Expert opinion on the reliability of reports of the Luftwaffe Quartermaster General

Among historians on the Web, disputes often flare up about the ratio of losses of Soviet aces and Luftwaffe pilots during the Great Patriotic War. Reflections on this subject are presented on the Sky Artist channel.

Among the "young" experts, the opinion has spread that the achievements of Soviet fighter pilots are greatly overestimated. In fact, as many of these "specialists" believe, the losses of our pilots were several times higher than those of the opponent.

Tellingly, in their statements they mainly rely on the so-called reports of the Luftwaffe Quartermaster General (SGKL) - a collection of documents that the Germans did not have time to destroy.

Meanwhile, it is immediately worth noting here that the aforementioned collection is only a small part of what has survived from the Luftwaffe archive. However, this is not the main thing.

The error of using the above reports as evidence of the real state of affairs at the front tried to prove in his article the expert Andrei Alabovsky.

He conducted a study in which he compared data from the SGKL with the "movement of materiel."

It is worth noting that Alabovsky immediately emphasized the impossibility of tracking every aircraft listed in the aforementioned documents (serial numbers are simply not indicated there). But he was able to identify some of them thanks to the Stabes mark.

So, as the expert writes, the discrepancy between the losses of the above-mentioned vehicles in the SGKL and the “movement of materiel” was more than 80%, which can hardly be a mistake.

At the same time, Alabovsky is sure that it is the “movement of materiel” that should be taken as the basis, in which losses are greater, since it was these documents that were responsible for the supply of new fighters to the Luftwaffe. In this case, any distortion of information for the sake of propaganda could become critical for the Wehrmacht. Therefore, this option should be excluded.

In turn, according to the expert, the reports of the quartermaster general of the Luftwaffe, which modern historians love to rely on, could just be a tool of German counterintelligence to misinform the enemy.

Other reasons why you should not believe the reports of the quartermaster general are discussed by experts on the Sky Artist YouTube channel:

Comments

[South Ukrainian]

In the first half of the war, the "air" was German, and after the Battle of Kursk, it was definitely ours.

[tihonmarine]

Quote: South Ukrainian

In the first half of the war, the "air" was German, and after the Battle of Kursk, it was definitely ours.

Rather, the way it was, overstrained Hitler's industry.

Konstantin answer back, I didn’t listen, I didn’t see.

[Guran33 Sergey]

The air became ours after the hardest battle over the Kuban. pilots

[cpunk]

In the eyes of the German fans in China, this cannot be trusted.

[Quote Lavrov]

It is unlikely that at present, in Russia there is a better specialist - a historian in the Air Force during the Second World War than M. Timin from Tacticmedia.
And for a long time already the comparison has been going on not only according to the sources of one side, but also with the documents of the other side on the same sector of the front.
And again, this is the eternal beginning of an article in style - with little blood and on enemy territory!
Yes, not only and not so much the ratio of losses determines the importance of the Victory, but also the fact that yesterday's schoolchildren, whose parents still knew how to read and write, knocked down the Nazis from the sky, who brought all of Europe to their knees. In the way engineers worked, ordinary workers, children stood at the machines for the sake of victory for days, including for the sake of victory in the sky.
And it is not correct to measure these victories only by the ratio of downed cars. We need to look deeper and wider. And not to be measured by those who were cooler than Pokryshkin or Mulders with Rudel. It must be understood that it was in the USSR that Pokryshkin, Kozhedub, and many others could only appear in spite of all the difficulties in the country ...

[2112vda]

This Timin is the best specialist? Lord, it is difficult to meet more tendentious materials. As stated in the Illanatol post below, all his fabrications are "sucked from an unwashed finger", I completely agree with this. Mr. Timin simply earns money and shows a certain circle of gentlemen that he is "one on the board" and nothing more. He has a sort of "alternative history" direction. Maybe, as an "alternative" historian, he is a good specialist, I do not presume to judge in this matter, I do not understand "alternative history". We have enough alternatives even without Timin.

