How Ukraine became a Russophobic state
Today's relations between Russia and Ukraine, and the worst thing - between Russian and Ukrainian society, are in the deepest systemic crisis and every year it only intensifies.
Not so long ago it was difficult to imagine the reformatting of Ukraine into an ethnocratic and Russophobic state. Ukrainian statehood, woven like a patchwork quilt from the Russian South-East, the Russian-Ukrainian Center and Western Ukrainian Galicia, has nevertheless formed a society that is mostly hostile towards Russia.
A natural question arises: why this happened and what contributed to the separation of the two branches of the Russian people, why is it mainly Russian in spirit for such a short historical Over a period of time, nationalistic tendencies began to prevail, leading to the loss of a significant part of the population of Russian identity, renunciation of Russian roots and the formation of a purely Ukrainian identity, mixed with the denial of everything Russian?
Why was the Russian beginning unable to defeat Ukrainian separatism and why did it flourish so violently in Ukraine?
Ukrainian ethnogenesis and "Ukrainianity"
It should be understood that in Ukraine before the collapse of the Union, the absolute majority of the population was made up of Ukrainians and Russians (Ukrainians - 73% and Russians - 22%) and only 5% of national minorities - Greeks, Bulgarians, Jews, Hungarians and other ethnic groups. That is, Ukraine was a typical bi-national country, while the overwhelming majority (regardless of ethnicity) was Russian in spirit.
There were no national movements even close, only among the nationally preoccupied creative intelligentsia the spirit of Ukrainians wandered, and in God-forsaken Galicia there was practically at the genetic level hatred of everything Russian, but there they were prudently silent and praised the CPSU in every possible way, trying to take the places of bread.
Nevertheless, the process of Ukrainian ethnogenesis, which had been developing for a century and a half, eventually led to the creation of an ethnocratic national state. Neither the centuries-old presence in one Russian state, nor reasonable political, economic and historical arguments, nor the rejection at the initial stage by the majority of the population of the Galician Russophobia imposed by the authorities, played a role. Ethnic egoism, calculation and instincts of the ruling elite and part of the population took the upper hand, which led to the domination of ethnocracy in the country.
Nationalism, constantly fueled by the authorities, has become a fulcrum for promoting the idea of creating an ethnocratic state opposing Russia. Without this support, the actions of the West and the oligarchs could not have led to such large-scale changes in the consciousness of the population and a complete reformatting of political, social and state institutions in Ukraine.
In its interests of the global confrontation with Russia, this tendency was successfully used by the West, skillfully stirring up passions and directing ukronationalism into Russophobia.
To reformat the consciousness of the population and change its national identity, a national idea was needed that could make massive shifts in public consciousness and form a completely different image of the country's future.
As such a national idea was used the ideology of "Ukrainians", which had been cultivated earlier by the Poles, Austrians and Germans in Galicia and introduced throughout Ukraine by the Bolsheviks during the "indigenousization" of the people of Ukraine in the 20s. This ideology throughout the years of Soviet Ukraine was cherished and preserved only among the nationally concerned Ukrainian intelligentsia and party nomenklatura, especially in the 60s and early 70s, during the reign of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Petro Shelest.
With the collapse of the Union, the new leaders of Ukraine needed an ideology to justify their secession from Russia and establish their power, which was taken as "Ukrainians" based on rejection not so much from communism as from Russia.
Its essence consisted in building Ukrainian identity on a fundamental rejection of everything Russian, denial of a common history, Russian roots and language, that Ukraine has its own path of development, different from Russia.
This ideology became the state and the basis for building the state "for the Ukrainians."
The “fifth column” in the person of Galicia, which is the epicenter of Ukrainian ethnogenesis and represented by a nationally preoccupied and passionate rural population and the “Svidomo” intelligentsia, became the social base and driving force behind the reformatting of Ukraine, as well as the core and locomotive of the collapse of the post-Soviet Ukrainian society.
