About some important factors related to Iran's strikes on Iraq, Syria and Pakistan
On the night of January 15 and on the night of January 16, Iran launched massive missile attacks on the territory of Iraqi Kurdistan and Syria, as well as Pakistan.
This is not the first time the Iranians have struck Iraqi territory, but this attack was the most serious since 2020, when Iran carried out a retaliation operation for the death of K. Soleimani. This is the first time such attacks have been carried out on Pakistani territory.
Both actions are aimed at “fighting terrorism” in response to the terrorist attack in Kerman, Iran on January 3. On this day, mourning events were held dedicated to the memory, again, of K. Soleimani. As a result of explosions in funeral processions, 94 people were killed and 290 people were injured of varying degrees of severity. The Islamic State group (ISIS - banned in the Russian Federation) claimed responsibility.
Iran's targets in Iraqi Kurdistan were in and near the capital of the region - Erbil (8 objects - 11 missiles), in Syria - the province of Aleppo (6 objects - 13 missiles), in Pakistan - the mountainous areas of the province of Balochistan (3 objects - 6 missiles and unmanned vehicles). The launch took place from the southwestern part of Iran (Khuzestan province).
Even from a purely technical point of view, this attack can be compared in effect to the beginning of Russia’s Syrian campaign in 2015.
Iran chose its launch points to demonstrate the range of its weapons. From Khuzestan to the affected areas in Pakistan and Syria, the range is 1–200 km. In 1, the Iranians previously fired at Iraqi Kurdistan and US bases in Iraq from a more “comfortable” distance. Here an equidistant province has been chosen, from where, if we take those same 400–2020 km, the Persian Gulf is also covered from the north. The distance is also excessive for shelling the Quetta district in Pakistani Balochistan bordering Iran.
However, in this case, Iran demonstrated not only its impressive range and the ease with which it can carry out multiple independent operations, but also the high accuracy of its weapons.
In January 2020, the Iranians launched 22 ballistic missiles at the American military base of Ain al-Assad. Despite the fact that half of them were Quam-1, which have the declared characteristics of the warhead - a serious 750 kg, the destruction at the base turned out to be relatively modest. The Americans said that all the victims “escaped with injuries,” the Iranians said that more than a hundred Americans died. Where the truth is, no one will know for a long time. In this case, the Iranians demonstrated high accuracy with less power.
It should be noted that in 2020, the Americans indirectly received a warning about the fact of a retaliatory strike, without specifying the location. This time no one was warned about anything.
That is, we see that Iran not only carried out retaliatory strikes, but also demonstrated a significant increase in its material and technical base compared to the previous period of aggravation in the region. In 2015, Russia's demonstration of high-precision and long-range weapons had a rather sobering effect on the United States and NATO. Now it is Iran's turn, and here, without a doubt, the addressee is not so much the United States as Israel.
Iran justifies its actions as follows. The militants who carried out the terrorist attack in Kerman were brought from ISIS cells in Aleppo, with transshipment in Iraqi Kurdistan. They also crossed the border through Iraqi Kurdistan. After the crime was committed, the remaining members of the groups moved through Balochistan to Pakistan. There, together with other cells, new attacks on Iran were planned. The operation was supervised, as they say in Iran, by the Israeli service Mossad, which has not very publicized offices in Iraqi Kurdistan, in particular in Erbil.
From the point of view of the theoretical scheme, there is nothing impossible here. Actually, in Iraqi Kurdistan they never particularly hid their cooperation with Israel. There is a military base near Erbil where American and Israeli transport workers (Harir) are constantly stationed, and they also use the international airport itself.
This is quite unpleasant for Iranians, considering that from Erbil to the Iranian border in a straight line is about 100 km, and to Tehran – 650 km. Regular flights, passenger Tehran - Erbil, by the way, fly. Problems are problems, but you have to live and trade. Ground passenger traffic is also quite dense.
Having Iran as neighbors, and the impossibility of real control over the work of the Israelis, the Kurds constantly find themselves in the crosshairs of Tehran, despite the density of population and trade.
In general, in terms of security, the Kurds have a rather difficult situation.
Firstly, they cannot guarantee that the Mossad, which, on the one hand, helps with training, will not do something secretly and on its own, leaving Erbil to collect all the big shots.
