Forum "One Belt, One Road". Important aspects of the positions of Russia and China
The review of the results of the past “One Belt, One Road” forum has to be divided into two parts: a general conceptual one for Beijing (see the previous material “On some results of the Chinese “One Belt, One Road” forum”) and a part related directly to Russia’s bilateral relations and China.
The interaction between Russia and China is built according to a separate model, as a special subsystem. In some ways, this subsystem resembles the relationship between the concept of “traditional globalism” under the flags of Davos and the Chinese view of this concept, expressed in the ideas of the “Community of a Shared Destiny for Humanity,” which actually allocated China its own special niche in the general model, taking into account the Chinese specifics of the method production and, more broadly, worldview. But there are also many significant differences.
By the will of objective and subjective circumstances, precisely relying on China and its sub-project, the so-called. “traditional globalism” is still breathing and trying to fight for the “good old days.” It is clear that the raw materials and military resources of the concept and its Chinese subproject largely have Russian soil, and accordingly, the model of relations between Russia and China is built according to its own individual patterns.
At the moment we have two keynote speeches ahead of us. The first from the leader of China, with whom he welcomed the opening of the “One Belt, One Road” forum, which emphasizes historical the nature of those relations that will be formed within the framework of the updated traditional global concept, since it “stands on the right side of history, meets the logic of the progress of time, and opens the right path for humanity.”
It was no coincidence that the second keynote speech from Joe Biden’s team came out a day later and also highlights the historical divide.
“We are at a turning point in history. This is one of those moments where the decisions we make today will shape the future for decades to come.”
The first speech is based on the theses of peaceful coexistence:
“The beginnings of the Great Silk Road won their place in history not with war horses and long spears, but with camel caravans and good intentions; not with warships and powerful guns, but with merchant ships with treasure and friendship.”
The second is based on unity in the name of war to a victorious end:
“You know, just as during World War II, today patriotic American workers are building the arsenal of democracy and serving the cause of freedom.”
Our observers are completely wrong to write that Biden’s speech was another “militaristic ringing bell.” If you carefully read the full text, it contains quite strong unifying theses, on the basis of which the United States sets the task of temporary transformation into a military factory.
And instead of once again proving that “Americans were enraged by Biden’s speech,” etc., most likely, we should think about the fact that unification around security at a particular moment is always stronger than unification around the benefits of future trade. And this speech very competently connects the need to unite different interest groups in the United States and return to the “value core” of the United States precisely in the name of common security - this time no longer looking hypothetical. It’s not for nothing that the West has already dubbed this speech “the second Fulton.”
Values without an economy have no basis, and an economy without values lacks controlled development. This is precisely why the economic initiatives that were voiced by China also go in parallel with the value theses of the “Community of a Common Destiny for Humanity.”
And in such conditions of a historical watershed, which is now recorded not just in the form of ideas and statements, but in strategic plans and programs, we can try to evaluate what and how Russia approached the anniversary forum in China. Based on these introductory notes, we can understand what kind of specific model of relations is being built between our country and the Chinese version of the global project.
And what about Russia?
The famous intelligence officer and sinologist Andrei Devyatov gave a very interesting description of the Russian-Chinese model as a “strategic rear relationship.” The problem, however, is that our rear turns out to be somewhat unusual - actively fighting. That is, we still need to understand who the rear is today: us for China or China for us.
A. Devyatov believes that the Russian leader has not yet joined the conceptual part of the Chinese project, preferring for now to remain within the framework of the construction of the “New Silk Road”, but without delving into the ideas of the “Community of a Common Destiny for Humanity.” In general, the sinologist describes the current relations between China and Russia with Deng Xiaoping’s formula: “Forever good neighbors, never enemies.”
A. Devyatov generally has a rather interesting, original and noteworthy concept, but in this case I would like to note that the leader of China himself did not strongly focus the audience’s attention on the ideologies of the “Community of the Common Destiny of Humanity.” He chose to organically weave her points into his keynote speech.
