The final elections of R. Erdogan and the problem of historical cycles, which is also relevant for Russia
Photo from the website of the Turkish Central Election Commission
The next municipal elections will be held in Turkey on March 31. This is a rather significant event in local political life, since in Turkey it is not enough to have control over the central government bodies - it is necessary to have preferential control over the provincial centers.
The point is not only that the city authorities in Turkey are often too independent financially (and therefore politically), it’s just that such independence, combined with the large budgets of a number of regional capitals, traditionally provides good support for the opposition.
If we look at the map of Turkey and superimpose the traditional results of election campaigns on it, we will see a well-defined conservative core in the central provinces - the political base of R. Erdogan (highlighted in yellow) and the opposing “fronde” in the coastal provinces and, accordingly, the rich and populated provinces (marked in red).
The conservative core in the center does not allow Turkey to cross the border separating it from a full-fledged civil confrontation, but the rich periphery (which includes tourism, ports, logistics) does not allow conservatives to relax, because the gap between supporters of R. Erdogan usually does not exceed 4-5%. .
In the eastern and southeastern provinces, the central government also needs control, since factors related to Kurdish trade (official and completely unofficial) are already at work here, as well as the eternal influence of radical cells of the Kurdistan Workers' Party.
The most important “municipalities” of Turkey are two capitals: the official one - Ankara and historical - Istanbul. The position of mayor of Istanbul in Turkey is a traditional springboard to higher power. R. Erdogan also ruled Istanbul for two years in the mid-1990s, and his most powerful opponents also traditionally rule Istanbul.
The Turkish political system is also interesting because at the city level there are not only (and even not so much) the main political parties, of which there are six in Turkey, but a wide network of local political associations.
There are more than thirty such regional-level structures in Turkey. It is not so easy for the ruling party of R. Erdogan (AKP) to resist them, since this requires immersion at the level of extremely specific problems, while the “sins” of the representatives of the center are visible, on the contrary, at the local level very clearly.
For the third year now, R. Erdogan, through problems, has been gradually building the famous Istanbul canal - a backup for the Bosporus, but its designers somehow did not think about pricing on the lands confiscated from the population. The problem remains with Syrian refugees, who have settled en masse in large metropolitan areas and coastal cities. Only 15% of them were able to be resettled back to northern Syria. Last March, after the earthquake, the problem of compliance with housing construction standards, etc., arose in full force.
The importance of these elections lies not only in control over the regions. In early March, R. Erdogan confused a significant part of his audience with the statement that these elections “the last in his political career"and his work will continue"brothers».
According to the political model of Turkey, the current presidential tenure of R. Erdogan is truly final. But hardly anyone doubts that, given a certain desire, the Turkish leader can turn the “Rubik’s cube” so that the final cadence becomes intermediate.
In 2017, he already carried out constitutional reform, and this practice itself is not new in the world. But in this particular case, there are indeed very high chances that the Turkish leader is indeed considering ending his career. It is possible that even ahead of schedule.
Health plays an important role here, and one can recall how before the elections last year, R. Erdogan was hospitalized almost live, and he spent part of a very intense campaign, as they say, “on moral and strong-willed people.” However, if health plays a role, it is an additional one, not a major one.
The desire to end his political career indirectly explains R. Erdogan’s attitude towards local elections, in which he plans to “act very decisively" He needs to complete a long stage of transformation, retaining control of Istanbul and Ankara, interrupting the specific Turkish tradition of metropolitan opposition in politics.
But, all the same, isn’t the conclusion about the political finale of the Turkish leader too bold, given the fact that in Turkey itself, after R. Erdogan’s speech, there is a quite popular opinion in the style: “the old wolf is too cunning so as not to replay everything later and turn it around 180 degrees"?
Let's consider the general context, which can provide food for thought not only about Turkish politics and not only about the style of government of R. Erdogan.
Big things are usually seen from a distance, so we only occasionally notice and feel that we actually live in a rather unusual historical period for the last 150 years.
It seems that a lot of events are spinning like a kaleidoscope, and everything seems to change every six months, especially since the media simultaneously explain to us about the global crisis. Crisis or not, let's take a look at some features of our historical period.
Through the forces of Western media platforms and the so-called “non-systemic opposition”, the thesis that the Russian “long state of one leader” is some kind of our special Russian phenomenon is being accelerated. The “long state” can be viewed in different ways, but let’s look around.
Germany. From 2005 to 2021, the highest echelon of power is represented by A. Merkel, who rather wisely and even gave up her post on time. From 2005 to 2019, a diligent student of A. Merkel - W. von der Leyen, who needs no introduction for the Russian reader, has been working in the upper echelon of Germany.
Since 2019, she has been proving that a successful mother of seven children can be no less successful not only in the field of the main departments of Germany, but also in the highest positions of the European Union. She has second place in the European hierarchy, and she managed to do everything - and leave her children the fortune acquired from vaccines, and also continue the policy of distancing, developing it to the point of actually breaking economic ties.
From 2008 to the present, two-thirds of what is commonly called the “American Deepstate” are personnel from another “long state” - the United States, under the collective brand of B. Obama. Even four years in power of D. Trump changed little here. Actually, it was none other than B. Obama who came to persuade the current head of the White House, who no longer recognizes his wife, to withdraw his candidacy.
The tenure of Xi Jinping in various guises has been stretching since 2010. And judging by all political events and strategic plans, its duration extends beyond 2030. We can also mention B. Netanyahu with his “long state” - from 2009 to 2021 and again from 2023 th... V.
