SS troops and the Wehrmacht in the Battle of Kursk. Comparative analysis of combat use
Translation of the essay by Roman Toeppel “Waffen-SS und Wehrmacht in der Schlacht bei Kursk. Ein Vergleich im operativen Einsatz”, published in the collection “SS Troops. New Research, Ferdinand Schoening, Padeborn, 2014.
Translation: Slug_BDMP
Introduction
On April 15, 1943, Adolf Hitler signed the operational order of the Headquarters of the Wehrmacht No. 6 on the offensive operation "Citadel". The operation was an offensive in converging directions in the area of the city of Kursk with the aim of encircling and destroying the Soviet troops concentrated there.
If successful, the Wehrmacht significantly reduced the front line and thus freed up reserves for operations in other sectors. In addition, it was supposed to capture a large number of prisoners and able-bodied civilians to work for the needs of Germany (Appendix 2).
Initially, Hitler planned to launch an offensive in early May, but these dates were shifted over and over again. This made it possible for both German and Soviet troops to better prepare for the upcoming summer battles. Operation Citadel, which began on July 5, 1943, resulted in an almost two-month series of battles for the cities of Kursk, Orel and Kharkov. Historian Karl-Heinz Frieser later called it "the greatest battle in stories". In terms of the number of troops involved, the Battle of Kursk was unparalleled in the entire Second World War: already in the first two weeks of fighting, about 2 million people, 5 aircraft, 000 tanks and self-propelled guns and almost 39 guns.
For a comparative analysis of the combat use of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS, the operation "Citadel" is the best suited - the first, offensive for the Germans, phase of the Battle of Kursk. Most of the formations participating in it during this period, at least during the first week, were in approximately equal conditions - they constantly fought offensive battles. Subsequently, they then defended themselves, then went on to counterattacks. Units and formations were withdrawn from the battle, sent to other sectors. Thus, a correct comparison seems difficult.
The purpose of this short study is to try to answer three questions:
- Were the SS formations participating in the Battle of Kursk better equipped than similar Wehrmacht formations?
- Did the SS formations justify the hopes placed on them?
- Did the SS troops suffer higher losses compared to the Wehrmacht?
By answering them, one can realistically assess the combat effectiveness of the SS troops.
I. Were the SS formations better equipped than those of the Wehrmacht?
One can speak with a high degree of confidence about the numerical strength of the German troops participating in Operation Citadel, since diaries of the combat operations of all three armies involved in the operation have been preserved. Documents of operational departments (Ia) are kept in the Federal Archive - Military Archive (BA-MA): Army Group "Kempf" - archival number Rh 20-8/83; 9th Army - RH 20-9 / 134; 4th Panzer Army - RH21-4/104.
33 German divisions took part in the "Citadel": 17 infantry, 5 motorized infantry and 11 tank. In addition, a large number of separate units were involved, reporting directly to the commands of the armies and army groups: for example, separate tank, anti-tank, self-propelled artillery battalions.
The 9th Army, under the command of Colonel General Walter Model, advancing on Kursk from the north, from the Orel region, consisted of 17 divisions. There were no SS divisions in its composition. Her offensive lasted exactly one week - from July 5 to July 11, 1943. On July 12, the Red Army launched its counterattack on Orel - Operation Kutuzov. As a result of this, the entire northern wing of the German troops went on the defensive.
From the south, from the Belgorod region, 4TA and AG Kempf (named after its commander, General of the Tank Forces Werner Kempf) advanced.
The AG "Kempf", numbering seven divisions, was entrusted with the task of covering the eastern wing of the 4th TA, Colonel General Herman Goth, from possible Soviet counterattacks.
The main task in the southern direction was assigned to 4TA: to break through the defenses in depth of the Soviet troops as quickly as possible and, advancing north, connect with the 9th Army, thus closing the encirclement around the enemy forces on the Kursk Bulge. 4TA was the most powerful formation participating in the Citadel, and consisted of ten divisions. Nine of them took part in the offensive. These included the Panzergrenadier division of the Wehrmacht "Grossdeutschland" (hereinafter: pg.d. "VG") and the II SS Panzer Corps, which included the Panzergrenadier divisions of the SS "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler" (hereinafter in the text : Leibstandarte), "Reich" and "Dead Head".
