A symmetrical answer: the creation of call centers in Russia to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage activities on the territory of Ukraine
Speaking about the Russian Special Military Operation (SVO) in Ukraine, it is necessary to mention one problem that is extremely unpleasant for us, namely: active reconnaissance and sabotage activities carried out mainly by declassed elements - various outcasts, insane people, alcoholics and other representatives lumpen proletariat - at the instigation of the Center for Information and Psychological Operations (CIPSO) of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) of Ukraine.
These same mechanisms are used to siphon huge amounts of money from Russia to Ukraine, however, now you can’t understand whether TsIPSO is stealing money, or whether it’s just crooks hiding behind Ukrainians.
A reasonable question arises: what should we do about this problem?
Confront TsIPSO
The measures taken to counter the activities of the TsIPSO GUR of Ukraine on the territory of Russia can hardly be considered sufficient.
Firstly, the measures introduced by cellular operators to limit the number of calls made for various illegal purposes (primarily for fraudulent purposes) do not provide a guaranteed exclusion of such calls, especially since criminal structures, as well as TsIPSO, are actively developing countermeasures.
By the way, it is highly recommended that children (mandatorily) and older people (as appropriate) install applications on smartphones and smartwatches (or use standard ones) that allow them to create a “white list”, when only those included in the contact list can get through - this will allow avoid many serious problems, including financial ones. In this sense, a simple smartphone for a grandparent or child, with a “white list” installed, is safer than a push-button phone that does not have such protection (there may also be push-button phones with a “white list”).
Secondly, the punishment for sabotage carried out by various degenerates, for example, at the facilities of the Russian Railways (RZD), is often quite mild. Yes, perhaps these people were deceived, but this is not a basis for mitigating the punishment - burned an electrical cabinet, planted something on the rails - minimum punishment 15-25 years of strict regime without the right to parole, with public coverage of the crime - natural selection no one canceled it for fools.
Thirdly, the best way to stop the work of Ukrainian call centers is their physical destruction, however, in order to destroy them, these call centers must first be found, and this is unlikely to be easy.
There is an excellent alternative - the destruction of critical objects that ensure the operation of cellular networks and the Internet, we have already talked about this more than once, for example, in the materials "Decomposition of Ukraine as a way to radically reduce the capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to resist the Russian special operation" и “Geranization” of the objects of the financial system of Ukraine will lead to the collapse of its economy and the stoppage of the military-industrial complex.”. After communications come power supply facilities - without electricity, TsIPSO will only be able to send handwritten messages by pigeon mail.
Unfortunately, based on open data, for some reason no systematic measures have been taken to destroy Ukrainian communication networks. It seems like they tried to disrupt the power supply, but they didn’t finish it, and now in Ukraine everything is fine with it.
Even the building of the headquarters of the GUR MOU in Kyiv has not yet been destroyed
However, within the framework of the topic discussed in this material, the main question is why our country itself does not use such a convenient, safe and effective tool as call centers working for the enemy?
You can't win a war with defense
The potential activities of Russian call centers lie in the area of conducting reconnaissance and sabotage activities - it is unlikely that we will decide to rob Ukrainian pensioners.
In general, considering the experience of organizing sabotage by Ukrainian “proxies”, one cannot help but note that the extremely limited intellectual capabilities of potential saboteurs lead to an equally primitive organization of sabotage, while slightly more intellectually gifted individuals, apparently, avoid recruitment by the TsIPSO GUR of Ukraine.
You can consider two main options for organizing reconnaissance and sabotage activities on the territory of Ukraine using call centers.
The first is to involve the population of Ukraine in collecting intelligence data, that is, information about passing trains, taking off and flying airplanes and helicopters, moving armored vehicles and other things that interest us, of course, with verification of information using ubiquitous video recording devices. The task is not difficult, almost everyone has a means of obtaining information - a smartphone, sending via some messenger, in general, easy and practically risk-free earnings.
