Forgotten victory: about the Soviet bomber raid on Taiwan. Samurai go on the warpath

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Forgotten victory: about the Soviet bomber raid on Taiwan. Samurai go on the warpath
Red Army pilots fought not only in the skies of China and Mongolia, but also of Spain (pictured), gaining combat experience that was useful to them in the Great Patriotic War and the subsequent war with Japan.


A Forgotten Victory: Ahead of the Conversation


When it comes to the military operations of the Red Army Air Force in the period preceding the Great Patriotic War, the first thing that comes to mind from a school textbook is: Khalkhin Gol, Khasan and the Finnish campaign.



We didn’t perform very well in the Finnish war, but in the battles with the Japanese Stalin's falcons won a number of victories. But still, the most brilliant of them belongs to the pilots who fought with samurai far from the borders of our Motherland.

We are talking about an almost forgotten operation on February 23, 1938: SB bombers in service with the Chinese Kuomintang army, led by Soviet crews, carried out a successful raid on Japanese-occupied Taiwan.

Result... However, before we talk about the result, as well as in more detail about the raid itself, let's talk about how our military aircraft and pilots ended up in China.

In other words, we will traditionally consider the topic, following the recommendation of L.N. Gumilyov, not from a mouse hole, but from a bird’s eye view.

When the first salvos of World War II rang out: a Chinese view


Most historians reasonably consider September 1, 1939 to be the date of the beginning of World War II, contrary to the opinion of a number of Chinese researchers who believe that its first salvos were heard eight years earlier, when the Kwantung Army, created on the Liaodong Peninsula, crossed the border of Manchuria.


Japanese occupiers near Mukden, September 1931

Thus, Japan unleashed aggression against China during the most difficult upheavals for it in the second quarter of the 19th – early 20th centuries. barely retaining nominal independence after the Opium Wars caused by the Taiping and Yihetuan uprisings, followed by foreign intervention.

Resetting as a result Xinhai Revolution the Manchu yoke, the Celestial Empire seemed to have risen, but here is a new misfortune: the militaristic cliques that tore it apart. And in the end, without straightening its shoulders, the country collapsed into the bloody maelstrom of civil war.

And were the powerful people who largely determined Tokyo's politics zaibatsu Could you not take advantage of the moment?

That is why not only the Chinese, but also some European politicians considered Asia the starting point of the biggest tragedy in stories humanity, which, in particular, was directly stated by the British diplomat Philip Noel-Baker, speaking at the final session of the League of Nations in 1946.

Samurai challenge


This view has at least indirect grounds. For, yes, on the one hand, the war in 1931 did not take on a global character; the leading countries were much more worried about the economic crisis on both sides of the ocean; on the other hand, with its invasion of the Celestial Empire, Japan provoked the inevitable involvement of the USSR and the USA in the conflict.

In fact, already a decade earlier, Tokyo saw them as potential opponents:

At meetings of the military-political leadership headed by the emperor that took place in 1923, writes orientalist historian Anatoly Koshkin, the foundations of Japan’s foreign policy and strategy for the subsequent period were developed. They outlined two main directions of Japanese expansion - northern and southern. In accordance with this, the USSR and the USA were identified as probable opponents, whose policies could actually prevent the establishment of Japanese domination in China and other East Asian countries.

Moreover, during this period, tensions arose in Tokyo’s relations with Washington. And it didn't all start in the 1920s.

The starting point of the looming problem was the outcome of the century before last. Less than half a century ago, the shogunate, which was in awe of Commodore Matthew Perry, suddenly sank into oblivion, and was already under full authority "descendant" of Amaterasu the Japanese smashed the Qing Empire in its tail and mane, forcing Chinese Bismarck Li Hongzhang sign unequal rights in 1895 Shimonoseki treaty.


The signing of the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty, which testified that imperialist predators had arrived in the regiment

By the way, it was not for nothing that Lee received such a flattering comparison with the German chancellor. I remember I wrote about him in one of the now defunct publications. The owner of a magazine lost in the vastness of the Internet, unknown to me, saved Article about an extraordinary figure of the Celestial Empire.