The idea of “Ukrainianness” and hatred of everything Russian have been brought up here by generations since childhood. They sincerely believe in their "God's chosenness" and strive to make the whole of Ukraine happy with their wretched ideas. The aspirations of the Galician minority and the intrigues of the West could not impose their worldview on society, only the purposeful actions of the elite and oligarchy that seized power to assimilate the entire population and impose ukronationalism did their job.
With independence, everything Russian was gradually squeezed out, and a radical change took place after the coup in 2014 with the establishment of a neo-Nazi rather than nationalist regime.
Confrontation between "Svidomo" and "Russian-speaking"
As a result of the ethnopolitics being pursued, the population (regardless of ethnic origin) was divided into two fundamentally different groups - “Svidomo” Ukrainians who perceive themselves as a separate people from the Russians with a clear national identity and pursue their national goals, which are to build a mono-ethnic Ukrainian state and reformat the Russian-Ukrainian population and national minorities into a cohesive political nation based on a common history, language, religion and national identity.
The second part, represented by an amorphous conglomerate of ethnic groups without a common national identity, united by Ukrainian co-citizenship and including Russians who have retained their Russian identity, “Ukrainian Russians” who have adopted a political Ukrainian identity, Ukrainian “Little Russians” who have retained an all-Russian (not Great Russian) identity, and national minorities ... All of them were united by the recognition of the Ukrainian statehood.
This group did not want to forget about its roots, did not want to be subjected to the dictates of "Svidomo" ("Bandera") and violent Ukrainization. They were in favor of close and economic ties with Russia and would like to stay to live in a calm and independent Ukraine. For this group without a clear ethnicity, united mainly by the Russian language, a somewhat derogatory concept was introduced - "Russian-speaking", which is actually a pseudo-identity.
A group with a blurred national identity knew well what it did not want, but had little idea of what it wanted and what it was striving for. Lacking a clear goal-setting for living in the Ukrainian state, she was not able to adequately resist the "Svidomo" and defend her rights, she lacked a specific goal: in what direction the state should develop and what it should become - Ukrainian or Russian. In such an unequal confrontation, this group inevitably had to lose.
Objectively, step by step, the "Svidomo" defeated the "Russian-speakers" and increased their influence. Their project could be successfully promoted only if there was an appropriate ideology, a social base in society and a driving force capable of turning the country backwards.
Rural nationally preoccupied Galicia, where only 12% of the rural slaughtered population lived, became the social base for the promotion of ethnocracy. It was opposed by the industrial South-East with 48% of the pro-Russian population, where the main science, industry, mineral resources and access to the sea were concentrated.
It would seem that with such an intellectual and numerical superiority of the population of the Southeast, it should have won in a civilizational confrontation with rural Galicia?
And everything happened exactly the opposite. Galicia won, and the victory was ideological.
On the one hand, there was a close-knit ethnos with a clear program for building an ethnocratic state based on the ideology of “Ukrainians” introduced by the authorities and supported by the West, and on the other, a conglomerate of “Russian-speaking” ethnic groups that did not put forward any ideology of building their future.
There was nothing to oppose to the ideology of “Ukrainians”, the same topical and unifying national idea of Russian unity did not exist. At the same time, the Russian leadership traditionally relied on the corrupt Ukrainian elite and did not take any steps to spread the ideas of Russian unity in Ukraine and support the corresponding trends in society.
The Ukrainian elite and the oligarchy that formed it deliberately exacerbated ethnic confrontation in society, whipping up hatred of everything Russian. Through their pseudo-parties such as the “Party of Regions”, they seized control of the Russian movement and sought to discredit it, while strengthening and financing nationalist forces. Lacking their own elite, the “Russian-speaking” did not oppose anything ideologically or organizationally to the idea of an ethnocratic state and were unable to break the system that built it.
In the presence of a serious social base, the ethnogenesis of the Russian political nation in Ukraine did not take place, for this there was no ideological basis capable of mobilizing supporters, and there were no driving forces ready to lead this process.
