Training camp-1941. Mobilization or retraining?

In our world, everything begins with paper, the collection of 1941 also began with a document:

No. 306. Extract from the minutes of the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

№ 28
8 March 1941 city

155. On the conduct of training camps for military reserves in 1941 and the attraction of horses and motor vehicles for training from the national economy.

To approve the following draft resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR: “The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decides:

1. Allow non-profit organizations to call for military training in 1941 in the military reserve in the amount of 975 870 people, of which:

for a period of 90 days 192 869 people,
for 60 days - 25 people,
for 45 days - 754 people,
for 30 days - 3 105 people.

2. Allow non-profit organizations to attract 45 horses and 57 cars for training camps from the national economy for a period of 500 days, with distribution across republics, territories and regions according to the appendix.

3. Fees to spend:

a) in reserve rifle divisions in three stages:

first stage - from May 15 to July 1
the second stage - from July 10 to August 25
the third stage - from September 5 to October 20;

b) in rifle divisions of six thousand in the period - from May 15 to July 1;
c) in rifle divisions of three thousand personnel in the period - from August 15 to October 1;
d) carry out other fees in turns throughout 1941.

First you need to understand what training camps are in the period before the Great Patriotic War.

The armies of the period of the second half of the XIX - XX centuries were mobilization, their personnel was relatively small, and in the event of a war, reserve ones were called up, who completed the existing divisions and formed new ones, namely mobilized ones, and became the basis of the army and bore the burden of the war. This was the case in all wars of this period, and World War II was no exception. And even more so, the USSR could not be an exception, with our vast territory, uneasy relations with neighbors and a chronic shortage of workers.

1939

Actually, until 1939 there was no general military service in the USSR, and a significant part of the conscripts served in a non-military way, by going through training camps. By 1939, when they finally introduced general military service and began to increase the army, everything was difficult with the reserve contingent. Part of it served, but served earlier, before the advent of new technology and new tactics, part of it “served” at training camps in the first half of the 30s, that is, it had only basic training of a very curtailed nature, and some percentage did not serve at all. All these people had to be pulled up / trained / retrained, units and crews had to be assembled from them ... All the more so was the experience of the "Liberation Campaign" in 1939, when they were called into service, calling it large training fees:

2 610 136 people, who on September 22, 1939 by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 177 of September 23, were declared mobilized "until further notice." The troops also received 634 horses, 117 vehicles and 300 tractors.

The collection of mobilized people and equipment was slow, during the campaign itself there were a lot of problems with the qualifications of personnel. All this had to be corrected and put in proper order. Any training camps, in addition to training fighters, are trained by military enlistment offices, and military units for the reception and distribution of spare, and transport, for the transportation of huge masses of people, increasing the general mobilization readiness.

It seems to me that there was still one more consideration - by replenishing the army with a mass of people in periods threatened for an attack, the authorities also increased the general level of combat readiness of the Red Army, and accelerated, in which case, mobilization as a whole. This is not in the documents, but just a guess - why not? In the end, the training camp was carried out in the reduced divisions, and the lion's share of the reserve ones took place in special districts. So, in 1941, the Western Special Military District received 43 people, the Kiev Special - 000, but the Far Eastern Front, together with the Trans-Baikal Military District - 81.

1940

Anyway - in 1940:

To strengthen mobilization readiness during 1940, conduct training camps for the assigned personnel for a period of 45 days for junior command personnel and 30 days for rank-and-file personnel.
To attract to training fees:
a) In all divisions of the six thousandth composition, 5 men each, in a total of 000 divisions - 43 men;
b) In the divisions of 2 in the Kiev, Belorussian, Odessa, Kharkov, North Caucasian and Transcaucasian military districts, 000 men each, and in the ZabVO, 1 men each. A total of 000 people;
c) There are 156 people in all spare shelves;
d) In other units (artillery of the RGK, Air Defense, UR'y and retraining of the command personnel of the reserve) - 297 people. In total, 000 people will be attracted to the training camp, not counting the 766 people currently undergoing training sessions.

In April-May, a million people were called to the training camp, who were trained and returned to their homes. There were no mobilization fees in 1940, no war was planned, there was, of course, not a routine, but quite understandable retraining and tightening of mobilization mechanisms, which was reasonable and necessary during the ongoing World War II.

1941

In 1941, it was decided to hold the training camp again, with clearly stated goals and objectives:

2. The main tasks of training camps are:

a) improving the combat training of the assigned personnel by positions and specialties in accordance with the assignment for wartime;

b) putting together combat crews (machine gun, mortar, weapon, etc.);

c) putting together a squad, platoon, company, battalion and regiment in states close to wartime;

d) instilling in commanding and junior commanding personnel of practical skills in commanding subunits.

In order to bring together subunits and crews to an acceptable level and reinforce deep divisions, divisions of special districts, especially six-thousandth divisions, in a dangerous period. The logic is clear - to put in order the divisions of the three thousandth (according to the wartime division of the Red Army 14 people), full mobilization and some time for preparation are needed, and the six thousandth, having accepted the participants of the training camp, turn into a more or less combat-ready unit. Another question, in the memoirs of our military leaders to stories with the training camps, the phrase "in view of possible aggression" was certainly added, which is not entirely true. In the sense, the training camp was held in view of the tense international situation, just as for this reason the size of the Red Army increased, general conscription was introduced and special districts were rapidly strengthened. But specific training camps are just one of the activities on this list, and not preparation for repelling aggression.

Or maybe we wanted to attack ourselves? Well, if the fees are a sign of preparation for aggression, then we wanted to attack in 1938, when one million three hundred thousand people were called up against them, according to directive No. 4/33617. No doubt they were going to make it to Antarctica in 1939, when 2,6 million people were drafted. Again they were preparing to attack the whole world in 1941, when 1 million people were drafted. But in 1941, only 900 thousand were planned to be conscripted ...

But seriously, before the general conscription, training was the only way to maintain a more or less adequate level of combat capability of the reserve, many of whom did not serve in the army. And 1939 in Poland and Finland showed a simple thing - the Red Army, after the reforms of the previous 20 years, is not capable of fighting, as evidenced by the Act on the Acceptance of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR Timoshenko S.K. from Voroshilov K.E .:

1. In connection with the war and significant redeployment of troops, the mobilization plan was violated. The People's Commissariat of Defense has no new mobilization plan.

Regulatory mobilization activities are not completed by development.

2. The People's Commissariat of Defense has not yet eliminated the following shortcomings of the mobilization plan, revealed during the partial mobilization in September 1939:

a) the extreme neglect of the inventory of military-liable reserves, since the inventory has not been carried out since 1927;
b) the lack of a single record of those liable for military service and the existence of a separate special record of railway workers, water transport and the NKVD;
c) the weakness and lack of work of the military commissariats;
d) lack of priority in the mobilization of units, which led to an overload of the first days of mobilization;
e) the unreality of plans for the deployment of troops during mobilization;
f) the unreality of the plan for the supply of uniforms during mobilization;
g) the unevenness of the rise in the mobilization of persons liable for military service, horse-drawn personnel and motor vehicles;
h) the absence of a firmly established order in the reservation of labor for wartime;
i) the unreality and unsatisfactory state of registration of horses, carts, harnesses and vehicles.

3. Among the reserves liable for military service are 3 untrained people. The People's Commissariat of Defense has no training plan for them. Among the trained personnel are registered military reserves with insufficient training and in a number of specialties, the mobilization need for specialists is not covered. The People's Commissariat of Defense also does not have a plan to retrain specialists and retrain poorly trained personnel.