The staff strength of the SS panzer-grenadier divisions was higher than that of similar army divisions. The number of their personnel, equipment and weapons was even higher than that of army tank divisions. Each of the three SS divisions consisted of about 20 men. They consisted of five motorized infantry battalions, and not three, as in army formations. In addition, they had two light artillery battalions, and not one each, like the Wehrmacht tank divisions.
P-g.d. "VG" in this respect was like an SS division. Only she and the Leibstandarte had reinforced motorized infantry battalions - five companies each, and not four, like everyone else.
Even greater was the superiority in the number of tanks. See Table 1.
Table 1. Equipment of the divisions participating in the Citadel operation with tanks and self-propelled guns.
Notes to table 1.
1) Availability details:
- tanks - on 11.07.43 (BA-MA, RH 10/60, pp. 57-59),
- assault guns - on 11.07.43 (BA-MA, RH 10/62, p. 92),
- anti-tank self-propelled guns - on 13.07.43 (BA-MA, RH 10/63, pp. 62-65);
2) the number of armored vehicles shown in table 1 includes both combat-ready vehicles and those under repair and in the process of being transported from factories in Germany;
3) table 1 does not take into account the BTT of units temporarily assigned to divisions for the duration of the operation "Citadel";
4) modern tanks include Pz IV with a long-barreled gun, Pz V "Panther",
Pz VI "Tiger" and captured T-34s; to obsolete: Pz I, Pz II, Pz III, Pz IV with a short-barreled gun, Pz 35 (t), Pz 38 (t) and command vehicles based on them.
Equipping divisions II because. SS and pg.d. "VG" the rest of the Wehrmacht soldiers could only envy. All of them included full-fledged divisions of self-propelled howitzers "Hummel", "Vespe" and "Grille". They also had one company of the latest Tiger tanks (14 units), which terrified the opponents.
In total, 147 Tigers took part in the Battle of Kursk. 90 of them are not mentioned in Table 1, as they were part of the 503rd and 505th separate heavy tank battalions.
In addition, pg.d. "VG" was the only owner of a whole battalion of "Tigers" - 45 units, and she was the first to receive the latest Panther tanks. Joseph Goebbels, in his diary entry dated April 1.04.1943, XNUMX, called "Greater Germany" the "Leibstandarte of the Wehrmacht". Thanks to high-ranking patrons in the high command of the Wehrmacht, "VG" had priority in supply compared to other army formations.
We must also not forget about divisions of assault guns. In the summer of 1943, these machines were especially appreciated on the Eastern Front. In reports from the front, their dignity is extolled literally to the skies. An example of this is the report of the Major of the General Staff von Busse to the headquarters of Army Group Center (BA-MA, RH 10/54, p. 87), as well as the report of the commander of the 200th training division of assault guns on a business trip to the Eastern Front (BA-MA, RH 10/58, p. 358).
However, the situation with the supply of II divisions cannot be tolerated. SS on all SS troops participating in the "Citadel", and consider that they all had priority in comparison with the Wehrmacht. Even such an illustrious compound as p-g.d. SS "Viking" was equipped worse than its comrades from II because. SS and in its condition corresponded to the usual pg.d. Wehrmacht. In early July 1943, the Viking had 46 tanks (mostly obsolete), 6 assault guns and 14 anti-tank self-propelled guns. For comparison: the 16th pg.d. Wehrmacht, who fought side by side with the Viking in the Donbass, had 53 tanks and 14 anti-tank self-propelled guns. Both divisions had been on vacation since April 1943, were replenished and entered the battle only on 17.07.1943/XNUMX/XNUMX.
