News of the day in the West: Russia defends the Crimean bridge!
Our respected and often cited edition of The Drive published an article by Tyler Rogovey “Russia seems to be preparing its Crimean bridge for missile strikes”. Tyler in his material is trying to comprehend two things: how can the Crimean bridge be disabled for Ukrainians and whether this can be done in the light of what Russia is doing in terms of its protection.
The article is quite capacious, but in order to accept and understand the point of view of the Americans, we, as usual, will have to disassemble everything into its components.
Russia has applied a number of protective measures to the bridge across the Kerch Strait connecting Russia and Crimea, including decoy barges covered in radar reflectors, as well as smokescreens used during exercises over the weekend.
The bridge, which was built between 2016 and 2018 and includes both road and rail links, is incredibly important to Russia. His connection between the Russian mainland and Crimea, which he took from Ukraine in 2014, is both symbolic and strategic. Recent developments appear to be preparations to protect the bridge from missile attack, and while countermeasures are apparently being deployed and tested, it is not clear if they will be removed or remain unchanged in the future.
The bridge, which was built between 2016 and 2018 and includes both road and rail links, is incredibly important to Russia. His connection between the Russian mainland and Crimea, which he took from Ukraine in 2014, is both symbolic and strategic. Recent developments appear to be preparations to protect the bridge from missile attack, and while countermeasures are apparently being deployed and tested, it is not clear if they will be removed or remain unchanged in the future.
Countermeasures are just fine. If it weren’t for the behavioral line of Ukraine to destroy any objects that are not Ukrainian (although they are hammering on their own with enviable persistence), the shelling of cities that were left by the Armed Forces of Ukraine just yesterday is today. Alas, but it is. Why the Armed Forces of Ukraine are so actively fighting the civilian population, which yesterday was “their own”, is a mystery to many. But as long as everything remains like this, one cannot even think about any weakening of protection. Belgorod, Kursk and Bryansk have shown that it is dangerous to think so.
Independent military analyst H.I. Sutton reported Monday, July 4, that two target barges coming from the Novorossiysk Naval Base had been towed to the site and moored on the east side of the bridge. He further noted that the ships were covered in a variety of radar reflectors, which are metal devices attached to the barge to make it more visible to radar. Sutton used the term "target barges" to identify the ships, as the Russian Navy is known to have used such ships as targets during exercises with the Chernomorsky fleet. Now it looks like their purpose may be to act as decoys, confusing incoming missiles aimed at the Kerch Bridge. Other radar reflectors were also seen attached to the shallows near the bridge. It is not clear if they were part of countermeasures or navigational functions.
If you have nothing seditious in your thoughts, then what difference does it make why these barges are near the bridge? In fact, the idea is sound: these barges, with correctly calculated reflector locations, are a very significant element of missile defense. Retroreflectors with corner reflectors are a very useful thing for confusing enemy radars, the radar beam, repeatedly reflected from these simple devices that can return the beam at a certain angle, can give a completely different picture on the screen or in the "brains".
Such reflectors are a very unpleasant thing in the way of missiles with a radar seeker. We will talk about the possible use of missiles a little lower, but as for the RLGSN, then yes, a very correct move was made.
Russian troops also conducted a smoke screen test on July 1, with footage of the exercise filmed by local residents trying to cross the bridge while the aerosol was being sprayed.
Smoke screens are a relatively standard defense tactic historically used to cover military movements and the particular type of aerosol used can challenge the imaging features of technologies such as infrared seekers used on precision munitions and especially more advanced cruise missiles that use scene/object juxtaposition to autonomous attack of their targets. Multispectral cameras mounted on surveillance vehicles such as the RQ-4 Global Hawk and other unmanned aerial vehicles may also be affected. They can also obscure some of the image acquisition satellites. Russia is notorious for using smoke screens as a primary tactic, and it has troops partly dedicated to using them. In the recent past, strategic targets have been hidden during exercises and operations, such as in November 2021 when the Russian Navy used them to cover its naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus.
Smoke screens are a relatively standard defense tactic historically used to cover military movements and the particular type of aerosol used can challenge the imaging features of technologies such as infrared seekers used on precision munitions and especially more advanced cruise missiles that use scene/object juxtaposition to autonomous attack of their targets. Multispectral cameras mounted on surveillance vehicles such as the RQ-4 Global Hawk and other unmanned aerial vehicles may also be affected. They can also obscure some of the image acquisition satellites. Russia is notorious for using smoke screens as a primary tactic, and it has troops partly dedicated to using them. In the recent past, strategic targets have been hidden during exercises and operations, such as in November 2021 when the Russian Navy used them to cover its naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus.