4. Manuals on mobilization work in the troops and military registration and enlistment offices, recognized as obsolete, have not been revised.

So they began to feverishly develop and test plans, and train these three million. Everyone in the Kremlin then understood that there would be a war, and that Comrade Voroshilov had ruined the work of the People's Commissariat, so they corrected, as they could and as best they could, along the way trying not to ruin the economy, and replenish the divisions with personnel and equipment, at least for threatened period. This partially worked, at least some of the divisions did not wait for a week or more for the arrival of personnel, but immediately moved into battle, having as fighters and junior commanders called up for training.

Hack and predictor Aviator

And it was hardly possible to do better. It's good to judge ancestors now. And then, when money for a normal army appeared only in the second half of the 30s, the lion's share of the reserve was not trained, the officer corps was weak (the cadre tsarist officers were killed by the red commanders in the 20s and 30s in the heat of political struggle, and in 1937-1938 they were killed and red commanders who want something strange), the population is illiterate (the obligatory seven-year plan was introduced until 1937), and there was a war of engines ahead? When does our production culture and design school lag behind the enemy? When there is confusion and vacillation among the people and a bunch of people offended at the authorities and at each other?

We were able to, jumped out and resisted. But it's funny to read how this army was supposedly going to conquer the world, or that only allegedly because of the stupidity of the leadership, 1941 happened. Everything was simpler and sadder: we, a hundred years behind, really ran them in ten, but did not have time to fully catch up with the West.

Fees are one of the tools to close this gap. And the fact that we won is the best proof that everything was done correctly.

Comments

[Vladimir_2U]

And 1939 in Poland and Finland showed a simple thing - after the reforms of the previous 20 years, the Red Army is not capable of fighting, as evidenced by the Act on the Acceptance of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR Timoshenko S.K. from Voroshilov K.E .:

1. In connection with the war and significant redeployment of troops, the mobilization plan was violated. The People's Commissariat of Defense has no new mobilization plan.

The act indicates shortcomings in mobilization issues, obviously. The combat readiness of the army of those years is a separate issue, but the above document has nothing to do with it.

and in 1937-1938 they killed the Red commanders who wanted a strange

These words of the author can be answered with his own words:

But it's funny to read

Fees are one of the tools to close this gap. And the fact that we won is the best proof that everything was done correctly.

One cannot argue with this, I wonder how things were with the training of reservists in Ingushetia on the eve of WWI?

[Proxima]

When the army is requisitioned
more than half a million horses and a huge amount of vehicles is naturally latent (hidden) mobilization. For these "fees" we had to unsubscribe in front of the whole world. An excerpt from the famous TASS statement of June 14, 1941, "about the unreality of the war with Germany": "The current summer training camp of the Red Army reserves and the upcoming maneuvers are aimed at nothing more than training the reserve and checking the operation of railway transport, carried out, as you know, every year, which is why these events of the Red Army are portrayed as hostile to Germany, at least , ridiculous". And when Germany did not react in any way to this famous statement, and then continued to build up its armed forces on the borders with the USSR, the response of the Soviet government was lightning fast: divisions, which were formed thanks to the aforementioned fees, began to be transferred to the western districts... And what do you order Stalin to do? He knew perfectly well that war was inevitable and tried to postpone it. General mobilization - this automatically meant war. So they got out as best they could.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Proxima

more than half a million horses and a huge number of vehicles - this is naturally latent (hidden) mobilization.

But only in 1941, none of this happened:

2. Allow NPOs to attract 45 horses and 57.500 vehicles for training camps from the national economy for 1.680 days, distributed according to the appendix to the republics, territories and regions.

This is what distinguishes the usual training camp in 1941 from the BUS-39.

[akims]

Do the current events around Russia remind you of anything?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Vladimir_2U

The act indicates shortcomings in mobilization issues, obviously. The combat readiness of the army of those years is a separate issue, but the above document has nothing to do with it.

It's just that the Act needs to be read in full.

2. The army has up to 1080 titles of existing charters, manuals and manuals. The main charters - the Field Service, the Internal Service, the Disciplinary and some combat manuals of the combat arms are outdated and require radical processing. None: instruction for driving large military formations (armies), instruction for attacking and defending fortified areas, and instruction for actions of troops in the mountains.

1. By the time of the acceptance and surrender of the People’s Commissariat of Defense, there was no operational plan of war, operational plans, both general and private, were not developed and lacked.
The General Staff has no data on the state of covering the borders. The decisions of the military councils of the districts, armies and the front on this issue are unknown to the General Staff.

1. The People’s Commissariat does not have an accurately established actual strength of the Red Army at the time of admission. Due to the fault of the Main Directorate of the Red Army, personnel records are in an extremely neglected state.

3. Among the reserves liable for military service are 3 untrained people. The People's Commissariat of Defense has no training plan for them. Among the trained personnel are registered military reserves with insufficient training and in a number of specialties, the mobilization need for specialists is not covered. The People's Commissariat of Defense also does not have a plan to retrain specialists and retrain poorly trained personnel.

By the time the People’s Commissariat of Defense was received, the army had a significant lack of staff, especially in the infantry, reaching 21% of the nominal strength as of May 1, 1940.
It was established that annual graduations from military schools did not provide the necessary reserves for the growth of the army and the formation of reserves.
The quality of the training of command personnel is low, especially in the platoon-company unit, in which up to 68% have only short-term 6-month training for the course of junior lieutenant.

[Alexey RA]

And, finally, a summary of the combat capability of the troops:

The main shortcomings in the training of troops are:
1) The low training of the middle command staff in the company link is a platoon and the especially weak training of the junior command staff.
2) Weak tactical training in all types of combat and reconnaissance, especially small units.
3) Unsatisfactory practical field training of troops and their inability to carry out what is required in a combat environment.
4) The extremely weak training of the combat arms on the battlefield: the infantry cannot cling to and break away from the fire shaft, the artillery can not support the tanks, the aviation can not interact with the ground troops.
5) The troops are not trained in skiing.
6) The use of camouflage worked out poorly.
7) The troops have not worked out fire control.
8) The troops are not trained to attack fortified areas, to set up and overcome obstacles and cross rivers. The reasons for this are:
1) Incorrect training and education of troops.
Many conventions are allowed in the combat training of troops; troops are not trained in an environment close to combat reality, in relation to the requirements of theaters of military operations.
The widespread use of the system of conventions in the training and education of troops has created in the troops a misconception about the harsh reality of war.
Troops are little trained in the field in the practical implementation of everything necessary for battle. ' Endurance, physical conditioning and the desire to carry out the order unquestioningly, accurately and quickly, despite any difficulties and overcoming them are insufficiently brought up and inculcated.

[Vladimir_2U]

Quote: Alexey RA

The main shortcomings in the training of troops are:
1) Low training of the middle command personnel in the company-platoon level and especially weak training of the junior command personnel ...

etc.

Everything except this point, important, yes, perhaps the most important, is the mobilization component, even this:

Quote: Alexey RA

The People’s Commissariat does not have an accurately established actual strength of the Red Army at the time of admission.

Thanks for the amended text.

[antivirus]

and in 1937-1938 they killed the Red commanders who wanted a strange
I agree with you - there were no tsars already in 15g. - there was a crash course from literate estates., commoners, not nobles and forward.
ages of war - not a regular officer

[The leader of the Redskins]

I myself was only once at a ten-day training camp. According to the agenda, everything is as it should be ... For a long time, however, either at the end of the 90s, or at the beginning of the "noughties" ...
There was little sense from them: they did not go on tanks, they did not feed very well, I heard nothing new ...

