Thin Ice of Southern Lebanon for Israel
On December 18-19, almost simultaneously with the US announcement of the creation of a coalition to protect maritime communications, major Western media, one after another, launched information that Israel had developed a plan for a ground operation in Southern Lebanon. The stated purpose of the operation is to push back armed detachments of Palestinian forces and Hezbollah (*) to the borders along the river. Litani.
This is not the first time in recent months that an “exchange of views” between the Hezbollah movement and Tel Aviv regarding a direct and large-scale clash similar to the Second Lebanon War of 2006 has occurred. Another thing is that today the situation in Israel is such that this option cannot be written off.
No matter how firmness of intentions are expressed in Israel today, which is quite understandable and explainable, it must be admitted that the party within which Tel Aviv is conducting its military operations is one of the most difficult and dangerous for it in perhaps fifty years. Therefore, the exchange of threats should be considered, as they say, “in complex and in context.”
It is unlikely that the leadership in Israel does not understand the true rationale behind the creation of a naval coalition against the Yemeni Houthis. This is not the protection of shipping, which, by and large, the Yemeni movement does not even think of encroaching on.
This is a double game, where the United States is only further heating up the issue of maritime communications, which forces large shipping operators and insurance companies to transfer flights to the Atlantic.
Such routing creates not just problems with the cost of supplies, it is colossal pressure on Israel not only from politicians, but, worse, from investors and financiers, and then everyone else along the chain.
The task is clear - to wind down the active phase of the campaign at least by the end of January. The United States generally initially insisted on a date for the New Year, apparently on January 13th - elections in Taiwan.
The United States, by the way, must be given its due - they put pressure on Israel through third parties and even gracefully in their own way, another thing is that the irritation in Washington is colossal, considering how many projects in the region will then have to be reassembled again and how much effort is now diverted.
For Israel, or rather not even for Israel as a whole, but specifically for the political elites associated with B. Netanyahu, this option is extremely difficult. They need to not only delay the completion of the campaign, but delay it so as to get a clear result that can be shown to the population.
There are big problems with this and taking into account the pressure that is being put on Israel through maritime transport, taking into account the fact that B. Netanyahu’s office is essentially driven into a corner, taking into account the specific Israeli position of superiority in the region, one can really expect some escalation steps.
It may not necessarily be Lebanon, but the Lebanese direction has many of its own significant reasons and prerequisites.
The fact is that even for the outside world today the main news are coming from the south, but for Israel itself the situation in the north is quite gloomy.
Firstly, in two months the government of B. Netanyahu had to resettle entire villages and towns from the Israeli-Lebanese and Israeli-Syrian border zones. Some to large cities, others beyond the 30-40 km perimeter to be taken out of the direct fire sector.
The entire north of Israel is an area of border disputes that not only have their roots in past wars, but also symbolize past power and an absolute power position regarding what is understood as Israel's interests.
Several generations have grown up in this position, to whom it is almost impossible to explain that Israel, even in theory, can retreat from there. It is easier to justify that it is possible to leave some settlements in the West Bank, but not from the north.
Southern Lebanon in general has always been viewed in certain circles in the “terminal stage of nationalism” as part of the historical “Greater Israel”, and in less acute perceptions - as part of natural economic interests. Southern Lebanon is fertile compared to other areas, although it is inferior in this regard to the Bekaa Valley.
The Litani River is a valuable water resource and a natural border of the subregion. Actually, the territories south of the river. Litani has not yet been mastered by Israel; it is presented solely as a consequence of pressure from the main world players who historically do not allow Israel to develop. And few people in Israel would be against it if Southern Lebanon repeated the fate of the Golan Heights.
The second point is that in relation to Southern Lebanon in Israel, the perception is based on the principle “we can repeat it”: up to the river. The litani reached once, reached twice - we will reach the third.
The results of the Second Lebanon War in 2006 in the world as a whole are assessed not in favor of Israel at all; in Israel itself, outwardly it is believed that this is a victory, but the internal discussion is such that realism sometimes still takes over, and throwing begins: “what if We won’t be able to repeat it.”
And these doubts hang in the air like a sword of Damocles, getting in the way like a stone in a shoe. And now the government is being asked questions from everywhere: how long will they be resettled from the north? And in the north, Israeli barracks are being attacked, in some towns the housing stock has been destroyed by 50-60%, but there is no particular hope for the concrete border wall - it has already been crossed more than once by mobile groups of Palestinians and Hezbollah, through which I attack with mortars and ATGMs from the heights.
The third point is that through the concerted efforts of Israel and the United States, the Lebanese Palestinians were not only not fragmented, but, on the contrary, were united in a way that had not happened for twenty years. It may now be a more cohesive community than even the Palestinians in the West Bank.
The “region experts” of both countries can only blame themselves here, but this also means that playing on the Palestinian contradictions, as well as the contradictions between Hezbollah and the Palestinian currents in Southern Lebanon, will not work. Previously it was possible to do this, but today it is extremely difficult.
