Elections in Pakistan. Recording social changes, positions of elites and potential opportunities
On February 8, early elections to the National Assembly, the lower house of the Pakistani parliament, were held in Pakistan. Ultimately, it is there that the majority will vote on the candidacy of a new “permanent” prime minister and, accordingly, on the main composition of the cabinet. The procedure itself is somewhat more complicated, but the result is formed in the National Assembly. National assemblies of the main states of Pakistan were also formed, where regional political parties play a significant role.
The elections took place in very difficult conditions
Firstly, in a number of areas they tried to disrupt them, and there were some excesses associated with terrorist acts and human casualties. As a result, during the voting, the Internet did not work in the country, and in some places mobile communications did not work at all.
Secondly, the leader of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, popular in Pakistan, I. Khan, on the eve of the elections, received, together with his wife, several large prison terms one after another (in total, so far we are talking about 24 By the way, in 2024 the former Prime Minister of Pakistan will turn 72 years old.
A month before the elections, realizing that there would be no other way out, I. Khan put in the first place of his party the party lawyer (and personal too) G. Ali Khan, who is also a strong lobbyist for I. Khan in London.
The turnout turned out to be slightly lower than expected - 51,2 million (42%), partly due to measures to cut off communications, but the distribution of votes turned out to be generally predictable - it was not possible to push PTI, and forming a government will require a very difficult approval process for all parties.
But the main thing is that the political and military elite of Pakistan found themselves (and finally) in a new social reality. This will have to be accepted and one will have to adapt to it. Here we are witnessing the third major change in the social structure of Pakistan in 70 years.
In general terms, the stages of change, their nature and significant personalities were described in the material “A little about the historical and current problems of Pakistan, the analysis of which may be useful”.
Are the elections in Pakistan important for Russian politics?
Yes, they are important, and it is quite strange that very little is said about the role of Pakistan and its characteristics. In particular, when building a model of work with Iran, it is impossible not to take into account ties with Pakistan (as well as with Iraq), not to mention Afghanistan.
It is a major political, military and economic hub. Although Pakistan is heavily influenced by Chinese, British and American politics, the peculiarities of the Pakistani political system could open up many opportunities for Russia. We will consider them in the second part of the material, but for now let’s turn to the results and their estimates.
The main struggle is usually for 266 seats in the National Assembly out of 366. Seventy mandates are given to women (60) and national minorities (10). This does not mean that 70 deputies later act on some kind of agenda, just the distribution of 266 seats shows the political vector - where politics will move in the next few years.
It should be noted that, unlike political systems in the West, party programs generally differ little in economic theses.
The parties line up the main emphasis here along the axis: “Islamic political liberalism” – “Islamic political conservatism.” Also, one of the main criteria is the representation of “their” regional groups in politics and, accordingly, in the economy. In Pakistan, the struggle of regional clans and groups was mainly concentrated between the two main states of Sindh and Punjab.
In general, ideas like “Islamic socialism” are no longer about public property, although some currents in politics in the Middle East, including Pakistan, still continue to adhere to the “classical” socialist bias.
But Islamic socialism of the present time is more about fair sectarian, ethnic and regional representation. This feature should always be taken into account when assessing the situation.
Also, we will not see in these regions anything similar to Western value liberalism or even ultra-liberalism, like the popular conventionally “leftist” movements in the West. There are gradations of the conservative position, but nothing more.
Of the existing 44 political parties, four forces traditionally have the greatest representation.
four forces
The party identified at the beginning of the material is the Pakistan Movement for Justice, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). Leaders: former Prime Minister of Pakistan I. Khan, who replaced him - lawyer G. Ali Khan, O. Ayub Khan.
This movement is somewhat similar to the political force in Taiwan (Taiwan People's Party), which incorporates a relatively young moderate conservative voter, and incorporates it not only from “its” region (I. Han did not have such a region for a long time, despite on ethnic Pashtun roots), and from all of them at once.
PTI is a phenomenon, but a phenomenon predetermined by objective social development. This is, if not a representation of the Pakistani middle class as a whole, then a representation of those who want to associate themselves with the future middle class, modern, but not having lost its conservative roots.
This objective process of transformation was also reflected in the past elections - PTI received first place and 93 mandates, which ultimately means a representation of 33%, after the final distribution of all mandates. This makes it possible to carry out your candidacy without hindrance, but also the opportunity to block any other. To bypass PTI, now the other two parties (Sharifov and Bhutto) will have to act almost in tandem.
The current elections have shown that during the term of his premiership, I. Khan managed to bring his ethnic region into Pakistani politics - the very restless Pashtun state of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where PTI generally received a complete advantage in the voting results. Thus, in terms of the alignments in the Sindh-Punjab elites, we can now talk about the alignment along the Sindh-Punjab-Khyber line.
Having started in the army environment, where Pashtuns gradually occupied 20% of the composition, this state will now fully enter into all political structures (army and civilian). This is another permanent change that the Pakistan Army Corps will have to adapt to. Pashtuns are now also not averse to being in the “middle class” status.
