The tragedy of the Russian fleet: the death of Admiral Makarov and Petropavlovsk

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The tragedy of the Russian fleet: the death of Admiral Makarov and Petropavlovsk
Squadron battleship "Petropavlovsk" - explosion on a mine near the Port Arthur fortress, March 31, 1904.


120 years ago, on March 31, 1904, the battleship Petropavlovsk hit a mine and sank in the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. About 700 crew members and Vice Admiral Makarov were killed



The Russian fleet suffered an irreparable loss, it was a disaster. After all, the Russian fleet lost not only its flagship, but also an experienced, talented and very popular naval commander, who was equally loved by sailors and officers. As soon as he arrived at the theater of military operations, Stepan Osipovich managed to efficiently organize the defense of Port Arthur. Many researchers consider this fatal event to be one of the reasons for Russia’s final defeat in the war with Japan.

General situation


From the very beginning of the war, the Japanese tried to paralyze the activities of the Russian Pacific fleet, since Russian ships were a threat to Japan's sea communications. The success of the Russian fleet could sharply worsen the position of the Japanese armed forces at the front and even lead the Japanese Empire to defeat in the war. Therefore, the Japanese considered the blockade of Port Arthur and the liquidation of the Russian fleet to be one of their main tasks.

On the night of January 27 (February 9), 1904, before the official declaration of war, 8 Japanese destroyers conducted a torpedo attack on the ships of the Russian fleet stationed on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. As a result of the attack, two of the best Russian battleships (Tsesarevich and Retvizan) and the armored cruiser Pallada were disabled for several months. This allowed Japan to calmly land an army in Korea and occupy the peninsula.

On the morning of February 24, the Japanese attempted to scuttle several old transports at the entrance to Port Arthur harbor in order to trap the Russian squadron inside. The plan was foiled by the battleship Retvizan, which was located on the outer roadstead of the harbor.

On March 8, 1904, Admiral Makarov (at the same time he was a prominent scientist in the maritime field) and the famous shipbuilder Nikolai Kuteynikov arrived in Port Arthur, along with several wagons of spare parts and equipment for repairing damaged ships. Makarov immediately took energetic measures to restore the combat effectiveness of the Russian squadron, which led to an increase in military spirit in the fleet.

On March 27, the Japanese again tried to close the exit from Port Arthur harbor, using 4 old vehicles filled with stones and cement. The transports, however, were sunk too far from the harbor entrance.


The battleships "Sevastopol", "Poltava" and "Petropavlovsk" (right) at sea. 1904

Search for "Scary"


Having received intelligence information that the enemy was preparing to land troops on the Kwantung Peninsula, and about the concentration of a large number of ships in Korea in connection with this landing, Admiral Makarov sent for reconnaissance to the Elliot Islands. Enemy ships could be located there. On the evening of March 30 (new style April 12), 1904, eight destroyers (“Boevoy”, “Grozny”, “Hardy”, “Silent”, “Storozhevoy”, “Rastoropny”, “Brave” and “Terrible”) under the flags of the commander The 1st detachment of destroyers, captain 2nd rank E.P. Eliseev, and the commander of the 2nd detachment of destroyers, captain 2nd rank M.V. Bubnov, left Port Arthur.

Each of the detachment commanders led a group of 4 destroyers from his detachment. The destroyer "Strashny" was part of the second group. By midnight the detachment entered the group of islands. At night the weather worsened: it began to rain and fog appeared. There was a threat of losing each other, which is what happened. The destroyers turned back. Around 22 p.m. 15 minutes. That night, “Terrible” and “Brave” lost their squad and tried to find it together, but during the maneuvering they also lost each other.

The situation was complicated by the fact that the commander of the “Terrible”, captain of the 2nd rank Konstantin Yurasovsky, had only recently arrived in the Far East and was practically unfamiliar with local peculiarities. The destroyer was delivered by rail in parts, assembled in Port Arthur and became part of the Pacific Fleet on March 1 (old style) 1904 - just 30 days before her death.

Meanwhile, the Japanese began implementing a new plan to neutralize the Russian fleet. They planned to lay mines at the entrance to Port Arthur, and then lure the Russian squadron there, leaving bait (a small detachment) behind the minefield. The role of bait was played by a detachment of cruisers. The Koryu Maru transport has been converted for minelaying. He is accompanied by the 2nd, 4th and 5th destroyer detachments. They are also tasked with distracting the attention of the Russians. At 11 pm the destroyers arrived at their destination and laid mines. On the night of March 31 (April 13), the Japanese ships quietly left.

Admiral Makarov was reported about the strange maneuvers of unknown destroyers. However, he considered that these were our destroyers, which had previously gone to sea on his orders. Therefore, no measures were taken. In the morning, the fleet commander, who was on the duty cruiser Diana, was going to start a search.


Stepan Osipovich Makarov (December 27, 1848 - March 31, 1904) - Russian naval leader, hero of the Russo-Japanese War, oceanographer, polar explorer, shipbuilder, vice admiral. Inventor of mine transport, developer of the theory of unsinkability, pioneer of the use of icebreakers. In 1895 he developed the Russian semaphore alphabet

"Terrible" takes the fight


At this time, the Russian destroyer is looking for its ships. The search was unsuccessful, and Yurasovsky sent the ship to the lighthouse of Mount Laoteshan. At about 2 o'clock in the morning, the signalmen of the "Terrible" noticed the lights and silhouettes of six ships in the sea - this was one of the detachments of Japanese destroyers. On the "Terrible" they mistook them for their ships and joined the detachment. The Japanese also mistook it for their ship. At dawn, the call signs were raised on the Scary.

The Japanese realized their mistake and offered to surrender. Yurovsky rejected the offer. Japanese ships opened fire on the Russian ship. Four Japanese destroyers and two twin-tube cruisers fanned out and began shooting at the Scary. An unequal battle takes place abeam Sikau Bay, 15-18 miles from Port Arthur.

The destroyer tried to break through to its base, but was overtaken. With the second salvo, the Japanese managed to hit the destroyer with a 6-inch shell, which killed commander Yurasovsky and destroyed the bow 76-mm gun. Lieutenant Ermiy Maleev took command. The destroyer, using a torpedo from the bow apparatus, was able to damage the enemy cruiser. A second cruiser came to his aid. There were 4 destroyers left against the "Terrible".

According to Japanese data, 4 Ikazuchi-class destroyers of the detachment of Captain 1st Rank Ishida (Ikazuchi, Inazumo, Oboro, Akebono) initially took part in the battle with the “Terrible”; there were no cruisers in the battle area at all , the Japanese also deny that a torpedo hit their ships.

Approximately 7 minutes after the start of the battle, a torpedo exploded in the stern apparatus of the “Terrible” from a shell that hit it. As a result of this explosion, almost all the servants of the torpedo tube and the stern 47-mm gun were killed, the cylinders of both vehicles were damaged and the main steam line was interrupted. The ship lost speed. The Japanese then shot down the ship's rear funnel. Many dead.

Of stories:

“The destroyer was completely beaten up, the boats were turned into chips, the rudder was damaged, there were many holes, three quarters of the crew were out of action.”

After a short meeting, the survivors agree to die, but not surrender to the enemy.

The Japanese ships approached the Russian destroyer, which had lost the ability to maneuver and most of its weapons, to a distance of 70-80 meters and shot at point-blank range. At this time, the “Brave” approached the sounds of shooting, but when the enemy ships turned in its direction and opened fire, its commander M.K. Bakhirev did not accept the battle and left at full speed for Port Arthur. In his defense, Bakhirev reported that the “Terrible” was already sinking by that time, but this was not the case.

The unequal battle ended with the death of the Russian destroyer. About 6 o'clock. 15 minutes. In the morning the ship sank with the St. Andrew's flag raised. From 8 to 12 surviving sailors with Lieutenant Maleev ended up in the water. The battle lasted almost an hour and a half. 4 officers and 53 lower ranks died with the ship.

About 6 o'clock. 30 min. the cruiser Bayan arrived, the Japanese destroyers retreated. Only 5 sailors of the “Terrible” were rescued from the water, as a detachment of Japanese cruisers (6 pennants) appeared on the horizon. The commander of the Bayan, R. Viren, ordered the rescue operation to be canceled (3 more sailors were seen in the water) and to retreat to the main forces of the squadron, which was leaving Port Arthur. "Bayan" left. It is possible that the Japanese picked up and captured three Russian sailors.

In memory of the heroic battle, four Russian destroyers were named: “Terrible”, “Captain Yurasovsky”, “Lieutenant Maleev”, “Mechanical Engineer Dmitriev”


The death of "Petropavlovsk"


At 7 o'clock in the morning, Admiral Makarov personally comes to the aid of Bayan with the battleship Poltava and four cruisers (Bayan, Askold, Diana, Novik). The commander's banner on the Petropavlovsk. Other ships were not waiting, the raid was not cleared, but the minefield was successfully passed.

Japanese cruisers opened fire on the Russian squadron. Makarov ordered to answer. The Japanese ships retreated. Meanwhile, the enemy’s main forces appear in sight - six battleships and two new armor-piercing cruisers, Nissin and Kasuga. The enemy has superior forces. Makarov decides to turn to Port Arthur. Here he was joined by the battleships Pobeda and Peresvet, and the commander again approached the enemy. This time the course led directly to the mines.

The squadron commander, Admiral Heihachiro Togo, orders to turn back without firing a single shot.

Under the Petropavlovsky, which was heading a detachment of battleships and cruisers, two miles from the lighthouse on the Tiger Peninsula at 9 o'clock. 43 min. a mine explodes. It was a disaster. The ammunition detonated. The force of the explosion threw the bow 305-mm gun turret, chimneys and casings overboard. The collapsed foremast destroyed the commander's and navigation bridges. A minute later, the flagship plunged into the water with its bow. This was followed by an explosion of the boilers, after which the Petropavlovsk, breaking into two parts, went under water.


The death of the battleship "Petropavlovsk". Drawing by unknown author

Eyewitnesses recalled:

“With a terrible explosion, a huge pillar grew above the battleship, twice the size of the battleship, which completely enveloped the battleship, covering the nose and middle of the battleship.”

Another eyewitness described the death of Petropavlovsk as follows:

“I stood on Quail Mountain, where a crowd of people with binoculars and telescopes had gathered. Everyone tensely watched the movement of the squadrons, expecting a battle. A cold wind was blowing. However, the sea horizon was covered with a bluish haze - fog. At first it was not clear to us why our ships were returning to the roadstead, but soon we noticed the appearance of unclear silhouettes on the eastern side - one, another, a third, another and another... Suddenly a column of smoke appeared near the Petropavlovsk, one, another with a huge flame. Screams and screams were heard: “Petropavlovsk is dying!” I don’t want to believe it, but he’s no longer above the water...”

The ship sank in less than 2 minutes. Therefore, most of the crew died.

At 10 o'clock 10 min. The battleship Pobeda also hit a mine. The explosion occurred on the starboard side in the area of ​​the bow coal pits. The dimensions of the hole are 8x5,3 m, the center of the hole is 5 m below the waterline. The ship took on more than 500 tons of water, but then the water was stopped by watertight bulkheads. Deciding that the squadron was under attack by a submarine, Pobeda and other ships opened fire on the water. The ship was out of action for several weeks.


Squadron battleship Pobeda at anchor, probably March 1904

Results


The Russian fleet suffered an irreparable loss. The tragedy completely demoralized the Russian Pacific Fleet, because the country lost not only its flagship, but also an experienced, talented and very popular naval commander, who was equally loved by sailors and officers. As soon as he arrived at the theater of military operations, Makarov managed to efficiently organize the defense of Port Arthur. Many researchers are inclined to consider the death of Stepan Osipovich one of the prerequisites for the future defeat of Russia. The new command was unable to intelligently organize the combat activities of the Pacific Fleet.

“The most terrible, most difficult day for Port Arthur! The most terrible day for our fleet! Admiral Makarov died today. In his person we lost no less than half of our entire naval strength. The loss is irreparable!”

- wrote war correspondent Pavel Larenko in his book “The Sad Days of Port Arthur”.

Along with the admiral, the outstanding battle painter Vasily Vereshchagin, who sketched sketches for future paintings, the chief of staff of the Pacific squadron, Rear Admiral Mikhail Molas, ten staff and 18 naval officers, two doctors, a priest, two military officials, as well as about 650 sailors died on the battleship . Only 80 participants in the fatal campaign managed to escape, including the shell-shocked commander of Petropavlovsk, Captain 1st Rank Nikolai Yakovlev, Captain 2nd Rank, Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich, former aide-de-camp and head of the naval department of Makarov’s headquarters (cousin Tsar Nicholas II).

The death of Makarov and the flagship significantly weakened the Russian Pacific Fleet. The sailors were demoralized and afraid of mines. There was no new naval commander who could replace Makarov and inspire people.

