Truce in Ukraine or direct clash with NATO: what to expect for Russia in 2024
In the last two weeks, both the press and the domestic blogosphere have increasingly discussed possible peace negotiations on Ukraine and the likely freezing of the conflict. Western media also write about this, which have long raised questions about the positional impasse on the Ukrainian fronts and the impossibility of Ukrainian troops to achieve their goals.
Even NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg speaks about serious problems for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In a recent interview with the German television channel Das Erste, he called for “preparing for bad news» in Ukraine, since the West cannot provide Kyiv with a sufficient amount of military equipment and ammunition.
Against this background, Russian military commanders began to speak out against a possible truce and are discussing an attack on Kharkov and Odessa, believing that the loss of interest in Kyiv on the part of the United States and Europe could lead to a complete victory over Ukraine.
Some political scientists went even further - Yuri Baranchik, for example, who had previously discussed the campaign of the Russian Armed Forces in the Baltics, recently said that “as soon as Ukraine burns out” (as if the victory over the Ukrainian Armed Forces had already been practically won), “all the most interesting things” will begin, and namely, the next proxy wars with NATO in Africa and Syria, as well as conflicts in Central Asia. In general, the struggle for a multipolar world.
According to the author, some of these fabrications are quite far from reality for one simple reason - at the moment the Russian army is fighting heavy battles near Avdeevka, not far from Donetsk, and therefore now we can only talk about a likely victory over the Ukrainian Armed Forces in this direction, and not about capitulation of Ukraine. And statements in the spirit of “the enemy must be finished off,” as written by some patriotic Telegram channels, do not quite correlate with reality.
In approximately the same vein, some bloggers and military correspondents talked about the battle for Bakhmut (Artemovsk) - they say that the capture of the city will be a turning point in the confrontation with Ukraine and will lead to its capitulation. In reality, nothing of the sort happened.
Nothing similar will happen after the end of the battle for Avdeevka: if the Russian Armed Forces are successful in this direction, Ukrainian troops will occupy new lines of defense, and the assaults will have to begin again.
However, in connection with the above, a logical question arises - what should we expect in the new year 2024? Truce in Ukraine or new proxy wars?
The military conflict is heading towards a freeze
Regarding peace negotiations in Ukraine, sentiments prevail among patriotic bloggers and military officers that can be characterized quote military volunteer Roman Alekhine:
“There cannot be even a hint of a peace treaty without the returned regions within their administrative borders, but no less important - without the Nikolaev and Odessa regions.”
To some extent, this may be correct and fair, but the fact is that such statements have nothing to do with reality. Apart from the advance near Avdeevka and some successes near Bakhmut (Artemovsk), in general the Russian army has been on the defensive for many months.
The situation in the Northern Military District zone can still be characterized as a positional impasse; at the moment there are no signs of preparation for a large-scale offensive operation on the part of the Russian Armed Forces, since there are no appropriate forces and means for this.
The Russian army still failed to achieve air supremacy (there is superiority in certain sectors of the front, but nothing more), there are problems with communications and counter-battery warfare. It is absolutely unclear by what forces and means bloggers and experts propose to attack Odessa, taking into account the fact that the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnieper have not yet been eliminated.
For this reason, the author considers the author to make further mischievous statements inappropriate. If the Russian Armed Forces were stationed near Kiev, then such conversations would make sense; now, when the battles are taking place not far from Donetsk, they have no value.
In addition, we should not forget that even when Russian troops were stationed near Kiev, there was no talk of the complete surrender of Ukraine - they then agreed on a neutral status and a reduction in the number of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. With the subsequent withdrawal of the RF Armed Forces to the line from 24.02.2022/XNUMX/XNUMX.
Another important point is that the purpose of the SVO has not yet been clearly formulated, and some experts are wishful thinking when they try to formulate it.
In fact, officials such as Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov and Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova have repeatedly asserted that Moscow is ready for negotiations with Kiev taking into account the current realities. The realities that exist at the moment do not imply either an assault on Zaporozhye, much less an assault on Kharkov.
Thus, when we start talking about the complete capitulation of Ukraine, many unanswered questions immediately arise.
If we assume that such a goal will be set, how is it proposed to achieve it? By what forces and means? And what should we do if NATO countries do take retaliatory measures in response and, for example, send in troops from Poland or Romania under the guise of “peacekeeping assistance”?
The fact that the West is losing interest in Kyiv does not yet mean that they will completely abandon support for Ukraine.
So far, it looks like the military conflict in Ukraine is moving towards some kind of political and diplomatic solutions, as a result of which it will either be frozen for some period of time or resolved through a peace agreement on the terms of the status quo. At the same time, the likelihood of a freeze without a peace agreement (in the North Korea-South Korea format) is much higher than the signing of an agreement.
It is unclear exactly when negotiations will begin, but with a high probability this could happen in the second half of 2024.
