Military Review

Tsushima. Accuracy Factors of Japanese Artillery

109

Battleship "Mikasa"


Introduction


At the very beginning of the twentieth century, there was an intensive development of naval artillery: new powerful and long-range guns appeared, shells were improved, rangefinders and optical sights were introduced. In total, this made it possible to fire at previously unattainable distances, significantly exceeding the range of a direct shot. At the same time, the issue of organizing long-range shooting was very acute. The maritime powers have tackled this challenge in many ways.

By the beginning of the war with Russia, the Japanese fleet already had its own method of fire control. However, the battles of 1904 demonstrated its imperfection. And the technique was significantly redesigned under the influence of the received combat experience. Elements of centralized fire control were introduced to Tsushima on ships.

In this article, we will consider both the technical and organizational aspects of the management of Japanese artillery in the Battle of Tsushima. We will conduct our acquaintance exactly according to the same plan as in the previous one. article about the Russian squadron:

• rangefinders;
• optical sights;
• means of transferring information to tools;
• shells;
• organizational structure of artillery;
• method of fire control;
• target selection;
• training for gunners.

Rangefinders


Tsushima. Accuracy Factors of Japanese Artillery
Rangefinder determines the distance

By the beginning of the war, on all large Japanese ships, two rangefinders (on the bow and stern bridge) manufactured by Barr & Stroud, model FA2, were installed to determine the distance. But by this time, the production of a new model FA3 had already begun, which, according to the passport, had twice the accuracy. And at the beginning of 1904, Japan purchased 100 of these rangefinders.

Thus, in the Battle of Tsushima, all Japanese ships of the battle line had at least two Barr & Stroud FA3 rangefinders, similar to those installed on the Russian ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron.

Rangefinders played a rather modest role in combat. There were no complaints about their work.

Optical sights



Optical sight on the 6 "bar of the Armstrong gun

All Japanese guns, starting with the 12-pounder (3 ”), had two sights: a mechanical H-shaped and an 8-fold optical sight produced by Ross Optical Co.

Optical sights made it possible in the Tsushima battle, already from a distance of 4 m, to direct shells to a certain part of the ship, for example, to the tower. During the battle, the fragments repeatedly disabled the optical sights, but the gunners promptly replaced them with new ones.

Long-term observation through the lenses led to eye fatigue and impaired vision, so the Japanese even planned to attract fresh gunners from the other side's guns to replace them. However, in Tsushima, this practice was not resorted to due to the fact that there were breaks in the battle, and the ships changed the firing side several times.

Means of information transmission


In the Battle of Tsushima, different means were used, duplicating each other, to transmit commands and data for pointing guns on different ships:

• electromechanical indicator;
• negotiation pipe;
• telephone;
• clock face;
• mouthpiece;
• plate.

Consider them in more detail.

Electromechanical pointer

Devices for obtaining distance (left) and commands (right)

The Japanese ships were equipped with electromechanical devices "Barr & Stroud", which transmitted distance and commands from the conning tower to artillery officers. In design and principle of operation, they were similar to the Geisler instruments on Russian ships.

On the one hand, these pointers did not suffer from noise and clearly conveyed information, and on the other hand, the subtle movements of the arrows under conditions of shaking from shots could escape the attention of the receiving side. Therefore, the transmission of distance and commands was always duplicated in other ways.

Negotiation pipe
The negotiation pipes connected the key posts of the ship: the conning tower, aft wheelhouse, towers, casemate guns, tops, the upper bridge, etc. They were very convenient for communication in peacetime, but during the battle it was difficult to use them due to the constant noise and rumble.

Nevertheless, in Tsushima, negotiating pipes were actively used to transmit commands, and in those cases when they failed due to damage, they used messenger sailors with signs.

Phone
A telephone was used to transmit commands. He conveyed the voice with sufficient quality. And with strong battle noise, it provided better audibility than voice trumpets.

Clock face
The dial was located on the bow bridge and served to transmit the distance to the casemates. It was a round disc about 1,5 meters in diameter with two hands, reminiscent of a clock, but with ten, not twelve, divisions. A short red arrow stood for thousands of meters, a long white arrow for hundreds of meters.