But the defeat of the monarchy, which had decayed under the rule of the Manchus, turned out to be so crushing that even Li’s diplomatic talent could not prevent the difficult conditions of peace. As a result, both the aforementioned Taiwan and the Liaodong Peninsula became part of the Empire of the Rising Sun.

This is where they are burdened by the glorified R. Kipling pregnant white man the gentlemen in the person of Russia, Germany and France perked up, considering the geopolitical ambitions of the samurai disproportionate to their place in the sun.

Through Triple intervention these powers imposed on the Meiji diplomats something similar to what the leading European powers had arranged for A. M. Gorchakov in Berlin seventeen years earlier.

Taiwan, so be it, was left to the samurai, but St. Petersburg took the Liaodong Peninsula for itself. In Tokyo they did not argue, but they harbored a grudge and did not abandon their ambitious plans.

And ten years later they won back, sinking the 2nd Pacific Squadron and significantly correcting Adjutant General A.N. Kuropatkin’s ideas about his own leadership abilities.

In 1914, the Germans had to witness the rise of a white cloth with the image of a red rising sun over the bastions of Qingdao, which had become their native city.

While Europe contemplated the “lunar landscape”


The First World War was a window of opportunity for the samurai, and they, while stuck in a positional impasse and contemplating the lunar landscape Europeans thinned out their armies with chemical attacks, imposed on the Chinese twenty one demands, which essentially turned the Celestial Empire into a Japanese protectorate. Even formal participation in the war on the side of the Entente did not help Beijing.

The British and Americans expressed concern about such a shameless violation open door principle, within the framework of which the robbery of a huge country was envisaged by all the elected.

No, they were willing to reluctantly put up with Tokyo’s ambitions, but up to a certain limit. And the subjects of the Mikado, as it seemed in the leading European capitals and Washington, had crossed this limit.

The Japanese in response only shrugged their shoulders, understanding: other than concern, there were no other levers of influence on them: the year was 1915. Before China, was it born in Westphalia in 1648, reanimated in Vienna in 1815 and now self-destructing Europe, as well as those who helped them in this USA?

Having become skilled in the big geopolitical game for half a century, and turning out to be diligent students of field marshal - by the way, including the Russian one - G. Moltke the Elder and O. Bismarck, the Japanese were not at a loss and plundered China with all their might.

Further - more: with the collapse of the Russian Empire, caps with yellow stars flashed in the Far East.


The Japanese occupy Vladivostok, which seemed ownerless to them. 1918

In the United States, such escapades of the samurai spirit were looked at without delight, but while the volleys of the First World War were thundering, they could not reason with Tokyo.

The seriousness of the latter’s intentions was evidenced by the project to build eight battleships and eight battlecruisers by 1927–1932.

In Washington, they fidgeted in their chairs at such plans:

Analysis of the data, writes historian D. A. Bezrukov, showed that in order to maintain parity with the Japanese Empire in the Pacific, the United States needed to commission 2 battleships per year. At the same time, it was necessary to build new and modernize old cruisers of all types, of which there were relatively few anyway. Otherwise, by 1927 the Japanese fleet should have significantly surpassed the American one. In an effort to maintain a military advantage, the US Navy command requested additional funding from Congress for the construction of 12 battleships, but was refused.

Harding went a different route


W. Harding, who replaced W. Wilson in the Oval Office, decided to achieve superiority over the self-important samurai in a different way - by reducing naval armaments, mainly Japanese ones.

The British did not object - in their deplorable financial situation, despite the Versailles triumph, and with a huge external debt to the United States, it was much more profitable to fix the status quo through an agreement.

What to do: against the background of the above Japanese development program fleet, the British could afford to build only one cruiser "Hood" - the same one that was sunk Bismarck in May 1941.

Among the samurai, Harding's idea caused discord, vacillation and debate in the House of Representatives. This is understandable: it’s 1921. The intervention against Russia is not yet a thing of the past and requires funds, as does the occupation of Manchuria.

Admirals and generals lobby for the development of the imperial military, which costs the treasury a third of its revenue.

And then the people “treacherously” demonstrated their unwillingness to heed the breadth of imperial plans and responded three years earlier rice riots.