It can be confidently asserted that the best equipment of the Leibstandarte, Reich and Totenkopf divisions in the summer of 1943 is explained by the fact that they were assigned the most responsible tasks during the attack on Kursk. This was also envisaged by the “Proposal for the conduct of Operation K”, presented by the Chief of Staff of the Kempf Group on 1.04.1943/XNUMX/XNUMX (BA-MA, RH 20-8/81). Some army divisions (not only "VG") that were supposed to participate in the "Citadel" were also strengthened. The most striking example of this is the 78th "assault" division. The 78th had an anti-tank self-propelled gun division (26 Marder self-propelled guns) and the 189th assault gun division (31 pieces). This, in fact, an infantry division was so “pumped up” with weapons that during the battles of the summer of 1943 this led to great difficulties. Major of the General Staff von Busse wrote the following in his report to the headquarters of Army Group Center dated 17.08.1943/XNUMX/XNUMX:
“The 78th “assault” division in its current state is incapacitated. At a minimum, an anti-tank self-propelled gun battalion should be removed from its composition, since it also has an assault gun battalion. The division is overloaded with weapons, the commanders are not able to effectively dispose of them. The connection is not able to ensure the evacuation of damaged vehicles and compensate for losses in the crews.
(BA-MA, RH 10/54, p. 91).
II. Did the SS formations suffer excessive losses in the Battle of Kursk?
Division II. because The SS were operating in the decisive sector of Operation Citadel, which, of course, meant high losses. However, the question is different - were these losses higher than in the formations of the Wehrmacht, and can they be considered "excessive"? Can the accusations from the Wehrmacht that the SS achieved success only at the cost of unjustifiably high losses be considered fair?
A typical example is the statement of Erich von Manstein in his Lost Victories:
"... The high bloody price that they (SS) paid, most often does not go to any comparison with the results achieved."
Researchers (for example, Bernd Wegner in his book "Hitler's Political Soldiers") point out that the SS Reichsführer H. Himmler himself constantly emphasized the high losses of the SS troops. Thus, he created the glory of "especially stubborn and fanatical fighters" for his wards. However, such "advertising" was a double-edged sword.
Among the Germans, an opinion was soon formed about excessive losses in the SS troops, which scared away many potential volunteers. In the eyes of the professional military, this was also not a "compliment": you need to inflict high losses on the enemy at the cost of your own minimum. The example of the 18th Panzer Division clearly shows that large own losses do not mean a high combat value of a unit. Although there is no complete data on the losses of the 18th TD in Operation Citadel, however, one thing is certain - they were among the highest in the 1943 summer campaign of the year. So high that there was no point in replenishing them. This tank division was disbanded and an artillery division was created on its basis.
The catastrophe of the 18th TD is explained by the fact that it was one of the weakest among all tank divisions, and by the beginning of the offensive it had not been replenished to its full strength. In addition, it is necessary to add tactical errors that led to failures and high losses (ZhBD 18th TD for the period 28.06.43/12.07.43/27 - 18/139/10; BA-MA, RH 12-17 / 23, pp. XNUMX-XNUMX and XNUMX–XNUMX). Even in the history of the division, written by one of its veterans, Wolfgang Paul, it honestly and without embellishment speaks of the complete failure of the connection near Kursk.
Nothing of the kind can be blamed on II divisions. because SS. In the midst of the fighting on 12.07.1943/1.07.43/2.08.43, the commander of the GA "South" E. von Manstein visited the corps and expressed "gratitude for outstanding successes and exemplary behavior in battles." This was entered in the railway corps for XNUMX - XNUMX (ВА-МА, RS2-2/17, RS2-2/18). A few days later, the commander of the 4th TA, Herman Goth, noted the SS divisions subordinate to him in the order and expressed "highest gratitude" for the "restraint, steadfastness and unparalleled courage" shown in previous battles (order dated 18.07, BA-MA, RH 21-4/111, p. 115).
The fact that this was not a banal praise for raising the morale of the troops is evidenced by the fact that the commander of II. because SS Paul Hausser, at the end of the offensive on Kursk, was awarded the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross at the suggestion of G. Goth. Hausser was the only one of the four generals of the 4th TA awarded after the "Citadel". The commander of the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, General Otto von Knobelsdorff, received only a written thanks from G. Goth, and General Eugen Ott, who commanded the LII Army Corps, received nothing at all.
But what price did the SS divisions pay for their success in Operation Citadel? Were their losses higher than the average for the troops involved in the operation? A simple comparison with other compounds will not answer this question. Firstly, the offensive of the 9th Army formations stalled on July 11, and the troops of 8 A and 4 TA advanced until July 17.