The hero of this material is R. Erdogan, who has been working in the upper echelons of Turkish politics since 2003. Since 2014, he has been leading as President of Turkey, and after last year’s elections, his term expires in 2028.
You can give other examples, which, of course, are not an absolute indicator - after all, there are almost two hundred states in the world, however, if we take the states that determine the shape of economic and military-political processes, then 2004-2030. will turn out to be a period during which, by and large, almost the same forces operate.
There is hardly any doubt that until these forces, one way or another, complete the processes of transformation (successfully or having suffered defeat) towards the model of development that is considered the most correct, they are unlikely to leave the scene. And it is unlikely that we will see anything new in the arena until these processes are completed. The contours of this historical period can already be clearly defined. V. Putin’s Munich speech in 2007 is the formalization of the modern version of the European Union, and 2030 is the year where most official strategic development plans stop.
If we consider the activities of R. Erdogan (although this is adequate not only in relation to him) precisely in this historical context, then his policies, his words about ending his political career, as well as the attention he pays to the current municipal elections become clear.
By 2028, Turkey's strategic transformation under his leadership will be completed, but it will not end on its own, but together with other major players on the board.
An analysis of the Turkish strategy for Russia seems extremely important due to the fact that Russia’s strategies were largely linked to interaction with Ankara. And R. Erdogan’s plans have changed at least once over the past ten years, but this change was quite serious.
Until 2020, the Turkish leader put a lot of effort into building an “Ottoman Pole” out of Turkey. On an interesting balance between military confrontation and economic and political interaction, relations were built between Russia and Turkey, which were perceived by some with surprise, and by some observers openly with hostility.
The sale of the S-400, the construction of a nuclear power plant, the creation of a “gas hub” at the same time that Syrian and Libyan forces, together with our PMCs and special forces, were fighting directly with Turkish proxies and Turkish units, looked, to put it mildly, unusual.
Since 2020, Turkey has been moving further and further away from the concept of the “Ottoman Pole”, generally making a sensible attempt to distribute its resources. After the start of the North-Eastern Military District, Ankara already has to choose: either “under-pole” or economic and partly political accession to the European macroeconomic cluster.
All the figures showed that, objectively, Turkey would one way or another enter this cluster, which happened in 2023 from June to December. Was this inevitable? Judging by economic indicators and where and how Ankara generates value, yes, inevitably. The question is what policy Turkey will have now and how to build relations with Russia.
Having abandoned harsh forms of expansion (although outwardly everything looks like Ankara is threatening everyone around), Turkey, in general, has benefited more. Normalization with Iraq and assistance in improving relations between Erbil and Baghdad gives relative freedom to work through the channels of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, as well as several important raw material corridors.
Normalization of relations with Egypt makes it possible not to waste military forces on the borders in the Mediterranean Sea and to gain access to gas developments on the Egyptian and Libyan shelf without much friction with the militarily strong Cairo. Resources can now be focused on supporting close forces in Sudan and trying to gain a foothold even in Somalia.
At the same time, R. Erdogan is true to himself and, even in the current conditions, maintains “multi-vector trade” with Israel. It was possible to establish working relations not only with Qatar, but also with the rest of the Arabian monarchies, which made it possible to attract loans and investments.
R. Erdogan has put the Syrian issue on pause, planning to work depending on the situation, which will be determined by relations with Iran and the United States. Ankara has yet to substantively discuss gas transit from Turkmenistan with Iran.
From the point of view of the Middle East and specifically Syrian strategy, Russia, after Ankara’s policy change in 2020, was left without a concrete plan. After the completion of the operation in Idlib, when the Astana format was still fully operational and there were serious auctions for each road, everything fell into place, but no new strategy emerged.
After the beginning of 2022, this direction completely ceased to be one of the main ones. But for Turkey it has not ceased to be so. Russia does not play together with Turkey against the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and R. Erdogan is forced to resolve these issues together with Iran. Not because he doesn’t want to negotiate with us - there are no proposals or vision for the future. The situation is approximately similar in Libya.
Last year, R. Erdogan’s extradition of “Azovites” to Kyiv was quite loud. But this is only the top media part of the Turkish iceberg, which has finally moored to the EU economy. Everything else is a consequence of the main process - multiple tightening of compliance with the sanctions regime, financial restrictions, logistics, etc.
At this stage, Russia should somehow get together and determine a kind of “road map” of relations with current Turkey, which by 2028-2030. is going to “knock out its tails” - both political (municipal elections) and economic.
For example, decide what we are building in Iraq, if we are going to build after all, we will help Syria return the territories or remain observers, and the process will take place between the USA, Turkey and Iran, we need to initiate a water agenda in Syria and Iraq or let everyone figure it out themselves .
How ready will we be for the fact that gas will actually flow to Turkey from Turkmenistan through Iran? What will the model of relations generally look like when Turkey is finally consolidated as an economic part of Greater Europe, and we are just finally undone from Greater Europe?
The logic of such integration suggests that Ankara will no longer be able to act as at least some kind of negotiating platform on Ukraine, no matter how much R. Erdogan talks about this topic.
It’s not only R. Erdogan who has to “knock out his tails”, he’s just the first to say so publicly. In fact, we—Russia, China, and our “sworn Western partners”—will have to do exactly the same thing. 2028-2030 - this is the time of completion of a large historical cycle, and the state in which each player enters the new cycle will depend on who has time to do and how much during this time.
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