The British Times newspaper noted:

“Russia lost a beautiful ship, but even more lost in the person of a man who was likely to make the Russian fleet an important factor in the war. His loss and manner of death deal a heavy blow to the Russian fleet, not to mention the disappearance of a valiant and inspiring commander, whose influence, introducing a new element into the war, was recognized by the Japanese. The enemy's judgment is the best proof that Makarov combined the qualities of a great sailor with his recognized mastery of maritime science. Without at all wanting to doubt the presence of Russia’s mental strength, we can say that with the death of Admiral Makarov, Russia is losing a leader who will be difficult to replace.”


Carrying out victims of the Petropavlovsk explosion. In the background is a damaged Pobeda. March 31, 1904
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  1. -6
    April 2 2024 04: 57
    The Russian fleet suffered an irreparable loss, it was a disaster. After all, the Russian fleet lost not only its flagship, but also an experienced, talented and very popular naval commander, who was equally loved by sailors and officers. As soon as he arrived at the theater of military operations, Stepan Osipovich managed to efficiently organize the defense of Port Arthur. Many researchers consider this fatal event to be one of the reasons for Russia’s final defeat in the war with Japan.
    It was always interesting what results did Makarov S.O. have during the Russian-Japanese War? Except that “we are equally loved by sailors and officers”?

    Let's clarify the results.
    Sunk: Petropavlovsk, Steregushchiy, Strashny
    Damaged: Victory.

    What losses (ships sunk/damaged) did the enemy suffer during this time?

    https://topwar.ru/28006-russko-yaponskaya-voyna-1904-1905-godov-sostoyanie-rossiyskogo-flota-nevezenie-i-upuschennye-vozmozhnosti.html
    1. +3
      April 3 2024 08: 33
      What - do you think that other admirals were better and smarter than Makarov? And other admirals achieved great success? So I will list: the commander of the fleet, Stark, on the very first day of the war allowed three Russian ships to be torpedoed at once. Commander Vitgeft allowed the first squadron to be completely defeated and scattered. Or maybe Viren - who allowed the complete execution of all battleships in Port Arthur? Or will you consider Jessen the best, who allowed the death of Rurik, the grounding of Bogatyr, and the explosion of Thunderbolt on a mine? Or is it better than Makarov, the damned Rozhdestvensky, who completely destroyed the entire Russian fleet?
      1. -1
        April 3 2024 11: 23
        do you think that other admirals were better and smarter than Makarov?

        You know how to read, I’m writing about something completely different. This article made me think about the phenomenon of adm. Makarov, whose results in numerical terms are puzzling, especially together with judgments like: "Makarov, with his recognized mastery of maritime science, combined the qualities of a great sailor. Without at all wanting to doubt the presence of Russia's mental strength, we can say that with the death of Admiral Makarov, Russia is losing a leader who will be difficult to replace".

        I remind you of the results of the battle under his leadership: 1 EDB sunk, 1 EDB damaged; the enemy did not suffer significant damage. We won’t count destroyers, it’s a shame.

        The question of “who is better and smarter” is more complex.
        Vitgeft, IMHO, is better - he managed without irreparable losses in the Yellow Sea. May 15, 1904 - 2 Japanese nuclear submarines were sunk.

        Well, the ideal one is “in a spherical vacuum” (sorry for the humor... feel ) the admiral in such a situation is Andrei from Chelyabinsk, undoubtedly. For example, his battle plan in the Yellow Sea is quite good.
        1. +3
          April 3 2024 14: 13
          whose performance results in numerical terms are puzzling,

          You calculate the results of whose activities in numerical terms are puzzling, in just 1 month of his life. Moreover, as soon as he arrived he inherited 3 torpedoed ships.
          And the Japanese laying mines on the high seas was a new and unusual thing at that time. Moreover, the explosion and instant death of the battleship Petropavlovsk - no one expected this. After all, the battleship Pobeda survived the explosion quite safely and remained afloat. And if Makarov had been on Pobeda, he would have remained alive and continued command and undoubtedly would have himself ordered the laying of mines against the Japanese fleet.
          But Vitgeft resisted in every possible way the laying of mines, and only the commander of the Amur, at his own peril and risk, carried it out. moreover, Vitgeft forbade finishing off the damaged Japanese ships, did not dare to withdraw the entire fleet and canceled the attack on the destroyers.
          Do you think:
          Vitgeft, IMHO, is better - he managed without irreparable losses in the Yellow Sea.

          And the fact that Vitgeft openly stood on the bridge and was killed due to his own stupidity - isn’t this his stupid mistake? And don’t you consider the fact that the entire Russian fleet was scattered to be the reason for its subsequent death?
          Yes, Makarov lost 1 battleship, and Vitgeft destroyed the entire Port Arthur fleet.
          1. -1
            April 3 2024 14: 33
            Hmm, your assessment of specialists is somehow strange, and the one you don’t like should even be responsible for events after his death.

            Let's make an analogy, although this method is not ideal.
            Two surgeons.
            First: during his work in the department there was one corpse, one became seriously ill. There are no recoveries.
            Second: there is no deterioration in condition, 2 were discharged.

            Well, the conclusion is obvious.

            To put it simply, admirals are needed to command the fleet in battle. It is by this result - the result of the fleet - that they should be assessed, IMHO.
            The assessment “through losses” is also not ideal, but in conditions when the enemy fleet successfully challenged dominance at sea, there is no other, more objective assessment. Although, if you like, you can use the criteria “love of sailors and officers.”
          2. -1
            April 3 2024 15: 23
            Quote: geniy
            But Vitgeft strongly resisted the laying of mines

            can you provide a source? As far as I know, he several times demanded that Loschinsky send Amur to the sea... hi
            Quote: geniy
            didn't even bother to take out the entire fleet

            From Vladik too? hi Let me remind you that 1 TOE at that moment had 3 EDB in working order, 2 of them with 10 dm artillery... we reliably saw the death of 1 EDB, the enemy had 5 more, and the PA also had mines... request
            1. +3
              April 3 2024 16: 54
              Quote: DrEng02
              Let me remind you that 1 TOE at that moment had 3 EDB in working order, 2 of them with 10 dm artillery... we reliably saw the death of 1 EDB, the enemy still 5

              Nope. At that moment, the enemy had only three, two of which were blown up and one managed to drown.
              We have Poltava, Peresvet and Bayan ready for departure with cruisers and destroyers
              As Lutonin wrote
              And at this time, an army of 80000 was landing at Bitszyvo, there were transports with artillery parks, with provisions, with reserves. What would have happened if the admiral, having released Poltava to finish off Yassim, had thrown Peresvet, Bayan, all the cruisers and 16 destroyers to Bitszyvo? There would have been a massacre there, the Japanese would have received such a blow that the fate of the entire campaign would have been decided in our favor.

              Bizivo is probably a fantasy after all, but it was possible and necessary to finish off the Japanese
              1. -2
                April 3 2024 17: 21
                Quote: Senior Sailor
                At that moment, the enemy had only three, two of which were blown up and one managed to drown.

                Does VKV have a surveillance radar? Or is the Japanese 2nd EDB brigade over the horizon?
                Quote: Senior Sailor
                but it was possible and necessary to finish off the Japanese

                In theory, yes, in reality it’s difficult - you have to take out ships, go through mines... hi I believe with reason that preparing such an operation was not possible in the PA at that time... request
                1. +3
                  April 3 2024 17: 57
                  Quote: DrEng02
                  Does VKV have a surveillance radar? Or is the Japanese 2nd EDB brigade over the horizon?

                  even if that’s the case, by the time they get there... “Yashima” has definitely been finished off. Otherwise, the Japanese kept its loss secret until the very end of the war.
                  Quote: DrEng02
                  In theory yes, in reality it’s difficult

                  How is this... an excellent excuse for those who don’t want to do anything))))
                  There is nothing complicated there. Order in advance on combat-ready ships to separate steam and leave
                  Quote: DrEng02
                  pass the mines...

                  Where do you think "Cupid" went?
                  The Japanese were constantly throwing mines, ours were constantly trawling them. Routine
                  Quote: DrEng02
                  Motivated

                  IMHO that's what you called it?)))
                  1. -1
                    April 3 2024 18: 09
                    Quote: Senior Sailor
                    even so, as long as they come...

                    until we catch up - the distance is 11 miles from the entrance (according to Ivanov), taking into account the ships leaving the harbor, this is an hour's sail and this is if the enemy is standing request
                    Quote: Senior Sailor
                    a great excuse for those who don’t want to do anything))))

                    It is recommended to THINK first, and then do... there are more benefits, I speak from experience... hi To strike at the landing site was indeed reasonable, but the VKV was a temporary military commander with limited rights and the goal was to restore the combat effectiveness of 1 TOE... somehow they forget this, and aftereffects have a strong effect... request
                    Quote: Senior Sailor
                    Order in advance on combat-ready ships

                    This is if you know the result in advance... I think they were just expecting damage to 1 EDB...
                    Quote: Senior Sailor
                    Where do you think "Cupid" went?

                    compare the draft? taking into account the deepening of the Amur mines (3,5 m in low water), its safe passage is clear (draft 4,5 m)
                    Quote: Senior Sailor
                    ours constantly trawled them. Routine

                    of course, just as they were constantly being blown up - see the release on June 10...
                    Quote: Senior Sailor
                    IMHO that's what you called it?)))

                    do you have a passion for editing? :)
                    1. +2
                      April 3 2024 18: 54
                      Quote: DrEng02
                      This is if you know the result in advance...

                      Does not knowing the result somehow prevent you from making steam in boilers?
                      Read Lutonin. He's biased, of course, but...
                      Quote: DrEng02
                      do you have a passion for editing? :)

                      Not understood...
                      1. -1
                        April 4 2024 11: 46
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        somehow interferes with the generation of steam in boilers?

                        and fall into a trap like COM? let yourself be broken into pieces?
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        He's biased, of course, but...

                        Yes, everyone is biased towards VKV - either he’s not a sailor, or he did something wrong... and this is the lyrics - look at the results of his work - essentially the best or successful combat admiral of the RIF steam era.. request
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Not understood...

                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Motivated
                        IMHO that's what you called it?)))

                        hi
                      2. +2
                        April 4 2024 16: 05
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        and fall into a trap like COM? let yourself be broken into pieces?

                        Sorry, this is already a clinic. Once during the entire war, the Japanese found themselves in a vulnerable position, but you, like Vitgeft, found a thousand reasons not to do anything.
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        look at the results of his work

                        Well let's see.
                        He didn’t even try to fight for the raid, he failed his combat training, sent the artillery ashore and didn’t even try to return it. Instead of commanding, he constantly tried to shift personal responsibility in endless meetings. The only success came despite his orders. He could have gone out to sea to make a breakthrough with much larger forces (at least the Bayan was in good order), but he returned to the raid and waited until the Sevastopol caught a mine again.
                        Successful command in ZhM - yes! Well done. But let's be objective, it was Togo who was doing this bullshit. As soon as the fate of the squadron and Vitgeft himself ceased, it was decided.
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        Motivated
                        IMHO that's what you called it?)))

                        I tried to point out that your statement may be motivated, but it is not justified. What does it have to do with it editing?
                      3. -1
                        April 5 2024 12: 14
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Once during the entire war the Japanese found themselves in a vulnerable position,

                        we run in circles - you have an afterthought... hi
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        He didn’t even try to fight for the raid, he failed his combat training, sent the artillery ashore and didn’t even try to return it.

                        it is clear that only VKV is to blame... bully
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Instead of commanding, he constantly tried to shift personal responsibility in endless meetings.

                        I understand. that the COM style looks impressive, but it is stupid... request
                        The manager’s task is to organize the work of his subordinates, and not to do everything for them; in reality, the COM style led to the death of the EDB and himself... hi
                        As for the meetings, this is an attempt to take into account the opinions of others; military councils have an old tradition, for example, Kutuzov held them after Borodino...
                        In this case, it was at the meeting that the idea came up to conduct active minelaying! And VKV supported it and brought it to life.
                        .
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        The only success came against his orders.

                        Brad! hi He gave the order to Loschinsky to carry out the operation! And not just once!
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        and waited until “Sevastopol” caught a mine again.

                        Or maybe this is Essen’s oversight? hi
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        It was Togo who was doing bullshit.

                        Let us note that the VKV correctly used Togo’s “garbage”, but the ZPR could not use Togo’s loop...
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        As soon as the fate of the squadron and Vitgeft himself ceased, it was decided.

                        Nonsense... lucky shot, no more... minutes earlier Togo could also have died...
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        What does editing have to do with it?

                        Do you know the meaning of the word "editing"? That's exactly what you were trying to do...
                      4. 0
                        April 5 2024 12: 31
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        it is clear that only VKV is to blame

                        Who was the most senior commander of the sailors after the blockade began?
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        Or maybe this is Essen’s oversight?