[figwam]

Quote: Leader of the Redskins

either at the end of the 90s, or at the beginning of the "noughties" ...

Yes, in those years, fees were the same everywhere, then everything was reduced and destroyed, and now Shoigu announced the formation of 20 formations and military units in the Western Military District by the end of this year. Several divisions are tens of thousands of people, the West will probably accuse us of preparing for an offensive, in my opinion history goes in a circle.

[Doliva63]

Quote: figvam

Quote: Leader of the Redskins

either at the end of the 90s, or at the beginning of the "noughties" ...

Yes, in those years, fees were the same everywhere, then everything was reduced and destroyed, and now Shoigu announced the formation of 20 formations and military units in the Western Military District by the end of this year. Several divisions are tens of thousands of people, the West will probably accuse us of preparing for an offensive, in my opinion history goes in a circle.

If by 20 formations we mean divisions, then this will never happen - there are neither so many equipment, nor people. In the best case, they will probably form directorates, and even those on paper, because there are just too few officers.

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

If by 20 formations we mean divisions, then this will never happen - there are neither so many equipment nor people.

That's right - it wasn't about connections because the statement said:

Shoigu announced the formation by the end of this year in the Western Military District 20 formations and military units.

So a connection can be one formed, in which there will be more than a dozen separate units, plus several separate service units of the district subordination for the normal functioning of this unit and other units. It will just turn out a total of twenty - most likely it was meant. Moreover, Shoigu did not mention whether the creation of the units would be associated with an increase in the number of the Ministry of Defense, or whether we would remain with the same states, because this is the key question at whose expense the banquet will be.

[Doliva63]

Based on the experience of the USSR Armed Forces, it is difficult for me to imagine a formation consisting of 20 separate units - neither a division nor a corps. True, Shoigu has a different life experience, here I pass

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

Based on the experience of the USSR Armed Forces, it is difficult for me to imagine a formation consisting of 20 separate units - neither a division nor a corps.

Look at the staff of an ordinary Soviet division - there are only six combat regiments and seven separate battalions, plus a few small units - here you have fifteen separate units.

True, the states are changing now, but it is possible that squadrons of drones and other new products, including cruise missiles or short-range missiles, or a squadron of helicopters, will be added to the division. I will only remind you that tactical nuclear weapons in combat conditions were trusted by division commanders, and for this they could be assigned an ACS or separate batteries of missiles. So, of course, I don’t know what flight of thought our commanders have, but twenty parts is not so much as it might seem.

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Doliva63

Based on the experience of the USSR Armed Forces, it is difficult for me to imagine a formation consisting of 20 separate units - neither a division nor a corps.

Look at the staff of an ordinary Soviet division - there are only six combat regiments and seven separate battalions, plus a few small units - here you have fifteen separate units.

True, the states are changing now, but it is possible that squadrons of drones and other new products, including cruise missiles or short-range missiles, or a squadron of helicopters, will be added to the division. I will only remind you that tactical nuclear weapons in combat conditions were trusted by division commanders, and for this they could be assigned an ACS or separate batteries of missiles. So, of course, I don’t know what flight of thought our commanders have, but twenty parts is not so much as it might seem.

Buddy , I still remember the staff of the Soviet divisions (although it differed, of course, but not fatally). The individual battalions you are talking about are still units, not formations. Attached troops are also units, like the same missile brigades in the GSVG, for example. That is, there are 2 types of formations - division and corps. Everything. Well, I understand that Shoigu did not serve in the army, but you ?!

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

Well, I understand that Shoigu did not serve in the army, but you ?!

His words

Shoigu announced the formation by the end of this year in the Western Military District 20 formations and military units.

betray a civilian in him, because the military expresses such an idea in a different way. But on the other hand, the preposition "and" can be interpreted so that it indicates the total number of compounds and parts.
And you yourself must understand that it was possible to form 20 formations by the end of the year only during the Great Patriotic War, but after it, in peacetime, the General Staff would hardly have come up with such a proposal. There are no equipment or trained people to form such a number of formations in Russia, and you are well aware of this, so treat the words of this commander with caution and condescension.
By the way, the formations, in addition to the headquarters, consist of separate units, with their own numbers, names and have their own banners, but not all is true.

That is, there are 2 types of formations - division and corps.

According to Soviet military science, formations include brigades and divisions in the Ground Forces. The corps can consist of 2-3 divisions and it belonged to the unification, like the army. But in some types of armed forces, corps could consist of separate regiments, and then they can be ranked among the formations - for example, in the country's air defense. So here we need to be careful about the definitions, stipulating in advance what kind of armed forces we are talking about. The submarine division is cool, of course, but its staff structure can never be compared with a combined-arms division, just like an aviation regiment with a motorized rifle.

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Doliva63

Well, I understand that Shoigu did not serve in the army, but you ?!

His words

Shoigu announced the formation by the end of this year in the Western Military District 20 formations and military units.

betray a civilian in him, because the military expresses such an idea in a different way. But on the other hand, the preposition "and" can be interpreted so that it indicates the total number of compounds and parts.
And you yourself must understand that it was possible to form 20 formations by the end of the year only during the Great Patriotic War, but after it, in peacetime, the General Staff would hardly have come up with such a proposal. There are no equipment or trained people to form such a number of formations in Russia, and you are well aware of this, so treat the words of this commander with caution and condescension.
By the way, the formations, in addition to the headquarters, consist of separate units, with their own numbers, names and have their own banners, but not all is true.

That is, there are 2 types of formations - division and corps.

According to Soviet military science, formations include brigades and divisions in the Ground Forces. The corps can consist of 2-3 divisions and it belonged to the unification, like the army. But in some types of armed forces, corps could consist of separate regiments, and then they can be ranked among the formations - for example, in the country's air defense. So here we need to be careful about the definitions, stipulating in advance what kind of armed forces we are talking about. The submarine division is cool, of course, but its staff structure can never be compared with a combined-arms division, just like an aviation regiment with a motorized rifle.

"treat the words of this commander with caution and condescension" - after these words I easily agree with you in everything

[El Barto]

"Military unit" is a common, vernacular concept, and can mean anything.
That's right - "military unit". This is already a legal term denoting a military unit that has a certain level of rights (now, mainly economic - in relation to property) and a certain level of authority of the commander / chief in relation to property and l / s

[Doliva63]

Quote: El Barto

"Military unit" is a common, vernacular concept, and can mean anything.
That's right - "military unit". This is already a legal term denoting a military unit that has a certain level of rights (now, mainly economic - in relation to property) and a certain level of authority of the commander / chief in relation to property and l / s

I, like, know, but thanks!

[antivirus]

plumbers KNS (platoon) are also needed on the East or in the Crimea.

................................................................

[Doliva63]

Quote: antivirus

plumbers KNS (platoon) are also needed on the East or in the Crimea.

................................................................

Honestly, I didn't understand

[antivirus]

there will be a platoon of plumbers (bucket water intake) - one of 20 new connections.

[ccsr]

Quote: antivirus

there will be a platoon of plumbers (bucket water intake) - one of 20 new connections.

I did not serve at the cosmodrome, but we had a detachment of soldiers in refrigeration units, if my memory serves me right. So the cosmodrome is still that structure, where regular plumbers may just be needed, taking into account hydrants and other fire-fighting measures.

[Doliva63]

Quote: antivirus

there will be a platoon of plumbers (bucket water intake) - one of 20 new connections.

