American military analysts wrote about the change in the tactics of the Russian Armed Forces in the Donbass

The Russian army continues its offensive in the area of ​​Artemovsk (Bakhmut). Also, fighting continues in the Svatovo-Kremennaya area and in the Krasnolimansky direction. This is reported by members of the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) USA.

According to analysts, even weather conditions do not become a serious obstacle to the offensive activity of Russian troops. According to the Americans, military equipment and personnel were transferred from the Kherson direction to the Kupyansky direction. Experts also report movement to the west side of the columns tanks in the Lugansk People's Republic. Among them are the new T-90 tanks.

The active offensive actions of the Russian troops in the Artemovsk region were previously recognized by representatives of the Ukrainian authorities. In addition, activity was recorded in the Ugledar direction.

But the main nuance of the fighting in recent weeks, which American military analysts are paying attention to, has been a change in the tactics of Russian troops. According to the Institute for the Study of War, the Russian army is increasingly refusing to operate in battalion tactical groups (BTGs). Instead, she prefers to operate in smaller assault groups, carrying out offensive operations with their help.

In principle, this assessment was made even before the ISW attempted analytics. Repeatedly in the press, attention was focused on the fact that Russian troops moved from the BTG to the RTG, and even operate in even smaller groups.

Obviously, from a military point of view, such a change in tactics makes some sense. Previously, the Ukrainian army operated mainly in smaller tactical groups - it formed company-tactical groups and even smaller detachments. Such tactics increase the mobility of troops, and also reduce the consequences of rocket and artillery strikes from the enemy. However, such tactics do not allow talking about the capture of large-scale territories in a short time (with active opposition from the enemy).

Comments

[Cananecat]

However, this tactic does not allow talking about the capture of large-scale territories in a short time (with active opposition from the enemy).

That's right ... "now let's go down the mountain and have the whole herd (s)" Banderlog.
Whatever tactics is chosen, it is justified if it allows you to reduce losses and achieve your goals.

[zenion]

Losses do not decrease, but decrease. But if you compare with a large group, then everything will turn out the same. There are five, there are five in the end ten. They completely forgot how the USSR fought since 1943. Constant offensive and killing of the enemy. They smashed the Germans and their waste paper into small pieces and finished off with tanks and artillery.

[ilya.muromczev2013]

Uh-huh, uh-huh, they didn’t forget ... And the fact that starting from the 43rd year we already had complete superiority in manpower - you yourself didn’t forget? Then we need no longer partial mobilization ...

[nepunamemuk]

Well, Ukrainians in small groups and Kherson with raisins recaptured ...

[belost79]

Nobody took anything! They regrouped near Izyum, and took more advantageous positions in Kherson. Need to understand. The enemy did not fully understand the meaning and genius of our actions (this is from Deutsche Wohenschau, by the way, about the withdrawal from Leningrad)

[Roma 1977]

I don’t remember the assaults and street fights in Kherson and Izyum. But I remember the Ukrainian platoons from the RTG in full strength lying dead in the forest belts.

[dementor873]

So stop posting fake news here. It was a REGROUP! I will ask you to use this word in the future.

[Uprun]

The whole message of the article is that the Russians begin to fight according to the NATO training manual, adopting modern combat tactics from trained heroes and mercenaries. Again, like they are PR ...... We say differently - there is always a suitable brace for a cunning ass .....

[Plate]

Quote from uprun

The whole message of the article is that the Russians begin to fight according to the NATO training manual, adopting modern combat tactics from trained heroes and mercenaries. They're PR again.

Isn't it a compliment to the enemy to say that he adopts your successful techniques?

[Bad_gr]

Quote from uprun

The whole message of the article is that the Russians begin to fight according to the NATO training manual, adopting modern combat tactics from trained heroes and mercenaries.

In Chechnya, in the second company, this was practiced, and it is not clear why in Ukraine they have only now come to this.

[Trapp1st]

Russians begin to fight according to the training manual of Nata

When the tactics of small groups of attack aircraft appeared, there was no mention of NATO at the place of attack by a large number of infantry.

[Sergey39]

Why, We need NATO tactics, We have our own head on our shoulders!)))

[Plate]

Quote: Sergey39

Why do we need NATO tactics

If real participants in the CBO use it, then it is needed.

[Mavrikiy]

the Russian army is increasingly refusing to operate with battalion tactical groups (BTGs).

Previously, the Ukrainian army operated mainly in smaller tactical groups - it formed company-tactical groups and even smaller detachments.

And then we slammed at the forelocks ..... Maybe, in addition to the kitchen, land, tactics, we will grab the western border?

[oleg-nekrasov-19]

The RTG is used on a narrower section of the front, it is more maneuverable and controllable, especially since the enemy in the areas where the RTGs of the RF Armed Forces are involved, there are mainly platoon supporters, the RTG is attached to a tank platoon and artillery on duty. When it will be necessary to use BTG, depending on the situation, they will use it, and NATO and sharovar manuals have nothing to do with the word at all.