                        Well, yes, it was Essen who ordered the removal of the secondary battery from the squadron, and then exposed the squadron to a night attack by destroyers.
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        Brad!

                        That is, we diligently ignore documents if they do not fit into the picture of the world?
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        Do you know the meaning of the word "editing"?

                        Yes. By occupation. And this is not even close...
                        However, it doesn't matter anymore
                      5. 0
                        April 5 2024 12: 47
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Who was the most senior commander of the sailors after the blockade began?

                        he was an interim - do you understand the difference? Well, secondly, why did Alekseev appoint him?

                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        and waited until “Sevastopol” caught a mine again.

                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Well, yes, it was Essen who ordered the removal of the secondary battery from the squadron, and then exposed the squadron to a night attack by destroyers.

                        There's an elderberry on the fence, and there's a guy in Kuev... bully Could you please explain how secondary battery guns and galvanic shock mines are related? bully
                        By the way, about the secondary battery - this is a consequence of the Sevastopol defense request I note that after the death of the VKV, things in the PA in this regard became even worse...
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        That is, we diligently ignore documents if they do not fit into the picture of the world?

                        if it's not a secret - what documents? and questions from me:
                        1) Who supported the idea of ​​​​installing MH on the tracks?
                        2) Who gave the order to Loschinsky to set up the MZ Amur? And how many times? hi
                      6. 0
                        April 5 2024 16: 39
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        Could you please explain how secondary battery guns and galvanic shock mines are related?

                        I'll enlighten you. There were also self-propelled mines. Whitehead. They were carried by destroyers. That is why the “mine-resistant caliber” was used.
                        However, I was wrong. My memory failed me. On June 24, when Vitgeft withdrew the squadron, but did not dare to fight and turned off the coast, forcing him to repel the attacks of the destroyers, the Seva was blown up by a barrage mine. For some reason it seemed to me that he was torpedoed
                        And in general, it’s a miracle that they weren’t torpedoed
                        But in any case, I apologize.
                        he was an interim - do you understand the difference?

                        Understand. He was the only one without the constant supervision of a governor. And he was so subordinate that he constantly ignored orders. It took a personal command to push him into battle.
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        if it's not a secret - what documents?

                        Well, how to talk to you?
                        Colleague Countryman posted a scan, Andrey referred to the official story, but no...

                        To hell with everything!
                      7. 0
                        April 5 2024 18: 10
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        However, I was wrong.

                        You see, it’s VKV’s fault... request
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        But in any case, I apologize.

                        and it’s in vain, we’re just talking - it’s not an exam, anyone can make a mistake... hi
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        It took a personal command to push him into battle.

                        1) Perhaps the VKV understood the degree of readiness of 1 TOE for battle and had no illusions about its result - unlike the ZPR, it well understood the importance of squadron speed.
                        2) Having received the order from IN2, he carried it out in a disciplined manner, while doing well in the battle and dying. It amazes me - why does he get such disrespect from his descendants? request From contemporaries this is clear...
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Well, how to talk to you?

                        banal, without lyrics and demagoguery, just answer the questions:
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        1) Who supported the idea of ​​​​installing MH on the tracks?
                        2) Who gave the order to Loschinsky to set up the MZ Amur? And how many times?

                        And if you answer honestly, an amazing picture will emerge - VKV accepted the idea and put it into practice... hi Well, he received it from his contemporaries and descendants in full for this - and not a sailor, and in spite of him ... hi
                      8. +1
                        April 5 2024 14: 28
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Well let's see.
                        He didn’t even try to fight for the raid, he failed his combat training, sent the artillery ashore and didn’t even try to return it. Instead of commanding, he constantly tried to shift personal responsibility in endless meetings. The only success came despite his orders. He could have gone out to sea to make a breakthrough with much larger forces (at least the Bayan was in good order), but he returned to the raid and waited until the Sevastopol caught a mine again.
                        Successful command in ZhM - yes! Well done. But let's be objective, it was Togo who was doing this bullshit. As soon as the fate of the squadron and Vitgeft himself ceased, it was decided.

                        Well said!!!
                        In general, Vitgeft’s cowardly behavior on June 10 angers me personally the most. The only real chance to break through and waste it so mediocrely
                      9. 0
                        April 5 2024 18: 11
                        Quote: Trapper7
                        The only real chance to break through

                        can you give any arguments why the result would be better on July 28.07?
                      10. +1
                        April 8 2024 10: 40
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        can you give any arguments why the result would be better on July 28.07?

                        1. Bayan is in service.
                        2. Retvizan without a hole.
                        3. The competence of gunners is better. Another two months of inactivity could not improve their skills. Only make it worse. Let me remind you that the Russian fleet fought the January battle almost equally with the Japanese.
                        4. Nissin and Kassuga have just entered service and their preparation is definitely worse than two months later.
                        And finally, I came across the opinion that the condition of the vehicles in Poltava and Sevastopol in June was better than before the battle on July 28.
                        All this taken together gives reason to assume that June 10 was the best moment for a breakthrough to Vladivostok. Even if, as a result of the battle, Seva and Poltava suddenly fell behind, then the remaining 4 ebres would be enough to break through Kamimura and strengthen the 2nd squadron
                      11. 0
                        April 8 2024 13: 43
                        Quote: Trapper7
                        to break through Kamimura and strengthen the 2nd squadron

                        you are mistaken, Kamimura on June 10 was still under Togo, so against 1TOE there is not only 1 BO, but also 2... in my opinion, the chances are noticeably worse... request
                      12. 0
                        April 8 2024 16: 17
                        Mmmmm... all sources say that ours met 4 battleships and 4 armored cruisers... There is no mention of Kamimura
        2. 0
          April 3 2024 15: 19
          Quote: Wildcat
          1 EDB sunk, 1 EDB damaged

          The 12dm gun on the EBR is also lost...
      2. -1
        April 3 2024 15: 17
        Quote: geniy
        Commander Vitgeft allowed the first squadron to be completely defeated and scattered.

        don't tell me how? As far as I know, he died BEFORE this... request
        [/quote][quote=geniy]Or you think it’s better

        Togo? who allowed 2 EDBs to explode on mines? hi
  2. +3
    April 2 2024 05: 37
    I read that the Japanese took advantage of the pattern of actions of the Russian detachment of ships, which consisted of a monotonous and constant maneuver in the form of eight battleships at the entrance to the harbor when repelling Japanese attacks.
    1. Msi
      -4
      April 2 2024 09: 10
      I read that the Japanese took advantage of the pattern of actions of the Russian detachment of ships

      Was Admiral Makarov really that good??? Why did he allow himself to be ambushed?
      1. +13
        April 2 2024 10: 14
        Quote from Msi
        Was Admiral Makarov really that good??? Why did he allow himself to be ambushed?

        Was Admiral Togo so good that, having set a trap for Makarov, he later made exactly the same mistake (walking along the same route along Arthur) and lost 2 battleships out of the blue?
        Unfortunately, everyone makes mistakes. And Makarov was really good. Not because he was infallible, but because he stood for combat training and active actions of the fleet. If he had remained alive, 1TOE would most likely have died, but most likely having caused heavy damage to Togo. And who knows, the Japanese would have decided to fight further with 2TOE...
        1. +5
          April 2 2024 10: 56
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          And Makarov was really good. Not because he was infallible, but because he stood for combat training and active actions of the fleet.

          The problem is that Makarov's violent energy was not supported by routine staff work. As a result, instead of planned actions, personal heroism began each time.
          The enemy intercepts destroyers on the approaches to the base. During the second exit, maybe the plan should include an early exit of a cruiser to cover the returning MM? No, why - it’s better to start pulling out the Bayan from the internal roadstead, which will approach the battlefield when everything is over.
          Did the Russian MM approach the base at dawn? And who then was hanging around at night in the EDB maneuvering area? Come on, there’s no time to think - we have to shake urgently go to the aid of the destroyers.
          "Bayan" met superior forces? Maybe the enemy is preparing for battle? No, that can’t be the case. Now we’ll go out with a couple of EDBs and disperse the adversary. And a group of two EDB and four missile launchers flies out to the approaching main forces of Togo. After which Makarov turns to the base and, not paying attention to the fact that the enemy, having a multiple superiority in forces, is in no hurry to defeat his small detachment, connects with the rest of the EBR and forms a figure eight. The ending is a bit predictable.
          These are not planned actions, but some kind of reflex reactions - only to the current impact, without planning at least a step forward.
          1. +2
            April 2 2024 11: 36
            Quote: Alexey RA
            The problem is that Makarov's violent energy was not supported by routine staff work.

            Well, let's watch :)
            Quote: Alexey RA
            The enemy intercepts destroyers on the approaches to the base. Maybe during the second exit, include in the plan an early exit of the cruiser to cover the returning MM? No, why - it’s better to start pulling out the Bayan from the internal raid, which will approach the battlefield when everything is over.

            Here you are completely wrong. Makarov just ordered Bayan to be ready to leave at dawn to support the destroyers. He was ready, and even deployed the internal boom using a boat from the Bayan. But the port boats were late, although they had been warned in the evening, and arrived at the cruiser not at 4.30 but at 5.10, which caused the delay
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Did the Russian MM approach the base at dawn? And who then was hanging around at night in the EDB maneuvering area?

            That's right, this was a fatal mistake
            Quote: Alexey RA
            "Bayan" met superior forces? Maybe the enemy is preparing for battle? No, that can’t be the case. Now we’ll go out with a couple of EDBs and disperse the adversary.

            There were two options - either Arthur had a relatively small detachment of BRKR or the main forces were following them. Makarov assumed that the main forces were coming and ordered the squadron to go to the outer roadstead. He himself, having gone forward with 2 EDB, could have helped the cruisers if Togo’s main forces had not shown up, but he would not have risked anything at all if they had shown up. Taking into account the time that Togo needed to get closer to the range of actual fire, Makarov always managed to get under the coastal batteries.
            Quote: Alexey RA
            After which Makarov turns to the base and, not paying attention to the fact that the enemy, having a multiple superiority in forces, is in no hurry to defeat his small detachment, connects with the rest of the EBR and forms a figure eight.

            Once again provoking Togo to fight in a position advantageous to himself.
            Makarov sent the destroyers into the night, and could hope that they would torpedo someone. As well as the fact that Togo, angry at the night attack, will get into a fight.
            Quote: Alexey RA
            These are not planned actions, but some kind of reflex reactions

            Initially, Makarov had a plan to withdraw the squadron at dawn and, if the night strike of the destroyers was successful, to give Togo bream. The plan is completely adequate. All his other actions are also absolutely adequate and correct, except one. Alas, Stepan Osipovich did not think about the possibility of mining under the batteries. Which was the cause of the disaster.
            1. +1
              April 2 2024 12: 24
              Good afternoon.
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              He himself, having gone forward with 2 EDB, could have helped the cruisers if Togo’s main forces had not shown up, but he would not have risked anything at all if they had shown up. Taking into account the time that Togo needed to get closer to the range of actual fire, Makarov always managed to get under the coastal batteries.


              And in cases of a decisive mood, Togo, with two battleships, comes under fire from the main forces of the Japanese fleet. Coastal batteries would not have helped much; many would not have had enough firing range.
              1. +3
                April 2 2024 12: 33
                Quote: 27091965i
                And in cases of a decisive mood, Togo, with two battleships, comes under fire from the main forces of the Japanese fleet.

                Why two? By the time we returned to the outer raid, Peresvet and Pobeda were already there, and the delayed Sevastopol was in the process; it just appeared in the passage when the rest lined up in battle formation. So at least with four and soon with five.
                Quote: 27091965i
                Coastal batteries would not have helped much; many would not have had enough firing range.

                So what? The 254 mm would have been finished off and that would be fine. And there was no reason not to take the fight in this configuration, with Arthur at hand. The Japanese were still far from being “Tsushima”; they couldn’t gouge Novik, Askold and Bayan with 12 armored ships, catching them in the outer roadstead
                1. +1
                  April 2 2024 12: 42
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  So what? The 254 mm would have been finished off and that would be fine. And there was no reason not to take the fight in this configuration, with Arthur at hand.

                  Dear Andrey, this is not a land battle; the squadron requires free space for maneuvering. At the same time, it is worth understanding that the forces are not equal, such a battle cannot be won, but you can not lose by trying to reduce damage and losses to a minimum.
                  1. +4
                    April 2 2024 13: 26
                    Quote: 27091965i
                    Dear Andrey, this is not a land battle; the squadron requires free space for maneuvering.

                    This is undoubtedly true. However, Togo’s options for maneuver are also very limited and I absolutely do not see how the current situation is worse for Makarov than for Togo. Both are constrained in maneuvers, while Togo can only wage a decisive battle by getting under the fire of our batteries.
                    Quote: 27091965i
                    At the same time, it is worth understanding that the forces are not equal, such a battle cannot be won, but you can not lose by trying to reduce damage and losses to a minimum.

