The thin ice of Southern Lebanon for Israel continues to melt before our eyes
“I won’t compromise”
Recent weeks have brought not only the refusal of the Prime Minister of Armenia N. Pashinyan from the agreement on November 9, 2020, but also another refusal - by the Prime Minister of Israel B. Netanyahu from the terms of both the UN General Assembly decision of November 29.11.1947, 1, and from clause. 242(i) of UN Security Council resolution 22.11.1967 of November XNUMX, XNUMX.
The first decision involves the creation of two states, Israeli and Palestinian, the second document orders Israeli troops to leave the occupied territories, which included Palestinian settlements, East Jerusalem and, by the way, the Golan Heights - most of the Syrian province of Quneitra.
The legal framework was recognized, among other things, by official Tel Aviv. And although in the end, as we all know, the provisions were not fully implemented, it was on them that the entire political structure of the Palestinian-Israeli settlement was subsequently based. She held on with difficulty, but there were no real alternatives to her.
In 2020, the so-called the “Trump-Kushner plan” or the “Deal of the Century,” where the Palestinian and Israeli sides recognized the status quo regarding the existence of settlements, fixed it and received investments of up to $50 billion in exchange. However, the “Deal of the Century” also provided for the existence of precisely two states.
Later, this plan was transformed into the idea of the “Abraham Accords”, and even later into the concept of the “Indo-Abrahamic Accords”, but in any case, the basis was the division into two states and the final recognition of them by each other, and within the UN.
As a result, in his official account on X (“Twitter”), B. Netanyahu literally stated the following:
“I will not compromise on full Israeli security control of all territory west of the Jordan, which is contrary to a Palestinian state.”
On the same network, UN Secretary General A. Guterres replied that this was unacceptable. His reaction is clear and obvious, but the main thing here is that B. Netanyahu’s message caused confusion not only in the EU and Washington, but also in Israel itself, where B. Netanyahu, despite the coalition government, continues to lose his rating.
In the Arab and Iranian media and social networks, this not only caused a storm of emotions, but also gave rise to quite serious thoughts with a cool head about what the Israeli prime minister and his cabinet intend to do next. Because the context of events in the region is such that with these statements Israel is becoming several steps closer to an operation on the northern border - in Southern Lebanon.
Between the upper and the nether millstone
B. Netanyahu's office is between a rock and a hard place. For the role of the anvil, the Israeli Prime Minister himself chose the promise to completely destroy Hamas and occupy the Gaza Strip, and for the role of the hammer - a strict demand from the United States and some European states about the need to give the operation a clear and sane framework, or to complete the operation and transfer it to military - police format.
The Israeli prime minister understood that one thing could be done, and that one thing was keeping promises. Otherwise, he will face the largest investigation since 1967 and a government crisis. However, the IDF cannot achieve a quick victory, and a not-so-quick victory is already becoming completely unobvious.
Firstly, even pro-Israeli publications in the United States are beginning to estimate the scale of losses of the military wing of Hamas at no more than 25% of its composition.
Secondly, Israeli experts already admit that Hamas’s military forces and its technical capabilities still remain very high.
Part of the territories of northern Gaza, from where the IDF forces withdrew after the cleansing, find themselves again under the control of Hamas, and although the Israeli losses are officially classified, the Israeli media themselves estimate them at 1,3–1,5 thousand people killed, which is for Tel Aviv is the maximum for several decades. Arab media here generally starts from the figure of 6,5 thousand, and the minimum values are sensitive.
Washington, as strange as it may seem at first glance, essentially supported the blockade of maritime shipping, entering into a clash with the Yemeni Houthis. Ships have occasionally been caught in the crossfire in the region before, but official military action has turned a significant portion of the ships around Africa. The pressure on B. Netanyahu’s cabinet through trade and financial circles had already become overwhelming by mid-January.
Further, Nicaragua and South Africa are joining this pressure, filing a lawsuit against Israel for crimes against the Palestinian civilian population at the International Criminal Court. Then Indonesia, Mexico, and Chile follow the same path. South Africa, Mexico and Indonesia are already heavyweight countries, especially in this case Indonesia with its 202 million Muslim population should be noted.
Several times there were messages from Tel Aviv that Israel was thinking about slowing down the operation in the Gaza Strip, then there were messages in the opposite direction - that the operation would be “for a long time”, “almost indefinitely”, etc. It was clear that it was going on very intense discussion. As a result, B. Netanyahu chose the toughest option - to go ahead.
The problem here is that the results are not yet visible. To delay the operation in Gaza any further means to lose completely and in the scenario of breaking through the walls, no matter what. Therefore, the Arabs and Iranians, who have now spoken out loud about Israel’s approaching full-fledged military operations in Southern Lebanon and Syria, are not at all acting from the position of alarmists. This option is increasingly taking on concrete contours.
The context of events around South Lebanon was discussed point by point in the December material "South Lebanon's Thin Ice for Israel." All of the above is completely relevant at the moment. It should only be added that while rocking the topic of where and how Israeli citizens resettled from the border (which is about 100 thousand people) will return, B. Netanyahu’s supporters cannot help but understand that so far the main part of the confrontation on the Lebanese border is clashes between the IDF not even with the forces of the Hezbollah movement, but with the Lebanese Palestinian armed groups.
