues have not been resolved?
While B. Bhutto’s son was assigned to party work, N. Sharif’s daughter and niece of the current prime minister were assigned to the province. Punjab, but what next if even the national composition of the army, which has always had its own economic base, changes.
For Russia
In this situation, Pakistan naturally needs not only to reduce costs for energy raw materials, but to look for markets for those products where Islamabad has its strengths. Look for direct investment, and not wait for tranches from the IMF, which traditionally only “support the pants.” Actually, that's what they are designed for.
And it is completely logical that in the official press release Sh. Sharif pays special attention to interaction in the SCO format. BRICS is still about politics, and the SCO is a structure where issues of investment and even military cooperation have been institutionally worked out.
Pakistan’s task now will be not only and not so much to “cover” brands in the USA and Europe, but also to multiply exports to other regions. This is undoubtedly China, but in Russia Islamabad also sees a major consumer who can provide a lot in terms of providing raw materials.
And in this case, it is completely unprofitable for such an antagonist of Russia as Great Britain to turn away from its long-time wards, for whom the United States has no business or projects.
Actually, what was described in previous materials* as a window of opportunity for Russia to work with Islamabad after the Pakistani elections is happening right now. This opportunity should not be missed in the current conditions of head-on confrontation with Russia in the Ukrainian direction.
It is unlikely that this will result in the rapid implementation of such landmark projects as, for example, the Russia-Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. After all, Iran has a whole North Pars gas cluster right next to Pakistan, but it is possible and necessary to work on the export of agricultural machinery, petrochemicals, crude oil supplies for yuan, while helping interaction within the SCO.
By the way, this can be done within the framework of the Union State with the Republic of Belarus, which will only revive this structure.
Well, stopping overpaying four times the price for imported branded consumer goods “supposedly from the EU” would also not be amiss.
*Previous materials on the topic of Pakistan:
“Elections in Pakistan. Recording social changes, the position of elites and potential opportunities"
"Construction of the Wakhan Corridor and the updated regional configuration before the elections in Pakistan"
“A little about the historical and current problems of Pakistan, the analysis of which may be useful”
“The results of political battles in Pakistan may open up new opportunities, but they need to be properly analyzed.”
“Who is blowing up Pakistan and why?”
Information