Stalin's line helped disrupt the German blitzkrieg

64
Stalin's line helped disrupt the German blitzkrieg
Tower T-26 as a firing point of the Minsk UR. Stalin Line


Stalin Line


After the First World War, in which most of the war was positional and where fortresses and fortified areas played a huge role, the military was preparing for a new big war, following the example of the old one. The military theories of most countries did not take into account blitzkrieg strategies.
It was believed that at the beginning of the war, personnel formations and units would have time to occupy the border fortified areas (URs), strengthen them with field structures (trenches, communication passages, dugouts, barriers, etc.), and deploy artillery behind them. URs were supposed to receive echeloned logistical support. In a system with deployed troops, the URs were supposed to become impregnable for the enemy, as during the First World War. When the armies stormed the positional fortifications of the enemy for weeks and months and had minimal progress, suffering heavy losses.



As a result, many European powers built long-term defensive lines. In France, it was the Maginot Line built in 1928-1936. on the border with Germany; in Germany on the French border in 1936–1940 the Siegfried Line (Western Wall) was erected; Italy, on the border with Austria, Switzerland, Austria and Yugoslavia, erected an Alpine rampart; in Yugoslavia, it was the Rupnik line, built in case of war with Italy and Germany; in Greece, the Metaxas line, etc.

The Soviet Union also followed this path. After the military alarm of 1927, when there was a threat of war with England and Poland due to events in China, in the USSR, on the western border, they began to build URs from the Karelian Isthmus to the Black Sea. The total length of the defensive line was 1 km. However, passages were left between the URs, as a result, the length of the lines of fortified areas was 850 km.

Initially, 13 URs were built: Karelian, Kingisepp, Pskov, Polotsk, Minsk, Mozyr, Korostensky, Kiev, Novograd-Volynsky, Letichevsky, Mogilev-Podolsky, Rybnitsky and Tiraspolsky. In 1938, eight new fortified areas began to be built between the already existing ones: Ostrovsky, Sebezhsky, Slutsky, Shepetovsky, Izyaslavsky, Staro-Konstantinovsky, Ostropolsky and Kamenetz-Podolsky.

Destroyed caponier installations of the 76-mm gun mod. 1902 on carriage arr. 1932. 12th Mogilev-Podolsky fortified area

URs were 50–150 km long along the front and up to 12 km deep. They tried to cover the flanks of the fortified areas with natural obstacles. Each UR protected important communications and had to hold out until the mobilization and deployment of the main forces of the Red Army.

According to German data (compiled after the capture of the Stalin Line "in 1941), in total on this line (not counting the Karelian UR) there were 142 casemates and positions for field artillery of 76 mm caliber, 248 casemates and bunkers for anti-tank guns (45 mm caliber) and 2 casemates and machine gun bunkers. Most of the long-term structures were in the Minsk UR - 572 artillery, 33 anti-tank, 114 machine-gun. According to the fortification historian D. Kaufman, the French Maginot Line had up to 401 structures per kilometer of front, and the Stalin Line - from 7,7 to 0,7.

After Russia in 1939-1940. returned to its composition Western Belarus and Ukraine, the Baltic states and Bessarabia, the Stalin line was mothballed and disarmed. On the new border, they began to build a new fortified line - the so-called. Molotov line.

It is interesting that in the USSR these fortified areas were never officially called the Stalin line. This name became widespread in Russia after perestroika and came from the West. So this line was called by the Western press and used in their memoirs by the German military leaders.

This name first appeared in December 1936, in an article in the Russian-language newspaper Segodnya, published in Latvia. Then this article was reprinted in the British newspaper Daily Express, and the term "Stalin's line" became widespread.


Artillery semi-caponier APK-1. 22nd Karelian fortified area

Value


The German army gained extensive experience in forcing fortified zones in Western Europe. The Germans actively used assault groups, sappers, who bypassed long-term fortifications, entered from the rear, used explosives, flamethrowers, gas grenades and fuel. Also in the course was heavy artillery.

Long-term firing points built in the 1920s-1930s could not resist guns with a caliber of more than 150 mm. The casemates of the URs were supposed to be supported by infantry and artillery, but the Soviet divisions, in the face of the enemy's rapid advance, often did not have time to occupy or create foreground and rear positions.

However, despite the fact that the Stalin line was disarmed, it played its part in the disruption of the German blitzkrieg. So, the Minsk fortified area, which turned out to be at the forefront of the enemy’s strike and was not fully equipped, fought from June 26 to June 29, 1941. The Germans during his assault lost more than 200 tanks, that is, an entire tank division. For example, during the 40-day campaign in France, the losses of the Wehrmacht amounted to 640 tanks. This led to the loss of time, the speed of the offensive. The capture of Minsk took place instead of June 27 only on June 29.

The report of the headquarters of the German 12th Panzer Division on the battles on June 27 and 28 in the Minsk fortified area reported:

“The resistance of the Russians was different and, perhaps, depended on the personality of the commander.
Some garrisons of pillboxes fought to the last soldier.
Others closed the embrasures at the very first shot with direct fire and went on the attack.
Still others left the casemates and took up positions in the foreground, where they defended themselves with exceptional tenacity.
There were also such silent bunkers that they did not show any signs of life. But when the assault groups thought that the Russians had already been finished, they suddenly opened dagger fire at close range. Such "resurrected" pillboxes on the evening of June 27 did us a lot of trouble, which slowed down the division's advance.
Therefore, it is recommended to destroy all bunkers without exception by the forces of special sapper teams.

The Polotsk fortified area held back the enemy for 20 days, and the Kiev fortified area for more than two months.

Thus, the URs of the Stalin line played a role in disrupting the German blitzkrieg. If the Nazis passed the French Maginot line without problems, then they got stuck on the Stalin line for a period of 3 days to two months, losing a large amount of manpower and equipment.

The Red Army and the USSR gained valuable time by redeploying divisions from the rear military districts, mobilizing and evacuating. At the same time, the German headquarters had to adjust their offensive plans, temporarily postponing the offensive against Moscow and turning the strike formations to the south, to Ukraine.