Bullhorn
The horn was actively used to transmit orders and firing parameters from the cabin to the messenger sailors. They wrote down information on a board and passed it on to the gunners.

In battle conditions, the use of the horn was very difficult due to the noise.

Voice command transmission

Nameplate
A small black board with chalk notes, which was betrayed by a messenger sailor, was the most effective means of communication in the face of strong rumbles and shocks from his own shots. No other method has provided comparable reliability and visibility.

Due to the fact that the Japanese in the Battle of Tsushima used several different methods in parallel to transmit information, a clear and continuous communication was ensured for all participants in the centralized fire control process.

Shells


The Japanese fleet in the Tsushima battle used two types of ammunition: high-explosive and armor-piercing No. 2. They all had the same weight, the same inertial fuse and the same equipment - shimozu. They differed only in that the armor-piercing shells were shorter, had thicker walls and less weight of explosives.

In the absence of any strict regulations, the choice of the type of ammunition was decided on each ship independently. In fact, high-explosive shells were used much more often than armor-piercing shells. Some ships generally only used landmines.

The Japanese land mines were very sensitive. When they touched the water, they raised a tall column of spray, and when they hit the target, they produced a bright flash and a cloud of black smoke. That is, in any case, the fall of the shells was very noticeable, which greatly facilitated zeroing and adjustment.

Armor-piercing shells did not always explode when hitting the water, so the Japanese practiced combining ammunition in a volley: one barrel fired armor-piercing, and the other high-explosive. At long distances, armor-piercing shells were not used.

Artillery organizational structure



Aiming with the 12-pounder (3 ") Armstrong cannon

The artillery of the Japanese ship was organizationally divided into two groups of main-caliber guns (bow and stern turrets) and four groups of medium-caliber guns (bow and stern on each side). At the head of the groups were officers: one was assigned to each turret of the main caliber and two more led the bow and stern groups of medium caliber (it was believed that the battle would not be fought on both sides at the same time). The officers were usually in towers or casemates.

The main method of firing was centralized fire, in which the firing parameters: target, range, correction (base, for 6 "guns) and the moment of firing were determined by the firing manager (senior artillery officer or ship captain), who was on the upper bridge or in the conning tower. The group commanders had to participate in the transmission of the shooting parameters and monitor the accuracy of their execution. They were supposed to take over the functions of fire control only when switching to rapid fire (in Tsushima this happened rarely and by no means on all ships). The functions of the commanders of the main caliber turrets, in addition, included recalculating the corrections for their guns based on the data obtained for the medium caliber.

Before Tsushima, the organizational structure of the Japanese artillery was about the same. The key differences were that the commander of each group independently controlled the fire: he specified the distance, calculated the corrections, and even chose the target. For example, in the battle of August 1, 1904 in the Korean Strait, Azuma at one of the moments simultaneously fired at three different targets: from the bow tower - “Russia”, from 6 “guns -“ Thunderbolt ”, from the aft tower -“ Rurik ”.

Fire control technique



Admiral H. Togo on the upper bridge of "Mikasa" in the Battle of Tsushima (picture)

The Japanese fire control technique used at Tsushima was quite different from that used in previous battles.

First, let's take a quick look at the “old” technique.

The distance was determined using a rangefinder and transmitted to an artillery officer. He calculated the data for the first shot and transmitted them to the guns. After the sighting began, fire control passed directly to the gun group commanders, who observed the results of their firing and independently made adjustments to them. The fire was conducted in volleys or at the readiness of each gun.

This technique revealed the following disadvantages:

• The commanders of the groups from the not high enough towers and wheelhouses did not see the fall of their shells at a long distance.
• During independent shooting, it was not possible to distinguish between our own bursts from those of others.
• Gunners often independently adjusted the parameters of fire, making it difficult for officers to control fire.
• With the existing difficulties with the correction due to the inability to distinguish between the fall of the projectiles, the final accuracy was unsatisfactory.

An effective solution in the battle on July 28, 1904 in the Yellow Sea was proposed by the senior artillery officer of the Mikasa K. Kato, adding the following improvements to the salvo firing:

• Fire all guns on only one target.
• Strict adherence to uniform (within the same caliber) shooting parameters.
• Observation of the fall of shells from fore-mars.
• Centralized adjustment of shooting parameters based on the results of previous shots.