                    The whole point is that such a battle is more profitable for us than for Togo. After July 28, a month later, all our ships were in service, but they were considerably battered. Moreover, in case of serious damage, the ships would have to be sent to Japan for repairs.
                    In general, there was a normal test of strength in the style of January 27th. In terms of combat training, gaining experience, the general mood of the crews, etc. - a very correct thing.
                    At the same time, we must not forget that this battle was not an end in itself, but was considered by Makarov as a backup option; he then hoped to strike a blow at the squadron, which had been thinned out by night attacks by destroyers.
                    1. +1
                      April 2 2024 14: 17
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      However, Togo’s options for maneuver are also very limited and I absolutely do not see how the current situation is worse for Makarov than for Togo.

                      Behind Togo is the open sea, behind S. O. Makarov is the coastline.
                      at the same time, Togo can wage a decisive battle only by getting under the fire of our batteries

                      It all depends on the distance of the battle. In order for S.O. Makarov could maneuver more or less freely; he would have to move further from the coastline, which would automatically take most of the coastal batteries out of the battle.
                      After July 28, a month later, all our ships were in service, but they were considerably battered. Moreover, in case of serious damage, the ships would have to be sent to Japan for repairs.

                      The repair base in Port Arthur was also not “all right”.
                      1. +3
                        April 2 2024 14: 36
                        Quote: 27091965i
                        Behind Togo is the open sea

                        Where can he retreat to? And that's it - no other advantages. And if he wants to fight seriously, then he needs to go straight to the outer raid.
                        Quote: 27091965i
                        In order for S.O. Makarov could maneuver more or less freely; he would have to move further from the coastline, which would automatically take most of the coastal batteries out of the battle.

                        Petropavlovsk was less than two miles from the Golden Mountain. There was no point in fighting more than 30 cables away.
                        Quote: 27091965i
                        The repair base in Port Arthur was also not “all right”.

                        Nevertheless, the squadron was returned to service within a month. And our ships hardly had a chance to snatch more than on July 28.
                      2. +2
                        April 2 2024 14: 46
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Petropavlovsk was less than two miles from the Golden Mountain. There was no point in fighting more than 30 cables away.

                        Let me answer as a former military reconnaissance officer. The free area for maneuvering, the coastline, the number of ships, the location and firing range of coastal batteries make it possible for S.O. Makarov should only conduct a defensive battle. Togo, taking advantage of its superiority in the number of ships and guns, can carry out a brief temporary attack, firing simultaneously at ships and coastal batteries.
                      3. +2
                        April 2 2024 15: 02
                        Quote: 27091965i
                        The free area for maneuvering, the coastline, the number of ships, the location and firing range of coastal batteries make it possible for S.O. Makarov should conduct only a defensive battle

                        Certainly. But they don’t interfere with attacking the tail of Togo’s column during the retreat, as Stark could have done in the battle on January 27.
                        Quote: 27091965i
                        Togo, taking advantage of its superiority in the number of ships and guns, can carry out a brief temporary attack, firing simultaneously at ships and coastal batteries.

                        Undoubtedly. But, remembering the results of the battle on January 27 and February 11 EMNIP, when he attacked our three cruisers, the results of this attack could not have been devastating for 1TOE
                      4. +2
                        April 2 2024 15: 19
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Certainly. But they don’t interfere with attacking the tail of Togo’s column during the retreat, as Stark could have done in the battle on January 27.

                        This is a short-term battle and causing serious damage is unlikely. For coverage, it is necessary to move away from the shore and it is unknown how Togo would behave in this case.
                        Undoubtedly. But, remembering the results of the battle on January 27 and February 11 EMNIP, when he attacked our three cruisers, the results of this attack could not have been devastating for 1TOE

                        I don’t think that on January 27, the three cruisers were a priority target for Togo; the main thing for him was to finish off the damaged ships and fight with the battleships. Therefore, the shelling of the cruisers was most likely treated carelessly.
                      5. +2
                        April 2 2024 15: 30
                        Quote: 27091965i
                        This is a short-term battle and causing serious damage is unlikely.

                        Absolutely right. Therefore, nothing bad was seen in such a battle as in option B, and the decision to take it in itself should not be considered a mistake
                        Quote: 27091965i
                        I don’t think that on January 27 the three cruisers were a priority target for Togo

                        We are not talking about the battle on January 27, but about the battle on February 12, when 3 of our cruisers in the outer roadstead became the target of an attack by the main forces of Togo. The squadron was on the inside and could not support them
                      6. +1
                        April 2 2024 16: 56
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        and about the battle on February 12, when 3 of our cruisers in the outer roadstead became the target of an attack by the main forces of Togo. The squadron was on the inside and could not support them

                        I think it’s difficult to compare high-speed and maneuverable cruisers with battleships. It is impossible to answer this question unequivocally; maybe the Japanese shot poorly, maybe the cruisers maneuvered well. In general, they didn’t sink because they didn’t hit laughing
                      7. +2
                        April 2 2024 18: 03
                        Quote: 27091965i
                        I think it’s difficult to compare high-speed and maneuverable cruisers with battleships.

                        And IMHO it’s not particularly necessary in this situation - the cruisers fought for half an hour at a distance of 30-40 cables. In Novik's logbook there is an indication that the speed was increased to 20 knots, but if this is so, then we are most likely talking not about the actual speed, but about the speed of the machines corresponding to it. In the battle between VOC and Kamimura, our speed reached at least 17 knots, this did not stop the Japanese from hitting us.
                        On January 27, Russian battleships generally took the battle almost on their feet, and nothing bad happened to them
                        Quote: 27091965i
                        In general, they didn’t sink because they didn’t hit

                        "And there is no objection to that!" (from)
                2. 0
                  April 2 2024 13: 08
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Why two?

                  albeit with 5 EBR (and 2 under-EBR with a 10 dm main battery), and one 12 dm gun is not in use... and the enemy has 6 with a 12 dm main battery! Why not wait for the repair of 2 EDBs while strengthening combat training?
                  1. +3
                    April 2 2024 13: 11
                    Quote: DrEng02
                    strengthening combat training?
                    Reply

                    On an internal roadstead?
                    1. 0
                      April 2 2024 13: 17
                      Quote: Senior Sailor
                      On an internal roadstead?

                      including! It is quite possible to train gunners in shooting from rifle and barrel inserts, train crews to fight for survivability, machine teams to carry out maintenance of equipment, etc. No one is canceling continuous trawling, the Kyrgyz Republic going out to search around, and the EDB going out to cover them. No one denies that COM did a lot when the squadron entered the outer roadstead, but it completely lost the fight in the outer roadstead. What prevented you from installing protective MH on the approaches to the PA?
                      1. +1
                        April 2 2024 14: 29
                        Oh how .... belay
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        It is quite possible to train gunners by shooting from rifle and barrel inserts

                        Can you explain the meaning of such an event?
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        What prevented you from installing protective MH on the approaches to the PA?

                        Actually, they were installed in the first days of the war. But since the plan for these productions, let’s say, was not entirely adequate, ours were afraid of these minefields more than the Japanese ones.
                        And there were no more mines. The barrier on which “Hatsuse” and “Yashima” were blown up were literally the last to be erected.
                      2. -1
                        April 2 2024 14: 39
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Can you explain the meaning of such an event?

                        drug training... request You’ll be surprised, I didn’t come up with this... there is a good novel by Azolsky, Lingering Shot - it describes in detail gun shooting in the 1940s...
                      3. +3
                        April 2 2024 14: 50
                        N..yes... a difficult case.
                        OK. Barrel shooting is needed to practice aiming skills while pitching. The question arises, where will the pitching on the internal roadstead come from?
                      4. +4
                        April 3 2024 10: 33
                        The question arises, where will the pitching on the internal roadstead come from?

                        The team can run from side to side like on Oryol)))
                      5. +4
                        April 3 2024 10: 48
                        Yeah. And if you give the gunners a drink, then they will start swinging Yes
                      6. 0
                        April 3 2024 15: 30
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        N..yes... a difficult case.

                        They told you below - it turns out that gunners can be sent on raids, so there would be a desire to do the job.... hi
                      7. +1
                        April 3 2024 17: 03
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        I told you below

                        Not only would you read that me they write, but if they had thought about it, it wouldn’t be worth it to you.
                        It was not the gunners who were sent to the raid, but the ship)))
                        And in general, try to do a minimum of research on the issue before you suggest.
                        How many times did Makarov withdraw the squadron during the month of his command?
                        What were you busy with?
                        It would seem obvious that if the squadron went out to practice joint maneuvers (and this was literally on fire!), then there was neither time nor opportunity for shooting.
                      8. -1
                        April 3 2024 17: 29
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        what they write to me

                        this is an open forum...
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        If only you had thought about this, it wouldn’t be worth it to you.

                        decided to be rude?
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        It was not the gunners who were sent to the raid, but the ship)))

                        Are you engaged in self-spanking? bully read:
                        "For information. Cherkasov's notes indicate that before the battle on July 28 gunners of "Peresvet" switched to "Askold", who was on duty at the outer roadstead for gunfire."
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Not only would you read,

                        But you should at least read... hi
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        (and this one was literally on fire!),

                        if COM - his deceitful ideas about reducing the distance between ships in formation led to an accident! At the same time, in a line of 7 EBRs (6 spaces), 3 cabs were won - was it worth it?
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        then there is neither time nor opportunity for shooting.
                        This was the problem with COM - it did not highlight the main thing! Later, Grabin said - a tank is a cart for guns, and for EBR this is even more accurate! Shooting accurately is much more important than the length of the squadron formation...
                      9. +2
                        April 3 2024 18: 05
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        decided to be rude?

                        I would have decided to be rude)
                        It’s just that they’ve already explained it to you in as much detail as possible, but where is it...
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        read:
                        “For information. Cherkasov’s notes indicate that before the battle on July 28, the Peresvet gunners switched to Askold,”

                        I'm saying think need to ...
                        How many gunners can fit there? What if we gather from the entire squadron? Will they shoot at least once before the evening?
                        Well, this is never a panacea. Especially when you consider that the amplitude of oscillations is different for all ships and the skill acquired on one ship is not very applicable to others.
                        This is certainly better than nothing at all, but no more
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        Moreover, in a line of 7 EDB

                        there is a fact. the squadron did not know how to maneuver! And something had to be done about it
                      10. 0
                        April 3 2024 18: 13
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        I'm telling you, you have to think...

                        but you don't say. try it yourself... hi
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        How many gunners can fit there? What if we gather from the entire squadron? Will they shoot at least once before the evening?

                        Your tactic is to come up with something stupid and blame your opponent for it? It made sense to send gunners from different ships to duty stations one by one, and not in bulk!
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        This is certainly better than nothing at all, but no more

                        but there are no perfect recipes...
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        there is a fact. the squadron did not know how to maneuver! And something had to be done about it

                        We just started by reducing the distance between the matelots - what nonsense! You need to learn from simple...
                      11. +2
                        April 3 2024 18: 51
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        your tactic is to come up with something stupid

                        No, it was you who came up with the stupidity of shooting with barrels on the internal roadstead and you just don’t want to give it up, clinging to everything you can.
                        Once again, Makarov commanded the fleet just a month! And the cruisers were not on duty in the outer roadstead before his arrival. It was he who figured out how to protect them with an artificial pier made from sunken steamships. And it took quite a bit of time to implement this idea.
                        Again, the war has just begun, and the artillerymen have not yet had time to lose their qualifications (as happened from sitting for a long time under the command of Vitgeft)
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        You need to learn from simple...

                        And, as it turned out, everything in general.
                        COM didn't have time
                      12. -1
                        April 4 2024 11: 43
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        No, it was you who came up with the stupid thing about shooting with barrels on the internal roadstead

                        Not at all, are you quoting only what you need - complexes? bully read me:
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        including! train gunners by shooting from rifle and stem linersIt’s quite possible to train crews to fight for survivability, machine teams to carry out maintenance of equipment, etc.

                        hi
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        It was he who figured out how to protect them with an artificial pier made from sunken steamships

                        It’s a pity that you yourself don’t understand that you’re writing about your idol! The boss’s task is to organize the work of his subordinates, and not to get into every hole! Having finished everything on himself, the COM led to the fact that his headquarters lost the initiative and were waiting for instructions - a logical result - after the shadows on the roadstead, it was the responding commander who had to make the decision on the control trawling - but they were waiting for instructions...
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        and the artillerymen had not yet had time to lose their qualifications (as happened from sitting for a long time under the command of Vitgeft)

                        It’s a pity that you lose your objectivity to please your idol! VKV is not an angel, but it was he who demanded that Loschinsky send Cupid on a mission! COM would give the order over his head! And training gunners is the task of senior gunners of ships, and not the acting commander - it was the COM who taught them to wait for the command center! And as they gave you the data - gunners were taught, including on the outer roadstead, with gunfire, which you reject! hi
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        And, as it turned out, everything in general.
                        COM didn't have time

                        That’s the problem, he thought he was the smartest, the result: before his arrival there were 4 EBRs in service, after - 3, and another lame one with 3 12 dm guns hi
                      13. +1
                        April 4 2024 15: 55
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        read me:

                        Well, let's...
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        On an internal roadstead?
                        including! It is quite possible to train gunners by shooting from rifle and barrel inserts,

                        Did you write
                        Then why lie?)))
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        talk about your idol!