Connection of plumbers? Well, Shoigu will go down in the history of the VF Armed Forces

[VS]

"" I myself was only once at a ten-day training camp. According to the agenda, everything is as it should be ... For a long time, however, either at the end of the 90s, or at the beginning of the "noughties" ...
There was little sense from them: they did not go on tanks, they did not feed very well, I did not hear anything new ... ""
- You were at a simple training camp) YOU were not given ANY WEAPON, nor were they lodged in the barracks to the conscripts, nor were they entered into the composition of the crews - they stupidly swelled in a separate camp-barracks away from the conscripts and dispersed to their homes)) SO WAS THAT?) ) But in 1941 there were already BUS)) I am partial hidden mobilization))

[The leader of the Redskins]

Half. From the AK they fired at the targets. They lived in the barracks, but separately from the conscripts. We didn't drink.

[bk0010]

Quote: Leader of the Redskins

There was little sense from them: they did not go on tanks, they did not feed very well, I heard nothing new ...

Do not compare yourself with the conscripts of the 30s: you watched films about the war, drove in cars, at least read about the army, and besides, literate. A conscript of the 30s could not leave his village anywhere, and have an idea of ​​the war in the framework of the retelling of the war of 1812 by his great-grandfather. Although in everyday matters he probably surpassed you (he got used to the lack of hot water, for example)

[Olgovich]

There were no mobilization fees in 1940, no war was planned

the war was already going on, and it was very difficult with the Finns.

In addition, the liberation of Bessarabia, occupied by Romania, was to come.

And 1939 in Poland and Finland showed a simple thing - the Red Army after the reforms of the previous 20 years incapable of fighting, what is the certificate of the Act of Acceptance of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR Timoshenko S.K. from Voroshilov K.E.
Everyone in the Kremlin then understood both that there would be war and that Comrade Voroshilov ruined the work of the People's Commissariat

Said Act from 8 May 1940 listed all main reasons the biggest military catastrophe in the world g-defeats 1941-42

It became obvious that the murder in 1937-38 of hundreds of thousands of fellow citizens, incl. military, only weakened the army and it was necessary to shoot, apparently, less, but completely different ...

Everything was simpler and sadder: we, a hundred years behind, really ran them in ten, but did not have time to fully catch up with the West

and who threw the country into stone Age civil war unleashed by a thief? Industry disappeared, almost died, fled, degraded the working class, the engineering corps, etc. ...

And nowhere in the world have they used such amazing methods of catching up "as the exile of millions of peasants, the execution of hundreds of thousands in a year and millions of imprisoned camps. This has brought only losses.

[chenia]

Quote: Olgovich

and who threw the country back into the stone age by civil war

Those who dropped Nikolashka and Western allies.
And the Bolsheviks of the former RI from the manure and pulled (but not all can be seen).

Quote: Olgovich

You don't know how to do it differently, just don't take it ...

This is you about Nikolashka (and people shot and everything about .... al). I agree.
The fact that Moldovan wine hits your head is understandable.
But why in a bottle?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Olgovich

It became obvious that the murder in 1937-38 of hundreds of thousands of fellow citizens, incl. military, only weakened the army and it was necessary to shoot, apparently, less, but completely different ...

Read Smirnov - "Great maneuvers". He has a good idea of ​​the state of the army under the leadership of the future shot.
In short, during the maneuvers, the units and formations were unable to fulfill the assigned tasks, even despite the pre-written scenario and the help of intermediaries. The tactics of the same infantry in the offensive were best described by the words "running in a heap."

We sometimes hover on a very large operational and strategic scale, and what will we operate with if the company is not suitable, the platoon is not suitable, and the detachment is not suitable?

© Budyonny
The best results of the leadership of the "old guard" are seen in the example of Blucher.

[stalkerwalker]

Quote: Alexey RA

what condition was the army under the leadership of the future shot.
In short, during the maneuvers, the units and formations were unable to fulfill the assigned tasks, even despite the pre-written scenario and the help of intermediaries. The tactics of the same infantry in the offensive were best described by the words "running in a heap."

... The tankers of Yakir and Uborevich attacked blindly - their reconnaissance was poorly organized, did not show activity and (according to the assessment of the chief of the Combat Training Directorate (UBP) of the Red Army, 2nd rank commander AI Sedyakin, who oversaw the maneuvers) "was incapacitated." As a result, the T-26 from the 15th and 17th mechanized brigades of the KVO repeatedly struck "at an empty place." BT-5 and BT-7 from the 5th and 31st mechanized brigades of the BVO could not detect ambushes (and actions from ambushes were a favorite technique of German tankers). T-28s from the 1st BVO tank brigade "suddenly" (!) Found themselves in front of a strip of tank traps and gouges and were forced to turn sharply to the side - to a not yet explored area of ​​the terrain, where they got stuck ...
The squadrons of light bombers and attack aircraft R-5, SSS and R-Zet, which were supposed to clear the way for the advancing tanks, essentially could not do this. Their interaction with mechanized brigades and regiments "failed" (BVO), "was completely lost or carried out sporadically" (KVO): the organization of communication between the aviation and tank headquarters let down. In the KVO, the interaction of tanks with artillery was also lame ......
The failure of the great military maneuvers of the Red Army in 1935-1936 "

[Alexey RA]

Quote: stalkerwalker

T-28s from the 1st BVO tank brigade "suddenly" (!) Found themselves in front of a strip of tank traps and gouges and were forced to turn sharply to the side - to a not yet explored area of ​​the terrain, where they got stuck ...

My favorite quote. An elite heavy tank brigade, during the execution of a pre-directed script, suddenly flies out to the nadolby and further into the marshy area.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Alexey RA

Read Smirnov - "Great maneuvers". He has a good idea of ​​the state of the army under the leadership of the future shot.

I did not get that firing squad -voroshilovs / budenny, who brought the army, already WITHOUT shot, to the aforementioned Act of 1940 and disaster 1941- Did you not command troops in 1937?

Quote: Alexey RA

The best results of the leadership of the "old guard" are seen in the example of Blucher.

Where is he to Voroshilov

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Olgovich

I did not understand: and the Voroshilov / Budyonny shooting men, who brought the army, already WITHOUT shot, to the aforementioned Act of 1940 and the catastrophe of 1941, did NOT command the troops in 1937?

And citizen Voroshilov, unfortunately, was saved by his old merits. And they saved him until 1940, when only as a result of the victory in the war with Finland first red officer finally flew out of his post.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Alexey RA

And citizen Voroshilov, unfortunately, was saved by his old merits. And they saved him until 1940,

what was there before 1940 ...
and his FAILURE command of the NW direction, which led to the blockade of Leningrad in its worst possible scenario? ?

You probably read Stalin's telegrams to him in Leningrad ...

WHAT would happen after similar to someone else .....