That's right, gentlemen, we have what we have, as our neighbors say. Smoke, colloidal suspension, aerosol - everything that is there for the sake of obtaining a result will go into action. What happened on the Bridge is nothing more than a practice of setting up thick curtains, which can really complicate the work of not only the missile seeker, but also satellite guidance and correction systems.
These measures are unusual and suggest improvisation - Sutton - there is no "standard" protection, but in wartime people do their best to reduce the risks... Target barges are not designed for that. They are designed to train your own forces to destroy ships. If Ukraine tried to use anti-ship missiles like the Harpoon to hit the bridge, they could be effective. But this is not standard procedure.
And again let us doubt the words of the "expert".
Everything that is suitable for the performance of a combat mission is all good. A civilian copter, after it turned out that he could pick up and drag a mine, became drone-kamikaze. It's like an example. And examples of such stories wagon and three carts.
Naturally, in terms of the defense of the Crimean bridge, everything will be involved: air defense systems, ground-based anti-ship missiles, electronic warfare systems that can confuse missiles, regardless of what kind of seeker they have.
The bridge, as Mr. Rogovei rightly noted, is a very important component of the life of the peninsula. Economic and military component. Moreover, with the help of this bridge, Russia used to be able to control all Ukrainian shipping in the Sea of Azov, but now this is in the past. There are no more Ukrainian ports there, so the issue is off the agenda.
In general, the bridge is a very useful thing, and the fact that it will be guarded by all means, in my opinion, is clear and understandable, like broad daylight.
Basically, anything the Kerch Bridge signifies would make it an incredibly attractive target for Ukrainian forces — that is, if they have the will and firepower to mount such an attack.
The Kerch Bridge itself is by no means any longer close to Ukrainian-controlled territory, raising questions about the specific type of attack Russia fears Ukraine or anyone else might carry out. Because of the distance, Sutton suggested that an air attack might be considered, but further cited that the presence of Russian S-300 and S-400 missile systems would certainly hinder such an effort. Underwater attack is theoretically possible, but extremely unlikely at almost all levels
The Kerch Bridge itself is by no means any longer close to Ukrainian-controlled territory, raising questions about the specific type of attack Russia fears Ukraine or anyone else might carry out. Because of the distance, Sutton suggested that an air attack might be considered, but further cited that the presence of Russian S-300 and S-400 missile systems would certainly hinder such an effort. Underwater attack is theoretically possible, but extremely unlikely at almost all levels
Well, Mr. Sutton considers the issue very competently. And we will also spin it in full.
Let's take a look at what is in service with the Armed Forces of Ukraine and what the Ukrainians were given from what can really damage or even destroy the Crimean bridge.
But we'll start with a front line map.
Based on this map, we are aware that we should not expect an attack on the Bridge from land. The minimum safe distance from which a land-based missile system can be struck is about 350 km.
That is, "Point U" does not fit here at all. "Thunder" could get to the Bridge from the Zaporozhye region, but, alas, the complex remained a beautiful fairy tale.
MLRS "Alder", "Smerch", "Hurricane", and the gift HIMARS are also not suitable in range. Even several RGM-84 Harpoon ground installations donated by Denmark and the USA will not be reached either!
This sad fact is acknowledged by both Sutton and Rogoway. Today, there is no point on the territory of Ukraine from where it would be possible to strike at the Bridge using ground-based launchers.
Move on. Strike from the sea.
In general, it is sad (for the Armed Forces of Ukraine), but there is nothing to beat here. Of course, hoist missiles, the same "Harpoons", on some self-propelled barge and try to get within launch distance...
Of course not. The Ukrainian Navy simply does not have corvette or frigate-class ships capable of carrying out missile launches. And they have nowhere to take.
Therefore, we do not consider the launch of an anti-ship missile from a ship due to the lack of such, because for a successful launch we need not only a launch container, we need guidance equipment and at least the corresponding radars.
Air strike.
Here everything is more difficult and easier at the same time. The Armed Forces of Ukraine still have planes capable of flying to the Bridge. As well as there are pilots who will take rockets and fly to demolish the Bridge. And there are missiles, too, as Moskva showed.
The only thing is that these planes will have to get closer to the missile launch distance. And here is the question of the availability of radars (and we have them) capable of tracking the aircraft long before its approach to the launch lines, the question of the S-300, S-400, Buks, Thors and Pantsirs, capable of shooting down any aircraft and any rocket. And, of course, electronic warfare.