In the previous article, we discussed why China was forced to move away from these accents. After all, in fact, the period of the new “golden decade” was presented, but it turned out that not all the questions of the previous stage of construction of the Chinese model received answers and solutions.
Many were disappointed by the openly raw material orientation of the agreements between Russia and China, which were presented at the forum, and not only the agreements as such, but also the vector itself - “raw materials in exchange for everything else.”
On the other hand, it is difficult to deny that it was the Russian leader who was in second place after the forum host. This is evidenced not only by the video from the event and the schedule of meetings, but also by the fact that he spoke immediately after Xi Jinping.
Separate Eurasian economic cluster as a subject
The raw material factor should certainly be discussed, but first of all it is worth looking at the conceptual level, and here we should turn to the wording from the transcript of V. Putin’s welcoming speech. And they are quite remarkable.
Firstly, it should be noted that the emphasis was clearly placed on the North-South corridors, and not on integration as a whole or West-East. Three North-South lines were mentioned in the speech: Murmansk-Bander-Abbas; Northern Sea Route - South; Ural - Siberia - South and only the fourth branch Siberia - ports of the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean, but it is also in the context of the South. There is also a fifth route: “Arctic - Far East”, however, even here again one can trace not so much the “Chinese” as the overall southern vector: “And finally, we are planning another corridor from the Arctic to the South in the Far East, its elements are also being formed."
Let's look at the final thesis about logistics:
“All these transport corridors from North to South - in the European part of Russia, in Siberia and the Far East - open up the opportunity to directly connect and integrate the Northern Sea Route with large logistics hubs in the south of our continent, on the coast of the Indian and Pacific oceans.”
It simply leaves no doubt about the vector. Is this formulation of the question different from the usual one over the years: “From East to West” and “from East through North to West and South”? Without a doubt.
Secondly, few people paid attention to the fact that V. Putin mentioned the EurAsEC twice and the EAEU once.
“There is a specific agreement between Russia and China on the parallel and coordinated development of the EurAsEC and the One Belt, One Road program, and a non-preferential agreement on trade and economic cooperation between the member states of the EurAsEC and the People's Republic of China is being implemented. A joint commission has been established to unite efforts to implement this agreement. In February of this year, a detailed roadmap was adopted, which, among other things, provides for the establishment of interaction between the Eurasian Union and China in the field of trade policy and digitalization of transport circuits.”
Such a long quotation has to be given to show that this mention is not the same thing, just in different words. These are separate integration forms, both in terms of the regulatory framework and participants, and it is not for nothing that they are mentioned separately. The EurAsEC included Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, but did not include Armenia. The EAEU includes Armenia, but not the first two states. Let's note this and turn to the following quote:
“But, of course, with such a global scale that was initiated by the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China ten years ago, frankly speaking, it is difficult to expect that everything will work out. Our Chinese friends are doing it. We are very pleased with these successes, because this concerns so many of us... I would like to wish success to the People's Republic of China, the Chairman of the People's Republic of China in the implementation of his plans...”
On the one hand, Chinese plans are important for everyone, and on the other hand, they wish the PRC and its leader success in implementing not general, but specifically Chinese plans. This is a nuance that is worth many others.
At the end of the material there will be links to transcripts of the speeches of both leaders, and it is quite possible that someone will find other important points there. In the meantime, based on the above, it can be stated that the Russian leader came to China with his old project of “Greater Eurasia” - from the Customs Union to the EurAsEC, then to the EAEU, then to the Commonwealth. This project has been under construction for more than twenty years. Its results are ambiguous, not least because the EAEU and EurAsEC have never become a zone for the formation of common value, either in the previous version or in the current one, and the trade and industrial basis of its participants is European and Chinese.
Vector "North - South"
Nevertheless, it was from the position of the leader of such an association, which has its own specific goals, objectives and even routes, that Moscow spoke at the forum, which emphasizes the North-South vector. These are not just figures of speech, they are a conceptual framework. Whether the fact that the leaders of Belarus, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were not present at the forum is an echo of this conceptual framework, among other reasons, is a matter of debate. However, the very basis is stated on the forum.