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  1. +26
    19 July 2023 06: 10
    An excellent Belarusian film 2009 - "Dnieper Frontier" about the battles of July 3-26, 1941 ... without sugary pathos, the harsh reality of those desperate, cursed weeks ... ".. An important stage in the disruption of the German blitzkrieg ... east of the Minsk URA ... "

    “... For the first time, the heroic defense of Mogilev, the so-called Dnieper frontier, became the basis for the film ... At the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War, when the troops of the Nazi invaders were rapidly advancing ... the city of Mogilev, the Dnieper, the Buynitsky field delayed the enemy onslaught for a long time ... As many historians say, there are the origins of the Victory ... "
    1. +3
      19 July 2023 14: 19
      Quote: Michael Drabkin
      An excellent Belarusian film 2009 - "Dnieper Frontier" about the battles of July 3-26, 1941 ... without sugary pathos, the harsh reality of those desperate, cursed weeks ... ".. An important stage in the disruption of the German blitzkrieg ... east of the Minsk URA ... "

      “... For the first time, the heroic defense of Mogilev, the so-called Dnieper frontier, became the basis for the film ... At the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War, when the troops of the Nazi invaders were rapidly advancing ... the city of Mogilev, the Dnieper, the Buynitsky field delayed the enemy onslaught for a long time ... As many historians say, there are the origins of the Victory ... "

      Watched. Great movie and good technique.
      1. -1
        20 July 2023 13: 25
        An article just like that or on the topic of the current NWO, where in the future our line of defense has the right to be called the "Putin Line"? And if even three days of the Germans' delay near Minsk is considered to be the fulfilled role of the "Stalin Line" in this place, then our one and a half year "standing on the Ugra" (Ugledar) should be included in all textbooks of military art and history. We compete, who has a stronger erection? lol
        1. 0
          27 July 2023 19: 39
          You still don't understand what's what. I didn’t understand either, but when suddenly the thought came to mind, I almost fell off the floor. The murder of the USSR was conceived so that the tsarist government could prolong the First World War and give someone time to start a new revolution. If the victory fails, then the revolution will succeed. And it will be beautiful to look at how the wind shakes on the lanterns hanging corpses overhead. Of course, there will be a lot of shouting that we killed the USSR in order to arrange a new USSR. But you can't trust them, not at all. Let them swing over your head.
  2. +15
    19 July 2023 06: 17
    Thus, the URs of the Stalin line played a role in disrupting the German blitzkrieg. If the Nazis passed the French Maginot line without problems, then they got stuck on the Stalin line for a period of 3 days to two months, losing a large amount of manpower and equipment.

    Conclusions.
    There are no impregnable fortresses, so it is not rational to play long-term from defense in a strategic plan. It is always necessary to seize the operational initiative by transferring it to a more significant level.
    All the good days!
    1. +13
      19 July 2023 08: 08
      Quote: Kote Pan Kokhanka
      Thus, the URs of the Stalin line played a role in disrupting the German blitzkrieg. If the Nazis passed the French Maginot line without problems, then they got stuck on the Stalin line for a period of 3 days to two months, losing a large amount of manpower and equipment.

      Conclusions.
      There are no impregnable fortresses, so it is not rational to play long-term from defense in a strategic plan. It is always necessary to seize the operational initiative by transferring it to a more significant level.
      All the good days!

      It all depends on the rear - Stalingrad and Leningrad confirm.

      Z.y
      As soon as Germany and Russia began to live well, the Anglo-Saxons immediately set them against each other ...
      1. +1
        19 July 2023 19: 16
        It all depends on the rear - Stalingrad and Leningrad confirm.

        I do not agree.
        In the first case, the enemy tried to embrace the immensity - advancing in two divergent directions.
        As for Leningrad, it was not the main direction of the offensive.
        Regards, Kote!
    2. +14
      19 July 2023 08: 34
      There are no impregnable fortresses, so it is not rational to play long-term from defense in a strategic plan. It is always necessary to seize the operational initiative by transferring it to a more significant level.
      Here is Comrade Sun Tzu of the same opinion:
      "War loves victory and does not like duration."
      “When they defend themselves, it means that there is a lack of something; when they attack, it means that there is everything in abundance.
      “He who defends well hides in the depths of the underworld; he who attacks well, acts from the height of heaven.”
    3. +7
      19 July 2023 14: 22
      Quote: Kote Pan Kokhanka
      Thus, the URs of the Stalin line played a role in disrupting the German blitzkrieg. If the Nazis passed the French Maginot line without problems, then they got stuck on the Stalin line for a period of 3 days to two months, losing a large amount of manpower and equipment.

      Conclusions.
      There are no impregnable fortresses, so it is not rational to play long-term from defense in a strategic plan. It is always necessary to seize the operational initiative by transferring it to a more significant level.
      All the good days!

      So they were only supposed to delay the enemy for the duration of the mobilization, concentration and deployment of the main forces and means.
      1. 0
        16 December 2023 22: 09
        Quote: Ulan.1812
        So they were only supposed to delay the enemy while mobilizing, concentrating and deploying the main forces and means

        Isn’t it possible to prepare forces and means in advance? Plant troops in military units under the pretext of exercises? As someone said: “Russia was unprepared again, but when was it ready?”
    4. 0
      21 July 2023 15: 20
      output
      had:
      lay railway tracks for armored trains along the URs
      create caponiers for KV tanks (Minsk UR had 200 bunkers, of which only 10 were anti-tank)
      equip UR garrisons with steel breastplates
      and not get involved in the construction of the Molotov line on the new border
  3. +23
    19 July 2023 08: 00
    Artillery semi-caponier APK-1. 22nd Karelian fortified area
    who cares what's inside - "I have them" (photo) wink
    machine gun nest to protect the entrance
    gun breech

    closer
    1. +21
      19 July 2023 08: 04
      let's continue ....))
      switch and communication node



      where the guns of the semi-caponier are actually directed. There is a railway line hi
      1. +10
        19 July 2023 08: 18
        "I have them"
        I visited, it's interesting, thanks! hi
        1. +10
          19 July 2023 08: 26
          I visited, it's interesting, thanks!
          Yes, you are always welcome)) It was with colleagues on the Mannerheim Line (partially) that they ordered an excursion. The landscape there is, of course, kapets wassat
          1. +6
            19 July 2023 14: 24
            Quote: Region-25.rus
            I visited, it's interesting, thanks!
            Yes, you are always welcome)) It was with colleagues on the Mannerheim Line (partially) that they ordered an excursion. The landscape there is, of course, kapets wassat