Within the framework of one state, the two ideologies - “Ukrainianness” and Russian unity - are incompatible, they are antipodes and pursue diametrically opposed goals. Only one ideology could win in Ukraine. No Minsk agreements could change the essence of the Ukrainian state, reconcile the parties and build a society based on mutual interests.
Formation of a neo-Nazi state
Metastases of "Ukrainians" slowly spread throughout Ukraine, capturing region after region, and by 2014 a social base had matured in society for the establishment of an ethnocracy. The idea of federalization or the creation of autonomy for the South-East, put forward in the wake of the coup and supported by the Russian leadership, did not fit into the ideology of building a mono-ethnic Ukrainian state and was suppressed with all the might of the state machine.
After the coup, it was not nationalist, but Russophobic forces who were brought to power after the coup, which were faced with the goal of the final separation of Ukraine and the formation of an "anti-Russia". The whipping up of Russophobic hysteria, the mass assimilation of the population, resulting in repression, lustration, ethnic cleansing, the suppression of Russian culture, education, language and the Russian Orthodox Church, proof of the “age-old enmity” of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples and the imposition of the Galician cult of Bandera all over Ukraine - became the main task of the authorities ...
A demonic image of “Russian barbarians” was formed in society, who conquered the “freedom-loving” Ukrainians and dreamed of eliminating their statehood. Russia was blamed for all the troubles of the country and the population, which did not allow them to develop freely. This was also served by the adopted law on decommunization, aimed not so much at combating the communist legacy as at destroying everything Russian and etching out the slightest reminders of a common past.
The flared up civil war in Donbass was presented only as a Russian-Ukrainian war, and Russia was presented as an "aggressor country" that had seized part of Ukraine. The evolution of accusations moved from separatist terrorist mercenaries in Moscow, to Russian terrorist troops and occupiers. The Cabinet of Ministers even issued a dictionary on how to "correctly" interpret these events with the introduction of specific terms justifying the "occupation". At the everyday level, the problem of Crimea's withdrawal was inflated, everyone was convinced that “it was ours,” and aggressive Russia took it away, and no arguments that the Crimeans themselves massively voted for Russia are not accepted, but rejected.
A new generation has grown up for which the Russian past does not exist. Russia is a foreign and aggressive country, with which one can and should only fight. In a short period of time, the pro-Russian social base was eroded, even a part of ethnic Russians became “Svidomo,” and Ukraine was ideologically and politically reformatted into a Russophobic state built on rejection and confrontation with Russia. The Bendery authorities cleared out active pro-Russian bayonets, only the townsfolk remained, and at all times they were never capable of anything.
It is impossible to stop the process of building a state hostile to Russia in Ukraine with the existing system of power and a significant part of the population hostile to Russia.
To break the political system from within and remove the ruling elite from power in Ukraine today there are no political forces and support from the population, and an attack from the outside only mobilizes the "Svidomo" to counter force and resist.
In this regard, the Ukrainian state in the foreseeable future will remain hostile to Russia. The breakdown of the system can be carried out only due to the development of certain international circumstances that put an end to this state.
All this suggests that the return of the entire territory of Ukraine to the sphere of influence of Russia at this stage is impossible, we can only talk about reformatting a non-“Svidomo” part of the population and, in the event of the collapse of the state into independent enclaves, ready to independently determine its future with subsequent integration into the sphere of interests or into the composition of Russia.
This part of the population needs its own national idea and the corresponding ideology, justifying the impossibility of finding it within the framework of the Ukrainian ethnocratic state and the need to separate from Ukraine and independently decide on its future structure.
Without a driving political force armed with an appropriate ideology and capable of convincing the “Russian-speakers” of the correctness of their ideas and necessary actions, this task cannot be solved.
Within neo-Nazi Ukraine, such a force cannot appear due to objective reasons. It can only be formed outside: and through the reformatted republics of Donbass, to deploy a liberation movement in the Russian territories occupied by the “ukrami”.
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