While the zaibatsu were plundering China, Siberia and the Far East, on the islands themselves, ordinary Japanese experienced a shortage of rice, which resulted in riots

Despite the fact that in the early 1920s, Japanese goods gradually replaced British ones from the markets of India, Australia and Canada, that is, from the British colonies and dominions.

But the process of conquering the market is not one-time in nature, its results make themselves felt in the future, and the budget deficit caused by exorbitant military expenditures is here: in the present.

In addition, the economic expansion of the samurai in the British fiefdom endangered Japanese-British Alliance Treaty of 1902.

However, from Washington he was generally seen as having outlived his usefulness. There was no arguing in London: outdated is what it is. After all, at the beginning of the 20th century, gentlemen did not even think of considering the guys who had just emerged from the Middle Ages yesterday, who had replaced their haori with a tailcoat, as competitors, and even more so, as the dominant force in the Asia-Pacific region.

Moreover, from the heights of Capitol Hill and the banks of the Thames, Japan seemed to be a Moor, who in 1905 had done her job by knocking down Russia, but for some reason did not want to go home.

Japan doesn't want to be Shakespeare's Moor


Actually, London concluded an alliance agreement with Tokyo in order to curb the growing ambitions of St. Petersburg in Southeast Asia with the bodies of Japanese soldiers, but not at all to contribute to the growth of influence of the Empire of the Rising Sun.

The British were ready to share the Pacific Ocean with the Americans, to take into account the interests of the French in Indochina and the Dutch in what is today called Indonesia. But they saw the Japanese as unnecessary at the celebration of imperialist life, at least as equal partners.

However, over the past almost quarter of a century, much has changed in Asia. And not for the better for the interests of Great Britain, but in the future, if the growth of Japan’s military power continues, for the United States.

Therefore, the latter initiated the convening Washington Conference, the main participants of which, in addition to the host side, were the British and Japanese.

The latter were strongly recommended by the Americans to introduce restrictions on the total tonnage of the fleet's light forces. No, they recommended it to everyone, of course, but the proposal primarily affected the interests of Tokyo. And it didn’t even affect so much as it infringed.

The discussion was about limiting the total tonnage of the light forces of the fleet: for aircraft carriers, respectively, the USA: 80, Great Britain - the same, Japan - 000, for cruisers, the first two powers - 48 each, the Empire of the Rising Sun - 000; for submarines, the British and Americans 450, the Japanese - 000.

The latter, after much debate, agreed. By the way, in part the position of their delegation can again be compared with the Russian one at the Berlin Congress.

Nevertheless, these figures do not indicate a complete loss of Japanese diplomacy. On the contrary, she managed to achieve the demilitarization of the island possessions of world powers in the Pacific Ocean, which at the beginning of World War II would play into Tokyo’s hands.

Just as we should not forget: the United States had to keep its fleet in two oceans, while the British had to spread it all over the globe. The samurai did not plan to go beyond the Pacific Ocean.


The gentlemen gathered in Washington, dissatisfied with the growing Japanese ambitions

But the real defeat of Japanese diplomacy was nine power treaty, the essence of which is equal opportunities to plunder China, which unsuccessfully tried in Washington to achieve the withdrawal of Japanese troops from their country.

This represented a blow to Tokyo's economic interests, aggravated a few months later by the withdrawal of the samurai from the Far East. The Japanese had grandiose plans for its exploitation, as well as for Siberia. And everything is down the drain. Also, the presence of occupation troops there cost a pretty penny.

Yes, but what about us?

We weren't invited at all. More precisely, the delegation was then formally independent Far Eastern Republic she came to Washington, but was not allowed to attend the conference.

However, did we care about naval weapons then?

A large program for the construction of an ocean-going fleet and, within its framework, battleships of the class "Soviet Union" will appear much later. And for now there is no Soviet Union.

And again China is in the samurai's sights


Following the collapse of hopes of robbing China and Siberia, the Japanese suffered a natural disaster: great earthquake of 1923. It caused them significant economic damage, aggravated by the banking crisis that came four years later and the Great Depression, which shook the empire even before the Wall Street crash in October 1929.

In this situation, the enslavement of China was again actualized in the eyes of the samurai, which, in fact, led to a worsening of relations between Japan and the USSR and the USA.