This is how centralized fire control was born.

In preparation for the Battle of Tsushima, the Mikasa's positive experience was extended to the entire Japanese fleet. Admiral H. Togo explained the fleet transition to a new technique:

Based on the experience of past battles and exercises, the ship's fire control should be carried out from the bridge whenever possible. The firing distance must be indicated from the bridge and must not be adjusted in gun groups. If an incorrect distance is indicated from the bridge, all the projectiles will fly by, but if the distance is correct, all the projectiles will hit the target and the accuracy will increase.

The centralized fire control process used by the Japanese in the Battle of Tsushima consisted of the following stages:

1. Measurement of distance.
2. Initial calculation of the amendment.
3. Transfer of shooting parameters.
4. Shot.
5. Observation of the shooting results.
6. Correction of shooting parameters based on observation results.

Further, the transition to stage 3 and their cyclic repetition from the 3rd to the 6th.

Distance measurement
The range finder from the upper bridge determined the distance to the target and transmitted it to the fire control through the negotiating pipe (if he was in the conning tower). H. Togo, before the battle, recommended refraining from shooting at more than 7 meters, and he planned to start the battle from 000 meters.

Except for the first sighting shot, the readings of the rangefinder were no longer used.

Initial calculation of the amendment
The fire controller, based on the readings of the rangefinder, taking into account the relative movement of the target, the direction and speed of the wind, predicted the range at the time of the shot and calculated the value of the rear sight correction. This calculation was carried out only for the first sighting shot.

Passing firing parameters
In parallel, the fire controller transmitted firing parameters to the guns in several ways: range and correction. Moreover, for 6 "guns it was a ready-made amendment, and the commanders of the main caliber guns were required to recalculate the received amendment according to the data of a special table.

The gunners were strictly instructed not to deviate from the range received from the fire control. It was allowed to change the rear sight amendment only in order to take into account the individual characteristics of a particular weapon.

Shot
Zeroing was usually carried out with 6 ”guns of the bow group. For better visibility in conditions of poor visibility or concentration of fire from several vessels, 3-4 guns fired in a salvo using the same parameters. With a long distance and good observation conditions, the volley could be carried out by a "ladder" with different distance settings for each gun. At a shorter distance, single sighting shots could also be used.

A volley on the defeat was made by all possible barrels of the same caliber.

The commands for the shot were given by the fire controller with the help of an electric howler or voice. On the command "to prepare for a volley", aiming was carried out. At the command "volley" a shot was fired.

Synchronous shooting required great coordination in the work of both loaders and gunners, who had to do their work strictly in the allotted time.

Observation of shooting results
The results of the shooting were monitored by both the shooting manager himself and the officer on the fore-mars, who transmitted information using a horn and flags.

The observation was carried out through telescopes. In order to distinguish the fall of their shells from those of others, two techniques were used.

First, the moment the shells fell was determined using a special stopwatch.

Secondly, they practiced visual accompaniment of the flight of their projectile from the moment of the shot to the very fall.

The hardest part was tracking your projectiles in the final phase of the Tsushima battle. "Mikasa" fired at "Borodino" and "Orel" from a distance of 5800-7200 m. The glare of the setting sun, reflected from the waves, greatly interfered with observation. The senior artillery officer of Mikasa himself could no longer distinguish between the hits of his 12 "shells (from 6" guns they did not fire because of the great distance), so he adjusted the fire only according to the words of the officer on the fore-mars.

Adjustment of shooting parameters based on observation results
The fire controller made corrections for the new salvo based on observation of the results of the previous one. The distance was adjusted based on the ratio of undershoots and overflights. However, he no longer relied on the readings of the rangefinder.

The calculated parameters were transferred to the gunners, a new salvo was fired. And the firing cycle was repeated in a circle.

Completion and resumption of the firing cycle
The fire was interrupted when visibility conditions did not allow observing its results or when the range became too great. However, there were interesting moments in Tsushima when the fire was interrupted not because of the weather or the increase in distance.

So, at 14:41 (hereinafter, the Japanese time), the fire on "Prince Suvorov" was suspended due to the fact that the target disappeared in the smoke from the fires.

