The blockade of Kaliningrad - it will never be lifted
Attempt number...
Lithuanian Railways will increase the tariff for freight transportation with Russia and Belarus to a “record” rate of up to 62%. This step, of course, is aimed primarily at further deterioration of economic conditions in the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation - both within the region and in terms of exports and imports.
This is far from the first experience of economic pressure on a remote region of Russia. There is no doubt that, fearing more severe excesses, our political and economic opponents seem to be checking the Kaliningrad region for red lines. Although of a slightly different kind than in Ukraine.
As is known, up to 80% of economic relations between the main territory of Russia and the Kaliningrad region are transit through Belarus and Lithuania. And from January 1, 2024, the Lithuanian freight railway operator LTG Cargo is raising tariffs for its services.
The increase in rates directly depends on the direction of transportation, however, the largest increase will be for Russia and Belarus - by 46–62%. LTG Cargo announces at the beginning of December 2023 that
“Taking into account the pre-announced rates of payment for the use of public railway infrastructure and the increased volume of cargo transportation administration procedures, the highest rates will remain for goods transported between Lithuania, Russia and Belarus. Tariffs for cargo transported to/from non-EU countries will change by 46–62%.”
At first glance, the argument seems to be neutral, but geographically it is quite specific. It is typical that for customers delivering goods within the country, tariffs will increase by only 5–10%, while for container transportation between major Lithuanian cities, railway tariffs remain almost unchanged.
The port of Klaipeda is Lithuanian, but essentially an enemy Memel
In addition, as for the rates “for the use of railway infrastructure for transportation through the Klaipeda port, they will change individually.” Moreover, it is explained that, for example, for clients “with long-term contracts, tariffs” will remain the same “as specified in the contracts.”
However, in all other cases the level of tariffs for Klaipeda “increases to 29%”. Taking into account such obvious tariff benefits for the Klaipeda port, it is reasonable to assume that Vilnius is thereby trying to direct cargo transportation through Belarus exclusively to this port. Accordingly, and in force since the early 80s. transbaltic ferry Lithuania - Germany (Klaipeda - German port Mukran).
However, the situation concerns not only the tightening of tariff policy on railways. By the end of November 2023, Lithuanian customs also significantly reduced the rate of truck passage from the Kaliningrad region.
Let us remind you that they proceed through the only checkpoint for freight vehicles - the Chernyshevskoye international checkpoint in the east of the Kaliningrad region (Kybartai - on the Lithuanian side). The queue of trucks on the “Lithuanian” border with the Russian region appeared at the end of the second ten days of November and has only been growing since then.
At the beginning of December, it grew to almost 200 cars, and the lag time from the reserved time in the electronic queue system already exceeds 113 hours. At the same time, Lithuania is not going to follow the example of Finland and completely close its border with Russia. Taking this factor into account, Vilnius’ indirect desire to force cargo carriers to “re-focus” on Klaipeda is also visible.
It is obvious that transit cargo transportation to Kaliningrad and the region, as well as in the opposite direction through Poland, is even more impossible. First of all, for foreign policy reasons. That’s why they were completely stopped back in the late 2010s – before the pandemic and before the SVO.
Transit is not a dogma
One way or another, there is only one of the options that change the geography of cargo flows with the Kaliningrad region. This is a more active development of ferry capacities between all ports of the Kaliningrad and Leningrad regions.
In addition, a response transit decision from Moscow and Minsk is quite possible: this is an increase in tariffs for cargo transit between Lithuania and the countries of Central Asia. Moreover, Lithuania’s trade with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for the period from the beginning of 2022 to the third quarter of 2023 cumulatively increased by more than a third.
Mutual freight transit between Lithuania and these countries has also increased noticeably – the increase was slightly less than 30 percent. In 2024, it is planned to increase these indicators by another 25–30% and at least 30%, respectively. These shipments are carried out both through Russia and Belarus, and the share of this direction in the mutual trade turnover of the former Soviet republics reaches almost 40%.
It is interesting that Russian and partially Belarusian fertilizers have been carefully removed from Western sanctions. And, if there had been a large terminal for transshipment and export of this product in the 70s. built not in Klaipeda, but in Kaliningrad, then the siege excesses would hardly have been possible at all.
Moreover, supplies of not only fertilizers, but any chemical products to Kaliningrad would be possible only through Lithuania. In this regard, we have to take into account the fact that since December 2023, the export transit of Belarusian chemical fertilizers through Klaipeda has almost stopped.
This was done, of course, at the request of the EU, and this decision deprived Lithuania, already rapidly impoverished, of up to 15% of annual budget revenues. This situation actually forces Vilnius to seek various kinds of relaxations of this ban.
Mantas Bartuska, head of the Lithuanian railway company Lietuvos gelezinkeliai, estimates losses from the termination of this transit at 60 million euros per year. For the entire Lithuanian chain of railways, ports and related infrastructure, Mr. Bartuska estimated financial losses at 100 million euros per year.
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