                        You started writing nonsense again.
                        I immediately wrote that COM has a lot of bugs, you just don’t know about them...
                        All I want is some justice. request
                        Crap. I never thought that I would end up among the “defenders of Makarov”; usually I am accused of the exact opposite)))
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        And as the data was given to you - gunners were taught, including in the outer raid, barrel shooting, which you reject!

                        You're lying again)
                        I don’t reject barrel shooting as such, I just think that it should be carried out as it should be, and not for show.
                        And it’s supposed to be at sea and on your ship Yes
                      14. -1
                        April 4 2024 16: 03
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Did you write
                        Then why lie?)))

                        Unlike you, I quote in paragraphs and it’s immediately clear where you are being disingenuous... request I advise you to learn to understand what you read, although this is an elementary school task...

                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        I don’t reject barrel shooting as such, I just think that it should be carried out as it should be, and not for show.

                        the race went wide.... bully
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        You just don't know about them...

                        so you are a seer and you know what I know and what I don’t... bully I recommend undergoing a medical examination, I’ll say right away - I already passed it in March... hi
                      15. +1
                        April 4 2024 16: 10
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        you know what I know and what I don’t..

                        For some reason it seems to me that if they knew, they would have written))
                        However, it's my fault. We finally came up with one thing. Poorly organized staff work. But this is the shortcoming of all Russian admirals in that war.
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        I recommend getting a medical examination

                        Arguments over? laughing
                        Okay, let's leave it at that... until next time bully
                        All the best hi
                      16. -1
                        April 5 2024 12: 18
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        For some reason it seems to me

                        need to be baptized...
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        But this is the shortcoming of all Russian admirals in that war.

                        That’s why the naval general staff was created after the war....
            2. +4
              April 2 2024 23: 54
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Here you are completely wrong. Makarov just ordered Bayan to be ready to leave at dawn to support the destroyers. He was ready, and even deployed the internal boom using a boat from the Bayan. But the port boats were late, although they had been warned in the evening, and arrived at the cruiser not at 4.30 but at 5.10, which caused the delay

              EMNIP, Diana was on duty at the outer roadstead. Even taking it into account sleepiness she would have arrived before the delayed Bayan.
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              He himself, having gone forward with 2 EDB, could have helped the cruisers if Togo’s main forces had not shown up, but he would not have risked anything at all if they had shown up. Taking into account the time that Togo needed to get closer to the range of actual fire, Makarov always managed to get under the coastal batteries.

              Deva pulled Makarov to a meeting with Togo as much as 25 miles from the fortress. And the entire Russian detachment did not have time to return: 15 minutes before the Russian ships entered the range of coastal artillery, the distance from the Mikasa to the end Diana was only 38 kbt. If Togo had not had the goal of carefully pushing Makarov’s flagship EDB to the fortress so that he, as always, would become the head of the column of EDB 1 TOE (and go in the “eight” straight to the mine bank), then the result of Makarov’s exit would have been loss or severe damage 1-2 CR.
              Source: Gladkikh S.A. The fatal "eight of Admiral Makarov." // "Gangut", No. 44, 2007, pp. 21-33.
              1. +3
                April 3 2024 09: 32
                Quote: Alexey RA
                EMNIP, Diana was on duty at the outer roadstead. Even taking into account her sleepiness, she would have arrived before the delayed Bayan.

                Alexey, initially the plan was this: “Bayan” goes to meet the destroyers, “Diana” supports it if necessary. “Bayan” was sent for a reason, but because it has four pipes, and the Japanese don’t have those.
                The boats arrived at Bayan at 05.10. Bayan approached the place of Scary’s death at 06.05, and even then he was still 50 cables away from the Yap, that is, it took him 55 minutes to go to the roadstead and go to the scene of events. Diana received the order to support Bayan at 05.40. At 06.30 she was still not at the battlefield.
                Taking into account the above, I absolutely don’t see why you think that “Diana” would have arrived faster.
                Quote: Alexey RA
                Source: Gladkikh S.A. The fatal eight of Admiral Makarov.

                I have all due respect to Gladkikh, but he has practically only Russian sources. He did not check against the Japanese top secret, and there the data is often very different from ours
                Quote: Alexey RA
                And the entire Russian detachment did not have time to return: 15 minutes before the Russian ships entered the range of coastal artillery, the distance from the Mikasa to the end Diana was only 38 kbt.

                Let's say all this is true. But this threatened Diana little
                Quote: Alexey RA
                the result of Makarov's exit would be the loss or severe damage of 1-2 CR.

                Alexey, even in Tsushima, Togo’s battleships “shot at Suvorov for about 10 minutes,” according to our data, and we can assume that ours knew better. And on February 12, 1904, Askold Bayan and Novik had a fun exchange of fire with the 6th EBR and 8th BRKR of the Japanese fleet for half an hour at a distance of 30-40 cables and suffered virtually no damage.
                If the Japanese had opened fire on Diana, they would have increased their speed and escaped from the fire. And that's all
        2. +4
          April 2 2024 11: 01
          In general, the actions of Admiral Makarov and the public perception of these actions were best described by Makarov himself almost 30 years before the war, in a diary entry about the Vesta battle:
          All of Vesta’s weapons and their job is to plug various holes with shirts. There can be no talk or thought about preliminary preparation; the shells did not penetrate into the canal, the signalmen did not distinguish the ship, the miners could not gather the guides. The whole calculation was based on the fact that at that moment everyone would tear off his shirt and plug some hole or hole with it. If you imagine that two boats were sailing from St. Petersburg to Kronstadt, sailors were sitting on one boat, and people completely unfamiliar with maritime affairs were sitting on the other. The first ones will sail through, and nothing interesting will happen to them along the way, the second ones will be stormy, their sail will most likely be torn out, the boat will be thrown on its side, it will begin to flood, their shirts will be lifted instead of the sail, and the water will be shed with their caps. In short, sailing will be full of interest. In Kronstadt they will be greeted with all kinds of applause, and these people will be known as true heroes.
          1. +2
            April 2 2024 12: 06
            As for me, you are too strict towards both 1TOE and Makarov. The Japanese, although they knew exactly when to start the war, and even though they were preparing for it in all respects, also at the beginning of the war, were not the same masters who met the 2nd and 3rd TOE in Tsushima. Both the morning battle in January and the battle between the main forces of Togo and three of our cruisers in the outer roadstead clearly did not shine in either concept or execution. And on July 28, well, very strange - the gunners of the United Fleet took him away.
          2. +1
            April 2 2024 12: 27
            Makarov himself described it best

            Sorry, but you didn’t publish Z.P. Do you cite Rozhdestvensky in the newspaper “Birzhevye Vedomosti” dated July 17, 1878? S.O. Makarov, as far as I remember, presented a refutation entitled “Civil Feat, or Self-Flagellation of Zinovy ​​Rozhdestvensky.” Of course, I don’t claim to be the ultimate truth..
            1. +2
              April 2 2024 12: 41
              Quote: Ermak_Timofeich
              Sorry, but you didn’t publish Z.P. Do you cite Rozhdestvensky in the newspaper “Birzhevye Vedomosti” dated July 17, 1878?

              No, it's just Makarov
              https://military.wikireading.ru/10759
            2. +3
              April 2 2024 15: 43
              Quote: Ermak_Timofeich
              Sorry, but you didn’t publish Z.P. Do you cite Rozhdestvensky in the newspaper “Birzhevye Vedomosti” dated July 17, 1878?

              No, this is exactly Makarov’s diary - impressions from visiting Vesta and talking with Baranov. The same recording in which Makarov calls Baranov’s description of the battle a false hoax.
              Baranov left, my duty was fulfilled, but heavy thoughts oppress and crush me. Have they always glorified those who shamelessly knew how to praise themselves? Is it really possible that this famous case of the brig “Mercury” was the same false fraud as the “Vesta” case, which cannot withstand even weak criticism, from which one can only learn that It’s important not to do it, but to be able to tell it.

              When the commander wanted to use mines, the mine officer, Lieutenant Pereleshin, reported to him that the conductors of the aft mine pole and 4 Harvey mines had been killed (it was a remarkable coincidence that the steering cable going to the bridge remained completely intact).
              The bomb exploded in the cabin, but there was not a single damage on the floor or walls, only one fragment in the upper deck. There was a fire, and there is absolutely not a single charred place.

              The shooting accuracy is amazing; out of 180 bombs fired, according to the employees, 3 hit.

              The Vesta steamship is exactly reminiscent of this same boat with adventurers. There is no description, no assumptions, everything is left to the will of Providence. I told Baranov, I admit that the battleship could retreat thanks to their fire, but that he did not drown them solely due to poor shooting and luck.
          3. +1
            April 2 2024 13: 12
            Quote: Alexey RA
            In general, the actions of Admiral Makarov

            It is curious that how well the myth was created... request
            At the same time, Admiral Vitgeft, under whom the enemy lost 2 EBRs, and who generally had a good squadron battle, is not only underestimated, but simply slandered...
            1. +3
              April 2 2024 17: 31
              Quote: DrEng02
              Admiral Vitgeft, under whom the enemy lost 2 EDB.... not just underestimated, but simply slandered...

              You are overlooking one circumstance - two Japanese battleships died no thanks by order of Vitgeft, and contrary to Vitgeft's order.

              Without the personal initiative of Captain 2nd Rank F.N. Ivanov, who actually violated the order by placing mines not where they were ordered, but where the Japanese were walking, Hatsuse and Yashima would have remained unharmed.
              So here Vitgeft is in all his glory - he is shown where the Japanese actually walk, and he cowardly orders to place mines closer to the shore.
              Apparently, God forbid they end up in international waters.
              1. -3
                April 2 2024 17: 37
                Quote: Comrade
                You lose sight of one circumstance - two Japanese battleships died not thanks to Vitgeft’s order, but contrary to Vitgeft’s order.

                Are you repeating old fairy tales on the level of Stepanov’s novel? The most interesting thing is that during the COM they set up a minefield 3 miles away... Once on Tsushima they examined this in detail, I recommend re-reading the thread..
                1. +2
                  April 2 2024 18: 03
                  Quote: DrEng02
                  Are you repeating old fairy tales on the level of Stepanov’s novel?

                  Discover the Russian official "History of the Russo-Japanese War", dear colleague. Everything is there first hand.
                2. +3
                  April 2 2024 18: 05
                  Quote: DrEng02
                  Are you repeating old fairy tales on the level of Stepanov’s novel?

                  Well, you probably have a documentary refutation of these tales on your hands... Demonstrate
                  1. 0
                    April 2 2024 18: 11
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    demonstrate

                    ordered... hi
                    1. +3
                      April 3 2024 00: 33
                      Quote: DrEng02
                      ordered..

                      While you are waiting for the order to be completed, read a fragment of the report of the Amur commander.

                      Having a slight darkness ahead on the horizon and not seeing enemy ships, he gave full speed, raised the signal to 17 knots, heading along the exit target. After passing 6 and then 8 miles from Port Arthur lighthouse, that is,, approximately the place indicated to me, I decided take advantage of the circumstances that have favored me and put the mine jar further, namely in the distance 100-110 cable from the Golden Mountain, where, according to my observations, recently large enemy ships blocking us most often stayed, and therefore I went further and, at a distance of 10 miles from the Port Arthur lighthouse, raised the signal: “all of a sudden turn to the left by 8 points.” , i.e., on the course Ost. I stayed on this course for two miles, after which, at a signal, everyone suddenly turned 8 points to the right, again, together


                      As you can see, it directly follows from Ivanov’s report that he deliberately violated the order and placed mines further than the eight miles indicated to him.