[antivirus]

Voroshilov was a watered appointee - not that regular officer (white bone, blue blood). Bolshevik in the army.
successfully led for a semi-literate country of civil level,

!!! did not pull the entire system of state administration from the collective farm (food supply-processing-food industry and mobile transport) to the military State Planning Commission (shell hunger, etc.) and the transport system + all infrastructure (for example, water pipelines (? water supply) -sewerage, where to get 380 V).
there was not enough medicine for everyone. and then dozens of questions.
!! the stables of 1913 did not hold for some reason all the horses of the new 1940 army + thousands of tanks and cars.
forges - repair of a mare not = rembatu of tank corps

[ABC-schutze]

1. Declaring that: “the war was already going on and it was very difficult with the Finns, did you forget to look at the calendar? .. It seems like it ALREADY ended in March 1940. kind of like, only by the forces and means of one Leningrad Military District. For which "mobilization", in fact, was hardly required ... And KE Voroshilov from the post of People's Commissar of Defense, after its completion, was asked. , by the way ... 1941. I apologize to ask, this opus of yours: "It became obvious that the MURDER in 2-1937 of HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS of fellow citizens, incl. military, only weakened the army and it was necessary to shoot, apparently, less, but completely different ... "was it built on some kind of" texture "? .. And, by the way, at whom and how intensively, in your opinion, then" it was necessary to shoot "? .. 38. Another, rather interesting" discovery "of yours:" The aforementioned Act of May 3, 8 listed all the main reasons for the largest military catastrophe in the world, the defeat of 1940-1941. " Your idea to translate into normal Russian, it turns out that the TOTAL MILITARY defeat on the CONTINENT by the Nazis of ALL "LEADING European" democracies "and their CAPITULATION before the Third Reich," the greatest military catastrophe in the WORLD "is not? .. A TOTAL breakdown of the USSR and the Red Army? , plans of Hitler's "blitzkrieg", already by September 42, you ranked among those. This is impressive ... By the way, remembering the "cost" of the defeats of 1941 - 1941, the Red Army and the Soviet economy suffered great losses. But the "price" of the defeats of the European "democracies" was their COMPLETE DISAPPEARANCE. And this, in spite of the fact that they were mobilized in advance, were put on alert and were not inferior to the Wehrmacht in terms of military potential. And the notorious "Stalinist regime" with its "mass repressions" was not there either ...

[chenia]

Quote: ABC-schütze

Your idea to translate into normal Russian, it turns out,

Do not try to convince Olgovich, it’s impossible for a sober head. For example, I definitely won't drink that much.

[Olgovich]

Quote: ABC-schütze

Declaring that: "The war has already been going on and it is very difficult with the Finns, did you forget to look at the calendar?"

have you read the article?

It's about 1940 and 1940 war already and still was

Did it get there?

Quote: ABC-schütze

And the author writes about collectingx 1941, by the way ...

by the way, NO, not only article:

No mobilization dues 1940 years were not, no war was planned

Quote: ABC-schütze

I apologize to ask "It became obvious that the MURDERING in 1937-38 of HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS of fellow citizens, including the military, only weakened the army and it was necessary to shoot, apparently, less, but completely different ..." on some kind of "texture" built ?.

on well-known FACTS unknown to you
You either apologize normally or get rid of the stupid "sorry"

Quote: ABC-schütze

And, by the way, at whom and how intensively, in your opinion, then "it was necessary to shoot"?

those who made the decision to shoot

.

Quote: ABC-schütze

is not? You ranked as such

certainly, see number of many million of our killed, wounded soldiers and civilians captured and the number of occupied territories.
Now show me where and when there is something similar in scale in the History of the World.
What? You can not? So memorize these numbers so as not to ask stupid questions.

Quote: ABC-schütze

there, too, it seems like it was not ...

There were no such vast territories as the USSR.

Let me remind you that if the USSR was a territory with France, it would have fallen twice as fast as it (in the same 40 days that France lost, the Nazis occupied two France in the USSR)

[ABC-schutze]

Alas, you again slipped past the checkout. I read the article. Unlike you ... And that is why, I reminded you that the war (military conflict) with the Finns ended in MARCH 1940. And the fees mentioned by the author in the article took place in April - May. Behind this, no "preparation for the war" (already past), as the author rightly notes, could not appear. Don't believe me? .. Here is a quote from the article for you: "IN APRIL-MAY, a million people were called to the GATHERING, who were trained and returned home. There were no mobilization fees in 1940, no war was PLANNED, there was, of course, not a routine, but quite understandable retraining and tightening of mobilization mechanisms, which is reasonable and necessary during the ongoing World War II. " For this, a logical question is not to the author, but to you. Having declared that "the war was already going on", why did YOU publicly lie? ... After all, the "Finnish" war did not go to the period of the BEGINNING of the training camp, neither "already", nor "still" ... This time ... I don't see any particular reason to apologize to you "normally". Because, you have more whims than intelligible arguments. And I am somehow immune to the hysterics of forum schoolgirls ... The "well-known FACTS" mentioned by you, on WHAT DOCUMENTAL and STATISTICAL material are they based on? .. On the fantasies of the "Vermont hermit", who, according to his OWN, confession (did not have a chance to see the documents "? .. Let's continue ... And who should have shot at those who "made the decision to shoot"? .. "Innocent victims"? .. Like Radek the clown or the fugitive Raskolnikov, etc.? .. It is not for you to "show" something there. And you will explain to me on what basis the TOTAL and LIGHTNING breakthrough of the WAR by the "leading" continental "democracies" with the FULL CAPITULATION OF THE ARMY and the TOTAL SUSPENSION of the civilian population by the aggressors-occupiers, the greatest war catastrophe in the WORLD "is not". And the COMPLETE breakdown of the USSR and the Red Army, by September 1941, PLANS of the "blitzkrieg" of the Nazi aggressors, from some of your crossroads, were announced as such? .. Only on the grounds that the soldiers of the armies of the European "democracies" and their commanders preferred the concentration camps of the occupiers? .. Didn't you fall or get injured on the battlefield? .. And the civilian population of the European "democracies", so as not to incur losses, showed a commendable inclination to collaboration and plowed at the occupiers, sticking out their tongues from zeal? .. If the USSR were a "territory with France", then it would NOT have existed AT ALL. For then there would be no "Russian Empire" either. Not only at the beginning of the First World War (which you ostentatiously and ostentatiously call "great"), but also during the invasion of Napoleon. And it means, and "Nikolaev" Russia, THEN, - in 1914, fell under the blows of the Teutons somewhere faster. For this, follow YOUR OWN "advice" and hack on your forehead, the size of the state's territory and its resources of ALL kinds, this is not a "gift of fate", but a LEGAL RESULT OF CENTURAL LABOR and the SPILLED blood of ALL ITS PEOPLES. And you catch up - with your funny "argument". And would France, in general, have been a “great power”, “if” for CENTURIES, it had not had colonies and had not robbed them? .. And what would be its "territory" on the continent in this case? .. And wouldn't she have fallen before the Nazis not even in 40, but, say, in 10 days? ... In short, don't confuse history with "geometry". France was occupied by the Nazis with lightning speed (yes, that's right), because she and the French, did not want to fight the AGGRESSOR, unlike the Soviet people. Although they had ALL POTENTIAL for SUCCESSFUL REFLECTION of the argess. Incl. and developed transport communications, and transport, and airfields.

[Olgovich]

Quote: ABC-schütze

And the fees mentioned by the author in the article took place in April - May. For sim, no "preparation for war", as the author justly notes that they could not appear.
... ... no war was PLANNED

the author and you, together with him, are in a deep puddle, because you do not know elementary Stories of your country:

- in the middle June 1940, after ultimatum , introduced additional military to all three Baltic countries (no one knew that there would be no war)

-then it was preparing powerful offensive (and it was carried out on June 28) to Romania with the aim of liberating Bessarabia occupied by it, was created SOUTH FRONT ... And Romania, for a second, possessed 800 thousandth army and rhas improved to fight

-really preparing for a war with the Anglo-Franks and even sent troops to
Transcaucasia.

The very same decision to collect in 1940 stemmed from the decisions on military development in the fall of 1939.

Quote: ABC-schütze

I don't see any particular reason to apologize to you "normally". Because, you have more whims than intelligible arguments. And I am somehow immune to the hysterics of forum schoolgirls ..

Yes, I don’t need it for fick: it’s just illiterate and inappropriate your usual "sorry" - it hurts the ear.