            So it turns out that it was not Mannerheim who did not want to take Leningrad, but the Karelian UR stopped the Finns.
            1. Alf
              +2
              19 July 2023 19: 37
              Quote: Ulan.1812
              So it turns out that it was not Mannerheim who did not want to take Leningrad

              Are you, dear colleague, going against the official political line?
              Yes, and what to take? There is no bomber aviation (Blenheim for the Stalin Line is not funny, but sad), there is no siege artillery, no tanks and self-propelled guns. But there are casemates on this side ...
      2. +3
        19 July 2023 16: 48
        If I remember correctly, the entrance to APK-1 is 300 rubles. was. Sestroretsk border. Exposure. There is an excursion in the open area, I don’t remember the cost.
      3. Des
        +3
        20 July 2023 06: 28
        Region-25.rus (Vladimir), thanks. Surprisingly powerful and complex. As from batteries in Sevastopol impressions.
        1. +2
          21 July 2023 12: 07
          thank you
          - you are welcome hi Well, it's actually pretty tight in there. And not all rooms are open for inspection. On the "Voroshilov" battery we have here nearby - in Vladivostok it will be more powerful (two towers of 3-305 mm each) wink
  4. +4
    19 July 2023 08: 16
    If the Nazis passed the French Maginot Line without problems
    Yes, they just bypassed it and entered the operational space.
    1. +10
      19 July 2023 10: 22
      Yes, they just bypassed it and entered the operational space.


      And bypassed and broke through.
      1. +4
        19 July 2023 12: 07
        Especially, somehow they didn’t put forces during the breakthrough
      2. Alf
        +2
        19 July 2023 19: 42
        Quote: vovochkarzhevsky
        Yes, they just bypassed it and entered the operational space.


        And bypassed and broke through.

        After the Ardennes detour and entering the operational space, it no longer made sense to defend, so the guardian command gave the order to withdraw units, although some fortifications held out to the end.
    2. +9
      19 July 2023 10: 47
      Where it is necessary there and broke through. Read Veremeev, he was a tourist there. Personally, I was impressed by the photo of the observation-machine-gun cap of 300 mm armor with partial (!!!) penetration by 88 mm anti-aircraft guns.
      1. Alf
        +1
        19 July 2023 19: 43
        Quote: Not the fighter
        Personally, I was impressed by the photo of the observation-machine-gun cap of 300 mm armor with partial (!!!) penetration by 88 mm anti-aircraft guns.

        To be honest, I don’t really believe that 300 mm armor and Aht-aht .... No. Or not 300 or not 88.
        1. +1
          19 July 2023 21: 30
          10-00. The Germans suddenly open heavy artillery and machine-gun fire on the French coast. 37 mm. anti-tank guns and 76 mm. infantry guns of the German 360 Infantry Regiment, as well as 88 mm. anti-aircraft guns begin shelling pillboxes of the first line of defense of the French, located directly on the coast. Each bunker accounts for four to six artillery pieces. 88 mm. anti-aircraft guns destroy armored turrets of bunkers, 37-mm guns hit embrasures. Large-caliber guns hit the French coast in the areas of forcing areas and put up a smoke screen.

          All that was found in a hurry. Unfortunately the site no longer exists :(
          1. Alf
            +3
            19 July 2023 21: 44
            Quote: Not the fighter
            All that was found in a hurry.

            There are no questions for you. But !
            Where did the Germans get the 76-mm caliber from?
            Where does it say that the wall thickness of the bunker is 300 mm?
            with partial (!!!) penetration

            Not by penetration. It's just that an 88-mm projectile hit the bunker, partially deepened, but did not penetrate.
            "Partial penetration" is like a little pregnant.
    3. +1
      23 July 2023 14: 13
      And in this "space" they were expected. Such is the role of each line - to impose on the enemy a direction convenient for itself.
  5. +11
    19 July 2023 10: 09
    Minsk was surrendered a week after the start of the war - it's hard to say that the UR worked. He was bypassed. Here is the defense of Smolensk - yes, it was very tough. And the origins of the Victory go back to June 22, when the first hundreds of German aircraft and tanks burned down and thousands of soldiers were killed on the first day of the invasion.
    1. +3
      19 July 2023 14: 26
      Quote: Glagol1
      Minsk was surrendered a week after the start of the war - it's hard to say that the UR worked. He was bypassed. Here is the defense of Smolensk - yes, it was very tough. And the origins of the Victory go back to June 22, when the first hundreds of German aircraft and tanks burned down and thousands of soldiers were killed on the first day of the invasion.

      And Kyiv UR. On June 22, Hitler won tactically but lost strategically.
    2. 0
      16 December 2023 22: 33
      Quote: Glagol1
      Minsk was surrendered a week after the start of the war - it's hard to say that the UR worked. He was bypassed. Here is the defense of Smolensk - yes, it was very tough. And the origins of the Victory go back to June 22, when the first hundreds of German aircraft and tanks burned down and thousands of soldiers were killed on the first day of the invasion.