                      And in confirmation of Ivanov’s words, a fragment of Vitgeft’s report addressed to the Viceroy. This report confirms Ivanov's words that he was ordered to lay mines eight miles away.
                      Tomorrow I will solve the questions:
                      1) ...
                      2) ...
                      3) exit of the Amur transport for laying a mine bank, in 8 miles from Arthur, in the path of Japanese ships
                      .
                      1. 0
                        April 3 2024 14: 26
                        Quote: Comrade
                        While you are waiting for your order to be completed,

                        received an article: Simonenko V. About one mine laying during the defense of Port Arthur. // Military historical magazine. - 1984. - No. 8. - P.66-68.-
                        hmmm, Murzilka... interesting:
                        “At about 16:11, mine laying began at a distance of XNUMX miles from the coast.”
                        "They were placed in one line 12,5 cables long. mine interval 45 m и recess 3,5 m from low water level (during low tide)."
                        I wonder how long the interval between mines is... hi
                        Quote: Comrade
                        and then 8 miles from Port Arthur lighthouse,

                        Everything is more interesting - it turns out that they measured the distance not from the shore, but from the lighthouse, which is understandable from the point of view of precise reference. So the question is - how far was it from the coast and what point of it?
                        Quote: Comrade
                        deliberately violated the order

                        why is it so menacing - he took the initiative, it’s curious - what was the exact wording of Loschinsky’s order.... in addition, there was a haze, which could well have affected the determination point - the distance was probably measured by the log, and not by exact determination.
                        "having a course on the exit alignment." They knew where it was, but how can they figure it out now...
                        Quote: Comrade
                        8 miles from Arthur

                        What does this mean? what point? And this is the starting point for setting up the barrier?
            2. 0
              April 3 2024 10: 43
              Quote: DrEng02
              At the same time, Admiral Vitgeft... who generally had a good squadron battle is not only underestimated, but simply slandered...

              Are you kidding? The battle on June 10 was especially good for him. When Retvizan was not yet damaged, and the cars of Seva and Poltava were in better condition.
              And the battle on July 28 “generally not bad” led to the complete defeat of 1 TOE
              1. -1
                April 3 2024 15: 29
                Quote: Trapper7
                The battle on June 10 was especially good for him.

                find the difference from the withdrawal of the COM squadron to the sea?
                Quote: Trapper7
                led to the complete destruction of 1 TOE

                really with VKV? What if a random shell had killed Togo, and not the VKV? request
                1. 0
                  April 4 2024 12: 39
                  find the difference from the withdrawal of the COM squadron to the sea?

                  six battleships at Vitgeft and 4 battleships at Togo.
                  really with VKV? What if a random shell had killed Togo, and not the VKV?

                  By the time of his death, the squadron had already lost and could not break through.
                  And the very fact of “luck” depends heavily on the number of hits. How many live firings did Vitgeft conduct before July 28? He commanded the fleet and did nothing to prepare the crew for battle. Yes, he was not a bad admiral, he maneuvered well and, given good vehicles at Seva and Poltava and the absence of a hole in Retvizan, he could have broken through.
                  But I got in the way "but"
                  1. -1
                    April 4 2024 12: 46
                    Quote: Trapper7
                    six battleships at Vitgeft and 4 battleships at Togo.

                    alas, out of 6 EBRs, 2 were with 10 dm, 1 12 dm gun was not working properly request
                    Those. Togo has 16 * 12 dm, VKV has 15, and against 8 * 10 dm, Togo has 1 * 10 dm and 6 * 8 dm for the Garibaldians ...
                    Quote: Trapper7
                    By the time of his death, the squadron had already lost and could not break through.

                    can you justify it? Let's count the number of remaining main battery guns on both sides? Or do you consider Togo’s decision to leave the battle to be a literary fiction?
                    Quote: Trapper7
                    How many live firings did Vitgeft conduct before July 28?

                    How long did COM last?
                    Quote: Trapper7
                    He commanded the fleet

                    lies, it was VRIO 1 TOE... hi
                    Quote: Trapper7
                    did nothing to prepare the crew for battle.

                    But isn’t this the task of ship commanders? Or VKV somehow interfered with them hi
                    Quote: Trapper7
                    But I got in the way "but"

                    Lucky shot interfered, Togo survived that battle, but VKV was unlucky... request
                    1. 0
                      April 4 2024 14: 31
                      can you justify it? Let's count the number of remaining main battery guns on both sides? Or do you consider Togo’s decision to leave the battle to be a literary fiction?

                      In Fuji, not a single projectile hit the entire battle, Asahi and Yakumo suffered no damage after the resumption of the battle in 16.30. The armored cruiser Kasuga received an 3 of an unknown caliber: most likely these were six-inch shells, but it is not even known whether it happened in the 1 or in the 2 phase, although it was probably still in the 2. One or two small projectiles hit the stern of the Sikishima, and a 12-inch projectile struck Nissin on 18.25.
                      Thus, during the entire second phase of the battle in the Yellow Sea, of the seven armored Japanese ships in the line, three did not suffer any damage at all, and three more received from one to three hits each.

                      by 17.40 the Russian squadron was firing from 13 305 mm guns and 5 or 6 254 mm guns, and another 2 254 mm guns were “of limited service.” The Japanese were capable of responding with 11 mm, 305 mm and 1 mm guns, so the overall superiority in heavy guns remained with the battleships V.K. Vitgefta.
                      https://topwar.ru/102872-boy-v-zheltom-more-28-iyulya-1904-g-chast-10-gibel-vk-vitgefta.html

                      Yes, perhaps I got a little excited about “by the time Vitgeft died, the squadron had already lost and could not break through”
                      However, in fairness, several points should be noted - the death of the admiral itself did not affect the course of the battle. The impact was a repeated hit and failure of the steering, as a result of which the Tsarevich passed through the line of his own battleships, disrupting their order. As well as serious damage to Russian ships.
                      Thus, it can be stated that in the 2 phase of the battle of Heihatiro Togo, even if it was at great risk for its ships, it still achieved its mission. Coming close to the Russian battleships, he inflicted such severe damage to them that the full penetration of the 1 Pacific Pacific Squadron was no longer possible. At best, 2 or 3 battleships could go to Vladivostok, and both Retvizan and Poltava suffered very seriously in battle. And even with the most fantastic assumptions in favor of the Russians, these 2-3 ships in the morning of July 29 would be confronted by 3 practically intact battleship and 4 did not participate in the battle of the armored cruisers of the Japanese. True, on the Japanese ships three 305-mm guns were disabled, but the Retvizan had a main caliber bow tower jammed: moreover, in reality, X. Togo would have had a much larger number of ships to resume the battle.

                      https://topwar.ru/104474-boy-v-zheltom-more-28-iyulya-1904-g-chast-12-otstuplenie-knyazya-uhtomskogo.html
                      1. 0
                        April 4 2024 14: 40
                        Quote: Trapper7
                        Yes, maybe I got a little excited

                        I agree.. hi . for example, compare this with the state of 2 TOE by the second phase of the battle...
        3. -2
          April 2 2024 13: 05
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          but because he stood for combat training and active operations of the fleet.

          Seriously? It’s curious why he then banned FOC raids into the straits? Maybe due to a lack of understanding of the importance of slowing down the deployment of the Japanese army by influencing communications?
          And his active actions did not lead to anything reasonable!
          I would like to note that the COM had a unique opportunity to trap the enemy's EDB - it could with high probability predict the path of the enemy's EDB after the first shelling of the PA, and set up an active MZ. However, he limited himself to flip-flop shooting...
          1. +2
            April 2 2024 13: 30
            Quote: DrEng02
            Seriously? It’s curious why he then banned FOC raids into the straits?

            The fact that you don’t understand this is a question of your understanding of the strategy of war at sea and the role of the Military Command.
            The FOC itself did not solve anything. It had value only as a detachment capable of drawing off Kamimura’s superior forces, and thereby facilitating the task of 1TOE.
            Quote: DrEng02
            he could with a high probability predict the path of the enemy’s EDB after the first PA shelling

            Could not. Such predictions are only possible when the enemy passes repeatedly along the same route. But mines were already in great short supply in Arthur and they should not have been thrown away at random
            1. -2
              April 2 2024 13: 35
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              oh, you don't understand this

              and straight away to the individual - a complex? bully
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              It had value only as a detachment capable of holding off Kamimura's superior forces

              The question is HOW to achieve this? It was after the death of COM that the VOC began attacks on communications, this led to Kamimura starting to chase after them... And COM, judging by his letters, planned to use the BRKR in squadron combat... request

              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              . Such predictions are only possible if the enemy passes repeatedly along the same route

              that is why COM carried out preparations for flip-flop shooting, because I didn’t know where they would shoot from? Do you have self-spanking? bully
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              And mines were already in great short supply in Arthur

              but they were in Petropavlovsk... I note that the VKV did not save mines and got the result... request
              1. +3
                April 2 2024 13: 56
                Quote: DrEng02
                and straight away to the individual - a complex?

                What does personality have to do with it? We all know something, we all don’t know something, that’s normal. I'm just pointing out a gap in your knowledge
                Quote: DrEng02
                The question is HOW to achieve this? It was after the death of COM WOK that he began raiding communications, which led to Kamimura starting to chase them...

                In general, Makarov, having appointed Jessen, gave him very specific goals and tasks, but left their implementation to his discretion. Makarov charged him with the duty to act to prevent transportation to Genzan or further north, the timing is at the discretion of the commander of the Military Command. Raids into Japanese territory were also allowed. But Makarov did not demand that this be done immediately, and this is understandable - he did not plan to give a general battle in March.
                Quote: DrEng02
                that is why COM carried out preparations for flip-flop shooting, because I didn’t know where they would shoot from? Do you have self-spanking?

                I have a statement of yet another of your dense ignorance of materiel. Read HOW you prepared for the changeover. The entire sea within the reach of the guns was divided into squares, the observers had to convey which square the Japanese were in, and the artillery guns had to hit that square. That is, Makarov precisely did not know where they would shoot from and prepared to shoot at all the places where the Japanese could theoretically maneuver, and where Russian guns could shoot
                Quote: DrEng02
                but they were in Petropavlovsk... I note that the VKV did not save mines and got the result...

                I note that your analogy, as usual, is false, for the reasons stated above.
                1. 0
                  April 2 2024 14: 08
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  and this is understandable - he did not plan to give a general battle in March.

                  It’s just not clear! COM did not understand the main task of the fleet - communications work!
                  And this was after the RIF was targeting precisely this with 186x, large long-range raiders were built a la Rurik, etc.... The main communications of the Japanese passed through the straits, and not at Genzan.
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  there is Makarov precisely that he did not know where they would shoot from

                  in the vile reality, the Japanese fired from one area, which is understandable... request But COM did not even set the task of using mines.
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  for the reasons stated above.

                  The reason is different - you have created an idol for yourself and do not want to honestly analyze his actions... request

                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Your analogy, as usual,

                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  another of your dense ignorance

                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  What does personality have to do with it?

                  really.. hi
                  1. 0
                    April 2 2024 14: 18
                    Quote: DrEng02
                    But COM did not even set the task of using mines.

                    sinful - after all, they set 20 minutes at 3 miles... hi
                  2. +3
                    April 2 2024 14: 48
                    Quote: DrEng02
                    It’s just not clear! COM did not understand the main task of the fleet - communications work!

                    As I already said
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    The fact that you don’t understand this is a question for your understanding of the strategy of war at sea

                    The whole point is that you correctly formulate the main task of the fleet, and then stumble over the methods of its implementation. Yes, suppression of communications was the main task of the fleet. But it was impossible to solve it by cruising actions without mastering the sea. Therefore, actions on communications should have been launched after mastering the sea, that is, defeating the main forces of Togo.
                    Quote: DrEng02
                    in the vile reality, the Japanese were shooting from the same area, which is understandable.

                    Yes. But for some reason the 20 exposed mines did not explode...
                    1. +1
                      April 2 2024 15: 01
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Therefore, actions on communications should have been launched after mastering the sea, that is, defeating the main forces of Togo.

                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      I have a statement of yet another of your dense ignorance of materiel.

                      hi
                      1) The defeat of Togo was fundamentally impossible in March 1904, and even in July it was unlikely! This is due to the number of combat-ready EDBs and BRKRs in the spring and the basing conditions of 1 TOE in the summer. This is a given that any commander in chief should have assumed. request
                      2) Task 1 of the TOE in winter - spring was to slow down the deployment of the Japanese army by influencing communications, which the VOK did well in the summer. Those. not a complete destruction of communications, but their limitation! And it was real. SOM essentially refused to help RIA, the speed of deployment was limited by the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway - from memory, 6-8 pairs of trains at the beginning of the war
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      But for some reason the 20 exposed mines did not explode...

                      I note that Amur set 50 minutes, if he would have set 20 it’s not a fact... request
                      And all 3 flip fires were from Cape Liaoteshan, so they would have put the same 50, who knows hi
                      1. +3
                        April 2 2024 15: 44
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        The destruction of Togo was fundamentally impossible in March 1904, and even in July it was unlikely!

                        That is why urgently and unconsciously sticking the FOC into the straits did not make any sense.
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        This is a given that any commander in chief should have assumed.

                        The question is that COM was still looking for such methods - a destroyer raid on Elliotts with the subsequent departure of the squadron to sea from this number. Makarov understood that even though he had fewer forces, he needed to look for a way to inflict, if not complete defeat on the enemy, then significant losses. And he was absolutely right about this.
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        Those. not a complete destruction of communications, but their limitation!