However, if you are fighting your inferiority complex in this way, then let you ...

Quote: ABC-schütze

The "well-known FACTS" mentioned by you, on WHAT DOCUMENTAL and STATISTICAL material are they based on ?.

Well-known and uncontested by anyone Help Pavlova.

The main executions are 08.37-08.38, 681 execution sentences, according to her.

You don't know that either?

Quote: ABC-schütze

On the fantasies of the "Vermont hermit", who, according to his OWN, confession (did not have a chance to see the documents "? ..

so it was not necessary to bashfully hide your fear and shame in the archives - and no one would have to figure it out on their own

Quote: ABC-schütze

And to shoot at those who "made the decision to shoot" who was supposed to? .. "

observing the LAW. Let me remind you that all extrajudicial decisions (VK troika, etc.) are recognized the state Illegal legislation of that time

Quote: ABC-schütze

It is a it is not for you to "show"I will be there.

those. you- Insolvent those. you can not. Ch.t.d.

This is not surprising - the world has not yet known SUCH military catastrophe (in terms of losses, scale and speed) in its history

Quote: ABC-schütze

declared as such? ..

Read again the above, if it does not come from the first.

Quote: ABC-schütze

If the USSR was a "territory with France", then.

he would have fallen twice as fast as france - that's the only thing you have to tie about, there, a knot

Quote: ABC-schütze

France the Nazis lightning fast (yes, that's right) they occupied it, because she and the French did not want to fight the AGGRESSOR, unlike the Soviet people.

And taken Vilnius on the 2nd day of the war, exit to Minsk on the 5th
(count the km!), to Riga on the 6th day is clearly NOT lightning fast, yes

Quote: ABC-schütze

ansport, and airfields. And EXACTLY smaller than that of the USSR "size of the territory" Fra

spare me the VERY chatter, huh?

[AAK]

Colleague, about undermining the fighting efficiency of the Red Army by Stalinist repressions and stopping hundreds of thousands of imprisoned and tortured commanders - best of all with the enemy of the people Vovka Rezun, the book "Purification", the chapter "About forty thousand generals" ...

[ABC-schutze]

Once again I will repeat a couple of practical tips ... 1. Learn to use the calendar. 2. And carefully read the articles under which you "mold" your comments. This one, excuse me, FIG, why did you "unsubscribe" to me: "the author and you, together with him, are in a deep puddle, because you do not know the elementary history of your country:

- in mid-June 1940, after an ultimatum, additional troops were introduced to all three Baltic countries (no one knew that there would be no war) "? .. The author and I will survive the aforementioned" sitting in a puddle "without any problems. , what
MAY 1940 (when the training ended), according to the calendar, JUNE PRECEDES you (the dates of the "introduction" of ADDITIONAL troops in the limitrophy), and the training itself, according to the DOCUMENT, was planned FOR UP TO 30 DAYS. After that, as the author notes, "the servicemen were DISSOLVED to their HOUSES." For this, you have already asked for as much as TWO, additional questions. 1. Why would it, the allegedly "ALREADY and STILL" "Finnish" war, which you mentioned, suddenly disappeared from the "register" of your actual "arguments"? years, and "jumped" as much as JUNE 30? .. And even from the Kola Peninsula, to the Baltic states? .. Not from "good" knowledge of the Russian history you mentioned? .. 1940. Where are your links to DOCUMENTS , confirming the FACT of the MASS (because there is no point in talking about anything else) of completing the ADDITIONAL contingents of the Red Army introduced into the Baltic states with citizens from among those who passed military training in APRIL - MAY 1940? .. Khrushchev, you can compare it with the "reference" (extensive statistics "sent to I. V. Stalin (" under the stamp ") at his direction, on the SAME topic, five or six years earlier. 2 as published on the pages of VIZH and gives a very clear idea of ​​the real scope and goals of the so-called "repressive" political iks of Soviet power for the aforementioned "Stalinist" period (1940 - 20) of the existence of its "punitive" system. I prefer her. As for other "inquiries", you, citizens "accusers", first sort out the number of "innocent victims" of death sentences, in "YOUR own pants." For ... The "Pavlov's certificate", mentioned in the context of those sentenced to VMN, concerns BASICLY the "victims" of the active anti-kulak actions of the Soviet government against the anti-Soviet characters IN THE VILLAGE. And not at all against some "fellow citizens", as you indicated in your commentary, thereby emphasizing the "reason" for the decrease in the combat readiness of the Red Army by the beginning of the Second World War. I ask again ... Why are you lying? .. Who, the repressed former kulaks, criminals and fighters against Soviet power, would form the "backbone of the Red Army" to repulse the Nazis? .. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), July 1929, 1953, approved OPERATIONAL Order of the NKVD No. 31, here is its TITLE - "On the operation to repress the former KULAKOV, CRIMINALS and FORMER ANTI-SOVIET elements." I ask again ... Is it that all the above named, on the eve of the Second World War, would begin to increase the combat potential of the Red Army? .. After all, in THIS context, you shed your "mournful tear" for them, "fellow citizens" ...

[bk0010]

Quote: Olgovich

It became obvious that the murder in 1937-38 of hundreds of thousands of fellow citizens, incl. military, only weakened the army and it was necessary to shoot, apparently, less, but completely different ...

There was nowhere to weaken. Read about the territorial (militia) army of the USSR. She was supposed to save money, but she did not, and the combat capabilities were at the level of the plinth. In 1935, they realized this, began to resolve the issue, after the victory at Khalkhin Gol (the then equivalent of 08.08.08), they began to urgently make a regular army.

[Undecim]

The author pulled the 1941 collection out of the historical context and, in his frivolous manner, began to fantasize around this moment, spying on LiveJournal and other Internet cheat sheets.
The author did not have enough time and desire to study, even briefly, the history of the RKKA manning system.
Hence the pearls of the type

Actually, until 1939 there was no universal military service in the USSR.

18 September 1925 years
-------------------------------------------------- ----------------

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

LAW

ON MANDATORY MILITARY SERVICE

Section I. BASIC PROVISIONS

1. The defense of the USSR is the duty of all citizens of the Union.
The defense of the USSR with weapons in hand is carried out only
working people.
The dispatch of other military personnel is assigned to unearned elements.
duties.

The most important difference between the USSR Law of 1.09.1939/1925/XNUMX on universal conscription from the XNUMX Law on Compulsory Military Service was that conscription was canceled on the basis of class.

Article 3. All men - citizens of the USSR, without distinction of race, nationality, religion, educational qualification, social origin and status, are obliged to serve in the armed forces of the USSR.

Although the 1939 Law lifts class restrictions on conscription, only children of workers and peasants are still admitted to military schools. Students of institutes and technical schools are not conscripted into the army. They are undergoing military training in educational institutions. Graduates of technical schools are awarded the rank of lieutenant, and graduates of institutes immediately receive the rank of captain, and they are all enrolled in the reserve. The threat of war, the introduction of troops into Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bessarabia, and then the beginning of World War II on September 1.9.1939, XNUMX, the beginning of the war with Finland, and the need for a sharp increase in the number of the army that arose in connection with these events forced the Soviet government to carry out a number of hidden, and then open partial mobilizations. Younger storekeepers and almost all reserve commanders were drafted into the army.
All this is in the literature.

[Revolver]

Quote: Undecim

graduates of institutes immediately receive the title of captain

My grandfather graduated from the Shipbuilding Faculty of the LPI (now the Shipbuilding Institute), but he was just a senior in the reserve. True, he graduated in the 1920s.