Hirohito. Under him, Japan experienced the Great Depression, invaded China and entered World War II

The former did not want to see subjects of the Mikado in the Celestial Empire, especially near the Chinese Eastern Railway, the latter intended to plunder the country without their help.

Tokyo did not agree with either one or the other, which only brought closer the appearance of the SB in the skies over Taiwan, and three years later the B5N2 over Pearl Harbor. But we’ll talk about this in more detail in the next article.

To be continued ...

Использованная литература:
Bezrukov D. A. Washington Conference on Limiting Naval Arms as a Factor in the Emergence of Potential Controversies in the Asia-Pacific Region
Popov G. G. Japan on the way to participation in World War II: the first steps of economic mobilization and the Chinese question // Historical and economic studies. – 2017.
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  1. +4
    12 March 2024 07: 36
    Our assistance to China was not advertised because it was provided to the Kuomintang. Mao and his CCP were nobody then. And so - even in the film "Officers" an episode with our advisers was included. True, this film is from 1971.
    1. +7
      12 March 2024 08: 19
      Quote: Aviator_
      Our assistance to China was not advertised because it was provided to the Kuomintang
      The Kuomintang is quite a leftist party, just remember Sun Yat-sen. It was then that she rolled far to the right
      1. +1
        12 March 2024 20: 57
        The Kuomintang is quite a leftist party,
        While Sun Yat Sen was alive, as he was written before, in a three-syllable form.
    2. +2
      12 March 2024 09: 39
      Yes, ours officially recognized the PRC only after its proclamation in 1949, the UN in 1971, and some Nauru still recognize Kuomintang Taiwan as China.
      1. +2
        12 March 2024 20: 59
        This is how the PRC did not exist before 1949. There was China, and there was Manchukuo with Emperor Pu-Yi in its northern territory.
    3. +9
      12 March 2024 10: 22
      The USSR has provided assistance to the Kuomintang since 1924, because The Kuomintang was the only large revolutionary party in China. The CPC, formed in 1921, was not so massive and did not have a strong influence in China. With the assistance of the USSR, to train command personnel in the spirit of loyalty to the revolution, the Whampoa Academy was created in 1924, in which Soviet military personnel taught advisers. Under the leadership of General Ga-Lin (Blücher), the Northern Expedition was carried out in 1926-1928, which united the lands of Northern China. The CPC actively collaborated with the Kuomintang during that period.
  2. +4
    12 March 2024 07: 49
    Interesting topic, that raid really deserves attention. The author started from afar, and this is probably correct.

    “We didn’t perform very well in the Finnish war, but in the battles with the Japanese, Stalin’s falcons won a number of victories.”

    Well, I don’t know what the Author meant here. What was “not so good” about the Finnish conflict that radically distinguished this conflict from Khasan or Khalkhin Gol. An unsuccessful first period of hostilities is just the first period, the loss ratio is not the most important factor, and even in Japanese conflicts this ratio is controversial, especially where equipment is concerned.
    1. +1
      12 March 2024 08: 24
      Quote: S.Z.
      What was so “not so” about the Finnish conflict that radically distinguished this conflict from Khasan or Khalkhin Gol
      There was almost no air combat during the Winter War, except for the bombing of Helsinki. And the political situation was somewhat different, there was already a war going on
      1. +1
        12 March 2024 10: 18
        There were still air battles, although not as intense, but our losses were significant. The situation, of course, was different, but I wouldn’t risk saying that we performed “not very well” against the Finnish one, and “very much” against the Japanese.

        In the end they acted successfully in both cases, although with mistakes and losses. That's what war is for.
    2. 0
      12 March 2024 09: 09
      Well, I don’t know what the Author meant here. What was so “not so good” about the Finnish
      First of all, the USSR underestimated the capabilities of the Finnish army to resist on land.
      By the end of January 1940, not only in Finland, but also in other countries of the world, there began to be a feeling that the Soviet Union was losing the war.
      Meanwhile, the Soviet command began to understand that continuing actions in the same vein would not bring success. The war demonstrated all the shortcomings of a peacetime army that had no real combat experience. There is an underestimation of the enemy’s fighting qualities and a lack of proper interaction between the branches of the military.
      For example, a request for a bomb attack on Finnish positions, sent by the command of a Soviet division, reached a specific Air Force unit through the chain of command within... a day! Moreover, it turned out that Soviet bomber aviation was not at all ready to operate in war conditions - the pilots did not know how to fly in difficult weather, and the navigators gave the wrong course even on sunny days. In order to turn the situation around, it was necessary to urgently call polar pilots from civil aviation into the troops.
      hi
      1. 0
        12 March 2024 10: 27
        "First of all, the USSR underestimated the capabilities of the Finnish army to resist on land."