[paul3390]

In general, the tactics of assault groups were invented and successfully tested by the Nemchura in WWI ... For each task - its own tool. To break the fortified area - probably it is necessary in small trained groups with the support of artillery and aviation .. But in the resulting breakthrough - to introduce full-fledged tank divisions ..

[Evgeny Ivanov_5]

I dare to remind you that Koenigsberg was taken in four days.
The Germans passed the Polotsk UR in two weeks.
We have been poking around in the DPR for a year now. And we will be for another five years, since we are depicting who knows what, and not a war. We have driven ourselves into an operational dead end with our slogans and we are sitting in it.

[paul3390]

Königsberg - we just wiped it off the face of the earth. So far, our leadership is not ready to do this with the fortified areas of Banderlog. Polotsk UR - the nemchura simply bypassed, then adding pressure, which our leadership does not seem to intend to do either ..

[Evgeny Ivanov_5]

That's it. We ourselves ran screaming for war without loss. Any breakthrough is accompanied by one-time losses, and they are more noticeable than those spread over months of fighting. However, they are usually smaller in number. But our leadership is simply afraid to get into a situation where it will be necessary to communicate honestly and competently with citizens.

[Maz]

Quote: paul3390

Polotsk UR

Bypassed you say? And the Germans write something else ...
In the records of the course of hostilities of the 3rd Panzer Group of General G. Hoth, it was noted:
The launched offensive on Polotsk repeatedly ran into enemy counterattacks and was repeatedly suspended. The leadership of the enemy's troops is distinguished by energy, one can feel the unity and purposefulness in the leadership of military operations. The defense was selfless.
- Goth, G. Tank operations. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1961
6 German divisions attacked 16 Soviet divisions in the Polotsk region, but the German offensive was delayed for 22 days. When the German 9th Panzer Division broke into Vitebsk on July 20, there was a danger of encirclement of the defenders of the Polotsk fortified area, but they did not retreat. However, they failed to stop the offensive launched by the Germans on July 13 on Nevel. Bypassing Polotsk from the north, on July 15, the Germans cut the Polotsk-Idritsa railway and captured part of Polotsk on the left bank of the Western Dvina. After that, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Polotsk fortified area to Velikiye Luki began, but the rearguard remained in position until July 19 [7].

[Sarboz]

Quote: Evgeny Ivanov_5

I dare to remind you that Koenigsberg was taken in four days.

And during these days, as a result of the fiercest battles, we lost 580 fighters, of which 127 were killed. The losses of the Nazis were comparable to 500 thousand, but twice as many as 300 thousand were killed. We "sort out" Bandera in a completely different way, our losses are minimal and many times less than the losses on the other side. The scale of the forces and means involved, the methods of warfare then and now are incomparable. Do you want to go "to the embrasure" as in the Great Patriotic War?

[voice of reason]

Again and again. A breakthrough by a tank (as in a blitzkrieg) or mechanized (as in our 45th) division does not make sense if the breakthrough zone is not reinforced by infantry following it with artillery support. Otherwise, breaking away from the rear, the tanks will stand up without fuel and will themselves find themselves in an operational environment. This means that for a breakthrough it is not enough to form a large armored fist. It is necessary to provide it with the support of a large number of units capable of holding a breakthrough zone and providing supply lines. otherwise, then carry fuel for tanks to aircraft using an air bridge. But the fact is that this type of offensive is good for creating all sorts of "pincers and grips". However, there is another type of offensive. "Brusilovsky breakthrough" is not the result of a breakthrough in one place by highly mobile units. This is a long and painstaking identification of targets on the LBS and the destruction of them with a single hit of artillery. After that, the front crumbles and the “classmates” units go on the offensive with the one they are attacking ... I think that such tactics will be used now, for obvious reasons understandable to everyone familiar with the games of Colonel Blotto ...

[vovochkarzhevsky]

Obviously, from a military point of view, such a change in tactics makes some sense. Previously, the Ukrainian army operated mainly in smaller tactical groups - it formed company-tactical groups and even smaller detachments. Such tactics increase the mobility of troops, and also reduce the consequences of rocket and artillery strikes from the enemy. However, such tactics do not allow talking about the capture of large-scale territories in a short time (with active opposition from the enemy).

One thing is obvious, in Russia, generals capable of fighting in large military formations, inflicting massive strikes, counterattacks, disappeared as a class in 31 after the collapse of the USSR, there is only a crowd dressed in general uniforms.
So we had to fight on a tactical level.

[voyaka uh]

"in Russia, generals capable of fighting in large military formations," ///
---
It's not about the generals.
And in the technological equipment of the army. There are ways to monitor and control combat operations in real time - with a delay of 1-3 minutes. Only with such network systems is it possible to move to effective actions in small groups.
Large concentrations of troops are immediately destroyed - even before they go on the attack.