      I would say that the origins of the Victory were the competent management of the country during the war years. I’m not taking military calculations now, that’s a different topic, but the transfer of factories to the Urals and the organization of the rear really made a difference. Germany did not have enough strength to fight on 2 fronts
  6. +8
    19 July 2023 10: 22
    I did not think that even here there would be apologists for the defensive ramparts... though, why am I surprised.
    So:
    By the beginning of 1941, the USSR was already well aware that a strategy based on defensive ramparts was a dead end. In fact, this is the further development of that very positional impasse of the First World War. When the strategists drew false conclusions, believing that if the troops were not just buried in the ground, but also concrete was added, then such a defense would be absolutely impregnable. At the same time, the following very critical shortcomings were ignored:
    1. The main drawback of defensive ramparts is that the troops involved in them are deprived of mobility from the word in general. It will not work to remove an hour from the forces for the transfer to a more problematic area, except perhaps only personnel in the form of infantry without any means of support and reinforcement.
    2. Based on the first point, the next drawback is that each kilometer of the defensive rampart must be saturated so as to withstand the concentrated attack of enemy troops. And this requires an unimaginable number of troops.
    3. Again, based on the previous one. The cost of defensive ramparts ultimately exceeds the cost of a mobile army. Both due to the number and more complex weapons, it is enough for an example to compare the 76 mm casemate cannon and the regimental ballistics equal to it. And at the same time, having both defensive ramparts and a full-fledged mobile army is too much for the economy.
    4. In terms of combat value, defensive ramparts also have a significant drawback, these are fixed radii of destruction installed in these weapons. The enemy will install them very quickly, then pull up more long-range weapons (he has enough time, since there is nothing to fear from counterattacks, pillboxes do not go on the attack) and breaking the defense is only a matter of time.

    Yes, in certain areas, URs may well be effective, especially in rough terrain. Although the Finns did not help. Therefore, the USSR did not so much build the Molotov line, as it imitated the construction of it, since it was already developing an active defense strategy. Unfortunately, for objective reasons, this strategy could not be fully implemented in the first year of the war, but later it proved to be excellent.
    1. +10
      19 July 2023 12: 06
      Quote: vovochkarzhevsky
      By the beginning of 1941, the USSR was already well aware that a strategy based on defensive ramparts was a dead end.

      And therefore, in parallel with the construction of the SD line in the reunited territories, they additionally began laying out the ground and laying the SD of the third line. smile
      "Scheme of fortified areas of the third line along the line: Ostashkov, Rzhev, Vyazma, Spas-Demensk" is dated 17.05.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.
      Quote: vovochkarzhevsky
      1. The main drawback of defensive ramparts is that the troops involved in them are deprived of mobility from the word in general. It will not work to remove an hour from the forces for the transfer to a more problematic area, except perhaps only personnel in the form of infantry without any means of support and reinforcement.

      You are mixing opap and infantry infill.
      The non-maneuverable part of the UR forces is an opab - bunker garrisons, own artillery, engineers and rear. The number of opabs is small - for example, in the mobilized KAUR-ovsky 22nd UR, there were less than 12 people. And this is on the defense sector from Sestroretsk to Lembolovo, 000 km long,
      In addition to the opap, the UR strip is defended by infantry filling units - ordinary rifle formations, which can be transferred at any time to another sector of the front. This was demonstrated in the same Leningrad, where the front command regularly maneuvered infantry filling between the southern and northern SDs - removed more or less entire formations from calm areas and directed them to threatened directions, later filling the resulting "holes" with militias and battered formations, which in the event of an aggravation of the situation, they were in the same way strengthened by connections with the directions that had become calm.
      Quote: vovochkarzhevsky
      4. In terms of combat value, defensive ramparts also have a significant drawback, these are fixed radii of destruction installed in these weapons. The enemy will install them very quickly, then pull up more long-range weapons (he has enough time, since there is nothing to fear from counterattacks, pillboxes do not go on the attack) and breaking the defense is only a matter of time.

      And the Heffalump, of course, is looking at the sky. smile

      isolated defense concept fortresses The UR, with the forces of only the UR-ovsky units, died back in WWI. SD is an integral part of the conventional defense of the ground forces, and they are defended by the joint efforts of all types of the Armed Forces and combat arms. Therefore, the supply of long-range artillery by the enemy is parried by the defenders by the transfer of similar counter-battery formations - artillery or aviation (or better - both smile ).
      1. +2
        19 July 2023 13: 04
        And therefore, in parallel with the construction of the SD line in the reunited territories, they additionally began laying out the ground and laying the SD of the third line. smile
        "Scheme of fortified areas of the third line along the line: Ostashkov, Rzhev, Vyazma, Spas-Demensk" is dated 17.05.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.


        Well? Were they brought to completion? As I said, it was more than just an imitation of activity.

        You are mixing opap and infantry infill.
        The non-maneuverable part of the UR forces is an opab - bunker garrisons, own artillery, engineers and rear. The number of opabs is small - for example, in the mobilized KAUR-ovsky 22nd UR, there were less than 12 people. And this is on the defense sector from Sestroretsk to Lembolovo, 000 km long,


        No, it's just that you, like any amateur, did not understand what it was about. request And here is the infantry filling? It's about the garrisons. Take the same artillerymen with SD, what kind of mobility do they have? That's right, none.

        The concept of the isolated defense of the fortresses of the UR by the forces of only the UR units died back in WWI. SD is an integral part of the conventional defense of the ground forces, and they are defended by the joint efforts of all types of the Armed Forces and combat arms. .


        Again, you don't understand what I'm talking about. request Nevertheless, military affairs must be learned in a real way, and not by reading the Internet. lol
        URs as such in critical areas are still relevant today. Just do not confuse focal SD with the strategy of defensive ramparts from sea to sea.



        Therefore, the supply of long-range artillery by the enemy is parried by the defenders by the transfer of similar counter-battery formations - artillery or aviation (or better - both smile)


        If a bet is made on defensive ramparts, then on counter-battery formations, aviation will no longer have enough funds, the economy will not pull.
        1. +3
          19 July 2023 14: 33
          Quote: vovochkarzhevsky
          And therefore, in parallel with the construction of the SD line in the reunited territories, they additionally began laying out the ground and laying the SD of the third line. smile
          "Scheme of fortified areas of the third line along the line: Ostashkov, Rzhev, Vyazma, Spas-Demensk" is dated 17.05.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.


          Well? Were they brought to completion? As I said, it was more than just an imitation of activity.