        Not everything went smoothly with the Japanese either. Taking into account the fact that they fought with the Japanese before, we can conclude that they have forgotten how to use the Finnish company, but this is not the case.

        The first stage of the Finnish company was unsuccessful - the breakthrough did not work out on the move, they were surrounded and suffered losses. However, we should not forget that Zhukov was not called to Khalkhin Gol because of excessive successes, and we should not forget about the attack by tanks almost head-on with the losses of a large number of light tanks - and there were no heavy ones then.

        The scales were different and incomparable. The ratio of losses is still controversial.

        In both cases, successes were eventually achieved after initial failures.

        It seems like this is our tradition.
        1. 0
          12 March 2024 10: 51
          S.Z. (Sergey)
          At the initial stage of the war with Finland, there was confidence that no line of Manerheim could withstand the pressure of the power of the Red Army; this could not be done with a swoop.
          I don’t understand why the leadership of the Red Army did not consider an amphibious landing on Finnish territory, given the fact that the Red Banner Baltic Fleet dominated the Baltic Sea?
          1. +2
            12 March 2024 11: 32
            “I don’t understand why the leadership of the Red Army did not consider an amphibious assault on Finnish territory, given the fact that the Red Banner Baltic Fleet dominated the Baltic Sea?”

            They didn't see the point. Probably for the better, considering how we carried out such landings later.
            1. +1
              12 March 2024 11: 46
              They didn't see the point. Probably for the better, considering how we carried out such landings later.
              The assault on the Mannerheim Line, according to the plan of the USSR leadership, was supposed to be a triumph of the power of the Red Army, therefore other options were not considered. But in my opinion, it was the amphibious landing that would allow us to quickly end the war, because... Finland did not consider this option either.
              Meanwhile, fearing that things were heading towards war with the Russians, the Finnish command announced a partial mobilization of reservists (under the age of 33), and on October 9 began the transfer of troops to the Soviet-Finnish border. By October 11, mobilization ended.
              1. +2
                12 March 2024 13: 43
                Taking into account the fact that the Mannerheim line was nevertheless broken through, and throughout the entire war our landing forces died more than they won, perhaps they were not considered correctly.

                Plus, how and how to support such a landing, if even one division on land that was surrounded was destroyed because it could not be supplied?
          2. +3
            12 March 2024 12: 09
            Quote: Gomunkul
            I don’t understand why the leadership of the Red Army did not consider an amphibious landing on Finnish territory, given the fact that the Red Banner Baltic Fleet dominated the Baltic Sea?