[ABC-schutze]

And you, in fact, have not objected to the author ... The author refers to the Law on UNIVERSAL MILITARY DUTIES. And you are trying to convince the VO forum that it was "already in the USSR", quoting the USSR Law on Compulsory Military Service. Already Article 1 of the law of 1939 reads: "Universal military service is a law. Military service in the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army is an honorable duty of citizens of the USSR." For this, we are talking EXACTLY about the GENERAL DUTIES of citizens to SERVICE in the "regular" Red Army. That under the previously existing "territorial-militia" system, in principle, it was impossible. thus, QUALITATIVE legislative changes, emphasized by the author, is quite justified ...

[Undecim]

And you, in fact, did not object to the author ...

You just did not get to the point. But this is not critical.

Are you trying to convince the VO forum

I'm not trying to convince anyone, this is a completely futile occupation. I expressed my opinion in a comment format.

[ABC-schutze]

With all due respect to your opinion, I still think that any "opinion" should be based on the arguments underlying it. And it is the weight of the arguments that is the main "convincing" factor. Alas... QUALITATIVE, CONCEPTUAL difference of the Laws from 1925 and the Law of 1939 is clearly visible from their very NAME. Until 1939, there really was no UNIVERSAL MILITARY duty in the USSR. And here the author is absolutely right. And the aforementioned cancellation of the conscription of citizens into the Armed Forces on the basis of their "class characteristics" is an absolutely PRINCIPAL distinguishing factor. The law of 1925, already in the first section, operates with the concepts of "Defense" and "Defense". And UNIVERSAL is only "Protection", but not "Defense" with arms in hand. The "non-conscription" you mentioned of students of institutes and technical schools, according to the Law of 1939, does not ABSOLUTELY deprive them of the STATUS OF MILITARY. According to the 1925 Law, "some class" elements of this STATUS DID NOT HAVE IN PRINCIPLE. And the "service in reserve" mentioned by you, after graduation from universities and technical schools, citizens, all the same, are in the STATUS OF MILITARY. For this, my amateurish opinion is ... The author of the article understood the ESSENCE of what was happening in 1939 - early 1942. processes much better than many commentators on his article. Although I admit that he read less "documents" than they did. The phenomenon, alas, is by no means rare. by no means everyone who knows "more" formulas, axioms and theorems, better understands the SPIRIT of science (say, mathematics or physics). The story is the same ... In any case, after reading the article, I noted for myself that the author, commenting on the events in the mentioned period, does not identify "on autopilot" such PROCESSES as the "call" of citizens for military service or their "mobilization" (all the more MASS). And he does the right thing ... For the "call" of citizens is carried out in peacetime, in a routine, planned manner. The state resorts to the "mobilization" of citizens in somewhat other cases. Moreover, the mobilization of MASS ... And if the citizens called up in APRIL - MAY 1940 for 30 DAYS military training, at the end of them, were "released to their homes" (and this statement of the author, NOBODY of the "document experts", alas, DID NOT REFUTE, then consider them EXACTLY. " mobilized "(incl. and "secretly"), EXACTLY in the context of the ongoing deployment of the Armed Forces (RKKA) in the pre-war (threatened) period, there are no grounds. Most of the formations and parts of the western districts were redeployed to "new territories" legally returned to the USSR (the Baltic States, Zap. Belarus, Zap. Ukraine, Bessarabia). The redeployment process, indeed, went RAPIDLY and was absolutely insufficiently prepared (incl. and for objective reasons). The units of the formation in the new places did not have the infrastructure necessary to ensure their full-fledged combat training and daily activities. And these, as you can understand, were the processes associated with what was happening at that time, the constant adjustment (in connection with the acquisition of new, vast, defended territories) of the plans of the mob. deployment of the aircraft. But the plans of the mob. deployments ALWAYS exist, as they did in the "old" western Soviet territories. And, at the same time, the deployment of units and formations, in accordance with the "old" plans of the mob. deployment, no one called "mobilization" (all the more "urgent" or "secretive"). For this, the troops went on a normal, planned work aimed at the implementation ("docking") of the plans adjusted to the new situation. Illustration?.. Second half of 1939 ... On the site of the former deployment (Smolensk) of the tank brigade that hastily left for a new location, the Smolensk Shooting and Machine Gun School is being formed and deployed. CALLED under the Law of 1939, citizens (cadets), having found themselves on an absolutely uncomfortable infrastructure (there was not even a canteen, they ate food in the garages of the car park). By the decision of the command of the school, after being drafted and enrolled in training companies, they GO home, being provided, for the planned period of their absence, with uniforms, food, according to the established norms and corresponding documents. Is this (sending home) similar to "urgent" or "hidden" mobilization in a threatened period? .. After a couple of weeks, all those who were "sent home" return to school and a full-fledged learning process begins.

[VS]

Avtar - maladets))) It is a pity that he did not touch upon the topic of what causes hysteria in Isaevshchina: SO what was it - the usual annual training camp, or it was already a hidden partial mobilization in anticipation of the German attack - as they were later called by the marshals themselves and simply officers of the VNU General Staff and IVI in their works on the study of the tragedy of the beginning of the Second World War - BUS under the guise of fees - in the 41st?)))

[smaug78]

causes hysterics among the Isaevshchina: SO what was it - the usual annual training camp, or it was already a hidden partial mobilization in anticipation of the German attack

The so-called Isaevism considers

hidden partial mobilization pending

the possible

German attacks

[Alexey RA]

Quote: smaug78

The so-called Isaevism considers

The so-called Isaevism believes that:

... as it is easy to see that the training camp of 1941 had nothing to do with mobilization measures, their holding looks like a consequence, rather, of a change in the deployment scheme of the Red Army, rather than some foreign policy events ... but memoirists (for the most part) and researchers (especially from the military department) could not resist the temptation to present the Soviet military and political leadership as much more perspicacious and prudent than those - alas! - actually were. Accordingly, now revisionists of all stripes are happily waving quotations from memoirs and studies: in the USSR, there was a hidden mobilization! And since the Soviet intelligence was unable to reveal the German preparations for war, it means ... yes, yes, and because of the text Vladimir Bogdanych's long donkey ears stick out with his "mobilization is a war, and we cannot imagine another understanding of it" and the subsequent a smooth transition to "the war that never happened."

© D. Shein

[smaug78]

And where does the Isaevism, if you quote Shein? "Congratulations, citizen, you have lied!"

[Alexey RA]

Quote: smaug78

And where does the Isaevism, if you quote Shein?

So one clan is the sirs of Znayki.

[smaug78]

Is that how you feel about yourself?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: smaug78

Is that how you feel about yourself?

No-no-no .... I'm talking about a clan of archival dock diggers.

[VS]

Quote: Alexey RA

Quote: smaug78

And where does the Isaevism, if you quote Shein?

So one clan is the sirs of Znayki.

the company still got there))

[smaug78]

The author has a two ... There are documents on the BEAD, the connection between intelligence messages and fees is direct. But no, the author is raving about reinventing the wheel. Samsonov, Frolova and Ivanov are a trio of delusional ...

[Alexey RA]

Quote: smaug78

There are documents on BEADS

Which documents?
Where have you seen the BUS without mobilization of equipment? Or with replenishment two divisions in the Special District?

[smaug78]

So start from the basics, that there is a BUS, that there is mobilization. What are the differences and so on ...

[Alexey RA]

Quote: smaug78

So start from the basics, that there is a BUS, that there is mobilization. What are the differences and so on ...