[Force multiplier]

Yes, that's right. The GC reports are an incomplete list of losses, and 10% and 20% are not light damage, but the percentage of damage to the structural elements of the airframe, and this is a "factory repair" (what it is - also well said in the video) at best.

could be a tool of German counterintelligence to misinform the enemy

Not that it is a disinformation tool, but their incompleteness and distortion are deliberate just to prevent the leakage of reliable data. This is standard information security. For example, among the British, this occurs even at the level of railway squadrons (deliberate distortion of serial numbers), or in the German camps of the reconnaissance department of the Luftwaffe General Staff, where German sorties for minelaying were initially recorded as "bewaffnete Aufklärung"

documents that the Germans did not have time to destroy

There, the Germans “destroyed” the documents in such an interesting and selective way that sooner or later all this will miraculously be found. The data for 1944 "disappeared" solely because the assessment of the effectiveness of the USAAF in the fight against the Luftwaffe did not become public knowledge, and one could continue to tell tales about the "decisive contribution of the Allies to the defeat of the Luftwaffe." Yes, it is significant, no doubt, but not decisive

[nikolai711]

You are right. Marshal Zhukov also noted this, raising a toast after signing the act of surrender. Soviet soldiers came on foot to look at the results of the bombing of Anglo-American aircraft.

[dump22]

It is much more reliable to look not at the data of allegedly downed enemy aircraft, but at the data on the manufacture of new aircraft.

During the Second World War, the USSR manufactured 213742 aircraft and received some more (?) from the allies.
Germany during WW2 produced 108182 aircraft (for the eastern and western fronts).

[Captain Pushkin]

Quote from: dump22

During the Second World War, the USSR manufactured 213742 aircraft and received some more (?) from the allies.
Germany during WW2 produced 108182 aircraft (for the eastern and western fronts).

The aviation industry of the USSR produced 1941 aircraft in 15735. In the difficult year of 1942, in the conditions of evacuation of aviation enterprises, 25 aircraft were produced, in 436 - 1943 aircraft, in 34 - 900 aircraft, in the first half of 1944 40 aircraft were produced.
Total: 137271
Under Lend-Lease, the Soviet Union received 13981 fighters, 3652 bombers, 206 seaplanes, 19 reconnaissance spotters, 719 transport aircraft, and 82 training aircraft. Total 18659 aircraft.

[Captain Pushkin]