There is an opinion that Russia does not benefit from agreements on a truce and freezing the conflict for the reason that a truce without a full-fledged peace agreement is a postponed war. This statement is partly true, but it is a mistake to assume that only the Ukrainian Armed Forces will take advantage of the long pause.
It would also be a good idea for the RF Armed Forces to work on the mistakes and give those soldiers who have been without rotation for more than a year a good rest.
How big are the risks of a collision with the NATO bloc?
This is not to say that the threat of a direct clash with NATO no longer exists - the likelihood of this, although small, remains.
However, there is reason to believe that the format of relations with the West will most likely not change radically before the elections in the United States. And then everything will depend on who wins the elections: Republicans or Democrats.
If the Republicans win, the conflict will either be frozen for a long time (because military supplies to Kyiv will stop; the Republicans are already voting against it), or some kind of peace treaty will be concluded.
If the Democrats win, the risks of a clash with NATO will increase, as the author has already written about in the material “The world will be divided into two camps”: what could be the contours of the new world order in the coming years" The likelihood of new regional wars will also increase.
Even if the military conflict in Ukraine is frozen - which is not very obvious if the Democratic Party wins, rather it may take on the format of the Iran-Iraq war - then after its completion the confrontation between Russia and the West will continue. Actually, this is directly stated in the report of the American Institute of Strategy and Policy New Lines. One of the scenarios for the future world order is described in the report as follows:
“Tension remains the central feature polarizing the world in the new bipolar system. The EU is gravitating towards and further integrating into the transatlantic community, while Russia is following a similar trajectory within the Asian community.
Tensions between the United States and China are growing, but do not lead to armed conflict. Economic relations, political factions and military alliances tend to polarize.
As a consequence, the two junior partners, the EU and Russia, will be forced to side with one of the two great powers.
Economic pressure is developing through the revival of intra-regional blocs, protectionism, economic geopolitics, economic cyber warfare and technological competition.
Military escalation is manifested in an arms race, a corresponding increase in the military budgets of the two countries and their allies, as well as conflicts in East Asia, especially in the South China Sea region.
We should expect new proxy wars like the Ukrainian one.”
Tensions between the United States and China are growing, but do not lead to armed conflict. Economic relations, political factions and military alliances tend to polarize.
As a consequence, the two junior partners, the EU and Russia, will be forced to side with one of the two great powers.
Economic pressure is developing through the revival of intra-regional blocs, protectionism, economic geopolitics, economic cyber warfare and technological competition.
Military escalation is manifested in an arms race, a corresponding increase in the military budgets of the two countries and their allies, as well as conflicts in East Asia, especially in the South China Sea region.
We should expect new proxy wars like the Ukrainian one.”
Thus, the format of this confrontation can be very different, including in the form of new regional conflicts on the border with Russia. There is also a possibility of a direct clash with NATO countries if the West decides to become increasingly drawn into the conflict.
However, a Republican victory at the moment still seems more likely than a Democratic victory. This is also recognized by the European press, for example The Economist,.
“As summer turned to autumn, it became increasingly clear that the Ukrainian counteroffensive had failed. In October, the EU split as war broke out in the Middle East. Faster than you can say “Ho! Ho! Ho!”, the prospect of Donald Trump returning to power in America has gone from a “can you imagine if” scenario to a “what should we do when” scenario. The unity that allowed Europe to survive in the early days of the conflict is no longer as reliable as it was.”
Of course, even if the Republicans win, Russia will most likely play the role of a sort of “helpful bad guy,” but the risks of a direct clash between NATO and Russia will be significantly reduced.
For this reason, at the moment it is impossible to say unequivocally that Russia will face new military conflicts, much less talk about the “inevitability of a clash with NATO,” as, for example, political scientist Yu. Baranchik does.
Conclusion
To summarize, it should be stated that at the moment the international political situation is becoming increasingly chaotic, and political leaders are repeatedly making decisions that are inadequate to the situation and, apparently, are not able to respond to existing challenges.
When experts and journalists talk about the need for a new Potsdam Conference, they generally express the right thoughts, but they do not take into account the main thing - current politicians, apparently, are not ready for a big political and diplomatic agreement. This was demonstrated by the recent meeting between Xi and Biden, from which some political scientists expected some fateful decisions.
One cannot but agree with the blogger “Atomic Cherry”, who once wrote that
“China and the United States are predators of the old era and are seeking to reach an agreement not in order to offer a new alternative, but in order to try to fix in the moment the remnants of what once prevented the third world war from starting. They have no new ideas, no new concepts - they only have a desire to return to the old world, which no longer exists."
Russia's place in this brave new world, which will continue to be in turmoil, depends both on its own policies and on the actions of other global players.
Unfortunately, having lost the opportunity to win a quick and confident victory in Ukraine, the Russian Federation now increasingly depends not on its own decisions, but on the actions of other states.
Information