          You are mixing opap and infantry infill.
          The non-maneuverable part of the UR forces is an opab - bunker garrisons, own artillery, engineers and rear. The number of opabs is small - for example, in the mobilized KAUR-ovsky 22nd UR, there were less than 12 people. And this is on the defense sector from Sestroretsk to Lembolovo, 000 km long,


          No, it's just that you, like any amateur, did not understand what it was about. request And here is the infantry filling? It's about the garrisons. Take the same artillerymen with SD, what kind of mobility do they have? That's right, none.

          The concept of the isolated defense of the fortresses of the UR by the forces of only the UR units died back in WWI. SD is an integral part of the conventional defense of the ground forces, and they are defended by the joint efforts of all types of the Armed Forces and combat arms. .


          Again, you don't understand what I'm talking about. request Nevertheless, military affairs must be learned in a real way, and not by reading the Internet. lol
          URs as such in critical areas are still relevant today. Just do not confuse focal SD with the strategy of defensive ramparts from sea to sea.



          Therefore, the supply of long-range artillery by the enemy is parried by the defenders by the transfer of similar counter-battery formations - artillery or aviation (or better - both smile)


          If a bet is made on defensive ramparts, then on counter-battery formations, aviation will no longer have enough funds, the economy will not pull.

          No one was going to sit on the defensive and win the war that way.
        2. +1
          19 July 2023 15: 52
          Quote: vovochkarzhevsky
          Well? Were they brought to completion?

          The deadline for the first stage is the beginning of 1942.
          But in fact, the UR of the third line was partially built earlier - the studies along the Third Line formed the basis of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky line of defense.
          Quote: vovochkarzhevsky
          And here is the infantry filling? It's about the garrisons. Take the same artillerymen with SD, what kind of mobility do they have? That's right, none.

          Once again, the number of all opab and other parts of the KAUR was about 12 people. Moreover, I was mistaken with the length of the strip - it was more than 000 km long on the entire front from Ladoga to the Gulf of Finland.
          By October 25, 1942, the 22nd fortified area included 13 OPABs (112th, 246th, 113th, 4th, 1st, 63rd, 126th, 154th, 293rd ii, 106th, 522nd, 283rd, 133rd OPAB), as well as the 147th separate communications battalion, the 125th separate sapper battalion, an auto company and an electrical unit. The total number of personnel of the fortified area consisted of 11 people: officers - 364 people, sergeants - 1344 people, ordinary - 2279 people. The fortified area was armed with 7741 2-mm guns, 152 156-mm guns, 76 84-mm guns, 45 mortars, 120 heavy machine guns, 704 light machine guns, 350 anti-tank guns.
          The OPABs were located in the following order: the coast of Lake Ladoga from Kraskovo to Nikulyas - the 112th OPAB, the Nikulias region - the 246th OPAB, Soelo - Katuma - the 113th OPAB, Peremyaki - the 1st OPAB, Nenyumyaki - the 4th OPAB, Lembalovo - 63rd OPAB, Okhta - Elizavetinka - 126th OPAB, Copper Plant - 154th OPAB, Mertut - 293rd OPAB, Kamenka - 522nd OPAB, Sestroretsk - 106th OPAB, Sestroretsk - 283rd OPAB, coast of the Gulf of Finland from Sestroretsk to Lisiy Nos - 133rd OPAB.
          All this made it possible to have at the turn of the Karelian Isthmus with a length of more than 100 kilometers only 3 rifle divisions of the 23rd Army - the 142nd, 92nd and 123rd. The divisions' defense line ranged from 25 to 40 kilometers..

          These are the pies. The presence of SD made it possible to stretch the defense zone of a rifle division by three to five times.
          And why do you need 76-mm guns if there are enough of them in the ground forces? Moreover, in the UR, traditionally, as in Imperial times, there was something that the infantry had already written off.
          Quote: vovochkarzhevsky
          URs as such in critical areas are still relevant today. Just do not confuse focal SD with the strategy of defensive ramparts from sea to sea.

          So the times of the Second World War are not now. Then, with armies of many millions, single URs turned into another Novogeorgievsk - the enemy broke through the field defenses in between, blocked the UR with infantry and developed the offensive further. That is why the General Staff demanded to close the flanks of individual SDs, not allowing "gates".
          Quote: vovochkarzhevsky
          If a bet is made on defensive ramparts, then on counter-battery formations, aviation will no longer have enough funds, the economy will not pull.

          * looks thoughtfully at the OM and BM artillery regiments formed in the USSR before the war. And on the crowd of air divisions of various types.
          1. 0
            20 July 2023 10: 23
            The deadline for the first stage is the beginning of 1942.
            But in fact, the UR of the third line was partially built earlier - the studies along the Third Line formed the basis of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky line of defense.


            That is, no one seriously built anything there, only intentions as disinformation of a potential enemy.

            Once again, the number of all opab and other parts of the KAUR was about 12 people. Moreover, I was mistaken with the length of the strip - it was more than 000 km long on the entire front from Ladoga to the Gulf of Finland.


            When will you learn to distinguish SD from defensive lines? Is it really so difficult to understand that SD is only a reinforcement of the troops on the defensive, while the defensive lines are designed to hold the defense on their own. lol


            These are the pies. The presence of SD made it possible to stretch the defense zone of a rifle division by three to five times.


            And where is the discovery? As a result, there are more troops and a larger defense zone.

            And why do you need 76-mm guns if there are enough of them in the ground forces? Moreover, in the UR, traditionally, as in Imperial times, there was something that the infantry had already written off.


            What are you saying, did the infantry arm itself with this? lol



            Well, if you are not satisfied with the 76 mm caliber for example, then here is the 85 mm ZIF-26 for you.




            And again it does not reach that producing it in sufficient quantities requires considerable resources?

            So the times of the Second World War are not now. Then, with armies of many millions, single URs turned into another Novogeorgievsk - the enemy broke through the field defenses in between, blocked the UR with infantry and developed the offensive further. That is why the General Staff demanded to close the flanks of individual SDs, not allowing "gates".