The burden of proof lies with the speaker of the thesis. You state:

Quote: smaug78

There are documents on BEADS

So I would like to see these documents.

And why look for differences between BUS and mobilization, if we are talking about the difference between ordinary training camps from large training camps?

[smaug78]

So what was the BUS or the mustache and when? Let's find a common stove for us and start dancing from it

[Alexey RA]

Quote: smaug78

So what was the BUS or the mustache carried out?

About holding training fees liable for military stock in 1941 and attracting horses and vehicles to collect from the national economy.

© an extract from the minutes of the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated March 8, 1941.

In March 1941, it was decided to hold regular training sessions in the following categories:
The assigned composition of the rifle divisions is 265000 people.
The rank and file involved in training for the positions of junior command personnel in the reserve - 25000 people.
The rank and file involved in training in specialties - 98800 people.
The assigned composition of the air defense and VNOS units is 23570 people.
The assigned composition of the fortified areas is 26230 people.
The command personnel of the reserve of road maintenance regiments - 1885 people.
Military food and agitation centers - 12848 people.
Art polygons - 6652 people
Field auto bakeries and meat processing plants - 2448 people.
Moreover, the call for the training camp was organized as flexibly as possible - so as not to disrupt field work and the implementation of the plan of industrial enterprises. In addition, equipment and horses were practically not involved in the training camp.
Then the first column "Attributed composition of rifle divisions" was increased to 466300 people, scattering the assigned personnel throughout the country, from the Siberian Military District to the ArchVO. But the equipment and horses were never mobilized.

The maximum for which these fees are pulled is for measures to reduce the time of the BUS and complete mobilization by reducing the amount of l / s called up for them (because part of it is already in the SD). The combat capability of the SD was raised insignificantly by the assigned assigned personnel. For the basis of the division's firepower - the artillery regiments - remained with the thrust of "one division per regiment", and the divisions themselves - with peacetime rear services.

[smaug78]

I rather agree with this: http://zhistory.org.ua/probus41.htm. What were the first US, after intelligence reports, they grew into the US

[Alexey RA]

Quote: smaug78

What were the first US, after intelligence reports, they grew into the US

To grow into a BUS, it was necessary to start transferring equipment and horses from the military to the army. Otherwise, mobilization as a means of increasing the combat effectiveness of formations does not work - instead of a rifle division, we get Muschschyn crowd with rifles, which neither can deploy artillery, nor fire, nor provide the supply of ammunition, fuel and food to the fighters. Oh yes - there is no connection either, because technically competent personnel are exempt from fees.

[smaug78]

It was planned to transfer the technique at the last moment, after the onset of clarity ...

[VS]

[quote] Everything was simpler and sadder: we, a hundred years behind, really ran them in ten, but did not have time to fully catch up with the West [/ quote]
and who threw the country into stone Age civil war unleashed by a thief? Industry disappeared, almost died, fled, degraded the working class, the engineering corps, etc. ...

And nowhere in the world have they used such amazing methods of catching up "as the exile of millions of peasants, the execution of hundreds of thousands in a year and millions of prisoners in camps. This has brought only losses. You just don't know how, just don't take it ... [/ quote]

nonsense is not necessary to say - the civil war against the background of the INTERVENTION OF WESTERN countries - there under a hundred thousandth group landed along the entire perimeter of the country and killed up to 100 thousand of our citizens - it was not the Bolsheviks who unleashed it)) And to talk nonsense about the industry and economy of the Republic of Ingushetia allegedly ruined by the Bolsheviks of Lenin - - it's not even funny))

[Daniil Konovalenko]

the officer corps is weak (cadre tsarist ones were killed by the red commanders in the 20s and 30s in the heat of political struggle, and in 1937–1938 they also killed the red commanders who wanted something strange),

Horrible Tell the author, did you practice in the Samsonov clan?

[chenia]

Bus-41 by and large was primarily aimed at arranging the locations of the newly formed units.

[Alexey RA]

In the end, the training was carried out in the reduced divisions, and the lion's share of the reserve ones took place in special districts. So, in 1941, the Western Special Military District received 43 people, the Kiev Special - 000, but the Far Eastern Front, together with the Trans-Baikal Military District - 81.

The table of distribution of the assigned composition of rifle divisions (these are those who in 1941 were called up specifically for replenishment, and not for retraining) by districts is at uv. D. Sheina.
https://litl-bro.livejournal.com/4736.html
It can be seen from it that KOVO received 65550 people, PrivO - 42000 people, but ZOVO and OdVO - only 24000 each.Moreover, the deep MVO and HVO received about 60000 each, SKVO - 48000, OVO - 42000 and even the Siberian Military District - 36000 person of the assigned staff.

I think the most indicative in this respect is the ZOVO, where the training of the assigned personnel is planned in two rifle divisions for the entire district.

© D. Shein

[icant007]

Quote: Alexey RA

Moreover, the deep-seated MVO and HVO received approximately 60000 assigned personnel each, SKVO - 48000, OVO - 42000, and even the Siberian Military District - 36000 assigned personnel.

And what confuses you in this case? That the inner districts have taken over a fairly significant part of the reservists?

[VS]

Quote: smaug78

It was planned to transfer the technique at the last moment, after the onset of clarity ...

the funniest thing - you're both right)))

I would call those fees I would call - partial BUS)) In the book of aentiISAEV I also raised this topic and in comparison with BUS 39 and 40 showed - the fees of 41 were exactly the same BUS - according to the documents)) Not full, but still BEADS it was))

[smaug78]

Duc, this is a no brainer ... US, after the intelligence report, that would somehow put straws in the US in the BUS)))

[VS]

Quote: Proxima

And what do you order Stalin to do? He knew perfectly well that war was inevitable and tried to postpone it. General mobilization - this automatically meant war. So they got out as best they could

BRAVO! MALADETS)))

[Eug]

And what is the role of the then Chief of General Staff Meretskov in these shortcomings? Maybe he suffered for that?

[VS]

Quote: Eug

And what is the role of the then Chief of General Staff Meretskov in these shortcomings? Maybe he suffered for that?

for KSHI he was removed - for stupidity on them - for inconsistency with the post of the head of the General Staff)) but for the fact that he was in the post and really did not do anything after Shaposhnikov))

[VS]

Quote: smaug78

Duc, this is a no brainer ... US, after the intelligence report, that would somehow put straws in the US in the BUS)))

not so .. On the SS of the partisans in the barracks to conscripts do not settle and they are not given weapons and in the calculations and crews are not introduced)) And this was planned initially)) so that intelligence did not report something changed) Ie. initially, these BEADS were "partial" .. defective plus - they, unlike the 39th and 40th, could not be called in the documents as the BEAD in the 41st))

[citizen]

(cadre tsarists were killed by red commanders in the 20s and 30s in the heat of political struggle, and in 1937–1938 they also killed red commanders who wanted something strange)

And who are those "wanting the strange"?

[Konnick]

cadre tsarist soldiers were killed by the red commanders in the 20s and 30s in the heat of political struggle

The author uses some kind of cliché, accusing the "red".
Yes, there were repressed former tsarist officers, but only those who got involved in the political struggle on the side of Trotsky as a party member. The non-partisan military experts were practically not touched. Let the author explain why Marshal Govorov and Lieutenant General Shapkin, who served with Kolchak, were not repressed, why Lieutenant General Kruse, a former White Guard general, was not repressed. All of them at that time were non-partisan.
Not everything is so simple. At the Novodevichy cemetery there is a whole alley of graves of Soviet generals, former tsarist colonels and generals. And the Vesna case was quickly hushed up, and the guilty were punished.