Monetary reform of 1947: how inflation was overcome in the post-war USSR

A situation when a large amount of cash accumulates in the hands of the population, while the supply of goods and services is at a low level, the cost of the latter increases significantly, thereby depreciating the currency and accelerating inflation.

This is precisely the situation in which the Soviet Union found itself during and after the Great Patriotic War. For comparison, in 1941 there were 18,4 billion rubles in circulation in the USSR, and in 1945 this figure already reached 72 billion.

It is worth noting that the Soviet leadership took the first steps to reduce the money supply in the hands of the population already in 1944, opening commercial stores in Moscow and then in other cities.

Prices in such trading shops were several times higher than on cards, but lower than in the markets. By the way, about the latter, prices for agricultural products by 1943 increased 19 times when compared with pre-war prices.

As a result, this measure brought results. But it was not sufficient to effectively solve the problem of inflation.

In this regard, a large-scale monetary reform was carried out in 1947, during which old money was exchanged for new ones in the ratio of 1 new bill to 10 old ones.

It is worth adding here that this step by I.V. Stalin was offered to implement it back in 1943. However, he decided to postpone the process until after the war, since during the fighting some quartermasters and other “unclean” citizens could have accumulated new banknotes.

As a result of the reform, only 14 billion remained in the hands of the population and organizations. In addition, food cards and commercial stores were abolished. Instead, the government introduced fixed prices for food products, which were higher than rationed prices, but lower than commercial ones.

Comments

[svp67]

As a result of the money reform, the population and organizations were left with only 14 billion.

And the front-line soldiers “burned out” all their savings received as a result of the war, and the amounts were decent

[Arkadich]

Many people there burned down. Of course, it hit the speculators, but the people also suffered enough.

[Ross xnumx]

Quote: svp67

the amounts were decent

Quote: Arkadich

Many people there burned down.

The conditions for the upcoming monetary reform were set out in Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks No. 4004 of December 14, 1947 “On carrying out monetary reform and the abolition of cards for food and industrial goods.” The resolution was signed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR I. Stalin and the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A. Zhdanov.
The Resolution established the procedure for exchanging old money for new ones, and also determined the conditions for the revaluation of cash deposits in savings banks and the State Bank of the USSR. When recalculating wages, money was exchanged in such a way that wages remained unchanged. For deposits in savings banks, amounts up to 3 thousand rubles were also exchanged one to one; for deposits from 3 to 10 thousand rubles, savings were reduced by one third of the amount; for deposits in the amount of over 10 thousand rubles, half the amount was withdrawn. Those who kept money at home received one new ruble for ten old ones upon exchange. Preferential conditions for the revaluation of savings were also established for holders of government loan bonds: bonds of mass loans were exchanged for bonds of a new loan in a ratio of 3:1, bonds of a freely marketable loan of 1938 - in a ratio of 5:1, and bonds of a 1947 loan were not subject to revaluation. From a government decree of December 14, 1947

As for the front-line soldiers:
What benefits did Stalin cancel for front-line soldiers after the war?
https://von-hoffmann.livejournal.com/881579.html
* * *
It’s especially a pity that the bonuses were cancelled. Rewards received in blood have been devalued. It’s despicable when they received thanks for the death of their breadwinner (missing people). But this is war, and it was necessary to establish a peaceful life after such devastation...
And at the same time, no one built palaces and yachts for themselves...

[Old electrician]

And the front-line soldiers “burned out” all their savings received as a result of the war, and the amounts were decent