            Well, of course, the General Staff always requires. Only there are still opportunities for industry.

            *looks thoughtfully at the OM and BM artillery regiments formed in the USSR before the war. And on the crowd of air divisions of various types.


            He condescendingly looks at an opponent who still cannot understand that all these artillery regiments of OM and BM and a crowd of air divisions of various types, therefore, was formed because the USSR did not invest in monsters like the Maginot line, limiting itself to SD.
    2. +4
      19 July 2023 12: 11
      Roughly speaking, on those defensive lines that were created before and after, the front line stabilized. Kiev fell, because the Germans simply bypassed the Kiev fortified area on the flanks, the troops were surrounded.
    3. Alf
      0
      19 July 2023 19: 45
      Quote: vovochkarzhevsky
      (he has enough time, since there is nothing to fear from counterattacks, bunkers do not go on the attack)

      Have you heard about infantry filling?
      1. 0
        20 July 2023 10: 24
        Have you heard about infantry filling?


        And how, with one infantry to counterattack? lol
        1. Alf
          0
          20 July 2023 18: 41
          Quote: vovochkarzhevsky
          Have you heard about infantry filling?


          And how, with one infantry to counterattack? lol

          According to the states of the 40th year, each infantry division had a tank battalion of 64 vehicles. Have you heard about NPP tanks?
  7. +6
    19 July 2023 10: 42
    I am a fan of Veremeev, who openly wrote that SD is resources dug into the ground in the truest sense of the word, which we already had little. Our economy at that time was 6 times smaller than the French one, and the length of the border was 10 times longer (the length of the Maginot line is 150 km, +30 "Saar gap"). It makes no sense to build less than the Maginot Line, where they need to go there. The only SD that completed its task is Karelian. Yes, not only the Finns built the Mannerheim Line there, but we also noted. Again, we take into account that in the 20 years of the interwar period they found an antidote against pillboxes. According to their standards, a sapper squad with infantry cover is enough to capture a Soviet two-loop pillbox. And the worst thing is that when Veremeev wrote articles about the so-called "Stalin Line", the main source was the "German Officer's Handbook on Soviet Fortifications" issue of the spring of 1941. There was EVERYTHING, binding to the terrain, to the reporting photos of the pillboxes before the camouflage, that is, a lot of information was leaked.
    We read the article. The depth of the UR is 12 km, artillery can be shot through, to the full depth. A BT tower with bulletproof armor looking into the field is a target. Minsk UR gnawed through in 3 days. URs were simply taken into account when developing plans.
    1. +4
      19 July 2023 12: 13
      The Germans built the Dnieper shaft, how long did it last?
    2. +7
      19 July 2023 12: 13
      Quote: Not the fighter
      The only SD that completed its task is Karelian.

      It was just that it was the only SD against which the enemy opposed it, for the defense against which it was built. smile

      The main trouble with the Stalin Line was that it was built against the armies of the "cordon sanitaire" of the early 30s: a lot of infantry, cavalry, a limited number of light tanks and heavy artillery, low mobility. And the army of the late 30s came to it - with medium tanks, assault self-propelled guns, heavy motorized artillery up to 210 mm and aviation. Yes, and with combat experience.
      Moreover, the General Staff of the Red Army perfectly understood all the shortcomings of the "LS" - and in 1938 a completely new "UR System" was adopted with more powerful DOS, all-round defense of both individual armored personnel carriers and the UR as a whole, and much deeper defense areas. But they did not have time to modernize the "LS" according to the new System, and they managed to build new missile defense systems using it only in the Far East.
      1. +6
        19 July 2023 12: 23
        The main trouble of the Stalin Line is that it was built against the armies of the "cordon sanitaire"
        Poland was considered the main and main enemy for a long time .. for example
        1. +4
          19 July 2023 15: 55
          Quote: kor1vet1974
          Poland was considered the main and main enemy for a long time .. for example

          Exactly. On the old fortification forum, it was repeatedly written that most of the apparent misunderstandings with the Minsk SD (location of defense areas, construction of DOS) find their explanation if we consider the Polish army and its plans as an enemy.
  8. +6
    19 July 2023 11: 55
    the author, "you are lying," everyone knows from Ogonyok that all these URs were blown up on Stalin's orders. And the Germans did not storm any pillboxes. These are all the NKVD combat logs of the German divisions fabricated right in July 1941 and planted to the Germans. If someone does not understand - this is sarcasm.
  9. +6
    19 July 2023 13: 41
    Here is the phrase about precious time
    The Red Army and the USSR gained valuable time by redeploying divisions from the rear military districts, mobilizing and evacuating.

    very crafty.
    On 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX we had a trained regular army. Well, almost personnel. Which, with its proper use, could well leave the German offensive. But starting from the post-war memoirs of our military leaders, the idea that we had must first to lose our regular army, during this time to mobilize the same number of recruits (how many lost personnel), and with these recruits begin to win.
    Undoubtedly, divisions from the inner districts had to be transferred, since reserves are always needed.
    But, I repeat, we, taking into account the divisions being transferred from the internal districts, had more than enough forces and means to repulse the enemy attack. If only our cadre army in June-July 1941 was competently commanded. And Timoshenko and Zhukov as well.
    But with these excuses: "... we suffered huge losses, but gained time ..." we mislead ourselves. We didn't need time. We had to fight competently from the very beginning.
    However, the experience of our NWO showed that we never learned anything. In February 2022, we struck with forces that were less than 1/10 of the strength of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and all sorts of "battalions". That's not how wars are won.
    1. +1
      19 July 2023 15: 30
      Quote: Seal
      On 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX we had a trained regular army. Well, almost personnel.

      More precisely, almost personnel and almost unprepared.
      For it is practically impossible in a year and a half from a hundred divisions, half of which are ex-territories, to deploy an army into more than two hundred divisions, of which four dozen are tank divisions. Having in the initial reserve of personnel from only 25 personnel divisions of the 30s. And the initial level of education for 30-50% of the rank and file and junior officers.
      The reform in the armored personnel carriers was especially entertaining, which had to deploy the structures of full-fledged corps and divisions (with motorized infantry, artillery and rear services), having in the initial brigades of direct infantry support from "naked" tanks and a couple of the same old-style mechanized corps (because the majority of the old brigades are full-time motorized infantry did not receive).