                        It was precisely this effect that Makarov was counting on when planning raids that would keep the Japanese on their toes, but would not overly threaten the VOK.
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        I note that Amur set 50 minutes, if he would have set 20 it’s not a fact...

                        Ours believed that the Japanese were walking 3 miles from the lighthouse, and they placed 20 mines there. The second time, the Yaps sent 2 EBRs half a mile from the lighthouse, and others went further than 4 miles, so neither 20 nor 50 nor 100 would have led to anything.
                      2. -1
                        April 2 2024 16: 15
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        That is why urgently and unconsciously sticking the FOC into the straits did not make any sense.

                        We sit on our butts - let RIA fight... bully
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Destroyer raid on Elliott

                        Meaning? for the sake of activity and losses of “consumable” MN? This is a matter of the KR raid....
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        And he was absolutely right about this.

                        Good intentions know where they lead... could you please tell me where and what losses the COM inflicted on the enemy?
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        which would keep the Japanese on their toes,

                        the enemy needs to be destroyed, and not kept in good shape... The painful point of the Japanese is the straits - the rest is nothing...
                        COM even had a clipper - why didn’t it send it to the ocean on a line to the USA?
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        wouldn't lead to anything.

                        A good principle is to do nothing... there is a principle for using weapons - mass!
                        The Japanese laid 700 mines at Vladik and caught Gromoboi...
                      3. +3
                        April 2 2024 18: 23
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        We sit on our butts - let RIA fight...

                        I should note that you have already been provided with all the necessary information about the falsity of such a thesis.
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        Meaning? for the sake of activity and losses of “consumable” MN? This is a matter of the KR raid....

                        That is, cruisers should carry out night torpedo attacks on the main forces of the fleet? Haven't you confused the REV and the WWII?
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        Good intentions know where they lead... could you please tell me where and what losses the COM inflicted on the enemy?

                        None. That does not negate the correctness of trying to apply them.
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        the enemy needs to be destroyed, not kept in good shape...

                        The destruction of enemy ships was never part of the WOC's mission. Only distraction and actions against shipping + demonstrations
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        A good principle is to do nothing... there is a principle for using weapons - mass!
                        The Japanese laid 700 mines at Vladik and caught Gromoboi...

                        Do you even read what they write to you? There were no min. After setting up 20 mines on Makarov’s orders, there were about 150-180 left
                      4. -3
                        April 2 2024 18: 32
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        That is, night torpedo attacks on the main forces of the fleet

                        Are you serious? Did COM send EM to attack the GS? Or was it just go there and attack whatever comes your way...
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        None. That does not negate the correctness of trying to apply them.

                        practice criterion... request
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        and actions against shipping

                        Is this not against the enemy?
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        After setting up 20 mines on Makarov’s orders, there were about 150-180 left

                        Do you yourself realize what you are writing? If it's not a secret, what are mines for? CATFISH had a CHANCE! Not written with a pitchfork, but serious! And he didn’t use it, but drove the MN at night to God knows where... angry
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        I should note that you have already been provided with all the necessary information about the falsity of such a thesis.

                        That's why they called them self-topes... request oh, what allusions to modernity...
                      5. -1
                        April 3 2024 14: 33
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        There are about 150-180 pieces left

                        Based on the data of the article in Simonenko VIZH 1984, No. 8, p. 66
                        "Of the 300 mines on board the transport, 50 anchor mines of the 1898 model with 120-meter mines were prepared for deployment." So you have greatly reduced the sturgeon - and this is only on board the MT Amur, it could have been on other ships and in arsenals... request
                      6. +1
                        April 3 2024 15: 11
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        Based on the data of the article in Simonenko VIZH 1984, No. 8, p. 66

                        And if we proceed from Krestyaninov and from the materials of the six-volume official war at sea, then exactly the numbers that I told you come out. That is why Amur, having deployed 50 mines on which the Japanese were blown up, had the opportunity to deploy another 49 and then 50 mines
          2. +3
            April 2 2024 14: 39
            Quote: DrEng02
            It’s curious why he then banned FOC raids into the straits?

            A little different. You forget that COM was only in command for about a month.
            The VOK did not achieve anything in the first campaign and did not act very well at all
            And then Makarov replaced the commander. Instead of Captain First Rank Reitzenstein, the more experienced and authoritative Admiral Jessen. But he got to Vladik after Makarov’s death.
            1. -2
              April 2 2024 14: 46
              Quote: Senior Sailor
              The VOK did not achieve anything in the first campaign and did not act very well at all

              1) Compared to the actions of 1 TOE at the beginning of the war (Yenisei, Boyarin) these are flowers...
              2) COM gave a directive of action - north of Genzan, and where does the TR traffic come from?
              3) COM planned to use BRKR VOK in the line (although he understood the problems with this), so he saved them...
              In short, his bet on a decisive battle indicates his lack of understanding of the fundamental difference in the basing of 1TOE and YaIF; the speed of repairing damage after a battle is simply incomparable.. request
              1. +3
                April 2 2024 14: 53
                Quote: DrEng02
                Compared to the actions of 1 TOE

                Thank God they didn’t run into the Japanese. They would have fought a lot with frozen trunks....
                As for COM, it has a lot of errors. But specifically here you are wrong.
                1. -1
                  April 2 2024 15: 05
                  Quote: Senior Sailor
                  They would have fought a lot with frozen trunks....

                  this is about the issue at sea - at home... request
                  Quote: Senior Sailor
                  But specifically here you are wrong

                  if not a secret - what is it? The only thing that COM could do that was really useful, besides repairing the EDB, training drugs, was not imitation of activity, but attacks on communications, especially FOC! And in PA he had good CDs for raids.
                  1. +2
                    April 2 2024 15: 14
                    Quote: DrEng02
                    if not a secret - what is it?

                    In short, Jessen is Makarov's appointee. Without him, there would be no raids.
                    Attacks on communications are definitely a godly thing. But as Andrei rightly pointed out, they would be more effective when the struggle for the sea unfolded. Before that, the risk is too great. But after the death of SOM and the loss of Petropavlovsk, the situation changed. There was nothing more to wait for.
                    But the idea of ​​assembling armored cruisers in Arthur, of course, is so-so. They were not very suitable for fighting in a line, and besides, the internal raid was already crowded.
                    Where can we conduct shooting here?))))
                    1. 0
                      April 2 2024 16: 08
                      Quote: Senior Sailor
                      In short, Jessen is Makarov's appointee.

                      So what? Makarov appointee IN2... request
                      Quote: Senior Sailor
                      they would be more effective when the battle for the sea began.

                      these are idle dreams until the arrival of 2 TOE in PA...
                      Quote: Senior Sailor
                      There was nothing more to wait for.

                      it was pointless to wait until the death of the COM because of the balance of forces - 5 (7) EDB (2 of them with 10dm) +1 BRKR versus 6 EDB + 8 BRKR...
                      Quote: Senior Sailor
                      Where can we conduct shooting here?))))

                      so they hit 2 times less under Shatung... request
                      1. +3
                        April 2 2024 16: 13
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        so they hit 2 times less under Shatung...

                        Actually at five.
                        But gunfire on the internal roadstead would not have helped here.
                      2. -1
                        April 2 2024 16: 19
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        But gunfire on the internal roadstead would not have helped here.

                        a good principle to justify doing nothing... hi even if regular exercises increased hits by 20%, would Mikasa be able to withstand them in ZhM? And what prevented COM from doing target practice during field trips?
                      3. +2
                        April 2 2024 16: 42
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        a good principle to justify doing nothing...

                        Yes. It was also possible to whittle the stick. With the same success, but everyone is busy good
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        let regular exercise increase your hits by 20%

                        Trim the sturgeon.
                        These exercises would not increase anything.
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        Would Mikasa have withstood them in ZhM?

                        In Tsushima I endured much more.
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        And what prevented COM from doing target practice during field trips?

                        fool
                      4. 0
                        April 2 2024 16: 45
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        These exercises would not increase anything.

                        The main thing in learning is regularity... hi
                      5. +1
                        April 2 2024 16: 51
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        The main thing in learning is regularity...

                        Nope. The main thing is consistency. Yes
                        Barrel shooting alone, especially in hothouse conditions, will do little. request
                      6. +3
                        April 2 2024 16: 56
                        Good afternoon, Ivan!
                        For information. Cherkasov’s notes indicate that before the battle on July 28, the Peresvet gunners switched to Askold, which was on duty in the outer roadstead, for gunfire.
                      7. +2
                        April 2 2024 17: 00
                        Ага. hi Hello to you too
                        And Lutonin wrote that he took every opportunity to send the Poltava gunners to fire... but not on the internal roadstead! am
    2. 0
      April 3 2024 10: 37
      So it was, Makarov, seeing the Japanese, began circling in a figure of eight under the cover of coastal batteries, wasting coal, in the hope that the Japanese would take the fight to both the squadron and the coastal artillery at the same time. The Japanese, seeing such a technique, threw mines along the route, so the COM flew in. It is true what they say: the only thing worse than a fool is an active idiot.
  3. -5
    April 2 2024 05: 49
    Oops, Kirill Vladimirovich survived there and it exploded too much, but it’s a conspiracy theory.
    But they could have won - there was a story that if the icon of the Mother of God had arrived in Port Arthur, then our victory would have been, but Faith in Russian society was shaken and the top was already rotting and the icon of the Mother of God remained in Vladivostok.
    1. +4
      April 2 2024 07: 06
      Exactly. I always thought that military officers should be taught not in military schools and academies, but in seminaries, and icons should be given to soldiers at the front instead of machine guns and ammunition.
      1. -6
        April 2 2024 09: 56
        Moo, oink. If you read history, ours fought the Russian-Japanese war with dignity. However, as now, our people die with dignity, but the main FAILURE, as then, is in the command and authorities, there are no Orthodox Christians there, although they are baptized for show. Shoigu destroyed the Masonic main temple, Putin stood at the service last Easter, and Yakunin was not allowed in with the Holy Fire, and even with the Patriarch, to put it mildly, not everything is smooth - everyone is actively blowing the trumpet of globalization and the new world order.
      2. -6
        April 2 2024 10: 09
        I’ll add - faith and icons help is primarily spiritual, and as our troops are used, it’s the only one that can’t be taken away, and the officers are trained and have machine guns with cartridges, but there is no artillery, drones, communications or even strategic planning, and conducting our own is more reminiscent of genocide and utilization of army resources
        1. +5
          April 2 2024 10: 31
          Moo, oink...

          Look, it’s like... And I, sinfully, thought that this was a person writing posts... recourse request
    2. +5
      April 2 2024 11: 25
      The Icon is poor protection against 11-inch shells hitting fortifications designed to withstand only 6-inch shells.
      And Faith doesn’t help much when the fortress’s defenses are planned in such a way that the enemy can calmly fire at ships in the harbor without even approaching the forts. We were also very lucky that at first the IJN did not send anything larger than 120-mm cannons to Port Arthur, and even only one battery - otherwise we would have had a “wounded wounded battle in the Yellow Sea.”
  4. +6
    April 2 2024 07: 29
    As soon as he arrived at the theater of military operations, Makarov managed to efficiently organize the defense of Port Arthur.

    This is an erroneous opinion; “the fleet began to show greater activity” is more appropriate, since the army command was responsible for the defense of Port Arthur.
    1. +3
      April 2 2024 10: 56
      It would be more correct to say, “organized defense from the sea.”
      Additional batteries on Lyaoteshan, flip-flop shooting...
      1. +2
        April 2 2024 13: 06
        Quote: Senior Sailor
        It would be more correct to say, “organized defense from the sea.”
        Additional batteries on Lyaoteshan, flip-flop shooting...

        Dear Ivan, to be honest, it is difficult to attribute this to “defense from the sea” if there is a fleet. The batteries on Liaoteshan were a necessary measure due to the damage to two battleships; before the war, no one imagined that this could happen.
  5. -4
    April 2 2024 07: 44
    The very behavior of the Scary crew is an example of the behavior of sailors in an almost hopeless situation, a real feat. Unlike the Varyag, they inflicted, albeit small, damage to the enemy. The situation itself arose, however, as a result of a navigation error. The Terrible One's hit on the Japanese cruiser, as far as I know, is fiction.