When all these protection elements are available and working properly, then there is nothing to be afraid of.
And one more subtle point: the striking ability of the Harpoon missiles and others like it, which leaves much to be desired. Modern anti-ship missiles are designed to destroy ships that are generally unarmored, judging by the standards of the Second World War. But in our case, the rocket will not be opposed by a ship with a side wall thickness of 50-60 mm of ordinary steel, but by a very strong and solid reinforced concrete structure, which warheads of 100-150 kg of TNT equivalent will be of no use. Well, who saw the Bridge, he will understand what I mean.
In general, having studied how the Su-24 could be dangerous to the Crimean bridge, the conclusion was not very pleasant for that side: the air-to-surface missiles of the Kh-23 and Kh-25 types, which the Armed Forces have, are frankly weak and their range is so is small, which guarantees the carrier aircraft entry into the air defense coverage area. Approximately the same can be said about the Kh-29, which is more modern, but nevertheless, does not have a long launch range, from 2 to 12 km.
But the main thing is small charges in warheads, actually from 86 to 136 kg. Of course, with a successful hit, the Bridge will receive damage, but talking about the possibility of destruction ...
The good old FAB-500 will be more effective here.
Yes, it is quite a tool for the destruction of such objects. But alas, in order to use this bomb, you generally need to manage to break through to the Bridge. And if the calculations of the complexes covering the Bridge do not "click through", then the chances of completing the tasks of launching a rocket from 5-7 km, or dropping an air bomb are frankly small. At the very least, I wouldn't want to end up in the cockpit of a Su-24 on such a mission.
Perhaps everything is not so bad for the Ukrainian side in the implementation of these projects, because the Americans also have more modern missiles than the Soviet rubbish that remains at the disposal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The question, however, is what is the likelihood that the United States and others will provide the Armed Forces of Ukraine with the latest weapons that can actually destroy or damage the Bridge.
Judging by how “willingly” NATO member countries part with relatively new weapons systems, this will not happen. Moreover, the Ukrainians very quickly part with them, although sometimes not of their own free will.
If the bridge over the Kerch Strait were attacked by any type, it would be a very unpleasant event for Russia and a major victory for Kyiv.
It is also possible that these precautions are being put in place, or at least being tested, out of fear that NATO might actively join the fight, putting the bridge at great risk. While such an idea may seem paranoid on Russia's part, it wouldn't be all that surprising given that they have been conducting similar exercises in Tartus. They may also include assessing the vulnerability of the bridge by testing them on Russian systems.
Whether or not Ukrainian forces actually end up launching an attack on the Kerch Bridge, the Russian military is definitely up to something. Whether smoke screens and unusual decoy barges would be enough to deter such an attack is unclear, but perhaps these countermeasures are just the beginning.
It is also possible that these precautions are being put in place, or at least being tested, out of fear that NATO might actively join the fight, putting the bridge at great risk. While such an idea may seem paranoid on Russia's part, it wouldn't be all that surprising given that they have been conducting similar exercises in Tartus. They may also include assessing the vulnerability of the bridge by testing them on Russian systems.
Whether or not Ukrainian forces actually end up launching an attack on the Kerch Bridge, the Russian military is definitely up to something. Whether smoke screens and unusual decoy barges would be enough to deter such an attack is unclear, but perhaps these countermeasures are just the beginning.
Pretty clear point of view. You know, paranoia or not, but in our difficult time it is better to be prepared for anything. And to the fact that Ukrainian pilots decide to break through to the Bridge with bombs or missiles, and to the fact that NATO decides to transfer several high-precision and long-range missiles to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. And the fact that such exercises are being conducted around the Bridge and such precautionary measures are being taken does not speak of paranoia, but of the desire to prevent any blow in our direction.
So the trap-barges and smokes are just a continuation of the earlier launched program to protect the Crimean bridge. And the fact that such a program will consist of several positions is clear and understandable for all of us. The fact that such actions are surprising in the West is simply due to a lack of understanding of the situation and unwillingness to believe the information on our part.
But you should not impose your opinion on anyone, especially those. Who does not want to accept it. As they say, the caravan goes on, no matter what. So we will count on the fact that the set of measures to protect the Crimean bridge will be quite effective and full-fledged.
And in the West they can be surprised at this as much as they like, it is more important for us to preserve our heritage no matter what.
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