Briefly about the results of the year: on the eve of the Battle of India, will Gaullism be revived in France? And a little about myth-making
On the eve of the Battle of India, or an elixir of vigor for the Russian defense industry
We can talk about the political results of the past year for a long time and in the format of more than one article. But if briefly and abstracting from the main thing, that is, from the events taking place at the front - and they should be talked about exclusively by those who are responsible for planning and conducting operations - then 2023, in my opinion, is marked by the consolidation of a number of myths in the public consciousness , having an indirect relation to the reality emerging on the international stage.
We will talk about them in the most general terms.
But I would like to start not with myths, but with the obvious: with the ever-increasing role of India in the international arena. Because cooperation with it in the military-technical sphere plays an extremely important role for the Russian economy.
Plus, traditionally and since the times of the USSR, we are accustomed to considering India as a partner of Moscow - those over fifty remember the visits of I. Gandhi to our country and the flight of R. Sharma to Soyuz T-11 – this year, by the way, marks his fortieth anniversary.
In fact, the partnership between the two countries continues. But it should be taken into account: despite the proclaimed course Look EastIndia is increasingly focused on cooperation in the field of security and defense technology with the United States, Israel and France, and is pursuing a policy of diversifying arms suppliers, thereby reducing dependence on Russia.
No, it is unlikely that we will find ourselves broke in the foreseeable future. However, our gradual ousting from the Indian arms market is quite possible, especially considering New Delhi’s desire to develop its own defense industry, independent of external supplies, within the framework of the course proclaimed by N. Modi Made in India.
Yes, here for the Indians not everything is going the way they would like, and, let’s say, Tanks Arjun or fighters Roof tiles, as well as the products of their own defense industry, in general are not yet able to compete with foreign analogues. But just for now.
And with a certain amount of reservations, the past year can be called the eve of the Battle of India. An important result, you will agree. Especially in the context of the US Indo-Pacific concepts, where cooperation with New Delhi, as a kind of link between East and West, plays a vital role.
France is also trying not to lag behind in rapprochement with India and is trying to squeeze Russia in the Indian arms market. So, in 2019, New Delhi acquired a batch Flurry, instead of Russian Su-30 MKI – more budget-friendly than French planes. Ahead is a possible Indo-French contract for the construction of submarines. Cooperation between India and the Fifth Republic in the energy sector is also steadily developing. In general, the Russian defense industry has plenty of reasons to stay awake.
Now about the myths.
So, the first of them: the Global North opposing the Global South
Both are too speculative constructs, capable of confusing rather than helping to understand the principles of arranging the main pieces on the great - let's remember Z. Brzezinski - chessboard.
What kind of Global North can we talk about in the context of the difficult relations between the nuclear powers: France, Great Britain and the United States?
It is enough to consider them through the prism of the relatively recent, but very painful for Paris, conflict with AUCUS, when Australia broke a contract with France for the supply of submarines of the Attack. Just as we should not forget the difficult vicissitudes of the dialogue between Paris and London around the island of Jersey.
Of course, it will not come to a military clash between them, but unity on many positions is of a purely declarative nature. There are plenty of Franco-British contradictions in their views on both European security and the problem of migration.
In addition, it is worth remembering that the bearer of Gaullist ideas and who put them into practice in the presidential chair, Giscard d’Estaing, died relatively recently, having managed to recognize Crimea as Russian. And the opinion of the political elite, although it does not hold official positions, is significant in France.
By the way, in this regard, let me remind you that the operation Danube did not significantly affect Soviet-French relations. For the founder of the Fifth Republic was a pragmatist and considered the Kremlin’s actions as completely logical to ensure its own security in Europe.
And, I think, in the current conditions, the possibility of France returning to the Gaullism policy has not been fully exhausted.
This is not about a defensive doctrine in all directions or a re-exit from the NATO military structure; we can talk about a more independent course of France regarding the one imposed on the North Atlantic Alliance by the Anglo-Saxons.
One of the markers of this kind of independence is Paris’s attempt to get closer to Beijing - in fact, here is another reason for you to argue about the artificiality of the confrontation between North and South.
Let me remind you that in April last year, E. Macron visited China together with U. von der Leyen. The owner of the Elysee Palace emphasized the importance of further development of scientific and technical cooperation with China, contrary to the strategy of the United States, which opposes the transfer of high-tech technologies to Beijing.
Further: Macron noted the unnecessaryness of bloc thinking in relation to China. This statement, in my opinion, should be understood in the context of a veiled criticism of the Anglo-Saxon course of confrontation with Beijing, and, in a broader sense, as disagreement with the dictates of the United States in Europe itself. The French president spoke about this more directly upon returning to his homeland - his words about the difference between allied relations with the United States and the vassalage format.
Moreover, what is important, Macron’s complimentary statements towards Beijing were made against the backdrop of harsh anti-Chinese rhetoric by von der Leyen, who literally on the eve of her joint visit with the French president called the Middle Kingdom a strategic enemy of the West and called for limiting Chinese investment in Europe.
Is France returning to Gaullism?
It is not surprising that during the visit the French president avoided imposed? to him by Frau Brussels, focusing on the above-mentioned trade and economic cooperation. After all, the French have a number of production facilities in China, which is virtually the only trading partner of the Fifth Republic.
And another important detail: Macron, according to one of the leading Russian sinologists, Alexei Maslov, is the first politician after de Gaulle who is beginning to shape European meanings.