    Togo was outplayed by Makarov. Who knows what would have happened if this had not happened.
    1. -1
      April 2 2024 10: 43
      It is curious that the Russians repaid the Japanese double the amount by blowing up 2 battleships, but this was entirely the initiative of the minzag commander, Vitgeft sabotaged this proposal as best he could. And after such explosions there were no more.
      Conclusion - the old admirals were so ossified in their patterns that they had difficulty accepting new methods of military action, both then and now, and it is necessary to forcibly update the leadership. It is curious that Makarov in his youth was a pioneer of mine warfare
      1. -2
        April 2 2024 12: 36
        Alas, one extra battleship was not worth Makarov. Now, if Togo drowned...
  6. 0
    April 2 2024 08: 18
    How beautifully Tsushima and the Russian-Japanese War as a whole are described in V. Pikul’s wonderful novel “The Three Ages of Okini-san.”
    1. +2
      April 2 2024 09: 10
      I don’t agree with you, it was this book by Pikul that caused negative reading. As a child, the books of Stepanov and Novikov-Priboy left a much more pleasant impression.
      1. +1
        April 2 2024 11: 56
        What kind of negative exactly, may I ask?
        In assessing the state of the empire or in describing military operations?
        Or an abundance of artistic content?
        1. 0
          April 2 2024 12: 42
          Both the description of military operations and the artistic component for Pikul are very weak. When compared with such novels as "Moonzund" and "From the Dead End", it is simply very weak.
  7. +1
    April 2 2024 08: 20
    Yes, I doubt that if Makarov had not died, the war at sea would have had a different outcome. He could not influence the quality of the shells. (By the way, he was one of the main ideologists of the introduction of lightweight projectiles in the navy). The Japanese fleet could not have acted more passively.
    The outcome of the war was predetermined long before it began. It was necessary to prepare for war, and not for “now we’re crap with these things... uh... we’re giving cabbage soup to narrow-eyed macaques, they’ll run away out of fear.”
    1. +3
      April 2 2024 19: 05
      Quote: belost79
      Yes, I doubt that if Makarov had not died, the war at sea would have had a different outcome. He could not influence the quality of the shells.

      The quality of the shells is the tenth thing. The Japanese were also very dissatisfied with their shells. The main problem is the loss of initiative to the enemy, passivity. Makarov could well have influenced this. In any case, he is known as an energetic and aggressive commander.
    2. +1
      April 3 2024 11: 07
      Quote: belost79
      He could not influence the quality of the shells.

      Practice has shown that our shells were perhaps worse than the Japanese, but their impact on the enemy was still not “insignificant.”
      It was necessary to hit more often, and for this you had to shoot better, and for this you had to practice and have normal sights and rangefinders.
      If our fleet had been able to shoot at the level of the Japanese, the battles would have taken place completely differently.
    3. 0
      April 3 2024 12: 05
      The RIF had so many battleships that it was possible to drive the Japanese under a bench without fighting.
      And Makarov is not the best admiral in Russia.
      1. 0
        April 3 2024 19: 56
        Quote: Maxim G
        And Makarov is not the best admiral in Russia.

        Who do you consider the best admiral for 1904 and why?
        1. -1
          April 4 2024 17: 35
          Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov:
          Educated, experienced, humane, brave.
          1. +1
            April 4 2024 20: 46
            Quote: Maxim G
            Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov:
            Educated, experienced, humane, brave.

            Previously I had about the same opinion. But after reading in more detail, at your request, my opinion about the admiral changed for the worse. In principle, much better than Rozhdestvensky, and if he had been the commander from the beginning, the defeat at Tsushima, of course, would not have happened. However, lethargy and self-doubt are not what a real naval commander should have. Even after observing with my own eyes the failure of both flagships, I did not dare to take command. Even having received unequivocal confirmation of his authority by the end of the battle, he was unable to take control of the squadron into his own hands. Considering the main problem of the imperial fleet - passivity and the complete lack of even a desire to seize the initiative - Nebogatov is clearly unsuitable for victory.
            1. +1
              April 5 2024 10: 25
              Quote: Saxahorse
              Nebogatov is clearly unfit to win.

              But is he able to avoid such a severe defeat that actually happened?
              One problem - if this were in reality, and, say, 2TOE under the command of Nebogatov reached Tsushima, gave battle, and then broke through/interned with a small part of the ships, then now Nebogatov would be branded with shame no less than Rozhdestvensky and there would be people who they thought that “if they had installed the ZPR, it would have been great”)))
              1. -1
                April 5 2024 21: 05
                Quote: Trapper7
                But is he able to avoid such a severe defeat that actually happened?

                Certainly. Simply breaking through to Vladivostok is a completely realistic task. Before Tsushima, the Japanese failed to sink more than one battleship. Without the help of the ZPR, the Japanese even at Tsushima faced a battle like in the Yellow Sea, with a bunch of plucked but unfinished battleships.
              2. 0
                April 6 2024 12: 03
                Nebogatov wanted to go through the La Perouse Strait, but Zinovy ​​Petrovich knew better, and they did not deign to hold a meeting. hi
            2. 0
              April 6 2024 12: 01
              The transfer of command according to the Naval Regulations is carried out using a special signal, and not at the request of Nebogatov.

              He managed to take control of the squadron, only some particularly conscientious commanders of the Almaz and destroyers, like Enquist, decided that what the hell, and did not go with Nebogatov.
              It is not he who is to blame for this state of the squadron, but the one who led it to the Pacific Ocean (ZPR and Company).
              1. +1
                April 6 2024 21: 11
                Quote: Maxim G
                It is not he who is to blame for this state of the squadron, but the one who led it to the Pacific Ocean (ZPR and Company).

                Agree. But he also clearly proved that the commander from Nebogatov was useless. Again, you need to take command in battle, and not wait for the Lord to send fiery screams...
                1. 0
                  April 7 2024 13: 42
                  It was necessary to miss Petrovich, and you should have brought your detachment to Vladivostok.
  8. +6
    April 2 2024 08: 20
    commander of the "Terrible", captain 2nd rank Konstantin Yurasovsky
    ...
    The Japanese realized their mistake and offered to surrender. Yurovsky rejected the offer.

    Well, if it’s impossible to write a normal article, then you can at least re-read the copy-paste so as not to misinterpret the name of the heroically deceased ship commander.
    The son of Konstantin Konstantinovich Yurasovsky, also Konstantin, a naval officer, served on a destroyer named after his father and died on it during the Civil War.
    Commander's Banner at Petropavlovsk
    .
    In the fleet, the commander does not have a “banner”, but a “flag”.
  9. -1
    April 2 2024 10: 52
    Remember the war! S.O. Makarov
  10. +1
    April 2 2024 11: 53
    Quote: Wildcat
    It was always interesting what results S. O. Makarov had during the Russian-Japanese War.

    Hm! Weird question.
    The most important result of Stepan Osipovich’s short command was the intensification of the squadron’s actions. This was more than enough to prevent the landing of Japanese troops, or at least extremely difficult to supply them. Under his command there was every chance to wait for Borodintsev and his comrades to arrive from the Baltic, and with such superiority in forces, no shells would have helped the Japanese.
    1. +3
      April 2 2024 12: 16
      Quote: Grossvater
      The most important result of Stepan Osipovich’s short command was the intensification of the squadron’s actions. This was more than enough to prevent the landing of Japanese troops, or at least extremely difficult to supply them.

      Hmm... the problem is that the Japanese landing turned out to be a consequence of the intensification of the squadron's actions under Makarov. For the result of this activity was the reduction of the combat-ready main forces of 1 TOE, EMNIP, to 2 EBR.
  11. +1
    April 2 2024 12: 32
    Quote: Alexey RA
    For the result of this activity was the reduction of the combat-ready main forces of 1 TOE, EMNIP, to 2 EBR.

    Sorry, but how is this? Tsesar and Retvizan were damaged at the beginning of the war, and COM from the Baltic warned about this.
    The death of destroyers in general is an everyday matter. And the landing took place due to the complete passivity of the Squadron, after the death of Makarov.
    1. +4
      April 2 2024 12: 47
      Quote: Grossvater
      Sorry, but how is this?

      You know about “Tsesar” and “Retvizan”. "Pobeda" was blown up on the same day as "Petropavlovsk". "Sevastopol" with a bent propeller after a collision. There are 2 serviceable electronic units left. "Peresvet" and "Poltava"
    2. +3
      April 2 2024 16: 10
      Quote: Grossvater
      Sorry, but how is this? Tsesar and Retvizan were damaged at the beginning of the war, and COM from the Baltic warned about this.

      Makarov, when he accepted 1 TOE, had 5 serviceable EDBs at his disposal: three Poltavas and two Peresvetychs.
      On the day of the explosion of two Japanese battleships, Vitgeft had only 2 electronic ballistic missiles: “Peresvet” and “Poltava”.
      "Retvizan" and "Tsesarevich" are still under repair. "Pobeda" - put in for repairs (caisson adjustment). "Sevastopol" is under repair.
    3. +1
      April 3 2024 00: 17
      Here is the condition of "Seva" for March-May 1904:
      No less dangerous than Japanese shells and mines for the Russian squadron was the lack of practice of joint maneuvering. This was reflected during the evolution of the squadron on March 13, when the battleship Peresvet hit the stern of the hesitant Sevastopol with its bow, damaging its underwater hull and bending the blade of the right propeller. Vice Admiral Makarov found Sevastopol commander N.K. Chernyshev guilty of the accident and on March 16 appointed captain 2nd rank I.O. von Essen (since July 2 - captain 1st rank), who has proven himself well as commander of the cruiser Novik.
      The lack of a dry dock in Port Arthur capable of accepting armadillos (the existing one had too narrow gates, as well as insufficient water depth at the entrance) forced the blades to be replaced afloat using a bell-caisson. The work was completed only on May 15, but before the death of S.O. Makarov, who did not want to disable a valuable combat unit, did not start repairs, and Sevastopol was twice more involved in the squadron exits, although its speed after the accident was limited to 10 knots. During this repair, the right car was finally sorted out.

      © S. Suliga, S. Balakin. Poltava-class battleships.
      Moreover, the remaining EBRs had problems - in April, the dispossession of ships began in favor of the land front:
      The fortress, poorly protected from land, was urgently reinforced by the fleet: medium and small caliber guns, along with servants, were transferred from ships to land positions (in total, 21 152 mm, 34 75 mm and a large number of small guns were removed). The Poltava crew equipped and maintained a 4-gun 152 mm battery on Perepelina Gora, and the Sevastopol residents were responsible for a two-gun 152 mm battery at an altitude of 218 fathoms. Liaoteshan Peninsula.

      © S. Suliga, S. Balakin. Poltava-class battleships.
      By order of the squadron chief on April 25, 4 x 152 mm Pobeda guns went to the Corner Mountain, 6 x 75 mm - to fortification No. 5 and Kurgan battery, 4 x 152 mm Peresvet - to Liaoteshan. Along with the guns, the crews and officers left. As a result, for example, on "Peresvet" there was only one artillery officer out of 3 in the state.
      Source - R.M.Melnikov. EDB of the "Peresvet" type // Gangut, No. 12, 1997, pp. 25-51.
  12. Alf
    +3
    April 2 2024 18: 49
    two newest armor-piercing cruisers

    Dear Author! Correct it, otherwise you will look, to put it mildly, funny.
  13. -2
    April 2 2024 18: 54
    It’s my own fault - where were you looking when the Japs were putting mines under their noses? - and with such crap it’s not clear how it managed to float
    1. +5
      April 3 2024 00: 37
      Quote: Bone1
      - and with such crap it’s not clear how it managed to float

      "Koryo-Maru"? A normal minelayer-mobilizer - similar minelayers were used further, in both World Wars in all fleets.
      Koriu-maru (蛟龍丸) Year of construction: 1903. Tonnage 745 (462) brt (1904) 57.06 * 7,92 * 5 *.52 speed 11 crew 31. weapons 1-57mm, 2-47mm. I don’t quite understand with mines, like 12 resets for mines, 40 minutes.
      © Geomorfolog, Tsushima Forum
      1. 0
        April 3 2024 08: 19
        “Normal”? - Well, you made me laugh - with such a size - how did it get to the PA? - And not only from it, but also from even larger small things. Yes, it should be noted that the mines of that time did not yet have machine guns, i.e. For each mine, you need to measure the depth and rewind the required length of the mine - it’s not hard to imagine how much time it takes to set each mine.
        1. +2
          April 3 2024 10: 30
          Quote: Bone1
          “Normal”? - Well, you made me laugh - with such dimensions - how did it get to the PA?

          What's the problem? Just remember the tugboat 2 TOE "Svir" that went with the squadron - it was even smaller.
          1. +1
            April 3 2024 17: 53
            He was part of a squadron; he would have made it alone. You made a feint with your ears - and reduced everything to the size of a mine layer - and left the main thing - you simply need to patrol the waters near the base - and not just watch from the shore
  14. The comment was deleted.
  15. +2
    April 3 2024 10: 30
    two newest armor-piercing cruisers "Nissin" and "Kasuga".

    A new type of ship - armor-piercing cruisers. Clinic, and that's all.
  16. The comment was deleted.
  17. +3
    April 3 2024 12: 12
    The tragedy for the RIF was that there were few such admirals.