            Where should this landing force be landed? Critical points along the coast were covered by coastal defense artillery. And landing somewhere in the wilderness... the problem of supply immediately arises. It’s not for nothing that the first goal for an assault force is usually to capture the port. Otherwise, you won’t be able to transport much across the unequipped coastline. But it is useless to land small forces - the enemy will simply demolish them.
            Moreover, the troops would have to land from mobilized transports on boats and boats. In general, hello Gallipoli.
            And most importantly, the Baltic Fleet in December 1939 knew nothing about the coastal defense of Finland. Absolutely nothing.
            Here, for example, is Bjorke’s battery - in the reality of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet headquarters and in reality:
            According to the RB headquarters, it was believed that on the island. Biorke there is a 4-gun 254-mm battery, which is an ordinary Russian open-type battery of the so-called. "Durlyakhov's machines." According to the diagram stored in the RO, the Finnish 10-inch battery was located in the area of ​​Pitkäniemi, i.e. in the place where it was installed back in World War I.
            In fact, the picture was somewhat different.
            In the place where the main battery was supposed to be, the Finns had a 2-gun 152-mm battery. And the 6-gun 254-mm battery (and not the 4-gun battery, as we assumed - author's note) was located in the southern part of Biorke, on a slope facing the sea and covered with forest, about 800 m from the coast. The guns were placed in spaced blocks, at a distance of 175-325 m from one another.
            © P.V.Petrov. Battleships against batteries of the Baltic Fleet squadron operations in the Biörk archipelago
            The Russare battery was discovered only after it fired at the Kirov group. Moreover, the Finns were in a hurry: a couple more cables - and the missile launcher and the EM would have rushed into the minefield. And so, after the 234-mm greetings, they set off on a reverse course.
            Well, the cherry on the cake: our two-gun 12"/52 battery on Cape Krestovy near Vyborg was discovered only after the end of the war.
            1. 0
              12 March 2024 13: 50
              Alexey RA(Alexey)
              Because Since the command of the Red Army did not envisage the possibility of a landing at all, reconnaissance of targets for the landing was not considered as it was unnecessary. I just suggested why this option was not considered, because logic itself dictated that if the Red Banner Baltic Fleet had an overwhelming superiority at sea over the Finnish fleet, why not land tactical landings on the coast of Finland, making them the main striking force in the upcoming war.
              The answer probably lies in the fact that the command of the Red Army at that time had a disdainful attitude towards the Finnish army, i.e. What can the Finns oppose to the might of the Red Army?
              1. +2
                12 March 2024 14: 42
                Quote: Gomunkul
                Because Since the command of the Red Army did not envisage the possibility of a landing at all, reconnaissance of targets for the landing was not considered as it was unnecessary.

                And under what pretext did the Baltic Fleet not conduct reconnaissance of batteries on the coastal flank of the Finnish defense line (the presence of which was known to the General Staff of the Red Army)? wink
                Not to mention the fact that the effective firing range of the Mäkiluoto armored turret 12"/52 battery made it possible to block the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. And there was also a Kuivassari battery near Helsinki. Was the BF even going to do anything outside the “Kronstadt Puddle”?
                Quote: Gomunkul
                I just suggested why this option was not considered, because logic itself dictated that if the Red Banner Baltic Fleet had an overwhelming superiority at sea over the Finnish fleet, why not land tactical landings on the coast of Finland, making them the main striking force in the upcoming war.

                This is how the landings were planned. But tactical - for clearing the federal zone and to help the advancing army.
                ...the following combat missions were assigned to the Baltic Fleet:
                1) Find and destroy the battleships of the Finnish coastal defense, preventing them from leaving for Sweden;
                2) By the actions of submarines and aircraft off the coast of Finland, stop the supply of troops, ammunition and raw materials by sea;
                3) With the outbreak of hostilities, capture, arm and hold the islands of Gogland, B. Tyuters, Lavensaari, Seskar and Penisaari;
                4) Be ready for an operational landing, at the request of the LVO commander, for a tactical landing on the army’s flank on the Karelian Isthmus (Humalijoki) and fire support for the LVO troops when capturing the Khumalijoki-Konevets island line;
                5) Be ready, at the request of the commander of the Leningrad Military District, for a tactical landing and fire support from Lake Ladoga for the district troops when capturing the left flank of the Finnish fortified line
                © Petrov P.V. Red Banner Baltic Fleet on the eve of the Great Patriotic War: 1935 – spring 1941.
                The first part of the landing plan was completed. But with the second there was a problem: the fleet in the Federal Zone ran into Bjorke’s batteries, unknown to it, and the army stopped. And then the fleet went to bases due to winter.
                1. 0
                  12 March 2024 15: 35
                  © Petrov P.V. Red Banner Baltic Fleet on the eve of the Great Patriotic War: 1935 – spring 1941.
                  The same source writes that the Finns turned out to be more prepared for negotiations with the USSR, when the delegation was in Moscow, they had already carried out covert mobilization, plus they had set up naval minefields.
                  Maybe I didn’t quite correctly express my thoughts about the landings; in my opinion, the landings near Helsinki would have played a big psychological role and perhaps would have accelerated the end of the Winter War, but with fewer material and political losses for the USSR.
                  1. +2
                    12 March 2024 16: 32
                    Quote: Gomunkul
                    Maybe I didn’t quite correctly express my thoughts about the landings; in my opinion, the landings near Helsinki would have played a big psychological role and perhaps would have accelerated the end of the Winter War, but with fewer material and political losses for the USSR.