At 19:10, Mikasa finished firing due to the impossibility of observing the fall of the shells due to the sun shining in the eyes, although at 19:04 hits were noted at Borodino. Some other Japanese ships continued to fire until 19:30.

After a break, the firing cycle began again with measuring the range.

Rate of fire



Practice shooting from 6 "Armstrong cannon

Japanese sources mention three rates of fire in the Battle of Tsushima:

• Measured fire.
• Ordinary fire.
• Rapid fire.

Measured fire was usually fired at long distances. Single fire on medium. Rapid fire, according to the instructions, was prohibited at a range of more than 6 m, and was rarely used in battle and by no means all ships.

The available information does not make it possible to unambiguously link the method of fire control and the rate of fire. And we can only assume that with measured and ordinary fire, the shooting was carried out in volleys with centralized control, and with rapid fire - independently, according to the readiness of each weapon and, most likely, according to the "old" method.

Based on the sequence of actions during centralized firing, volleys, even with ordinary fire, could not be very frequent (according to the instructions, no more than 3 rounds per minute for 6 "guns). The observations of the British attaches also confirm the low rate of fire in the Battle of Tsushima.

Target selection


In the Battle of Tsushima, there were no instructions or orders from the admiral to concentrate fire on a specific enemy ship. The fire controller chose the target on his own, first of all paying attention to:

• The closest or most convenient ship for shooting.
• If there is not much difference, then the first or the last ship in the ranks.
• The most dangerous enemy ship (causing the most damage).

Artillery exercises


In the Japanese fleet, a well-developed methodology for training artillerymen was used, in which the main role was assigned to barrel firing from enclosed rifles.


A device for placing a rifle in the barrel of a gun

The target for barrel shooting was a canvas stretched over a wooden frame and placed on a raft.


Target for barrel shooting

At the first stage, the gunner simply learned to use the sight and aim the gun at the target without firing a shot.

For training in aiming at a moving target, a special simulator (dotter) was also used. It consisted of a frame, inside which a target was located, displaced both in the vertical and horizontal directions. The gunner had to "catch" her in the sight and press the trigger, while the result was recorded: hit or missed.


Aiming at the target through the optical sight (top) and mechanical (bottom)

At the second stage, individual barrel firing was carried out at the target from each gun in turn.

At first, the fire was fired from a close distance (100 m) at a stationary target from a moored ship.

Then they moved to a long distance (400 m), where, first of all, they fired at a stationary target, and in the second, at a towed one.

At the third stage, the fire was carried out similarly to the previous exercise, only at the same time from the entire battery, one target at a time.

At the last, fourth stage, the shooting was carried out on the move by the entire ship in conditions as close as possible to combat ones. The target was towed first in the same direction, and then in the opposite direction (on the counter courses) at a distance of up to 600-800 m.

The main parameter for assessing the quality of training was the percentage of hits.

Before the battle of Tsushima, exercises were carried out very often. So, starting in February 1905, "Mikasa", if there were no other events, conducted two barrel firing a day: in the morning and in the afternoon.


Barrel firing

To understand the intensity and results of the Mikasa barrel firing for individual days, the data are summarized in the table:


In addition to the gunners, the Japanese also trained loaders, for which a special stand was used, on which the speed and coordination of actions were worked out.


Cannon loading exercises

The Japanese navy also fired training rounds with reduced charges from combat guns. The target was usually a small rocky island 30 m long and 12 m high. From the information that has come down to us, it is known that on April 25, 1905, the ships of the 1st combat detachment fired on the move, while the distance to the island was 2290-2740 m.

The shooting results are summarized in a table.


Unfortunately, information about other large practical firing has not reached us. However, based on indirect data on the shooting of the barrels of Japanese guns, it can be assumed that they could not be very frequent and intense.


Practical shooting of the cruiser "Kasuga"

Thus, barrel shooting played a major role in maintaining and improving the skills of Japanese gunners. At the same time, they trained not only aiming, but also the combat interaction of artillerymen of all levels. The practical experience of zeroing, observing and adjusting was primarily gained in previous battles, and not in exercises.

Also, the very high intensity of the preparation of the Japanese for the general battle should be especially canceled. And the fact that they led it until the very last day, meeting the enemy "at the peak of the form."

conclusions



Opening fire at the Battle of Tsushima

In the Tsushima battle, the Japanese shooting method gave excellent results.