Secondly, it is not enough to compare the absolute number of losses of connections, since their initial number differed significantly. It would be logical to compare the relative percentage of losses from their original number. The results for the formations of the Army Group "South" are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Losses of manpower of the German troops on the southern sector of the front in the Battle of Kursk in the period 4.07.1943/18.07.1943/XNUMX - XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX
Source: Kursk Operation Simulation and Validation Exercise - Phase II (KOSAVE II), prepared by Officeof the Chiefof Staff, US Army Concepts Analysis Agency, Bethesda, Maryland, 1998
Notes to table 2:
1) Table 2 does not take into account 57 p.d, since she did not conduct offensive operations and performed an auxiliary, defensive task. Also, 198 p.d., which entered the battle a few days after the start of the offensive, was not taken into account;
2) the table also takes into account the losses of units attached to divisions;
3) some formations of the GA "South" already on June 4 began to carry out local offensives in order to improve their positions. Therefore, the data are given from 4.07.1943/XNUMX/XNUMX.
According to the data presented, it can be seen that the highest relative losses were suffered by the infantry divisions. If we consider only tank formations, then the losses of the SS troops are the highest. However, II since. The SS bore the brunt of the fighting in the attack on Kursk. In this case, the losses no longer look excessive.
This is even more striking when comparing the losses of armored vehicles of the formations participating in the Citadel operation. Table 3 shows the losses of Tiger, P III, P IV tanks and assault guns according to the OKW report on 14.07.1943/XNUMX/XNUMX.
Table 3. Losses of tanks of tank divisions that participated in the operation "Citadel" in the period 5.07.43/14.07.43/XNUMX - XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX.
Notes to table 3:
1) the table does not take into account 12 etc., since it participated in the Citadel operation with only a small part of the forces;
2) data on the initial state:
- Tanks 11.07.43/10/60, VA-MA, RH 57/59, pp. 30.06.1943–XNUMX (XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX),
- assault guns RH 10/62, p. 92 (30.06.1943/XNUMX/XNUMX);
3) losses:
- GA "South" 14.07.43, RH 10/64, p. 67;
- GA "Center" 14.07.43, RH 10/65, p. 12.
From these data, it becomes clear that divisions II, since. SS is surprisingly small. And the further development of events does not change this ratio. On 27.07.1943/31/5, the irretrievable losses of the corps amounted to XNUMX tanks and XNUMX assault guns. It is clear that these formations initially had more tanks than others, and therefore the percentage of losses is not so high. It also means being able to overcome enemy resistance faster and thus avoid losses.
However, the II divisions, since the SS, bore the brunt of the fighting in the offensive. Against this background, we can draw an unambiguous conclusion: the loss of tanks is surprisingly small.
III. Were the SS divisions "elite"? What was their combat value in the summer of 1943?
The Battle of Kursk did not end after Operation Citadel was stopped. The Soviet side believes that it lasted until August 23, when the Red Army liberated Kharkov. In order to answer the question of how the SS divisions showed themselves in the Battle of Kursk, it is necessary to consider further events in the summer of 1943 on the southern wing of the Eastern Front. The Leibstandarte division no longer participated in these battles, since after the fall of the Mussolini regime on 25.07.1943/XNUMX/XNUMX it was sent to Italy. Hitler explained the decision to send the “Leibstandarte” to Italy to the commander of the “Center” General Field Marshal von Kluge as follows:
"Only first-class troops, who are also ideologically close to fascism, can achieve something there."
On the contrary, the divisions "Reich" and "Dead Head" continued to fight in the most critical areas of the GA "South". At the end of July, they took part in a counter-offensive against the Soviet foothold on the Mius River in the Donbass. In early August, together with the SS Viking division, they were sent to the Kharkov region and subordinated to the III. This was the final phase of the Battle of Kursk. Chief of Staff III, because Colonel Ernst Merk described them to one of the OKH inspectors:
“SS divisions, thanks to their excellent staffing and weapons, are capable of much. However, the quality of command and cohesion leave much to be desired. They need strong leadership and constant control from the higher command.”