bomber plane
Type 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
Arado Ar 234 - - - - - 150 64 214
Dornier Do 17 215 260 - - - - - 475
Dornier Do 217 1 20 277 564 504 - - 1,366
Heinkel He 111 452 756 950 1337 1405 756 - 5,656
Heinkel He 177 - - - 166 415 565 - 1,146
Junkers Ju 88 69 1816 2146 2270 2160 661 - 9,122
Junkers Ju 188 - - - - 165 301 - 466
Junkers Ju 388 - - - - - 4 - 4
Total 737 2852 3373 4337 4799 2351 - 18,499
Fighters
Type 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
Dornier Do 17 9 - - - - - - 9
Dornier Do 217 - - - - 157 207 - 364
Dornier Do 335 - - - - - 7 4 11
Focke-Wulf Fw 190 - - 228 1850 2171 7488 1630 13,376
Focke-Wulf Ta 152 - - - - - 34 ? ~150
Focke-Wulf Ta 154 - - - - - 8 - 8
Heinkel He 162 - - - - - - 116 116
Heinkel He 219 - - - - 11 195 62 268
Junkers Ju 88 - 62 66 257 706 2513 355 3,964
Messerschmitt Bf 109 449 1667 2764 2657 6013 12807 2798 29,155
Messerschmitt Bf 110 156 1006 594 501 641 128 - 3,028
Messerschmitt Me 163 - - - - - 327 37 364
Messerschmitt Me 210 - - 92 93 89 74 - 348
Messerschmitt Me 262 - - - - - 564 730 1,294
Messerschmitt Me 410 - - - - 271 629 - 910
Total 614 2735 3744 5358 10059 24981 5732 53,215
Stormtroopers
Type 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
Focke-Wulf Fw 190 - - - 68 1183 4279 1104 6,634
Henschel Hs 129 - - 7 221 411 302 - 841
Junkers Ju 87 134 603 500 960 1672 1012 - 4,881
Junkers Ju 88 - - - - - 3 - 3
Total 134 603 507 1249 3266 5596 1104 12359
reconnaissance aircraft
Type 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
Dornier Do 17 16 - - - - - - 16
Dornier Do 215 3 92 6 - - - - 101
Focke-Wulf Fw 189 6 38 250 327 208 17 - 846
Focke-Wulf Fw 200 1 36 58 84 76 8 - 263
Henschel Hs 126 137 368 5 - - - - 510
Junkers Ju 88 - 330 568 567 394 52 - 1,911
Junkers Ju 188 - - - - 105 432 33 570
Junkers Ju 290 - - - - 23 18 - 41
Junkers Ju 388 - - - - - 87 12 99
Messerschmitt Bf 109 - - 26 8 141 979 171 1,328
Messerschmitt Bf 110 - 75 190 79 150 - - 494
Messerschmitt Me 210 - - 2 2 - - - 4
Messerschmitt Me 410 - - - - 20 93 - 113
Total 163 939 1105 1067 1117 1686 216 6296
Seaplanes
Type 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
Arado Ar 196 22 104 94 107 104 - - 435
Blohm & Voss BV 138 39 82 85 70 - - - 276
Blohm & Voss BV 222 - - - - 4 - - 4
Dornier Do 18 22 49 - - - - - 71
Dornier Do 24 - 1 7 46 81 - - 135
Heinkel He 115 52 76 - - 141 - - 269
Total 135 312 186 223 330 1190
Transport aircraft
Type 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
Gotha Go 244 - - - 43 - - - 43
Junkers Ju 52 145 388 507 503 887 379 - 2,809
Junkers Ju 252 - - - 15 - - - 15
Junkers Ju 352 - - - - 1 49 - 50
Messerschmitt Me 323 - - - 27 140 34 - 201
Total 145 388 507 588 1028 462 3118
Total production
Year 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
Total 1,928 7,829 9,422 12,822 20,599 35,076 7,052 94,677

[Illanatol]

Quote: Quote Lavrov

It is unlikely that at present, in Russia there is a better specialist - a historian in the Air Force during the Second World War than M. Timin from Tacticmedia.

Definitely - no. Timin is just a blogger and nothing more.
This "Xperd" has nothing to do with aviation, and takes the evaluation criteria from an unwashed finger.

As for Luftwaffe losses, there are quite official German data based on analysis and archives of the Luftwaffe and other sources. They can be completely trusted.
According to them, the German losses were quite comparable with the Soviet ones. The Soviet side lost more planes, but even fewer pilots than the Germans.
According to the latter indicator, the Reich was second only to Japan (only the Japanese lost more than the Germans). The losses of Soviet pilots killed were less than not only German and Japanese, but also the losses of the allies.

[Illanatol]

Quote from: dump22

It is much more reliable to look not at the data of allegedly downed enemy aircraft, but at the data on the manufacture of new aircraft.

During the Second World War, the USSR manufactured 213742 aircraft and received some more (?) from the allies.
Germany during WW2 produced 108182 aircraft (for the eastern and western fronts).

Oh really?
Production of combat aircraft in the USSR
1941 g. - 7900
1942 - 22
1943 - 35
1944 - just over 40
1945 the first half of the year - 20 units.

In total - no more than 130 thousand.

And the number of aircraft released does not directly correlate with the number of losses.
Since the fate of aircraft may be different. Yes, combat and non-combat losses are very likely. But it may be otherwise.
It is known that the service life was very small (especially for engines). It is also known that, as the performance characteristics wear out, they sag (engine power drops, speed decreases, flight performance deteriorates).
New equipment was given to pilots who directly participated in the database. When wear and tear became significant, the pilots received new aircraft. And partially worn ones were handed over to newcomers, former cadets, who passed the final stage of flight and combat training on them, finally finishing off the service life, after which the aircraft were decommissioned.