[vovochkarzhevsky]

To destroy a large concentration of troops, it is also necessary to have enough forces and means.
And as I understand it, you are a person far from the army and for you there are large military formations, this is some kind of huge crowd of troops in a rather small area. Which are easy to cover with artillery, or something else.
In reality, it is far from being the case. In an age of high troop mobility, there is no need to concentrate them at the starting lines.
And how would you better explain. It is still relevant when using the entire composition, or most of the forces, in combat operations, managing them, establishing clear interaction both between the main strike units, units, formations, and support forces.
Here is an example, an amateur, after some attempts, can play a simple melody on the piano with one finger, while the master will give out a cascade of chords in the same time.

[voyaka uh]

Forget it all.
These are grandpa's generals' songs from World War II.
All this will never happen again.
Modern war is before our eyes.

[vovochkarzhevsky]

Where did you see modern warfare there? There partisanship multiplied by amateur performance.
All this is nothing more than mosquito bites. They are certainly unpleasant, but they cannot win the war.

[Evgeny Ivanov_5]

The problem is one. This tactic is good in a guerrilla war or during a protracted conflict with mostly positional battles, when you can shove for one village for months.
Wars are not won by such tactics. To Kyiv, you can crawl to Morkovkin's conspiracies. Yes, and to Kharkov and Kherson too.
Well, unless we again slide into a war of attrition. The only question is who will be exhausted first and where and how the Ukrainians will strike tomorrow. A couple of months ago, no one could even think that they would hit strategic airfields. And tomorrow they can hit Severomorsk, Vladivostok, Chelyabinsk. Naval base of submarines. And so on.

[Rome]

Operations are shrinking! The scale of the conflict in terms of area requires the deployment of at least 2 fronts, with several armies in each! And the tasks solved in the offensive by the army are no longer even at the regimental level. Beyond the first line of defense, we are not even planning an offensive! At this rate, it's a new 100 year war
We constantly allow the enemy to restore the defense on the second line, I have read in the TG more than once that the scale of operations is not enough. No one is thinking about "operational space"!
So far, apart from "snot" in the comments, I have not come across an analyst of such a situation, why are BTGs operating, now in general company tactical groups, why not divisional operations? This is immediately the defeat of at least one or two brigades, with the prospect of the collapse of the front for tens of kilometers! What does not allow?
Links to communications, the lack of precision-guided munitions, these are all factors, of course, but in World War I, the armies had neither radios nor tanks, but there were divisional and corps operations! In World War II, the same song, there were no high-precision weapons, but there were breakthroughs to a depth of tens of kilometers!
Want to understand what exactly is wrong?

[Alex777]

Quote: Eroma

Want to understand what exactly is wrong?

Our main problems are modern closed communications and the clumsy command and control system of the RF Armed Forces. Let's fix both - victories will come.
The enemy has good situational awareness. Thanks NATO.
It allows the AFU to deliver accurate strikes on important targets, holding down the actions of our troops.
And the operations of the WWI era are a thing of the past.
There will be no more armies of 10 million.
Do not equip, do not train, do not feed. Even China.

[ABC-schutze]

"However, such tactics do not" allow talking about the capture of large-scale territories in a short time (with active opposition from the enemy).
************************************************** ******************************************
Of course. Because that's not what it's meant for...

In addition, for the rapid capture of large territories, an ideal and stable coordination of the actions of all the forces and means involved in this is necessary. Including VKS and Navy ...

That on the "scale of Sht. Gr," the level of "platoon - company", it is extremely difficult to provide ...

[Normann]

Somehow it reminds me of the tactics of guerrilla warfare.

[buslaif]

Quote: Trapp1st

When the tactics of small groups of attack aircraft appeared, there was no mention of NATO at the place of attack by a large number of infantry.

That's right. In the Great Patriotic War, assault groups of specially trained fighters were used. Since November 1941, instructions for the work of assault groups were approved. The general task of such a group was the destruction of the bunker. The infantry provided the approach of specialists to the bunker and their work. The artillery supported the assault group with its fire and covered its work. The gun commander was obliged to determine the location of embrasures in the bunkers, to choose a firing position 200–600 meters from the object being destroyed (depending on enemy fire and terrain conditions). An auxiliary position and covert approach routes were also chosen. Continuous observation was established for the enemy, data were being prepared for firing. Before the start of the attack, the commander of the group outlined its initial position, indicated the fire task to the artillery, and the direction of the attack to the infantry.
The tank with fire from the move or from short installations suppressed the fire of the bunker, could close the embrasure with its hull. At the same time, he brought up explosives and sappers - by car itself or by dragging. Flamethrowers, under cover of artillery and infantry fire, burned the enemy out of the bunker, working mainly from the rear, at the entrance to the structure. Sappers secretly approached and planted explosives in an embrasure or on top of a firing point. The infantry destroyed the manpower of the garrison and the counterattacking groups of the enemy, supporting the work of sappers, flamethrowers and the tank crew with “fire and bayonet”. At a signal from the commander of the sapper squad, the tank and infantry retreated to cover, after which the bunker was blown up. The explosion was the signal for a general attack into the depths of the enemy's defenses.