                    For those wishing to disembark near Helsinki:
                    The 1st Coastal Artillery Regiment, under the command of Colonel V. Marjanen (headquarters in Suomenlinna), consisted of two artillery divisions, whose headquarters were located on the islands of Miessari and Isosaari. The regiment covered the most strategically important area of ​​Helsinki, where the main base of the Finnish fleet was located. The regiment had 15 artillery batteries (152-, 254- and 305-mm guns) located on the islands of Makiluoto, Miessari, Ryssyankaari, Katayaluoto, Harmaya, Kuivassaari, Isosaari, Villinki, Santahamina, Suomenlinna, Kustanmiekka and Makiluoto. A total of 4 - 305 mm, 16 - 254 mm and 32 - 152 mm guns. The total number of battery garrisons was 3964 people.
                    © ABS

                    Let me remind you that the only 254 mm battery with open AU was picked by BF for a month. Alternately with two LCs. Result:
                    1. Based on the examination of the batteries, the Commission states the fact that not a single bombardment of coastal batteries by ship artillery brought any tangible results...
                    © Conclusions of the commission of brigade commander Stolyarsky - Tsushima Forum, topic “Questions to M.E. Morozov.”
                    BO in the Helsinki area will be picked in the same way - over areas, without adjustments (on Björke the “barn” was used only in one of the shellings), at best, based on maps from 1917. Because the BF has no other commanders.
                  2. +2
                    12 March 2024 16: 41
                    Here, by the way, is the Finnish military plan (northern shore of the Federal Zone) in the Porkkala-Udd - Helsinki area - batteries 305 mm 203 mm for 1939.

                    And here is a more complete plan with smaller caliber batteries:
                    https://vk.com/wall-16112288_57827
        2. +2
          12 March 2024 11: 50
          Quote: S.Z.
          Not everything went smoothly with the Japanese either. Taking into account the fact that they fought with the Japanese before, we can conclude that they have forgotten how to use the Finnish company, but this is not the case.

          So all the ground troops who fought the Japanese remained in the Far East. Except perhaps for the landing.
          All Far Eastern conflicts were carried out by forces stationed in the Far East. The USSR carefully dosed its forces so as not to get into a big war. Let me remind you that one of the main points of accusation against Blucher was an attempt at general mobilization in the Far East, which led to a full-scale war with Japan.
          Quote: S.Z.
          However, we should not forget that Zhukov was not called to Khalkhin Gol because of excessive successes, and we should not forget about the attack by tanks almost head-on with the losses of a large number of light tanks - and there were no heavy ones then.

          And then everything was not very smooth. Zhukov’s beautiful plan for an encirclement operation by the forces of his subordinates degenerated into squeezing the Japanese into adjacent territory. One of the surrounding groups reached the meeting point and stood up. And the second, instead of quickly breaking through to the meeting point, bypassing the encountered garrisons and blocking them with infantry, began to stand at every strong point encountered and storm it. She reached the meeting point a week later.
          The end is a bit predictable ...
          Tov. Stalin
          I am sending the report just received to Comrade Zhukov and Kalugin. As expected, there were no divisions in the encirclement, the enemy either managed to withdraw the main forces, or rather, there were no large forces in this area for a long time, and a specially trained garrison was sitting, which is now completely destroyed.

          © Voroshilov
          1. 0
            12 March 2024 13: 44
            So I mean the same thing - both operations were ultimately successful, but the difficulties of failure and loss were both there and there.

            It was the same Red Army.
  3. +3
    12 March 2024 10: 23
    The author started from such a distance that now the writing of at least three more parts seems to be a prerequisite. In the second, it is necessary to outline the development of Soviet-Chinese relations, starting from the 20s of the last century and at least until the “raid of Soviet bombers on Taiwan” in 1938. The third part contains the history of the creation of the Air Force of the Republic of China. Well, in the fourth part - about the raid on Taiwan. By the way, the planes were technically still Chinese, bought from the USSR for money.
    1. +3
      12 March 2024 12: 12
      Quote: Dekabrist
      The author started from such a distance that now the writing of at least three more parts seems to be a prerequisite.