– another sufferer among hundreds of millions of innocent people executed?
During the monetary reform of 1947, it was not the money of the front-line soldiers that burned, but your conscience. Basic terms of exchange:
1. All old banknotes were exchanged at the rate of one new ruble for ten old ones;
2. Bank deposits up to 3 thousand rubles were exchanged at rates of 1 to 1; over 3 thousand, but not more than 10 - 1 to 2/3 of the old ones, and over 10 thousand - at the rate of 1 to 1/3.
What salaries did the military have? In August 1941, the salary of the chief of staff of the regiment was 900 rubles, by the end of 1942 - 1300 rubles. The salary of the division chief of staff was 1400 rubles; by the end of 1942 it became 1900 rubles. The salary of the corps chief of staff increased from 1700 to 2200 rubles.
The average level of salaries of military personnel can be judged by the salaries of military technicians and doctors. The salary of a radio engineer was 675 rubles, a weapon technician - 700 rubles, a paramedic - 650 rubles, a doctor - 800 rubles.
As of 1946, 3981 million rubles were stored in the field institutions of the State Bank of the USSR. by 2643 thousand people. On average 1500 rubles. per person. Such amounts were converted into new money 1:1. Those. a front-line soldier who had 1500 rubles on deposit received 1500 rubles after the reform, which corresponded to 15000 old ones. If a front-line soldier had a deposit from 3000 to 10000 rubles, for example, 6000 rubles, then after the reform he had 4000 rubles left, which corresponded to 40000 rubles. old. If a front-line soldier had 15000 rubles on deposit, then after the reform he had 5000 rubles left. Which corresponds to 50000 old. Thus, everyone who kept money in savings banks clearly benefited from the monetary reform of 1947. This is not the fraudulent Khrushchev reform of 1961.
But those who kept millions of rubles acquired through unsustainable speculation during the war years. A cruel bummer awaited in the mattresses. Because there was a ceiling on cash exchange. In addition, large sums of cash could only be exchanged upon presentation of a passport. Therefore, the lucky ones, who managed to exchange the stolen goods in two weeks, but were unable to explain the source of their wealth, soon went to places not so remote.
Due to the inability to expose and exchange stolen goods, an epidemic of heart attacks swept across the country in 1947. Worse than Covid. A classic example was told to me by my aunt. In one communal apartment in Moscow lived an inconspicuous employee - a rolling need, poverty under the fence. When the currency reform was announced, he had a heart attack and amen! When we went into his room, there was literally only a clothes nail, a nightstand and a bed. Looking at this poverty, the neighbors pitched in and buried the poor fellow with their own money. No one was interested in his junk and they decided to burn it along with the bedbugs. In the fire, the mattress burst, and bundles of money, already useless at that time, fell into the fire. Citizen Koreiko had thousands and thousands of imitators.

[Sergej1972]

What is the scam of the Khrushchev reform? It was not even a reform in essence, but of denominations. They just removed one zero.

[pettabyte]

Quote: svp67

And the front-line soldiers “burned out”

Do you need candy wrappers or purchasing power?
They have already depreciated.

Again, during the war it was possible to give gold for food (there were often cases when, say, a chain was cut and a piece was taken to the market), estimate how much hucksters, bandits and others had accumulated?

And most importantly, reform 1947 year.
There, the front-line soldiers could already rent/spend (almost) everything. And most likely there was no longer much left in the accounts.

In short, it smells like garbage.

[Ross xnumx]

In the Soviet Union they knew many ways (including the 400 that Ostap Bender spoke about) of taking money. Any monetary reform was connected with this. Only honest hard workers didn’t have a lot of money. And during the war years, many Khanygs made their capital from blood.
By the way, OB did not take money from the poor:

[Glagol1]

This reform was confiscatory - at the exchange rate only 3000 rubles were exchanged, the rest turned into candy wrappers. There were probably other options - for example, exchange 3000 at the exchange rate and the rest with reducing factors, for example 3000 - 10000 half, 10000 - 25000 - quarter, etc. An option was also discussed in which citizens could buy zero-coupon bonds with a multi-year maturity. Of course, not only hucksters and speculators fell under this reform. During the war, bonuses were paid at the front; for destroyed German equipment, for example, for a tank or plane, they paid 500 - 1000 rubles. It is clear that many front-line soldiers, especially pilots, had money in their savings books. Stalin was in no hurry with reform; in 1944, intensive negotiations were underway with the United States on post-war reconstruction and the option of allocating a multi-billion long-term preferential loan to the USSR was considered, but in return we had to “lie down” to the dollar. Stalin was not satisfied with this option and... The USSR was a country where the property of citizens was an insignificant institution; it was taken away easily and quickly. Here it is in 1947 - they took away 2/3 of all the money from citizens. Everyone has the right to evaluate this for themselves. I would go the route of issuing long-term bonds...