Let me add: in addition to the general, they were formulated by the owners of the Elysee Palace up to and including F. Mitterrand. But Macron’s attempt, in defiance of the Anglo-Saxons, to return to the policy of Gaullism, from my point of view, seems, if not obvious, then quite possible.
And likely, in the future, of sorts triumvirate of Russia, China and France is primarily beneficial to the latter. Because it will raise its political status, allow it to play a more independent role and turn it into a point of attraction for all those dissatisfied with the US dictatorship in Brussels.
And, most importantly, rapprochement with China and the reanimation of traditionally good relations with us will not jeopardize the balance of the aforementioned economic cooperation with the Middle Kingdom, which is so beneficial for the Fifth Republic, nor will it allow French business to return to the Russian market.
Actually, I will take the liberty of asserting that so far, yes, only weak, barely visible contours of such a triumvirate began to emerge on the horizon of the past year, becoming another important result of it.
It is no coincidence that Xi Jinping invited his French colleague to become a mediator in resolving the conflict taking place in Ukraine. Yes, D. Peskov then announced the impossibility of Paris’s mediation due to its support for the Kyiv regime.
But, as you know, Xi does not make statements that just shake the air. And if Macron refuses, in practice, and not declaratively, from a pro-Ukrainian strategy that does not meet the interests of France, then his mediation services may be quite useful. Moreover: I allow closed consultations on this matter between Paris and Moscow.
In the end, it was not in vain that I remembered Danube and d’Estaing: Since the mid-20th century, Paris has not crossed the boundaries of Moscow’s geopolitical interests in Eastern Europe. So Macron has someone to follow by example and not carry chestnuts out of the Ukrainian fire for the Americans.
The mentioned triumvirate is a much more practical project than the biased one of Iran, Russia and China, which I will talk about below.
The second myth is largely a derivative of the first: BRICS as a kind of alternative to the EU
However, the platform is receiving more and more justified criticism, the reasons for which lie on the surface. These include significant contradictions and even unresolved border disputes between India and China. And Argentina’s refusal to join the platform also does not help strengthen its image.
Miley was ordered from the heights of Capitol Hill not to join BRICS?
And another question: how will the accession of such problematic states as Ethiopia and Egypt affect the development of BRICS? The latter, by the way, can play the role of a Trojan horse, since Cairo is entirely focused on the United States, as evidenced by the current conflict between Israel and Hamas.
The third myth boils down to almost allied relations between Russia and China and Iran, including on the basis of confrontation with the United States
Firstly, the confrontation between our imaginary allies and the Americans is rather declarative in nature (a similar statement is no less appropriate regarding the Islamic Republic and Israel).
Beijing is focused not on confrontation with Washington, but on dialogue with it, on, if you like, a gentleman’s agreement on delimiting spheres of influence in the Asia-Pacific region, and, as it seems to me, without taking into account the interests of Moscow.
Simply put, China wants to trade, not fight, hence the talk a year ago about the possibility of its own military operation against Taiwan being extremely naive.
However, Beijing does not think in short-term terms, but prefers long-term planning, within the framework of which the island will sooner or later be integrated into the PRC peacefully, including through various kinds of preferences for Taiwanese business on the continent and the acceptance of the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the Republic of China into the PLA on decent conditions (salaries, pensions, length of service), and not in the bestial way the FRG treated former officers of the NNA of the GDR. However, there was annexation, not integration.
With Iran, things are also not so simple. Firstly, Tehran undoubtedly remembers history with the failed deliveries of the S-300, which happened a little over ten years ago during the presidency of D. A. Medvedev; secondly, the government of B. Assad, through joint Russian-Iranian efforts, did not repeat the fate of its Libyan colleagues. So what is next?
Further behind the façade of friendly rhetoric, our strategic interests with Iran are quite likely beginning to diverge. Russia is interested in stability in the Middle East, Iran is interested in expanding its sphere of influence, which could lead to a new round of confrontation in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Iran's broad stride: in which direction?
Well, and Transcaucasia: here Yerevan is able to rely on Iran, preferring it to Russia as a guarantor of its own security and even integrity. True, such a scenario seems unlikely to me, but it would be wrong not to take it into account, in the light of the interests of the counter-elite and the influential Armenian lobby within the Islamic Republic itself who want to overthrow N. Pashinyan.
Instead of an afterword, or about the danger of illusions
As a summary: illusions in the great geopolitical game are a dangerous thing. Let us remember Nicholas I, whose wrong steps on the political stage led to the Eastern War and a coalition of geopolitical rivals, Great Britain and France, which was completely unthinkable for him at that time.
And if you do not take into account political realities, then they are capable of presenting many more surprises. I’ll end with something banal: the past year showed that Washington’s attempt to isolate Russia in the international arena failed, but at the same time we did not have any more allies.
Can the incredible become obvious?
But the above-mentioned rapprochement between Russia and France is quite possible. I foresee an objection:
This is the kind of utopia.
Maybe. But, say, in 1970, a rapprochement between the United States and China seemed even more utopian, but a year later Taiwan gave up its place in the UN to the Celestial Empire, and a year later R. Nixon shook hands with Mao in Beijing.
What to go far: the restoration of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, thanks to the mediation of China and which seemed unthinkable to many, is also an important result of the past year, although it does not directly affect the interests of Russia.
Yes, another important political result: the strengthening of Russian positions in Africa - however, here the struggle is just unfolding between us, the United States and China.
Information