The US is planning a return to its previous strategy in the Middle East, and it is necessary to prepare for this
Line Russia – South
In the Russian media, the topic of the confrontation between Israel and Hamas is gradually disappearing into the front pages, which is generally logical - there was no global crisis on this issue, but the conflict in Ukraine was and remains a supplier of crisis situations. And our problems are somehow closer than the Middle Eastern conflicts.
Nevertheless, for our opponents in the United States and the EU, the topic of Israel and Palestine remains extremely important, and for the United States it is the number one topic. Many systemic decisions in foreign policy are still determined in this direction, and this cannot be ignored. It will not be possible to isolate yourself from this direction because relations along the Russia-South line (even if not global, but simply the South), again, are tied to Palestine and Israel.
This question is far from hypothetical. The European Union, which in our media is stubbornly considered a “lame duck on the verge of death,” is by no means going to limp and die. In a few days, the EU summit will decide “to transfer the economy to a war footing,” and it would be nice to understand what resources the United States will be able to provide in this direction. On the external circuit, the United States has no greater problem than the Middle East, and priority for resources is still given there.
The attack on Israel on October 7 last year seriously slowed down the implementation of an important program for Washington to create an “Indo-Abrahamic bloc.” Over the course of ten years, the idea of a new normalization of Arab-Israeli relations has grown from framework bilateral agreements into an entire geopolitical concept.
If the United States did not have such a unique relationship with Israel, which in terms of relations between political and economic elites is more likely to represent a forced (for the United States) symbiosis, Washington would not have any problems in implementing its plans.
India is looking at this cooperation with great interest, since it gives a chance for rapid technological modernization; for the Arabs, the Indian market, its opportunities and problems are clear and close, they are ready to invest reserves in their development, and they have always been reluctant to unobtrusively impose restrictions on Iran in Iraq against.
And all this without an “either-or” choice: either China or the USA. The US idea was good because it allowed both India to maintain strategic neutrality and the Arabs to pass between large geopolitical millstones, in a word - the “Third Pole”.
But this is “if only,” but in reality, Israel stood and stands in the way of this concept, or rather, its categorical reluctance to implement the project of a Palestinian state. And so, when, it would seem, Saudi Arabia was persuaded to sign, if not the Abraham Accords, then simply make concessions in the Israeli direction, Hamas decided to have its say. This word echoed so much that the consequences will be remembered for a long time.
It would be appropriate here to cite the competent opinion of M. Singh, managing director of one of the divisions of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP).
“Prior to October 7, it was widely believed that Saudi Arabia would push for a Palestinian component of normalization, but one that was far from immediate statehood or even a resumption of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. However, after Israel's military campaign in Gaza, the situation changed significantly. Fearing domestic and regional public opinion, Riyadh began demanding "time-limited, irreversible" steps toward Palestinian statehood, insisting that it would not settle for business as usual in the peace process."
This design, extremely convenient for a large US project, was knocked down by Hamas on October 7.
Division of Israel
Much suggests that Hamas initially did not intend to act on such a scale, but planned to commit a major and painful sabotage for Israel with the taking of hostages, in order, against the backdrop of general normalization, to remind the major players that it also has its own interests, and not just near Ryad, Washington and Tel Aviv, etc.
Considering how many resources the United States is forced to spend for a variety of reasons on the situation in Gaza, and even during the election period, the emergence of Hamas on the scene played against Washington. However, if you deal with it with a clear head, which is what the United States is now trying to do, then it seems quite possible for them to derive strategic benefit from this.
If, as a result, the negotiation process around the final division of Israel and Palestine into two states finally takes shape, then this will allow the United States not only to get out of the crisis with the flag of a leader who tore historical vicious circle in the region, but also automatically implement the idea of the “Third Pole”. The fact that in this case the Israeli right-wing and center forces are the losers (and they lost the campaign completely) is of little concern to the current administration in the United States.
These circles are alien to her, and for the exalted ideologists of the liberal Comintern, who have been part of this administration for many years, they are completely hostile, as well as for the electorate that this Comintern grazes and feeds. The main thing here for the United States is not to let anyone else get involved in this process of moderating the discussion about two states, so that the leadership can and remains with them.