      The Soviet-Finnish war gave a cut of the preparation of the Red Army until 1940. As a result of which the IVS actually admitted that the USSR does not have a modern army.
      Quote: Seal
      Which, with its proper use, could well leave the German offensive.

      For competent use two years of war were needed. And the revision of pre-war charters and instructions. In which, for example, for anti-tankers, the opening of fire was recorded, starting from the range of a direct shot - despite the fact that the frontal armor of the same "three-ruble note" arr. 41, the only Soviet pre-war anti-tank gun could from 150 meters.
      1. +1
        23 July 2023 14: 37
        The charter is the same for all. An anti-tank battle is being waged all artillery, not just antitanks. The charter is one and for all calibers. So it is correctly recorded when to open fire. The last - not only fought with "three rubles", there was a lot of other things, quite pierced.
    2. -2
      19 July 2023 15: 39
      Before the start of the Second World War, we had 2,69 million people in the western districts, the Germans and their allies deployed against us - 5,4 million people (without a fleet). So the enemy had a double superiority in forces, and your statement that we had enough troops is not true. The actual superiority of the enemy in forces was even greater, since the troops of our western districts were deeply echeloned in depth and, often, were hundreds of kilometers from the border, the Germans had compact groupings. It is also not true that before the start of the NMD, the enemy had 10 times more battalions than we did: the forces were approximately equal. Simply, for successful offensive operations, a significant superiority in forces is needed, but there was none.
    3. 0
      16 December 2023 22: 55
      Quote: Seal
      we struck with forces that were less than 1/10 of the size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and all sorts of “battalions”

      The number of Armed Forces of Ukraine in 22 is 200 thousand, well, another 100 thousand volunteer troops. It’s just that each country has a mobilization reserve and any baby talk, agreements, gives time for preparation. You either have to fight or not fight. The Germans had no moral restraints on waging war , and what about us? Therefore, there are no prerequisites for completing ours on our stated terms. It is enough for Ukrainians to build a defense and saturate it with air defense weapons, firing cruise missiles at Russia
  10. +3
    19 July 2023 15: 23
    After Russia in 1939–1940 returned to its composition Western Belarus and Ukraine, the Baltic states and Bessarabia,
    The author is incorrigible!!! Exactly the USSR returned the indicated territories to the Union republics ...
  11. +4
    19 July 2023 15: 31
    Karelian UR was never taken! He and the troops of the 23rd Army were able to stop the advance of the Finns. Subsequently, G.K. Zhukov removed from there not only army reserves, but also part of the divisional ones, in order to strengthen the defense in the south, where the Germans were actively advancing. So the fortifications built before the war on the Karelian Isthmus made a significant contribution to the successful completion of the Battle of Leningrad for us, and, accordingly, to the victory in the Second World War.
  12. +3
    19 July 2023 17: 04
    An extremely superficial article, a statement that the Germans passed the Stalin line with huge problems, and the Maginot line without problems is possible only because of ignorance of the real picture. The breakthroughs of the Maginot line did not generally affect its combat effectiveness at all, the French never conceived the chain of forts as some kind of general impregnable fortress, the problem was that almost all combat-ready divisions were removed from the Maginot line section after it became clear that the Germans had delivered the main blow through the Ardennes, and attempts began to plug this hole. The Soviet URs, for the most part, showed themselves from the word in no way, for example, in the Minsk region, isolated points resisted, although the UR was a triple chain of bunkers, the most powerful Kiev UR showed itself rather weakly, isolated cases of successful actions show that where there were experienced garrisons, weapons and BC, the fortifications held out for a long time, in most of the potential of the URs was wasted
  13. +1
    20 July 2023 14: 20
    Quote: Andrey A
    Before the start of the Second World War, we had 2,69 million people in the western districts, the Germans and their allies deployed against us - 5,4 million people (without a fleet).
    Well, we do not have a fleet. But we had the Pinsk and Dnieper military flotillas. Not God knows what, but nonetheless.
    About allies. Excuse me, but on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX only the troops of the Wehrmacht (Germany) and Romania crossed our border. All other German allies joined later.
    How many troops did Germany have.
    See Halder's diary paragraph of July 2, 1941.
    July 3, 1941. 12th day of war Losses: From 22.6 to 30.6 our losses amount to a total of 41087 people = 1,64% of the available staff (with a troop strength of 2,5 million). Killed: 524 officers and 8362 non-commissioned officers and privates. Wounded: 966 officers and 28528 non-commissioned officers and privates. Losses of officers in relation to total losses: wounded - 3,3% (campaign in the West - 3,1%), killed - 6,2% (campaign in the West - 4,85%), missing - 1,5 % (campaign in the West - 2%).

    The total number of troops is directly indicated by Halder - 2,5 million people. Well, this is already possible with the “satellites” - the Romanians and the Finns who had already entered the war on the afternoon of 25.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.
    Well, God bless them, let it be only purely German wars. But there are 2,5 million of them !!!! Not 5,4 million as you claim.
    What are the reserves of the Reich. Again we take Halder's Diary.
    16 June 1941 year
    Replenishment position. In the reserve army until 01.10 - 450 thousand people. Of these, the normal decline (illness, unfitness, etc.) is 150 thousand people. To make up for the combat losses in Operation Barbarossa, 300 remain. 70 can be added to this - from the field reserve battalions = 370.

