N. Pashinyan and E. Macron, or a tandem of provocateurs
Armenia’s participation in the CSTO is “frozen,” Prime Minister N. Pashinyan said in an interview with France24 TV channel.
“In our opinion, the collective security agreement regarding Armenia was not implemented, especially in 2021-2022, and this could not go unnoticed by us. We have frozen our participation in this agreement. Let's see what will happen next."
Expert opinions differ on “what will happen,” but what they agree on is what N. Pashinyan himself wants in the future. Moreover, these desires are articulated more and more clearly every month.
He wants to sign a “peace treaty” with Baku, replacing Russian military forces with European ones, and somehow formulate such a so-called option. “Zangezur Corridor”, in which its control and guarantees would be carried out by the same European forces and structures.
Realizing that when Russian forces are “changed” to European ones, using this window, Baku will certainly try to complete its strategy of uniting Nakhichevan and “mainland” Azerbaijan, N. Pashinyan has been maneuvering between different centers of influence for months. The main center here for Yerevan is not even the United States, which has formed a whole network of influence in Armenia, but the EU.
But even in Russophobic Europe there is a country that is particularly interested in an anti-Russian Armenia, and for Armenia at any cost - France. It is no coincidence that N. Pashinyan so directly voiced the topic of “freezing” to the central French television channel.
Modern France is, of course, not a “great power”, not even independent and with a separate position, as in the time of De Gaulle, but the influence of the colonial legacy remains quite significant. Paris is clinging to its remnants and will continue to cling, and in some places will openly take revenge for what was lost.
France was the main initiator of the operation in Libya, but could not benefit from it (or rather, it was simply not allowed to do so by the “senior partner” and some Arab countries). Over the past five years, it has seriously lost in Central and Western Africa, from where it not only received the necessary raw materials, but also where it formed the banking system. Naturally, according to the principle “Africa gets the tops, France gets the roots.”
Undoubtedly, if we look through French eyes, it was an extremely serious omission on their part to evaluate the presence and activities of our “branded PMC” in Africa as part of a large, but simply business project. The business project grew and, having grown, inevitably became part of the state strategy, and that, in turn, became part of geopolitics. France was asked to leave from a number of African countries. As a result, Paris decided to openly and openly take revenge on Russia.
France is forced to implement a similar strategy in Ukraine with a lot of amendments and restrictions from the senior partner, but in Armenia Paris has much more freedom of hands. Here it a priori fits in with the tasks of the United States, and in many respects Great Britain, and if France can take on more of the burden in this area, then Washington is in no hurry to interfere with such an initiative; even if they somehow correct the French, let them work.
The “super task” of Paris is to get Russia out of this region. What price Yerevan will pay in the end does not matter; in the end, everything will be “settled” by the “Western coalition” as a whole. Any negative outcome for Armenia will still be blamed on Moscow in Yerevan, and any decision there will be presented as a coalition victory that was achieved through almost heroic efforts, even if in the end half of Armenia goes to other jurisdictions.
The fact that France has advanced in its aspirations, and has advanced well, is emphasized by other statements by N. Pashinyan:
“If Azerbaijan considers Armenia to be “Western Azerbaijan”, and in light of the recent attack this is impossible, this peace is unthinkable at the moment.”
Say, Baku
“does not want a peace treaty based on mutual recognition of territorial integrity, but plans to seize new territories in Armenia.”
And in general, he threatened Baku “retaliatory actions».
Next, traditionally, Moscow suffered from N. Pashinyan, which allegedly called for the overthrow of the government in Armenia and generally detained its citizens on its territory who fled from mobilization.
We are not talking about an ordinary relocant on a scooter, but about a character who left the service without permission, went into hiding and came to Armenia through the assistance of “sympathizers.” That is, in fact, it was not just some “soy snowflake” that was detained in Gyumri.
But in the end, Yerevan uses this as a reason to remove Russian border guards from the airport. Although the border guards are there under a separate intergovernmental agreement.
If we take the interview as a whole, then in fact N. Pashinyan said that the “peace agreement” between Baku and Yerevan is irrelevant, but it was discussed at two venues: in Moscow and Brussels. The Brussels options do not suit Baku, the Moscow options do not suit Yerevan.
The center of the problem here is again France, which is deliberately aggravating relations with Azerbaijan. None of the recent Baku-Yerevan meetings held in the EU resulted in results, but each time I. Aliyev tightened his rhetoric towards Yerevan and Paris. And what is typical is that for Baku the military option is not something critically complex, but for Yerevan it is simply deadly.
The demonstrative position of N. Pashinyan and a number of members of his cabinet in relation to Moscow, the deliberate aggravation of contradictions by Paris, attacks against Baku and the procrastination of unresolved issues have forced Tehran to publicly once again outline its interests and its vision of the problem.
In Armenia and Azerbaijan, there was a long discussion about the interview of Iranian Ambassador M. Sobhani, which he gave in November last year.