Now let’s combine this with the theses of the Xi’an Declaration, where Beijing clearly outlined two dozen points of the “road map”, according to which the countries of Central Asia were asked to form a joint trade, production and cost platform with China. We will see not only a severe contradiction, but an outright dissonance that the countries of Central Asia will experience. Despite all the advantages of relations between Russia and China, the concepts are different! They can lead to greater or lesser synergy, but they cannot be combined into one.
That is, Russia came to the forum to negotiate the interaction between its and the Chinese concept, to connect them, to find commonality, but not to work within the framework of the Chinese project. This, in fact, is the answer to those who believe that Moscow has “laid down” to China.
Economically, in essence, yes - we already have about 30% of foreign trade turnover with China, but, as they say, “in our heads” the situation is obviously seen differently. On some grounds, there is an expectation that Moscow will somehow be able to create a separate Eurasian economic cluster as an entity, and policy is being built on this basis. That is why both the EAEU and the EurAsEC, i.e. almost all of Central (Middle) Asia, are mentioned within the “North-South” framework.
For the countries of Central Asia, this approach, on the one hand, is interesting because it will allow them to do what they love “multi-vector politics” for some time. On the other hand, the de facto value zone and trade and production sphere are tied to China; the currency of settlements was and remains the US dollar. The question arises: what is then considered as the future of the EAEU or some new form of integration? What should this look like from an economic model point of view? There is no doubt that the growth of trade turnover within the EAEU and EurAsEC has occurred and is growing further, but everyone understands that the growth is based on “parallel imports”.
Observers focused on raw materials contracts, purchases of agricultural products, where specific figures appeared, and on the timing of the completion of the Power of Siberia. All this is correct, as are the questions about where the limits are for the flow of trade from other directions towards Beijing. It is clear that 30% is not the final figure at all.
The model itself, described in the Moscow program, is quite adequate in concept, but the problem is that this idea has been in the air for twenty years, but in practical implementation it must be based on the industrial export core of Russia; such an economic pole cannot be built on raw materials. And today it is no longer just the export of manufactured goods, but also services and technologies. Not just even high-level machine tools, but the export of production facilities and production technologies and production management.
That is, even just financial investments are not enough. The Arabian monarchies have several trillion dollars in reserves in sovereign funds, but this does not greatly help them become an economic pole. Of these sectors, only Rosatom is ready, but this is a separate and very specific area.
For China, the situation here is also quite interesting. Against the backdrop of the determination with which the United States cements dependent and semi-dependent economies around itself and how fundamentally it is aimed at Southeast Asia, Beijing must put up an economic bloc of similar weight. But to what extent the two concepts have the potential for such merging is a debatable issue, to put it mildly. But we see that if we take the White House’s chants seriously, then there shouldn’t be any dissonance in development models.
At the same time, all indicators stubbornly tell us that both Central Asia and Russia are being drawn into the Chinese macroeconomic cluster, the value formation zone. And a separate material will be prepared, completely devoted not to concepts and projects, but to economic indicators, so that the description becomes specific and more visual.
But it is clear that, at the expense of China, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia, we in fact already form almost 50% of the $720 billion annual trade turnover. That is, we are already in this value cluster, and our value is formed through it. Even if we reduce raw material supplies by some percentage or increase them further, this will not fundamentally change the picture.
It is not yet very clear how a separate geopolitical concept and a separate value and commercial-industrial zone should be formed in place of the EAEU/EurAsEC. The general military-political line China - Russia - Iran is working, the potential of the southern direction through Iran specifically in Russia is high, although the potential is not described in terms of grandiose values, but with the concept of work in Central Asia there is clearly a dissonance with the Chinese model, in which we objectively walk ourselves and with our own feet.
And for now it is quite difficult to say how both we ourselves and our Chinese and other partners will be able to work with this paradoxical Russian vision of the future.
Transcript Xi Jinping's keynote speech at the forum
Transcript V. Putin's speeches at the forum
Information