At 14:10 (hereinafter, the time is Japanese) from a distance of 6 m "Mikasa" began zeroing in on "Prince Suvorov" with regular volleys from the nasal casemates of the starboard side. At 400:14 from a distance of 11 m "Mikasa" opened fire to kill with the main and medium caliber. Shots soon followed.

From the side of the 1st rank captain Clapier de Colong, who was in the wheelhouse of the Russian flagship, it looked like this:

After two or three undershoots and flights, the enemy took aim, and one after the other followed frequent and numerous hits in the nose and in the area of ​​the conning tower of the Suvorov ...
In the conning tower, through the gaps, fragments of shells, small chips of wood, smoke, splashes of water from undershoots and flights sometimes continuously fall in a whole rain. The noise from the continuous strikes of shells near the conning tower and their own shots drowns out everything. Smoke and flames from the explosions of shells and numerous nearby fires make it impossible to observe through the openings of the wheelhouse what is happening around. Only in fits and starts can you see individual parts of the horizon ...

At 14:40, observers from Mikasa noted that almost every shot of both 12 "and 6" guns hit the "Prince Suvorov", and the smoke from their explosions covered the target.

At 14:11 from a distance of 6 m "Fuji" opened fire on "Oslyaba". Already at 200:14 14 "the projectile hit the bow of the Russian ship. Moreover, this was not the first hit in the "Oslyabya" (the authors of the previous ones could have been other ships).

Warrant officer Shcherbachev observed the picture of the shelling of the flagship of the 2nd detachment from the aft tower of the "Eagle":

First, the undershot is about 1 cable, then the flight is about 1 cable. The column of water from the rupture of the shell rises above the forecastle "Oslyabya". The black pillar should be clearly visible against the gray background of the horizon. Then, after a quarter of a minute - a hit. The shell bursts against the light side of the Oslyabi with bright fire and a thick ring of black smoke. Then you can see how the side of the enemy ship flares up, and the entire forecastle of the Oslyabi is enveloped in fire and clouds of yellow-brown and black smoke. A minute later the smoke dissipates and huge holes are visible in the side ...

The accuracy and, consequently, the effectiveness of the fire of the Japanese artillery in the outset of Tsushima was much higher than in the battle on July 28, 1904 in the Yellow Sea. Already in about half an hour after the start of the battle, the "Prince Suvorov" and "Oslyabya" were out of order with great damage and never returned to it.

How, then, did the Japanese artillery, which on July 28, 1904, in a few hours could neither inflict heavy damage on the Russian battleships, nor even ignite large fires, so quickly achieved results on May 14, 1905?

And why the Russian squadron could not oppose anything to this?

Let's compare the key factors in the accuracy of artillery in the Battle of Tsushima, summarized in the table for clarity.


From a comparison of the accuracy factors of artillery, the following conclusions can be drawn.

Both sides had an approximately equal technical base (rangefinders, sights, firing data transmission means).

The Japanese navy used a more sophisticated fire control technique, developed on the basis of accumulated experience. This technique made it possible to distinguish between the falls of their shells and adjust fire on them even when firing several ships at the same target.

The Russian shooting technique did not take into account the experience of previous battles to the proper extent and was not worked out in practice. In fact, it turned out to be "inoperative": any acceptable accuracy could not be achieved due to the fact that it was impossible to adjust the fire based on the results of the shells falling due to the impossibility of distinguishing between them.

The Japanese navy conducted a very intense artillery exercise just prior to the Battle of Tsushima.

The Russian squadron fired only before going out on a campaign and during stops. The last practical exercises took place long before the battle.