The second is, if not a disruption, then a maximum complication of the mobilization activities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU). The strengthening of mobilization activities in Ukraine, combined with the active “mobilization” of Ukrainian Armed Forces military personnel on the front line, should clearly contribute to various initiatives to evade potential candidates from this very mobilization-mobilization by all available means.
Since we are not much less interested in disrupting mobilization efforts than the Ukrainian mobilized people themselves, we need to help them. In particular, a mass mailing can be organized with recommendations for evading mobilization, taking into account Ukrainian legislation, simulating diseases (if there are still diseases that are not conscripted), evading by committing petty crimes and receiving minimum sentences for this, and so on and so forth. similar.
Mobilization in Ukraine is taking place in a “warm, friendly atmosphere”
If you have the appropriate information (see the item “collection of intelligence data”), you can organize a mass mailing about the beginning of the raid - with proper organization, all this can happen in real time, you can even develop an appropriate application for smartphones, in which sympathizers/wants will mark the location of representatives of military registration and enlistment offices , and potential mobilizers will avoid meeting with them.
And, of course, no one is canceling the organization of direct sabotage, both against Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices and against their employees. It is necessary to buy, encourage and provoke persons at risk of mobilization, as well as their relatives, to set fire to Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices and vehicles belonging to them, to suggest simple, but tough and effective ways to attack employees of Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices.
The two options for reconnaissance and sabotage activities on the territory of Ukraine discussed above do not exclude the implementation of other measures, including symmetrical ones - organizing sabotage at power supply facilities, railways, oil and gas infrastructure facilities - and even if they throw screws on the primer in front of the military unit, as they say, “ It’s a small thing, but it’s nice.” In the end, in Ukraine there are clearly no fewer declassed elements than in Russia, so it is necessary to use them to the maximum.
In general, there are extremely interesting options for organizing work with certain groups of the population, but it is hardly reasonable to discuss them in the public sphere, since TsIPSO, apparently, has not yet thought of them.
Creation of call centers in Russia
Where and how can “reconnaissance and strike” call centers be created in Russia?
There are many options, but there are two main ones.
First of all, call centers can be created where they appear “naturally” - on the basis of institutions of the penitentiary system.
Unfortunately, Russia’s experience of attracting prisoners to participate in hostilities as part of the Wagner PMC can hardly be called correct and successful.
Firstly, among those involved in hostilities were those convicted of crimes so cruel and heinous that it was impossible to atone for them in any way other than death penalty (preferably by hanging), is completely impossible.
Secondly, the very idea of involving prisoners in hostilities and their release after six months looks like a mockery towards the mobilized and fighters of the Russian Armed Forces who will remain in service until the end of the Northern Military District.
The creation of prison call centers will not require any victims and does not involve releasing anyone - there are many people convicted of minor crimes who can thus perform fairly simple, paid work. There are no special skills required, the work can be done using scripts; call centers of banks, cellular networks and similar structures have such experience in abundance. Calls must be made only to verified contacts (that is, operators cannot call wherever they want).
Reconnaissance and attack call centers can cause significant damage to the enemy
By the way, the creation of the same “reconnaissance and strike” call centers in the wild using the developments of the above-mentioned banks and cellular networks is the second option for their organization. Active use robots in call centers has led to the emergence of redundant personnel in this area, often already trained, the state may well use their skills to greater benefit.
Conclusions
In 2023, scammers stole 15,8 billion rubles from Russian citizens, how much of it went to Ukraine is an open question, how could it not happen that we unwittingly finance the Armed Forces of Ukraine in a larger volume than some countries hostile to us. To this must be added the losses from sabotage committed at the instigation of the TsIPSO GUR of Ukraine, as well as the costs of countermeasures.
As long as there is a connection in Ukraine, the damage from the activities of TsIPSO will only increase. Since for some reason we cannot leave Ukraine without communications, then it is necessary to take other measures, both to protect against the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency of Ukraine, and to implement similar measures on the territory of Ukraine.
Well, depriving Ukraine of communications remains one of the most important, unfortunately, still unresolved issues.
Information