The difficulty is that of all attacks from the northern direction on Israel, Hezbollah directly belongs to 35-40 percent, the rest are Palestinian groups, even ideological communists. The Lebanese army was never taken seriously in Israel, but the army is a resource, and in such a situation, resources are a powerful argument.
In this regard, even from the point of view of the Israeli military, Southern Lebanon must be taken seriously. Not only is the entire border area there like a honeycomb, but the terrain is also difficult - rocky hills stretch along the border, where in 2006 the Israeli army stalled more than once with losses. After the war in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon also has heavy equipment, rockets and cannon artillery.
What else is important to understand. Israel is advancing in the Gaza Strip and reporting successes, but any success is always compared with other events. The world and even, unfortunately, Russia have already forgotten what the Israeli operation is actively compared to - the capture of Aleppo at the end of 2016. For external players this is already “something in the past”, but for the Arab world it is active memory.
Aleppo is the second largest urban agglomeration in Syria, and as a city itself it is generally number one - 3,8 million people. The city was taken by the forces of the Syrian army, Shiite formations, Russian Special Forces and Wagners, but (which is very important) with the direct participation of Hezbollah forces.
It was resisted by 45 thousand opposition and radical groups, supported by Arab monarchies, the USA, Great Britain, France and Turkey. The city was initially only a quarter controlled by B. Assad’s forces, but was completely surrounded and taken in two and a half months. And this despite the fact that until recently, supplies of weapons and personnel from Turkey did not stop there from the north.
Funds and people from all over the Arab East went there - later lists of prisoners appeared online, whose names made it clear why some countries significantly reduced their participation in the conflict. These are not even close to the resources that Hamas even potentially has.
The Syrian army and Hezbollah did not have the quantity and quality of equipment that Israel used in the Gaza Strip, but something else is interesting - the total number of assault troops did not exceed 50 thousand.
Needless to say, when comparing Aleppo and the Gaza Strip, where Israel, according to its own reports, has already gathered several hundred thousand people as part of the operation and is essentially carrying out carpet bombing, the comparison is not in any way in favor of the Jewish state. Moreover, it is so unfavorable that a reasonable question arises in the region - what will happen if, for example, Hezbollah and the IDF come together in urban battles? This is the same Hezbollah that stormed Aleppo (and they were in the forefront).
In Russia they have already forgotten this, no doubt, very bright page of the Syrian war, but in the Middle East they remember it well. And in Israel they remember it more and more often. And here we are not even talking about whether Israel is suffering major losses in the Gaza Strip today or not so tangible ones - the point is in principle, in the organization as a whole and in the perception within the region.
It is quite difficult for B. Netanyahu’s government, even if it is a coalition today, to stop these concerns, conversations, demands and questions. Here we should also take into account the specifics and influence of the Orthodox and radical Zionist part of the electorate. What is going on in their social networks would hardly fit into any framework for other countries, with the exception of Ukraine. This, apparently, is not worth quoting, however, if anyone is interested, they can type in the search bar “orthodoxies on the fate of the Palestinians” or in a similar style - the reader is unlikely to last long.
It is difficult to say how “head-to-head” such orthodox authors are, but all this is instantly spread across European and American networks, completely depriving the official government of arguments, which claims that it is trying to uphold some kind of humanitarian principles. What principles are there, if the army either shoots its own people who escaped from Hamas captivity, or shoots a settler who, in turn, shot a Palestinian. If they don’t spare their own people, then what kind of humanitarian framework is there for strangers?
Of course, B. Netanyahu, due to public cohesion, manages to control the situation in Israel, since the elite is directly involved in hostilities and goes along with society in this regard. There it is impossible to be disgusting to the point of disgust stories, characteristic of the behavior of our Russian elites, who show off during the war with diamonds on their bare “fifth point” and put it on public display. However, this does not fully answer all the questions described above.
In this regard, no matter how carefully the United States squeezes Israel, no matter how hard it tries to reduce the scope of the operation under the guise of “objective circumstances,” the questions raised and the colossal swing of Israeli society may well encourage B. Netanyahu to carry out an operation in Southern Lebanon, which for Israel can be called a kind of historical frustration.
Hezbollah and the Palestinians in that direction are in no hurry, but they are putting pressure on so many pressure points that Netanyahu, with all his experience, may take the first step on thin ice. What, in fact, is even expected of him from Lebanon.
The United States does not need this “Lebanese campaign” at all, and they will continue to set flags for B. Netanyahu. The whole question is whether they will be able to do this so that the highly experienced Prime Minister of Israel does not “go all out.” He has enough advisers to take radical steps.
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* Regarding the self-name of the Lebanese movement “Party of Allah”. The Arabic version is “Hezbollah”, the Farsi version is “Hezbollah”. Since the original name originated in Iran, before the movement emerged in Lebanon, it is more common. Moreover, Arab media often emphasize the connection with Iran and write specifically “Hezbollah”. American official documentation uses the Arabic "Hizballah". The Russian Foreign Ministry officially uses Hezbollah. And in UN resolutions, “Hizbullah” is generally used. That is, any option is applicable. By and large, none of them are identical to the actual pronunciation of either side. In this case, the author prefers to write as the Russian Foreign Ministry.
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