But pressure along the border is growing, and sooner or later, with this vector, Hezbollah will be forced to respond fully, Israel will also continue to increase pressure. And Hezbollah, in general, has nowhere to go, since it is inscribed in the political field of Lebanon: Hezbollah is an official part of the Lebanese political establishment, the movement controls the territories, population and economic flows.
It is precisely because of this that official Beirut, no matter how they call both M. Aoun and N. Mikati “pro-American,” will not actively oppose Hezbollah: in fact, Hezbollah is an integral part of the government consensus in Lebanon.
While Israel has not launched an attack on Lebanon, both can still not directly and indirectly speak for the Palestinian Lebanese groups, but offer “peace plans”; after all, they are counting on receiving Western financial assistance. But if Lebanon is attacked fully, then they will have to actively support the Palestinians.
Israel itself never stopped at the borders and carried out sabotage and air operations inside and through Lebanon, especially in the Shiite suburbs of Beirut. Just a couple of weeks ago, Israel eliminated one of the Hamas commanders, S. al-Arouri, in southern Beirut. And this means that Israel’s operation will drag the Lebanese army into this confrontation, at least with military-technical resources.
B. Netanyahu's announced withdrawal from the basic and consensual two-state solution, which indirectly entails resolution 242, automatically aggravates the problem of the Lebanese and Syrian border. Tel Aviv constantly attacks Iranian and pro-Iranian formations in Syria, bases in Aleppo and in the suburbs of Damascus, but still these actions did not address the pending issue of the state border.
Now it turns out that Israel will have to further militarize the Golan Heights, but from the point of view of international law that is still in force, they are territories occupied by Israel. Israel denied such an interpretation in relation to the Golan, but it did not deny resolution 242 itself, but precisely its interpretation. Well, what if the resolution becomes irrelevant?
Any Israeli operation in Lebanon will multiply the traffic of weapons to Hezbollah through Syria, and where is it more convenient to strike on the mountain roads of Anti-Lebanon if a military operation is underway in Southern Lebanon? From the same Golan Heights. And this is again militarization, again operations, only now against the Syrian air defense and the forces of official Damascus.
The “international community” will be blamed
In general, we are watching how B. Netanyahu, against the backdrop of American and international pressure, as well as the lack of obvious successes in the Gaza Strip, decides to unite Israeli society around himself, as well as the diaspora, according to the principle “We are against everyone, everyone is against us, we are in a besieged fortress " And under this flag, he is moving towards a serious escalation throughout the northern perimeter and in the West Bank.
But what is this old and experienced politician counting on? Has he really “gone crazy,” as many publications now write? It’s unlikely, he’s not one of those people who makes truly impulsive decisions. In his “right office” there are such characters, but not himself.
By intensifying actions along the Lebanese and Syrian border, with the simultaneous consolidation of society, B. Netanyahu will have, on the one hand, the opportunity to reduce the intensity of operations in Gaza itself, and the main criticism he receives is precisely for the methods of fighting in Gaza.
On the other hand, in the event of the inevitable completion of these undertakings through slippage in all directions, he will traditionally be able to declare that it is not Israel that has stopped, but the whole world and this “useless UN”, misguided European allies, “hidden communists” in the USA, etc. .p. forced Israel to retreat from a “decisive solution” to the issue with all enemies. The “international community” will be to blame, because without these frameworks for “little Israel”, all enemies would have come to a well-deserved end.
This technique is familiar to Israeli politicians and, moreover, is accepted by a significant part of the population. So Israel came out of the Second Lebanon War, and came out with the full conviction that the “international community” had put weights on Israel, but this not only applies to the 2006 operation, the end of the Six-Day War with its results is also often viewed in a similar vein.
This will really help B. Netanyahu get out of a long government crisis, even taking into account the tragedy of October 7, 2023. Another thing is that the United States, which is the main foreign policy and military support of Israel, may simply not be able to cope with such a multi-vector conflict either technically or diplomatically.
In Arab sources you can see reports that the Biden administration is preparing almost tons of compromising evidence against B. Netanyahu in order to slow down the unyielding Israeli prime minister, but if these reports are true, then they are only bringing the next Lebanese-Israeli military crisis closer. Moreover, in Israeli society, with its real current atmosphere of a “besieged fortress,” this will no longer be perceived convincingly enough.
Apparently, we will soon see several more attempts by the United States to reach a compromise with B. Netanyahu on reducing the intensity of fighting in Gaza while simultaneously increasing military activity against the Yemeni Houthis - the United States will try to bring the scheme to an end, especially since the naval operation is formally diverting considerable strength and means. There are not very many chances yet that B. Netanyahu will give in.
For now, Russia probably needs to urgently think about the fact that, despite all the problems, it is necessary to somehow further strengthen the Syrian air defense. However, not only Russia, but also Iran. Both Iran and Russia will now have to “look around” very carefully, because there is no doubt that forces will be distracted and separated from various sides, and the situation will also have to be monitored by pro-Turkish formations in Syria.
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