    Total in the army of the Reserve until October 1, 1941 - only 450 thousand people. Moreover, to compensate for combat losses in Operation Barbarossa, 300 thousand remain. To this we can add 70 thousand - from field reserve battalions = 370 thousand ..
    And we must take into account that we are the defending side. And the defending side can send all the rear men to the front line, including various regimental and divisional musicians, shoemakers, hairdressers, and so on.
    The Germans are the advancing side. They fight only with their main combat core. Which is a maximum of half the staffing of the division.
    Again, we, as the defending side, can use both the NKVD border guards, the NKVD departmental guards and the police, etc.
    Oh, yes, our Black Sea Fleet and its aviation are also actively operating against Romania.
    The Germans have none of this.
    Moreover, many of the German divisions that had been fighting on our territory for a week already had their rear units still on the territory of Germany or the General Government. And you take them into account completely.
  14. +1
    20 July 2023 14: 23
    Quote: Alexey RA
    For proper use, two years of war were needed. And the revision of pre-war charters and instructions. In which, for example, for anti-tankers, the opening of fire was recorded, starting from the range of a direct shot - despite the fact that the frontal armor of the same "three-ruble note" arr. 41, the only Soviet pre-war anti-tank gun could from 150 meters.

    There are examples that where our units were on the defensive, the Germans often could not break through them. Even in June 1941. And they went around through the battle formations of those of our units that had either already retreated or fled.
    That is, there were units that already in June 1941 could successfully beat the Germans. So, it's not about statutes and instructions, but about something else?
  15. +2
    21 July 2023 00: 52
    If the Nazis passed the French Maginot Line without problems, ...

    Correction - it wasn't. Maginot Line Germans just bypassed through the Ardennes (across the border with Belgium and Luxembourg). On May 10, they began, on May 16 they already invaded French territory, began to bypass the Maginot Line (thick hatched blue stripe on the map):


    Only one extreme (westernmost) bunker (fort) on the edge of the Maginot Line was stormed by the Germans on May 19 and 20, killing the French garrison of 107 people with smoke (displacing oxygen from the tunnels). Read more here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ouvrage_La_Fert%C3%A9

    And by May 24, the Germans had already driven the British forces to Dunkirk and bypassed the Maginot Line from the north.

    И June 13 only German troops began to break into France already BEHIND the Maginot Line. This can be seen on the map below - there is a dashed blue line (where the arrows start from) this is just the front line on June 13 (less than 50 km from the capital).

    On June 14, Paris fell.

    Only on this day, the Germans launched Operation Tiger, attacking the Maginot Line "head-on" with the 1st Corps (7 divisions, 1000 guns) from the north in a narrow section between St Avold and Saarbrücken (arrow from north to south on the map). They broke through the line, but expanded this breakthrough for 3-4 days, eventually capturing only 4 underground forts.

    On June 15, another 5 German divisions with 400 guns of the 7th Corps crossed the Rhine during Operation "Little Bear" and hit on a narrow mountainous area (Vosges) between the cities of Colmar and Strasbourg (arrow from east to west on the map). It all had no special meaning after the fall of the capital of France - the Germans rather just wanted to practice and show themselves, the enemies, that they could break through such lines.

    June 17 the entire Maginot line was bypassed from behind and to the side (the Germans reached the border with Switzerland)
    - dotted blue line from dots on the map below.

    At the same time, the Maginot Line was broken through in only two bottlenecks. The attackers captured only 10 forts in battle (1 in the north, 5 in the center, 4 in the Vosges) out of 58 forts of the entire line. On June 24, the garrisons of many forts were in shock, having suddenly received an order to surrender - their losses were either zero or not serious (2-3 people), they had in bulk b \ c and quite confidently held positions.

    I myself was in the coolest museum of the Maginot Line, in the underground fort of Schoenenburg, which at the time of surrender did not lose a single fortification from enemy artillery fire (3000 shells were fired at it, including 50 shells of 420 mm caliber and 160 bombs dropped - some towers went into the ground 20 cm from shaking) not a single fortification. The loss of life amounted to just two people (and then one of them died from a rupture in the barrel of HIS shell) out of about 650 people of the underground garrison. The fort fired 17000 shells of various calibers at the Germans (mainly from twin 75 mm cannons) and did not let the German infantry division close to it almost anywhere for an automatic shot. Tour guides described the reaction of the garrison to the surrender order as fury at betrayal, almost suicidal shock, turning into depression.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ouvrage_Schoenenbourg

    At the bottom of the map, the solid blue line is the maximum advance on June 25, at the moment AFTER the surrender of France on June 22:
  16. 0
    27 July 2023 10: 48
    In the 80s, one front-line soldier told how he retreated to the old defensive line, possibly in Belarus, as he crossed the Neman at night. Everyone was waiting for the Germans to be stopped at these lines. It turned out - brick pillboxes!
  17. 0
    27 July 2023 19: 26
    Of course, without the present military leaders, Stalin, the party, the people would not have been able to do anything, exactly as they do now.
  18. 0
    28 July 2023 12: 09
    How much can you talk about the past .. We have a new cruel war for a year and a half .. And there is no real ground army.! Those who remember the USSR go to warimperials, youth is in no hurry to join the army. I don’t specifically know the solution, but it is necessary urgently find! defense isdefeat anyway as events after 15 years have shown.
  19. 0
    7 September 2023 14: 39
    Despite the fact that the fortifications of the “Stalin Line” in 1941 no longer met the requirements of protection against heavy artillery, they played a role in disrupting the offensive according to the Barbarossa plan: fully equipped, with their resistance they tied up the offensive of the German army for three days. The fortified area of ​​Polotsk held back the Germans for 20 days, and the fortified area of ​​Kyiv for more than two months. Due to the stubborn resistance of the Red Army units and such long delays near Polotsk and especially near Kiev, the Germans had to stop the attack on Moscow and turn their tanks to Ukraine, retreating from their earlier plans. am
  20. 0
    16 October 2023 22: 56
    Particularly impressive is the disarmament of the “Stalin Line” before the war without the creation of a full-fledged “Molotov Line”, i.e. the road to Moscow was essentially open. It is probably impossible to find out who thought of this before, but without this, I think, the Germans would not have decided to attack. Of course, if Suvorov (Rezun) is right, then he explains everything, otherwise it’s pure betrayal. And in the current situation there is a war of nerves and technology. Whoever gets ahead will win.