(Source: Major General Ferber's report to the command of the GA "South" dated 17.08.43; VA-MA, RH 10/54, p. 112).
The conclusions of Colonel Merck can be considered controversial, since the SS divisions were subordinated to the III for only a short time. However, the opinion about bad command in the SS troops was very common, both during the war and after - in the memoirs of army commanders.
Indeed, the SS troops suffered from a constant shortage of officers and non-commissioned officers. The reason for this was to a large extent their rapid numerical growth. In the first half of 1943 alone, six new SS divisions were formed. This had dire consequences for the already existing connections. Even the three most privileged SS divisions - the Leibstandarte, the Reich and the Totenkopf - were sorely lacking in officers and junior command staff. This was especially noticeable in the Leibstandarte.
Despite a long break in the fighting before the start of the attack on Kursk in early July 1943, 277 officers and 1 non-commissioned officers were absent from the division. (Report on the status of the division "Leibstandarte" dated 1.07.43, BA-MA, RH 10/312, p. 2). The reason for this was the formation of 12 td. SS Hitler Youth. Not only the replenishment, previously intended for the Leibstandarte, but also most of the experienced officers and non-commissioned officers of the Leibstandarte, who made up the personnel of the new formation, went to its staffing.
Things were no better in the other two SS divisions. In the Reich, 286 officer and 734 non-commissioned officer positions were vacant, in the Dead Head - 259 and 967, respectively (Reports on the status of divisions dated 1.07.43, BA-MA, RH 10/313, p. 1 and RH 10/314, p. 1).
On the contrary, in the tank divisions of the Wehrmacht participating in Operation Citadel, the situation with the command staff was much better. Unfortunately, no documents on pg.d. "VG" at the above point in time, but, for example, the worst situation with the officers was at 2 td. - 21 officer vacancies, with non-commissioned officers - in 12, etc. – 388 (status reports 2 vol. dated 1.07.43, BA-MA, RH 10/141, page 2; 12 vol. - RH 10/150, page 1). In other tank divisions of the Wehrmacht, the number of vacancies was even smaller, for example, 6. was staffed by 100% (status report 6 etc. dated 1.07.43, BA-MA, RH 10/145, p. 1).
The main question, however, is different: how did the shortage of command personnel in the SS divisions affect the quality of command in battle and was it the cause of unjustified losses? Undoubtedly, command errors lead to unnecessary losses, and there are enough such examples in the history of the SS troops. A vivid example of this is the events of late July 1943 during the counter-offensive against the Soviet bridgehead on the Mius. As at Kursk, II plays the main role in the operation. SS. And the very first attack on one of the dominant heights fails with large losses of parts of the corps.
The command of the 6th Army, which was subordinated to II because. SS, prescribes more flexible actions. It strongly discourages repeating subsequent attacks in the same location. However, the next day, the SS strike in the same direction and with the same result: heavy losses for the Totenkopf Division. After that, the 6A command directly orders II because. SS change the direction of the blow and bypass the impregnable height. This eventually leads to success and the elimination of the Soviet bridgehead. (Source: 6th Army Combat Journal 17.07.43/17.08.43/20 - 6/303/123, BA-MA, RH 149-XNUMX / XNUMX, pp. XNUMX-XNUMX).
However, in the summer of 1943, the Wehrmacht also had enough such examples, and at all levels of command. For example, the chief of staff of the p-g.d. "VG" Colonel Oldwig von Natzmer believes that "the level of qualification of the division commanders as a whole does not correspond to the position held" (Report of Major of the General Staff Ferber to the headquarters of the GA "South" dated 17.08.43, VA-MA, RH 10/54, p. 113).
As an example of illiterate leadership at the regimental level, we can cite the actions of the tank regiment "VG" and the 39th tank regiment under the command of Colonel Count Hyacinth von Strachwitz during the "Citadel". He threw the tanks of both regiments into frontal attacks, not paying attention to losses. His immediate superior, the commander of the 10th Tank Brigade, Karl Decker, in his report dated 17.07.1943/XNUMX/XNUMX, did not find other words to describe Strachwitz's actions, except for "madness" and "stupidity" (BA-MA, RH 10/54, p. 58).