Thus, the superiority of the Japanese in the accuracy of firing was achieved primarily through the use of better control techniques and a higher level of training of gunners.
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  1. Kote Pan Kokhanka
    Kote Pan Kokhanka 24 May 2021 04: 54
    +11
    Alexey, many thanks for the attempt to systematize information about Tsushima and especially for the drawings and diagrams !!! It seems common truth, but the clarity of the technical component is always not "simple" for most authors, but here is a complete "set", which pleases !!!
    1. Konnick
      Konnick 24 May 2021 06: 28
      +12
      Well, finally, and then "grenades of the wrong system." It's all about the organization of the shooting. Tsushima was defeated by the naval commanders with their ossified conceit, and all these references to the "non-explosiveness" of shells are just excuses.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 May 2021 08: 31
        +2
        Quote: Konnick
        It's all about the organization of the shooting

        It is difficult to understand what place in Alexey's article led you to such an idea :)
        1. Konnick
          Konnick 24 May 2021 08: 51
          +8
          It is difficult to understand what place in Alexey's article led you to such an idea.
          :)
          The whole article.
          The targeting of our squadron was indiscriminate and therefore could not determine whose bursts. For the Japanese, the zeroing was ordered, on command, one might say in turn, and the Japanese gunners did not confuse their bursts. And Vladimir_2U's comment added clarity to this question, for me it was new that the Japanese later applied the difference in the color of the smoke of sighting shells.
          It was necessary to think earlier, and not rely on armor.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 May 2021 09: 24
            +4
            Quote: Konnick
            The targeting of our squadron was disorderly

            I see :))) It's scary to even ask where you read it.
            Quote: Konnick
            For the Japanese, the zeroing was ordered, on command, one might say in turn, and the Japanese gunners did not confuse their bursts.

            Generally speaking, the observation of falls using a stopwatch was used in the Russian navy; there was evidence of this even at 1TOE.
            Quote: Konnick
            And Vladimir_2U's comment added clarity to this question, for me it was new that the Japanese later applied the difference in the color of the smoke of sighting shells.

            Try again to read the comment of Vladimir_2U
            Quote: Vladimir_2U
            To World War II the Japanese worked out the explosion smoke of a certain color for each ship of the squadron.

            The battle of Tsushima happened a little earlier than the First World War, if that :)
            1. Konnick
              Konnick 24 May 2021 09: 32
              +5
              the Japanese later applied the difference in the color of the smoke of sighting shells

              Read carefully, THEN, do not find fault.
              By the stopwatch? When did they start shooting at the same time from the entire squadron?
              A single battleship is one thing, a squadron is another
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 May 2021 11: 30
                +2
                Quote: Konnick
                Read carefully, THEN, do not find fault.

                "Then" in this case can be read in different ways (before tsushima - not used, in tsushima - used ", for example)
                Quote: Konnick
                For the Japanese, the zeroing was ordered, on command, one might say in turn, and the Japanese gunners did not confuse their bursts.

                Let's clarify - where exactly in the article says that the Japanese shot at Tsushima in this way?
            2. rytik32
              24 May 2021 09: 51
              +10
              Dear Andrey, good afternoon!
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Generally speaking, the observation of falls using a stopwatch was used in the Russian navy; there was evidence of this even at 1TOE.

              The stopwatch alone was not enough.
              Schensnovich wrote directly that until he went into the fire in volleys, he could not distinguish between falls.
              By the way, his fire control technique was quite close to the "new" Japanese
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 May 2021 11: 27
                0
                Quote: rytik32
                The stopwatch alone was not enough.

                Dear Alexey, do you know of cases when the Japanese would have practiced this "new Japanese technique" in exercises? :)
                1. rytik32
                  24 May 2021 11: 49
                  +4
                  There are indirect references, even in that quote of Togo, which I gave in the article.
                  Unfortunately, I do not have the full amount of data on Japanese exercises at the beginning of 1905. The fact that there were exercises is known, but there are no details.
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 May 2021 12: 31
                    +1
                    Quote: rytik32
                    There are indirect references, even in that quote of Togo, which I gave in the article

                    Alexey, the whole question is that, as far as I know, squadron firing was not practiced during the exercises :) Accordingly, the maximum that could be practiced there was salvo firing by a single ship, which in no way could prepare the Japanese for such a complex type of hostilities. like shooting many ships at one target :)
                    1. rytik32
                      24 May 2021 18: 05
                      +3
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Alexey, the whole question is that, as far as I know, they did not practice squad-fire during the exercises :)

                      I don't know that either.
                      But this does not mean at all that this did not happen.
                      I do not have complete sources for Japanese teachings.
                      Maybe you have?
                      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 25 May 2021 07: 36
                        +1
                        Quote: rytik32
                        I don't know that either.
                        But this does not mean at all that this did not happen.

