Prospects for the Ukrainian Armed Forces' winter offensive
Time is running out
Mark Milley a month ago gave the Ukrainian army only 30-45 days until the end of the offensive. In the Ukrainian segment, real hysteria began about this.
We remembered a lot. And the fact that the Ukrainian Armed Forces allegedly recaptured Kherson at sunset last fall. Of course, not a word about the almost voluntary withdrawal of the Russian Army from the right bank of the Dnieper. We remembered Artemovsk, the decisive battles for which took place just last winter. Commentators in Ukraine explain the marking of time since the fall of 2022 simply - there was not enough equipment and weapons. The Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers are so brave that they don’t care about muddy soils or frosts. The further the commentator is from the front line, the more bravura his speech about continuing the offensive in winter sounds.
The chief of military intelligence, Budanov, both in Washington and in Kyiv, repeated something like this:
“Did winter stop the fighting last year? No, that's not true. Why do you think this will happen this year? The fighting will continue. The offensive operation will also continue.”
This is rather bad news for ordinary soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which is also confirmed by the NATO command.
On August 15, a meeting of high command took place, in which Zaluzhny, British Chief of Defense Staff Anthony Radakin and the Commander-in-Chief of NATO Armed Forces in Europe, American General Christopher Cavoli, took part. Later they announced a transformation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ tactics. In particular, a retreat from the offensive along the entire front line to targeted breakthroughs. The priority is the Zaporozhye Front, the direction to Tokmak.
Four months after the start of the failed nationalist offensive, interesting facts are emerging. From the very beginning, the Americans offered Kyiv to assemble a powerful strike fist and break through the defenses of the Russian Army in one place. But the Ukrainian Armed Forces thought differently and tried to repeat June 22, 1941, going on the offensive along the entire border.
Bandera's followers believed in many things. They believed that it would be possible to repeat the Kharkov disaster and the withdrawal of the Russian Army from Kherson. They believed that NATO equipment would become the energy source with which they would reach the Sea of Azov and occupy Crimea. It cannot be said that the Ukrainian Armed Forces were so wrong that they abandoned the NATO plan (if this is even true).
In the spring and summer of 2023, the nationalists found themselves at a disadvantage. The army was forced to control several thousand kilometers of the border from Kherson to the Brest region of Belarus. At the same time, the Russian Army still has impressive offensive potential, especially if the nationalists leave gaps in their own defenses. Concentrate the Armed Forces of Ukraine in one place, the Russians will immediately attack the cluster, and also go on the offensive in exposed areas of the defense.
After the failure of the summer offensive campaign, we can state a deep crisis of strategic and operational management in both the Ukrainian Armed Forces and NATO. But this does not mean that the Kiev regime will not send its soldiers on the offensive in the coming winter.
Mark Milley, by the way, recently changed his shoes and added the following to his tirade about time running out:
“The Ukrainian Armed Forces are advancing very slowly and very purposefully, preserving manpower. I will say to all critics that there is still a lot of time until the weather remains suitable for combat operations, there are still many combat-ready forces. And the Ukrainians have absolutely no intention of stopping. They will go until the final goal is reached. Ukrainians have no intention of stopping hostilities in winter.”
Winter Is Coming
What did the Ukrainian Armed Forces come up with for the winter of 2022–2023?
First of all, with new offensive tactics. If earlier the attack was carried out according to the good old scheme with tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and abundant artillery support, now the first two points have left the chat. Armored vehicles have to be protected, and artillery must be concentrated on narrow sections of the front, where infantry units go on the attack. It is this fact that is presented by “analysts” in Ukraine as an undoubted trump card in the winter offensive.
Budanov suggests walking under the Sea of Azov. Tanks, especially Abrams, will inevitably get stuck in muddy ground. Wheeled vehicles will not perform well either. In such conditions, a simple soldier will feel all the delights of a winter war.
Firstly, due to the slow progress (if it occurs at all), the Ukrainian Armed Forces will get extremely damaged fortifications and villages. First they will be ironed out by enemy artillery, and then by Russian artillery. In summer you can still spend the night in a ditch under the cover of greenery. In winter, the boys will either freeze to death or get wet through and through during the frequent thaw.
Secondly, as soon as stable snow cover appears, it will be very difficult to hide the movements of both personnel and equipment. Footprints in the snow and high contrast for thermal imagers are excellent for unmasking. The lack of foliage is a nice addition.
Thirdly, war in winter significantly reduces the time it takes to evacuate a wounded person to the rear. Even minor damage can be fatal in temperatures below freezing. To remove the “three hundredths”, more equipment is required, and in winter it is very vulnerable near the front. Incomparably more vulnerable than in summer. Don't forget about high humidity and unsanitary conditions in the off-season.
Fourthly, the hardships of winter could be partially offset by fighting in the city. You can hide from the wind and from the enemy. But in Zaporozhye there is a steppe and sparse forests, so it will be cold, hungry and painful.
In general, Budanov, before talking about the winter offensive, should literally plunge into the atmosphere of the winter war himself.
There is a high probability that in winter the Ukrainians will try to follow NATO’s advice and concentrate their strike force to break through to Tokmak. The logic is as follows.
In the thoughts of the theoreticians of the Ukrainian General Staff, the Russian Army, as expected, will not strive for major offensive operations in the coming winter. For the reasons described above. This means that the most combat-ready units can be removed from the northern front of the front and transferred to the south. Where to launch assaults in several waves. Several villages can definitely be captured in this way. Of course, with a corresponding level of losses in manpower.
The main question is: why does the Kyiv regime need a winter offensive?
The weak-minded do not sit in the military leadership, no matter how much we want. There are quite pragmatic reasons for continuing the offensive, albeit creeping. First of all, this is a hyped Russian military machine.
Time is now on Moscow’s side and the army has begun to quickly adapt to the realities of the special operation. There are many examples. These are also new versions of the long-range Lancet, which has already managed to hit a Ukrainian MiG at an airfield several tens of kilometers from the front. These include gliding bombs, in particular the FAB-1500, which have proven themselves in the depths of defense.
Russia is gradually leveling out its lack of dominance in the skies, albeit through asymmetrical methods. The pace of technical progress of the Russian Army is noticeably higher than the Ukrainian one, so it is vital for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to keep the initiative. Do not allow the opponent to dig in, build fortifications, or increase their military presence.
The second reason why Kyiv will continue to advance is the changing opinion of the West. In Europe, individuals with a complex attitude towards Ukraine are already coming to power, and in general they managed to quarrel with the Poles at the highest level.
By the way, story Duda’s love and hatred with Zelensky shows very well how zealous support for Ukraine can turn into indifference. Such gentlemen require victories on the battlefield, and for this all means are good. Albeit a sluggish winter offensive.
The domestic public is also experiencing military failures. But it so happened that the Kiev regime has learned to fight off the “electorate” with very cheap bones. Unpleasant, but not critical injections drones in Moscow or the last landing on the Crimean coast.
The Ukrainian mosquito fleet has been reduced to several ATVs, but the media effect is guaranteed. In the complete absence of military significance, the sorties.
This suggests one thing – the consumers of such information noise are exalted young Ukrainians with a complete lack of critical thinking. These are exactly the kind Zelensky and Zaluzhny will send on the winter offensive against Tokmak.
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