You can give an example of a lower, company level. The commander of the 505th heavy tank battalion, advancing on Kursk from the north, complained to the checking officer of the OKH:
“Due to the inexperience of the company commander sent from the reserve, who previously held either rear positions or the position of commander of a headquarters company, the battalion attack ended in failure and cost the loss of several Tigers.
(From the report of Lieutenant Colonel Count Kielmansegg on his assignment to the 9th Army, 11.07.1943/10/54, VA-MA, RH 61/XNUMX, p. XNUMX).
And this was no exception. The report of the 10th tank brigade, which fought on the southern wing of the front, says that all the commanders of the companies of the brigade equipped with "Tigers" and "Panthers" are too young and inexperienced (Report of the 10th brigade on the status of the officers of the units "Tigers" and "Panthers", 31.08.1943/10/56, VA-MA, RH 135/XNUMX, p. XNUMX).
It also happened that army generals were to blame for the failures of the SS formations. On August 4, 1943, during the German counter-offensive on the Soviet bridgehead on the Donets, the commander of XXXX tk. General Siegfried Heinrici sent his subordinate SS division "Viking" in a hopeless attack, despite the protests of its commander. It ended in failure and big losses. (ZhBD XXXX tk, 1.08–15.08.43, VA-MA, RH 24-40/54, entry dated 4.08.43). The next day, the commander of the Viking division, SS Brigadeführer Herbert Gille, refused to follow the order of the corps command and launch an attack without preparation and reconnaissance of the area. This is reflected in the hull's railroad records dated 5.08.1943/XNUMX/XNUMX.
Nevertheless, accusations of incompetence, leading to unjustified losses, are constantly heard against the SS by the army. A possible reason for this was the special, privileged position of the SS troops in the structure of the German armed forces, the resulting distrust on the part of the Wehrmacht and the resulting conflicts. A specific example can be found in the ZhBD of the 4th Panzer Army dated 13.07.1943/XNUMX/XNUMX:
“In a conversation with the commander of the GA “South”, the chief of staff of the 4TA pointed out the difficulties arising from the fact that the issues of the state of the personnel and the replenishment of the SS formations are resolved in addition to the army command, and it does not have comprehensive information about this.”
(BA-MA, RH 21-4/104, p. 157).
On August 20, 1943, General Otto Wöhler, who had taken command of the Kempf group five days earlier, filed a report on the removal of SS Gruppenführer Walter Krueger from command of the Reich division. The reason for this was not at all the latter's tendency to make rash decisions. Against. O. Wöhler described Kruger as "too inert and clumsy to command such a first-class formation as an SS division" (telegram dated 20.08.1943/19/30, time - 20:8, VA-MA, RH 95-728/XNUMX, appendix XNUMX). Wöhler's report remained without consequences, and Kruger retained his post, and eleven days later he was even awarded the oak leaves to the Knight's Cross. The Reich division distinguished itself in the battles for Kharkov and was honored with a mention in the Wehrmacht summary of 27.08.1943/XNUMX/XNUMX.
According to the memoirs of an officer of the headquarters of the SS division "Reich", the cause of the conflict between Generals Wöhler and Kruger was "the constant pulling apart of units of our division to plug holes in critical sectors of the front." Krueger vigorously protested against this. Wöhler, on the other hand, pointed to “an unusually difficult situation on the front of the Army Group, which does not allow waging war by classical methods and forces improvisation. The commanders of units that remain combat-ready must unquestioningly bear the brunt of defensive battles. (Rolf Dirk. Memoirs, Munich, 2009.). Brigadeführer Krueger in his telegrams to Himmler dated 20.08.43/22.08.43/XNUMX and XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX protested against the separation of the division in parts (VA-MA, M841).
Two other SS divisions, subordinate to General Wöhler, also proved themselves excellently in the final phase of the Battle of Kursk and played a decisive role in it. In mid-August, the "Dead Head" division achieved such success in the counteroffensive near Kharkov that, according to the recommendation of the commander of the III. General Hermann Breit was mentioned in the Wehrmacht summary of 18.08.1943/XNUMX/XNUMX (representation of the commander of III vol. to the command of the GA "South" - a telegram dated 17.08.1943, VA-MA, RH 20-8 / 95, appendix 702).