Secondly, on the territory of Iraqi Kurdistan there are mountain bases of the Kurdistan Workers' Party and villages associated with it. The PKK feels quite free in the Yazidi territories (Sinjar), and it is necessary to conduct business with them regarding the transit of oil to Turkey. At the same time, it constantly flies from Turkey to Iraqi Kurdistan as part of Ankara’s operations against the Workers’ Party.
At the same time, “who needs it” in Turkey understands that part of the oil that the Turks themselves buy is, in fact, the “share of the Workers’ Party”, simply formalized as a kind of “swap”.
Thirdly, the Iraqi Kurds have extremely difficult relations with the Americans. On the one hand, the United States literally tripped up the Kurds during the independence referendum in September 2017. The then curator of the region, B. McGurk, generally had a negative attitude towards the government of M. Barzani. Instead of holding a referendum and supporting it in some kind of “soft scheme” in relation to Baghdad, he did not invent anything and simply came out categorically against it, turning the administration against it as well.
Thus, the United States actually opened the way for the Iranians, who, for obvious reasons, needed this referendum even less than Washington or Baghdad. K. Soleimani carried out a unique military-political operation, brilliant for Iran and deadly for the idea of independence of Iraqi Kurdistan. He played so delicately on the contradictions between the two main clans after the death of D. Talabani that his opponents could only shrug their shoulders.
This US role in Iraqi Kurdistan will be remembered for a very long time. But on the other hand, in this region they hope that when the time comes for the United States to withdraw its bases from Iraq, it will be possible to conclude a long-term agreement with them and relocate part of the American contingents to Iraqi Kurdistan. From the point of view of relations with Turkey and Baghdad, this will be a serious long-term trump card, because despite all the autonomy and “almost” independence, relations with both players are based on oil production and transit. In this eternal issue, Erbil will not refuse additional support.
And here we can observe additional goals that Iran is already pursuing. If the blow in 2020 could be considered an excess, an isolated phenomenon. Today, attacks on US bases in Syria and Iraq are ongoing. But what will happen if official Iran and its armed forces are already involved in such attacks? The United States is already forced to move one of its military bases in Syria to the north. And under these conditions, it becomes quite dangerous for the United States to gain strength in Iraqi Kurdistan. Moreover, Iran can reach the airfields there without the use of special means. There would be desire and determination, and they were just demonstrated.
This one is very unpleasant story with missile strikes looks like official Baghdad, which periodically has to justify itself to the population for acts of Turkish attacks. After all, de jure Iraqi Kurdistan is part of the state of Iraq.
But here we must take into account the mood not of the political elite, but of the population itself. And the mood is such that even the Iraqi Shiite Sadrists, who are not the most friendly towards Iran, completely share the goals of the attack. They are supported even by pro-Turkish Turkomans who are generally anti-American. In general, it is difficult to find any group there that is complimentary towards the United States and especially Israel.
That is, Tehran created political problems for Baghdad, but did not gain any points in terms of public support. Considering the peculiarities of the political field in Iraq, it is this “grassroots” approval that will play to his advantage in terms of the development of economic contacts and transport contracts in the future.
It remains to be understood why there is a sharp deterioration in relations with Pakistan, through which Iran plans to extend trade routes and, in general, is building adequate work schemes. But the nuance is that in Pakistan there are major elections in a month, in fact, during which N. Sharif moved back to the country from London. Now a “technical government” is actually operating in Islamabad, and Tehran chose to work through this window of opportunity by armed means. Later, when the power vertical in Pakistan takes on a new configuration, this will be extremely difficult to do.
But Iran has demonstrated, including to “its separatists,” that the Quetta region, through which the future trade route passes, is closely monitored by Tehran’s services.
The timing here is pretty accurate. Therefore, when Iran says it will “respond when it deems it necessary,” this is not just a figure of speech.
We see that the United States does not need hot spots in Syria and Iraq. Washington would prefer, together with the “European coalition,” to launch expensive ammunition from the sea over the desert mountains of the Yemeni coast than to get involved in “responsibility for Iraq.” At the same time, for Iran, the best strategy seems to be a slow and without dangerous excesses pushing the United States out of Iraq and Syria.
However, we have forces in the Middle East that really need to expand the map of hot spots, as, in fact, the “endless” operation regime in the Gaza Strip.
There is little doubt that Iran's message that the United States should put Israel's anti-Iranian activities in Iraq on the brakes will be heard. Another thing is that the United States is so far demonstrating only relative influence on its Middle Eastern strategic ally, although the pressure on Israel from the Americans is getting stronger.
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