      In modern times, this is practically only the most immediate prehistory.
      From afar It looks like this: smile
  4. +1
    12 March 2024 12: 39
    The story is interesting, but in the style of "A Thousand and One Nights" ;-)
  5. +6
    12 March 2024 13: 01
    Let's start with the first photo. Which is signed
    Red Army pilots in China. 1937
    Let's start with the fact that the U-2 aircraft, against which the pilots are standing, was not delivered to the Kuomintang Air Force. If you look at the reports, the SB, Tb-3, I-16 and I-152 aircraft were delivered there, as well as a small number of UTI-4 aircraft (a training aircraft based on the I-16). Po-2 arrived in China after 1945. Again, if we look at the plane in the photo in the title of the article, we see the plane in Soviet livery, and the pilots in Soviet uniforms. Before writing this article, the author at least recalls F.P. I read Polynin. About such a work as “Supplies of Soviet aviation equipment to the Republic of China along the “northern” route as part of the plan for military-technical cooperation in 1937-1938.” authors Milbach Vladimir Spartakovich and Nazarenko Igor Sergeevich I’ll just keep silent. Well, for clarity, the color options for Soviet aircraft in the Republic of China at that time.
    1. +3
      12 March 2024 13: 25
      Quote: Fitter65
      Let's start with the fact that the U-2 aircraft, against which the pilots are standing, was not delivered to the Kuomintang Air Force. If you look at the reports, the SB, Tb-3, I-16 and I-152 aircraft were delivered there, as well as a small number of UTI-4 aircraft (a training aircraft based on the I-16). Po-2 arrived in China after 1945. Again, if we look at the plane in the photo in the title of the article, we see the plane in Soviet livery, and the pilots in Soviet uniforms.

      A search for a photo brings you to the page of Soviet aces: “Shimenas Alfons Iosifovich”, “Photo materials from the Shimenas family archive” - where this photo is not attributed in any way.
      http://soviet-aces-1936-53.ru/abc/sh/shimenas.htm
      And so - this photograph is passed off as China 1937, China 1938, and Spain.
      1. +3
        12 March 2024 13: 57
        Quote: Alexey RA
        And so - this photograph is passed off as China 1937, China 1938, and Spain.

        It’s good that they don’t pass it off as Berlin 1945. Neither in China -37/38, nor in Spain, Soviet pilots walked or flew in Soviet uniforms. Not to mention taking a photo in it, against the backdrop of an airplane that was not delivered to any of the listed countries...
        Quote: S.Z.
        As far as I know, the photo for the title is chosen not by the author, but by the editors; there have already been conversations on this topic.

        So these are not the reader’s problems, these are the author’s problems. Moreover, there was a conversation that the editors select photos for news articles. And for such people the author himself exhibits...
        1. +3
          12 March 2024 14: 44
          Quote: Fitter65
          Neither in China -37/38, nor in Spain, Soviet pilots walked or flew in Soviet uniforms. Not to mention taking a photo in it, against the backdrop of an airplane that was not delivered to any of the listed countries...

          Stirlitz walked through Berlin... And something elusive gave him away as a Soviet intelligence officer... Either a Budyonnovka, dashingly tilted to one side, or a parachute that was trailing behind him throughout the city...
          laughing
    2. 0
      12 March 2024 13: 46
      As far as I know, the photo for the title is chosen not by the author, but by the editors; there have already been conversations on this topic.
      1. +2
        12 March 2024 14: 42
        As far as I know, the photo for the title is not selected by the author, but by the editors

        If the author chose a photo in an article, no editor selects anything. No self-respecting author would trust this process to the current editors of the site, otherwise they will elect someone like him. The photo at the beginning of the article was definitely not taken in China. Most likely, this is the 11th school of military pilots named after the Proletariat of Donbass, where Shimenas Alfons Iosifovich served before being sent to China, from whose family archive the photo was taken.
        1. +1
          15 March 2024 08: 29
          My personal mistake, I selected the photo, not the editors.
          1. +1
            15 March 2024 09: 24
            The one who does nothing makes no mistakes. Everyone makes mistakes. The main thing is that they are not systemic in nature.
  6. 0
    22 March 2024 14: 10
    Then the legend about the pilot Li Xi Qing was born