[Glagol1]

Exactly. We produced a lot of aircraft, but the build quality was not ideal, so some of the aircraft simply did not go into battle. Plus motors. They were also not absolute. The Germans had a higher quality of equipment, namely assemblies, all of Europe worked for them, and half of our workers were women and children. So the losses were of the same order, at the beginning of the war we were inferior, in the middle and then the Germans. At the end of the war, the Germans had good-quality aircraft, and there were sorely lacking pilots, so they planted 18-year-old greenery at the controls, which immediately became a victim of the Lavochkins, Yakovlevs and others.

[Illanatol]

Quote: tihonmarine

Rather, the way it was, overstrained Hitler's industry.

That was not the problem.
The strength of the USSR was the mass training of potential flight personnel. There were thousands of flying clubs in the USSR, from whose graduates future combat pilots were trained. Therefore, the USSR never, even in the initial period of the Second World War, had a shortage of flight personnel.
The Germans did not focus on mass character, but on the quality of training, which at first was higher than in the USSR. However, this rate did not ensure mass character. While the losses were small, this was not significant (although there were alarming calls back in the days of the "battle for England"). But when the losses of the Luftwaffe began to grow (especially on the Eastern Front), the Germans began to experience personnel shortages.
The Reich had no problems with the release of aircraft until the end of the war, problems arose with the flight crew. The quality of his training had to be worsened (by reducing the training time), but it was not possible to increase the mass character to the proper extent.
Therefore, the number of the German Air Force remained not very large, the Germans did not succeed in building up their grouping on the same Eastern Front, despite all efforts. It was necessary to increase the load on the existing flyers, hence the enormous difference in the number of sorties for Soviet and German pilots.
The USSR at first had big problems with the quality of materiel and organizational structure, with the tactics of using the Air Force. When these problems began to be corrected, things started to go well, since there were no problems with personnel. The quality of pilot training was gradually improved, training times and flight hours were increased, and our growth curve surpassed that of the Luftwaffe by the middle of the war.

[lukash66]

Quote: Illanatol

Quote: tihonmarine

Rather, the way it was, overstrained Hitler's industry.

That was not the problem.
The strength of the USSR was the mass training of potential flight personnel. There were thousands of flying clubs in the USSR, from whose graduates future combat pilots were trained. Therefore, the USSR never, even in the initial period of the Second World War, had a shortage of flight personnel.
The Germans did not focus on mass character, but on the quality of training, which at first was higher than in the USSR. However, this rate did not ensure mass character. While the losses were small, this was not significant (although there were alarming calls back in the days of the "battle for England"). But when the losses of the Luftwaffe began to grow (especially on the Eastern Front), the Germans began to experience personnel shortages.
The Reich had no problems with the release of aircraft until the end of the war, problems arose with the flight crew. The quality of his training had to be worsened (by reducing the training time), but it was not possible to increase the mass character to the proper extent.
Therefore, the number of the German Air Force remained not very large, the Germans did not succeed in building up their grouping on the same Eastern Front, despite all efforts. It was necessary to increase the load on the existing flyers, hence the enormous difference in the number of sorties for Soviet and German pilots.
The USSR at first had big problems with the quality of materiel and organizational structure, with the tactics of using the Air Force. When these problems began to be corrected, things started to go well, since there were no problems with personnel. The quality of pilot training was gradually improved, training times and flight hours were increased, and our growth curve surpassed that of the Luftwaffe by the middle of the war.

At the expense of the losses of "experts", read "fun hunting in the East". And whoever was better or worse in terms of training was also there. Even at the beginning of the Second World War, our professional pilots were not inferior to themselves, and in many ways even surpassed the German ones. At the same time, fighting on obviously worse aircraft. But this is also a contentious issue. And in the last 16 episodes, he fought on equal terms with emils and even friedrichs.