[Ross xnumx]

Quote: Glagol1

Here it is in 1947 - they took away 2/3 of all the money from citizens. Everyone has the right to evaluate this for themselves. I would go the route of issuing long-term bonds...

In 1991-1992, almost all the money was taken away from citizens...Compensation for 15 Soviet rubles amounted to 000 Russian...This is not even 30/000.
And there was no war...
But more than a thousand banks appeared

[Glagol1]

The collapse of communism is comparable to war. The consequences of the collapse of the empire created a tsunami that washed away almost everything!

[zombirusrev]

Where would you go, no one asks you, and under the USSR in those years they lowered prices every year, thereby increasing the value of the monetary unit. Those. your cash ruble was constantly increasing in absolute value. “There was a time when prices were reduced..”//V.S. Vysotsky//

[Old electrician]

The USSR was a country where the property of citizens was an insignificant institution; it was taken away easily and quickly. Here it is in 1947 - they took away 2/3 of all the money from citizens...

- Wow! You forgot to say that all of them were then shot according to the lists, and then exiled to the uranium mines of Kolyma.
All anti-Sovietism is based on lies. In turn, anti-Sovietism is the highest form of Russophobia. Therefore, being a Russophobe, you pitifully pretend to be a patriot:

During the war, bonuses were paid at the front; for destroyed German equipment, for example, for a tank or plane they paid 500 - 1000 rubles. It is clear that many front-line soldiers, especially pilots, had money in their savings books...

and continue to shamelessly and brazenly lie.
I explain arithmetic specifically for the victims of the Unified State Exam.
Cash was exchanged from 10 old rubles to 1 new ruble. The upper limit is 10000 rubles. This is two annual salaries of a highly skilled worker. Large sums were exchanged only using a passport and then finding out where this amount came from. For the speculators who hid what they stole during the war in mattresses, this was a complete no-no. Because they could not legalize their capital in the shortest possible time and the ace died.
The pilots, unlike speculators, did not hide their money in mattresses, but kept it in the field institutions of the State Bank of the USSR. In 1946, the average amount of military personnel's deposits in field institutions of the State Bank of the USSR was 1500 rubles. Up to 3000 rub. deposits were exchanged in the amount of 10 old rubles for 10 new ones. Those. in 1947 1500 rubles. on the front-line soldier’s contribution automatically increased 10 times. Not a bad bonus!
If the deposit amount was more than 3000 rubles, but less than 10000 rubles, then 10 old rubles were exchanged for 6 rubles. 66 kopecks Also a good bonus for pilots! You will be surprised, but 6 rubles. 66 kopecks this is more than 1 ruble when exchanging 10 rubles. in cash.
If the deposit amount was more than 10000 rubles, then for 10 old rubles they gave 3 rubles. 33 kopecks In these times, such a gift is simply a fairy tale! You will be surprised again, but 3 rubles. 33 kopecks this is more than 1 ruble when exchanging 10 rubles. in cash. However, unlike the exchange of cash, there was no ceiling for the exchange of deposits.
All that remains is to add that your false concern for front-line soldiers causes nothing but disgust.
PS. Apparently you and svp67 are using the same manual from the Washington Regional Committee.

[Sergej1972]

As I understand it, if the contribution was large, then during the calculation the parts up to 3 thousand, from 3 to 10 thousand and over 10 thousand were recalculated separately? Or was the entire amount of such a deposit recalculated according to one norm? Sorry if I misunderstood anything in your comment.

[Old electrician]

As I understand it, if the contribution was large, then during the calculation the parts up to 3 thousand, from 3 to 10 thousand and over 10 thousand were recalculated separately?