Within a few days, General Wöhler twice expressed gratitude to the SS divisions: on August 17 and 20, the Totenkopf division and on 20.08. - Viking Division. There is an interesting piece of evidence from early November 1943 that sheds light on the prejudices about the bad command of the SS troops. In the "Assessment of the combat value of divisions III since." Viking says:
“The division showed itself well in heavy defensive battles and in the offensive. She has 2,5 years of experience on the Eastern Front and demonstrates outstanding tenacity in battle. After suffering heavy losses, she owes her success to the few experienced officers and non-commissioned officers remaining in the ranks. The command is distinguished by energy and resourcefulness, but its unauthorized actions, not coordinated with its neighbors, are a big problem.
(“Assessment of the combat value of divisions III since”, 2.11.1943/20/8 signed by the acting corps commander General Ziegler, VA-MA, RH 89-XNUMX / XNUMX).
Even with a shortage of command personnel, a military unit can fight well. It's not about quantity, it's about quality. Apparently, in the summer of 1943, everything was in order in the SS panzer-grenadier divisions both with equipment and with commanders. That is why the SS tank formations were sent to the most critical sectors of the front. In the work of the American historian George Stein (George Stein) "History of the Waffen-SS", written back in the 60s, but retaining its value to this day, it says:
"SS Panzer divisions went where, in Hitler's opinion, it was most dangerous."
Stein's words refer to the Leibstandarte, Reich, Totenkopf, Viking, Hohenstaufen, Frundsberg, and Hitler Youth divisions. These seven formations at the end of 1943 were renamed from panzer-grenadier to tank. Stein calls them "elite". But can they really be considered an elite?
The very term "military elite" has recently been criticized, especially in relation to the SS troops. Indeed, the SS troops were very heterogeneous, all in a total of 38 SS divisions differed greatly in their quality. And, of course, not all of them deserve high marks. In general, it is doubtful that the concept of "elite troops" can be attributed to large military formations, and this term itself can be used in a scientific assessment of their military effectiveness.
Nevertheless, such a rather historical concept as "elite troops" exists. In German documents, this is the name given to especially combat-ready formations of the enemy. For example, in the reports of 1941, the Greek troops are called so, and in 1944 - the British paratroopers who landed in Arnhem. Hitler used the term in March 1943 when referring to two German airborne divisions.
And in military-historical research, "elite" refers to especially combat-ready, highly motivated, successful and well-armed military formations. In this context, the SS divisions that fought at Kursk fully deserve the designation "elite". The enemy also assessed them in the same way: in Soviet documents, the divisions "Leibstandarte", "Reich", "Dead Head" and "Great Germany" are called "selected" (“Report on the combat operations of the 5th Guards Tank Army for the period 7.07–24.07.43.” p. 3, “Report on the combat operations of the 29th Tank Corps for the period 7.07–24.07.43”, p. 14, TsAMO, Podolsk In the first of the reports, the division "VG" was mistakenly called the "SS division").
Conclusion
In principle, it is difficult to compare the combat effectiveness of military formations in battle. The situation, terrain conditions, weather, the availability of air support, the number and morale of the personnel, as well as the strength of the enemy, always play a big role. It is almost impossible to take into account all these factors. Therefore, there are always many questions. Nevertheless, some conclusions can be drawn from the summer battles of 1943 on the Eastern Front:
1) SS divisions did not suffer unjustified losses, which also refutes accusations of poor command quality;
2) SS divisions performed well in the battles near Kursk;
3) divisions II because The SS were better than other formations provided with personnel and weapons.
However, for the servicemen of these formations, such a “privileged position” meant one thing - they would fight on the most critical sectors of the front. This affected their self-esteem. One of the veterans of the Totenkopf Division, who joined the SS in 1942 and fought on the Eastern Front until the very end of the war, in an interview, answering the question whether they considered themselves a "military elite", said this:
“We didn’t consider ourselves an elite, but we were made one.”
And in the battles of the summer of 1943 on the Eastern Front, this was completely true.
Information