The second and main political force competing with PTI is the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) Party, Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), PML-N. Leaders: Sharif family (N. Sharif, Sh. Sharif, M. Sharif), as well as R. Zafar-ul-Haq and A. Iqbal. These are the clan elite (see previous material) and the army and business groups of Punjab. The PML-N won 75 seats or a final 26%. The Sharifs are in fact the ruling bloc, and N. Sharif, a former prime minister and irreconcilable rival of I. Khan, who had lived in London for a long time, came to the country to campaign for the elections.
The Sharifs succeeded in removing and imprisoning I. Khan, but they failed to take leadership even taking into account the administrative resources. And the reason here is not in leaders or political technologies - in changes in the social structure, which are of a deep-seated nature.
The third force is the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), led by the son of the deceased B. Bhutto - B. Bhutto. He is a young politician who represents the elite groups of Sindh and Balochistan. In theory, at least according to the age criterion, it would be logical for B. Bhutto to ride the electorate of I. Khan, but B. Bhutto is perceived by this electorate as a “class alien element.”
If he had entered the political arena twenty years earlier, he would have had a chance to take this electorate, but at that time he was still a teenager, he moved to his homeland from Great Britain only in 2007, and it was I who was a promising politician “for everyone” then. .Khan. However, as the heir to the Bhutto-Zardari family, he already has serious political and international experience. After the death of his mother, he headed the party and later served as the head of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry.
The United National Movement (MQM-P) party showed good results. This is just a rare example of a party with a secular political platform that represents the so-called social group. "Muhajirs" (migrants) centered in the Karachi district (Sindh). The social basis of the movement is Muslim immigrants from India and partly Bangladesh. Leader – M. Sindiki. They received a significant 17 seats in the current situation, which they will undoubtedly be able to use well in political auctions.
Extreme Islamic conservatives have traditionally not taken significant positions, for example, the Islamic Congress (Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Pakistan, JUIP) took only four mandates. However, JUIP itself is formally a very moderate wing of truly “theological conservatives” from the entire network of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Deobandists, “Islamic revival”). JUIP stood out, moved to moderate positions and in the future will act together with PTI I. Khan, adding its 4 votes to 93 PTI. And this is also a sign of social changes, which were mentioned at the beginning of the material.
It is clear that N. Sharif’s plans to either regain the position of prime minister or form a government primarily for himself most likely cannot be realized. The government has to become truly representative.
Negotiations with B. Bhutto's PPP party, which the Sharifs' representatives began without waiting for the vote count to be completed, did not bring success. The RRR stated that for such discussions a separate party committee will be formed, which will negotiate with all political forces at once.
In all likelihood, what the Sharifs viewed as an interim and transitional government, formed six months before the February elections, will continue to exist. If not in specific personalities, then on the basis of the principles on which it was created.
Prime Minister A. Kakar is a compromise figure. Although B. Bhutto’s option also looks interesting, as the embodiment of the idea of “neither a candle nor a poker” for the Sharifs. In this case, there will be a simple majority, but it will also be unstable. And this is also a kind of sign of the times. The Sharifs will definitely try to come to an agreement with PTI in exchange for a review of the terms of I. Khan’s imprisonment. All of these options have their own probabilistic characteristics, but the first one looks the most realistic so far.
It is easy to see that in Pakistan today politics (in its civilian version) is shaped by groups oriented towards Great Britain. I. Khan - London (although we usually call him a “pro-Chinese politician”), the Sharifs - London, Bhutto - London.
This is an established practice, however, unlike in previous years, now the United States has almost ostentatiously retreated from significant influence on Pakistani politics. They have their finger on the pulse through Afghanistan and the Doha negotiation format, but have reduced the intensity of contacts.
Over the past six months, Pakistani generals have barely achieved several formal meetings at the Pentagon. Vicious to all sorts of “violations of democracy,” American politicians, foundations and the media are practically silent about the elections this February. But anywhere, in Pakistan, if you wish, you can criticize any side in the elections. They say that democracy is in danger, and communications are being cut off, and politicians are being shot at, and voter safety is not being taken care of.
The United States seriously intervened and played along with I. Khan’s opponents when he decided to continue his policy towards the Taliban (banned in the Russian Federation), quite complimentary and designed to put a certain limit to the confrontation with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as well as to improve relations directly with the Afghan "mainstream" Taliban.
This is where Washington acted quite actively. And then he again stepped aside somewhat, not even paying attention to the fact that the Sharifs did not respond to Kyiv’s requests for arms supplies. Islamabad has Ukrainian and Soviet equipment purchased in the past.
However, Indian sources claim that Pakistan is sending weapons through the British to Romania and then to Ukraine, but these are Indian sources. Pakistan categorically rejected and rejects even the very possibility of discussing such supplies. Who to believe, the Pakistanis or their eternal “partners”, the Indians, is a matter of taste. However, neither Washington nor even London focused on these supplies for two years, unlike other countries.