Regardless of the size of the deposit, its recalculation took place according to the same norm. But the norm itself depended on the size of the deposit:
With a deposit of up to 3000 rubles. old 10 rub. deposits were exchanged for 10 new rubles. Those. the exchange rate was 1:1. Glagol1 confusingly interprets this as confiscation of everything over 3000 rubles.
With a deposit from 3000 to 10000 rubles. old 10 rub. deposits were changed to new 6 rubles. 66 kopecks Exchange rate 1:2/3. Glagol1 interprets this as confiscation of 1/3 of the deposit.
For deposits over 10000 rubles. old 10 rub. deposits were changed to new 3 rubles. 33 kopecks Exchange rate 1:1/3. Glagol1 interprets this as confiscation of 2/3 of the deposit, pretending not to know about the cash exchange at the rate of 1:1/10.
I talked with those who witnessed the monetary reform of 1947. All of them unanimously praised the decision on the bonus recalculation of deposits and openly gloated over the ruin of speculators.
Finally, let’s briefly compare the reform of 1947 with Khrushchev’s monetary reform of 1961.
Remembering the currency reform of 1947, at the first rumors about a new currency reform, people began to collect change. Because in 1947, change, regardless of denomination, was exchanged 1:1. However, Nikita, unwillingly, shodded everyone: those who collected change, and those who kept money in the savings bank, and those who did nothing, hoping for “maybe.”
I’ll tell you about the little things right away. Unlike 1947, in 1961 only coins in denominations of 1, 1, 1 and 2 kopecks were exchanged at a 3:5 rate. It was impossible to collect even the slightest significant amount from them. Therefore, everyone who dreamed of making money on small things immediately broke down.
According to the official version, the reform was carried out

...in order to facilitate money circulation and give greater value to money...

.
In reality, the monetary reform of 1961, presented to the general public as a simple denomination, was a devaluation of the Soviet ruble in relation to foreign currencies and gold. Thus, the official exchange rate of the US dollar, which was 1:4 before the reform, was changed not by 10 times, like salaries, pensions, household deposits in savings banks and the scale of prices in the public sector of the economy, but only by 4,44 times and after the reform it amounted to 90 kopecks for 1 US dollar. In the same way, the gold content of the ruble was changed by 4,44 times. If before the reform it was 0,222168 grams per 1 Stalinist ruble or 2,22168 grams per 10 rubles, then after the reform it was only 0,987412 grams in a ruble that allegedly increased in price 10 times.
At the same time, the actual reduction by 2,25 times of the gold content and the exchange rate of Soviet money to foreign currencies and, accordingly, a decrease in the purchasing power of ruble wages (not only in relation to imports, but also when purchasing jewelry, goods on collective farms and other markets) was presented in official communications as

increase in gold content and ruble exchange rate

.
The collective farm market immediately felt this devaluation and prices there, in terms of old rubles, soared. In conditions when private farms began to be squeezed (another component of Khrushchev’s reforms), general speculation began, based on the resale of goods distributed to state stores. The store director, store manager and salesperson suddenly became “respected” people. The already growing commodity famine caused by the virgin lands and corn scams has sharply worsened due to the deficit artificially created by such dealers. When store shelves were completely empty, goods were resold at exorbitant prices under the counter or offered at the state price, but as a bribe. Currency speculators and black marketeers flourished, and currency prostitutes appeared. OBKhSS was knocked off its feet.
It was not possible to fool the people, as evidenced by an anecdote from that time:
Meets N.S. Khrushchev (N.S.) of the worker (R) and asks him:
- How do you like the new ruble?
R: - oh Nikita Sergeevich, I like it, oh how great! Oh how good!
N.S. - Why?
R: - well, of course!!! Earlier by 10 rubles. you could only drink, but now for 10 rubles. You can not only drink, but also have a snack!
The icing on the cake of the 1961 monetary reform was that at the end of May 1962 it was decided to increase retail prices for meat and meat products by an average of 30% and for butter by 25%. The newspapers presented this event as