That is why the United States launched such a wave in the media that Moscow’s dialogue platforms on this issue are “empty”, “about nothing”, etc. They work similarly on Turkey, China, and the EU’s task is to criticize Israel and collect shells for Kiev, the rest is up to the “seniors”.
For the current right-wingers in Israel, without a doubt, D. Trump and his entourage would be more suitable. In contrast to the rhetoric of WINEP's M. Singh, D. Trump's son-in-law J. Kushner argues as follows:
“Property on the Gaza waterfront can be very valuable. From an Israeli perspective, I would do everything possible to evict the people and then clear the area. I would simply bulldoze a site in the Negev Desert and try to move people there. I think this is the best option, so we have to go and finish the job.”
In general, Trump is an almost ideal candidate for the Israeli right; the problem for them is that he is not at the helm in Washington.
In addition to completely unprecedented efforts on the diplomatic circuit (and this is also an important power resource that in a different situation would be used in other matters), the United States is making significant supplies of ammunition to Israel.
While everyone is waiting for official approval from Congress to unblock military aid to Ukraine and Israel, the latter still receives weapons (unlike Kyiv) on a daily basis. There are probably some regulatory inventory balances and budget limits that the Pentagon can use on its own.
He uses them instead of Ukraine, and there is no trace of any “old missiles” or howitzers from the Second World War, which Kyiv usually gets. Israel is not shy about using expensive weapons in batches, while Washington spends limits.
These are the rules of this two-sided game, and in this case it is a positive factor for us, but a negative one for Kyiv.
To contribute to the winding down of Israel’s operation in Gaza, and with the current results this is a disaster specifically for B. Netanyahu’s cabinet, the United States launched an anti-Houthi naval campaign in the Red Sea, which, although it is taking place in a sluggish mode, has de facto blocked the route through Suez and is creating a colossal pressure on Israeli business and finance.
On the other hand, it is the United States that has been organizing sea and air humanitarian corridors for the Gaza Strip for the second week, which are being used more and more intensively.
The USA achieved partial success.
Partial US success
On the one hand, Israel does not curtail the operation in the Gaza Strip, each time violating the deadlines set by the United States, but on the other hand, the intensity of the operation is decreasing, twice Israel intended to transfer operations to the border with Lebanon and stopped, putting pressure on the city of Rafah in order to deliver “ “fat point”, a plus for B. Netanyahu, it didn’t work out before Ramadan, it won’t work out during and after.
Moreover, for the first time in many years, Israel found itself in foreign policy isolation, not always expressed in loud statements, although there are plenty of them, but the isolation is mute and quite strong. Israeli diplomacy is no longer accustomed to working in this situation.
The fact that in the materials of design institutes that deal with Middle Eastern issues in the United States, as well as in the press, theses began to appear that the resuscitation of the Abraham Accords is a matter of time, they say, negotiations on them have resumed, the situation is encouraging, etc. , means that the United States is already feeling the temporary limits of the Israeli military campaign and is preparing for the next political stage. This is a major marker, but a very important one given the overall context.
In any case, Israel will constantly create informational occasions, aggravate the situation in different directions, show plans for new operations, etc., but the real goal here is to create a background for a tough position in order to remove public dissatisfaction from the negotiations in Washington.
The peak of the military campaign in Gaza has been passed by the parties, and then the process of diplomatic agreements will begin, where several trends will converge at once: relations between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, which part of the political wing of Hamas to leave and which to “take out of sight”, how many guarantees and what guarantees will follow, preliminary road map in the West Bank and so on and so forth.
It will be important for Russia here to define its role in the negotiation process in such a way that it does not look like an obstacle to normalization. This is actually quite a difficult task.
It is also important that the winding down of the active phase of the campaign in Gaza in US domestic policy will give additional points to the Biden administration, while those reserves that are now going to Israel may well change the route and go to eastern Europe.
But the question is not only about ammunition, but about the fact that changes will need to be made to the overall strategy in the region. The current relations with the Arabian monarchies and political forces in the Middle East are important and necessary to stop Western activity in Ukraine; the bitterness of Europeans there will increase.
However, in the Middle East, the United States is again ready to move on to offering economic benefits, which means Russia will need to offer not only ideological narratives of “freedom from hegemony,” but also something more substantial, and this is a good reason to compare regional plans with China and Iran.
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