That is, we see that the United States delegated the Pakistani direction to the British, being more involved in the Middle East and India, but London here also acts within the framework of a purely regional policy, where the center of interests is shifted to Afghanistan.
The Pakistani generals find themselves in the most difficult situation here. It is often written that in Pakistan the generals rule everything. This is not entirely true. The current generals were formed as a result of social transformations in the second half of the twentieth century.
This is an elite that came not from the family aristocracy, but from the prosperous agrarian and trade confederations of Punjab and Sindh. In the 2000s, unlike the previous period, they prefer to rule from the “second row”, having formed a kind of caste-corporation, where not everything is measured by “corruption”; much is still determined by personal qualities and impeccable service within the framework of their military corporation. At the moment, the generals and civilian forces operate rather on the basis of a balance, albeit a dynamic one.
In relations with civilian elites, the army elite traditionally (since the time of Z. Ul-Haq) gravitated towards the Sharif family and, conversely, the Sharifs gravitated towards the army elite.
One of the central issues here for years has been relations with the Taliban and those movements that in Pakistan itself were in one way or another connected with its (Taliban) branches.
In the Pashtun region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and parts of Afghanistan, with the help of the United States, a whole network of radical groups has emerged, which ideologically emerged from Pakistani madrassas. This is the so-called the Haqqani network in Afghanistan, and the TTP in Pakistan. They do not represent the “official Taliban” (although the official ones have their roots in the same place), but one way or another, unlike the official Taliban, they are connected with a variety of cells of that large network, which is usually called “Al Qaeda” (banned in the Russian Federation ). Right down to family connections. The degree of radicalism varies everywhere, but this is precisely a kind of network.
Both the Sharifs and the Pakistani generals tried to weaken this network and completely eliminate the TTP, taking control of the border with Afghanistan. Methods preferred were purely forceful and tough. The answer was similar. I. Khan, having no support from the generals, relied on a rather unusual connection with the ISI, since he managed to temporarily separate the ISI and the army. Accordingly, his task was to incorporate the Pashtun region into Pakistani politics, establishing relations with all branches of the radicals and the official Taliban.
Apparently, the idea was clearly the author of the former head of the ISI, and not I. Khan himself, but his political party managed to include the Pashtun region in big politics, which, in fact, was shown by the elections. But in all other respects, this course came into sharp conflict with the positions of the civilian elites of Pakistan, the generals, and the United States. I. Khan was removed, but his party’s position in this region strengthened.
Now the new government will have to deal with the difficult task of supporting the political process and continuing to incorporate the region into Pakistani politics, which means increasing social spending, while at the same time trying to continue a hard line against the Haqqani network and TTP radicals. The task is quite non-trivial, given that the Haqqani network, for loyalty to official Kabul, is gradually taking control of precisely those provinces that stretch from the Pashtun regions north to Wakhan and Badakhshan, and China is looking there.
Neither the army corporation nor the traditional elite groups of Pakistan will be able to ignore the social changes that brought PTI to the forefront. The costs of incorporating new elites will increase, because they will also have to give part of the “food supply”. It will no longer be possible to deal with harsh measures like in the good old days.
What is left?
All that remains is to bring Pakistan out of its kind of lethargy and begin to attract investment by any means possible, creating jobs and stimulating the growth of the number of enterprises. At one time in Pakistan (by the way, like us) they tried to make mortgages and housing construction a kind of driver of the economy, but this turned out to be completely insufficient.
In this regard, it is obvious that Pakistan will take advantage of the moment when the United States stepped aside and handed over supervision to London. Russia and Great Britain have their own problems and their own scores to settle, but for the region, London as an investment and financial center is much preferable, since investments there are usually not colored in the colors of “values.”
When necessary, British finance often works simply in conflict with US interests. For example, Iran has been circumventing sanctions through the UK for years, when it is profitable; London has growing ties with China, although on the external circuit they are almost imposing sanctions on Chinese corporations. Sanctions are imposed, but they are observed in a rather specific way.
The “financiers on the island” will not interfere with the economic connection between Iran and Pakistan, which is gradually developing into stable interaction and acquiring projects, nor will they interfere with the increase in Chinese activity. Rather assist. In regional trade at the level of trade and financial intermediation, the British are already very closely involved in Pakistan.
In this regard, given that all the major elite groups in Pakistan prefer to distance themselves from issues related to Ukraine, and pragmatism is at the forefront, Russia needs to decide how ready we are to use this situation.
If London is some kind of fundamental “enemy forever”, then this is one thing; if we proceed from pragmatics, then it is quite possible to use ties with Iran and get involved in this work. After all, the North-South corridor, which we consider a megaproject, passes through Pakistan.
And it is better to avoid simple answers here, since the new social reality inevitably leads Pakistan to a new structure in the elite, and all together objectively suggests that Pakistan may well make a technological breakthrough in the period of 10-12 years, comparable to the breakthrough of Iran. And no matter how it turns out in the future that by investing in Pakistan together with our neighbors, we will receive many times more than from working with India.
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