request of all workers

.
The logical finale of the monetary and other Khrushchev reforms was the “Novocherkassk execution” of hungry workers in the city of Novocherkassk, Rostov region of the RSFSR on June 1-3, 1962. One of the main organizers of this massacre was A.I. Mikoyan: member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, in 1955-1964. First Deputy Head of the USSR Government. A.I. Mikoyan was one of the most active exposers of Stalin's crimes.
There were three anti-Stalin companies in the USSR:
Perestroika of 1928-1937 ended with its foremen being put against the wall in 1937-1939.
Perestroika of 1953-1964 ended with the liquidation of Bolshevism as an ideological movement. Historical paradox: after the 3th Congress of the CPSU, anti-Sovietism in the USSR became state policy. Before the XNUMXrd Perestroika, propagandists of the USSR and the USA tirelessly competed to see who could spit more deliciously at the Stalinist USSR. It is enough to name the anti-Soviet writer Shalamov, favored by the USSR authorities, and his Soviet colleagues in the anti-Soviet workshop.
Perestroika of 1985-1991 finally realized Trotsky's dreams of eliminating the USSR.
In all three cases, a simple rule was in effect: the more screams about the horrors of Stalinism, the more successfully the pockets of the population were emptied. It is also noteworthy that the foremen of Perestroika of 1985-1991 are now all as one in the West and are calling from there for the genocide of Russians.

[Frank Muller]

An even more preferential rate turned out to be for those military and civilian specialists who were “stuck” abroad. My grandfather, then an Air Force colonel, met his front-line comrades who had returned from Bulgaria, where after the war they served as instructors, training pilots of the fraternal army. Surprised by how their army colleagues in the USSR suffered, the military brothers-in-arms admitted that their personal savings remained almost intact. Entering the store, one of them (grandfather’s best friend, known to him since Finnish), looking at the price tag of the triple cologne, muttered displeasedly: “5 rubles!? Expensive!” And then, after sitting with the whole company for a couple of hours in a restaurant and paying there with no less than a thousand from his wallet, he laughed cheerfully: “You squandered more than a thousand? And to hell with the money! We still have a lot left.” True, how much “he still has left”, he left a secret.

[Sergej1972]

As I understand it, deposits in savings banks over 3 thousand were also exchanged, but at a reduced rate. A significant part of the cash turned into candy wrappers.

[Ignatius555]

We are also fighting inflation by raising the key rate, although here the relationship is the opposite, but that’s okay, everything can be explained to the people. They make sure that production does not develop, no one produces or buys anything. Woe reformers, they should learn from Stalin.

[Sergej1972]

Some kind of formal reply. Why was it necessary to post such material?

[zombirusrev]

Under socialism there is no inflation, there is a rebalancing of the money supply.

[steelmaker]

“In this regard, in 1947, a large-scale monetary reform was carried out, during which old money was exchanged for new ones in the ratio of 1 new bill to 10 old ones...”
I have long seen Russian paper money online in denominations of 1-5-20 rubles. It looks like we will have this reform too. This means that this war, the Northern Military District, has been planned for a long time. And this is not a war. As one “Chechen” said, this is politics and business. This is not how you fight in war.

[Frank Muller]

Papers in denominations of 5 and 10 rubles (the latter existed before, but now they have been returned to circulation and issue) have been in the trading network and in circulation for a long time. If I'm not mistaken, they came across them back in November last year. Their appearance and return to circulation seems to be explained not so much by inflation as by savings on metal. And where is metal needed now, I suppose you yourself understand?

[Frank Muller]

Papers in denominations of 5 and 10 rubles (the latter existed before, but now they have been returned to circulation and issue) have been in the trading network and in circulation for a long time. If I'm not mistaken, they came across them back in November last year. Their appearance and return to circulation seems to be explained not so much by inflation as by savings on metal. And where is metal needed now, I suppose you yourself understand?

[Jacques sekavar]

The Stalinist reform of 47 reduced the money supply and leveled out the imbalance in the money and commodity supply, and increased the purchasing power of new banknotes. This made it possible to abolish the card system, reduce speculation, and then reduce prices for essential goods; legends about that reform still circulate, especially against the backdrop of modern times.
The new reform is long overdue, and the social system predetermines its predatory nature, which will be akin to Chubais’ privatization, which the leaders of the economic bloc insist on under the pretext of reducing the role of the state in the market economy and replenishing the budget.