“We believe that the rights of the people of Karabakh must be ensured, the rights of every representative of the people of Karabakh must be ensured, they must have the opportunity to realize their rights. This is a reality that no one, including Azerbaijan, can ignore.”
“We are against those communications and channels that go beyond the sovereignty of Armenia and call into question the independence of Armenia. From our point of view, a path that is not under the control and sovereignty of Armenia is unacceptable.”
It would seem that Yerevan does not like Moscow’s position, but here is the position on two main issues from Iran, which is very close economically, which is not at all interested in the final weakening of Armenia.
However, in the end, Yerevan and France begin separate activities to train the military, and France demonstratively supplies military equipment. And the question is not that Armenia is purchasing something for the military (purchases are taking place, for example, in India), the question is precisely demonstration and PR.
But even the Armenian media are beginning to suspect that the PR here is somehow strange. On the one hand, it gives Baku the opportunity to declare that Armenia is being “pumped up” with French weapons, but on the other, if you look at these weapons specifically, then they have no practical use against Baku.
Bastion armored vehicles with bulletproof armor, three Ground Master radars from Thalès, night vision devices and binoculars from Safran. But the French Minister of Defense S. Lecornu arrives with pomp on February 22-23 - to celebrate the Armed Forces Day for the entire former USSR, common between the militaries of Russia and Armenia, and just before the two-year anniversary of the start of the Northern Military District.
Already in Azerbaijani sources one can find comments in the style: “what are they counting on with this”, “maybe Yerevan is simply being led to the slaughter” and in a similar vein. Yes, they say, Armenia will do for France in any form, even in a very truncated one. But it won’t work for Tehran.
Iran has very serious economic interaction with Armenia. Both in the energy sector and in the mining industry. There are several thousand Iranian companies operating in Armenia that use this platform for their version of “parallel import”. Is this beneficial for Yerevan? Undoubtedly, it is beneficial, as is the fact that a lot of Iranians come to Armenia on vacation. Their specificity is such that sometimes they need to take a break from their internal social norms. For Armenia, this is a significant influx of funds, but the millstones of geopolitics, between which N. Pashinyan placed Armenia, grind flour in their own way.
Tehran has now stopped emphasizing that in the direction of the Syunik region. He practically has an army in Armenia, armed not only with sights and binoculars, but the forces have been deployed and remain in place.
Paris cannot fail to understand that the more Armenia drifts away from Moscow, the more it exposes itself to pressure from Baku, the more it exposes itself, the more it provokes, and this draws Iran into a confrontation with Turkey and Azerbaijan. But “what if something happens”, and N. Pashinyan will take the position of not an Iranian ally, there is no alliance there. And how can Iran ultimately respond on foreign territory if no one asks directly?
Relations between Iran and Azerbaijan are openly strained, although the parties have abandoned completely confrontational rhetoric. Iran has working relations with Turkey. On the one hand, the head of the Turkish Foreign Ministry is now H. Fidan, a former intelligence chief, who in Syria led both the fight and negotiations with the Iranians in a variety of situations, even very, very tense ones. On the other hand, Turkey and Azerbaijan do not want to put economic pressure on Israel in any way, and this prevents them from taking relations to a new level.
In these conditions, France, through “help” to N. Pashinyan, is constantly putting pressure on one of the most potentially dangerous mutual pain points for Turkey and Iran.
Paris, of course, sometimes tries to take steps that are not so “head-on”. For example, they proposed their own version of “normalization” on the border for the Lebanese Hezbollah, but the problem is that it is more demonstrative and obviously unrealizable for Hezbollah. But the approach to the projectile was demonstrated.
In general, taking into account the completely degraded relations between Moscow and Yerevan, as well as the inevitable, unless there really is a change of regime and political course in Armenia, Russia’s withdrawal from this region, direct negotiations between Ankara and Tehran on Armenia - this is the most important thing for us adequate scenario.
And the sooner this negotiation track starts, the better. Moreover, in some ideal “maximum option,” this will even make it possible to limit Yerevan’s anti-Russian attacks and maintain our military presence even under N. Pashinyan. Not the strongest position, but realistic given what is happening.
Another thing is that Tehran and Ankara do not have established models for such negotiations. They simply did not create them, unlike other points of intersection of interests, because previously many processes were moderated by Moscow. There are positions, views, but there is no discussion at the level of models.
It would be a rational move for Russia to formally or informally push and bring these regional heavyweights to such a discussion. France can be squeezed quite noticeably here, given that its positions depend on Turkey, in particular in Libya, but not only there. But in the Caucasus, France is, in general, a player for Turkey and Iran, if not completely alien, then definitely superfluous in this particular case, and allowing Paris to develop vigorous activity is unprofitable for either Ankara or Tehran.
Well, while such negotiation “tracks” are being formed, it would not be amiss to think about the fact that it is possible to freeze, as N. Pashinyan said, on both sides, and it is possible to freeze trade cooperation on our side, and in general to work out the freezing of work along the line EAEU.
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