                        Since no known source contains a description of such teachings, and there is not even indirect evidence of this, we have no reason to believe that there were any.
                        Shooting on April 25 was conducted from a distance of 1,5-3 km, detachment firing was not conducted (and are they needed, from such and such distances?) Fragmentary data on another shooting of the same Shikishima (4 305-mm projectiles) also does not give suspicion of the Japanese in the practice of squadron shooting.
                      2. rytik32
                        25 May 2021 08: 18
                        +3
                        By the way, in the Japanese instructions there was also a clause providing for the transfer of the distance from the target ship to the next in order (like ours).
                        But there is no information that this was used in Tsushima.
                2. Alexander Asafiev
                  Alexander Asafiev 29 May 2021 14: 42
                  0
                  See 海軍 軍令 部 編 極 秘 海 戦 史, or in the instruction from where the images were taken, there are 300 pages if my memory serves me right. Well, just 日 露 戦 争 特 展 it doesn't hurt to go through
            3. Saxahorse
              Saxahorse 24 May 2021 22: 30
              0
              Quote: rytik32
              Schensnovich wrote directly that until he went into the fire in volleys, he could not distinguish between falls.
              By the way, his fire control technique was quite close to the "new" Japanese

              This is not his method, firing with volleys was practiced even during the pre-war exercises of the 1st TOE. But in a real battle, whoever guessed it, Vitgeft did not seem to pay attention to these issues. And Shchesnovich himself is still a balabol, all praises himself beloved. :)
    2. zenion
      zenion 25 May 2021 18: 15
      +1
      Someone said that earlier the word began with the letter X and there on. Now they write Tsushima.
  • Vladimir_2U
    Vladimir_2U 24 May 2021 05: 18
    +8
    Great article! Thanks to the author.



    When they touched the water, they raised a high column of spray, and when they hit the target, they produced a bright flash and a cloud of black smoke ...
    ... The observation was carried out through telescopes. In order to distinguish the fall of their shells from those of others, two techniques were used.
    First, the moment the shells fell was determined using a special stopwatch.
    Secondly, they practiced visual accompaniment of the flight of their projectile from the moment of the shot to the very fall.
    By the Second World War, the Japanese worked out the explosion smoke of a specific color for each ship of the squadron. There is even a canvas with such a nuance:

    USS Gambier Bay (CVE-73) was a Casablanca-class escort aircraft carrier of the United States Navy. She was sunk at the Battle of Samara ... ... She was the only American aircraft carrier to be sunk by enemy fire during World War II.





    Small black board with chalk notes betrayed by a messenger sailor
    Oh, these Japanese people, they were already using tablets! laughing
  • rytik32
    24 May 2021 07: 08
    +11
    Based on the text of the circulars and orders, Rozhestvensky understood perfectly well that we did not know how to shoot. Most likely, he hoped, based on the experience of combat in the ZhM, that the armor would withstand Japanese shells and most of the squadron would reach Vladivostok.

    He did not expect that the Japanese would change the method of firing and start the battle immediately from an effective distance, which would give a completely different number of hits than in the ZhM.

    It can be clearly seen that the requirement to adjust the fire on falling shells, which was absent in the instructions, appeared as a result of exercises in Madagascar, when the shells flew one by one to nowhere, and the aiming did not change.

    Although Rozhestvensky practiced concentrated shooting at one target in Madagascar, but either the rate of fire was low, or few ships fired at one target, there were no questions about observing the falls of their shells. Now, if questions arose, then our squadron in Tsushima would conduct distributed fire - each ship for its own purpose. If there was still an order for the head to turn 2 rumba away from the enemy, when he goes to the traverse, then at an actual speed of 13 ... 14 knots (yes, I did not seal myself, that is how much, in fact, ours gave in the last phase of the battle) it would be still to compete ...

    Another option was possible: the Borodinians at the maximum speed of the front line to reach a close distance, where the gunners would be hitting with direct fire, and good firing angles would give an advantage, and armor-piercing shells would pierce ... The rest of the squadron should have gone side by side, covering the flank battleship from concentrated enemy fire, i.e. would turn out to be "L-shaped" system. But, as I understand it, this option was rejected due to the fact that it involved heavy damage in close combat, and then there was nowhere to be repaired.
    1. A_Mazkov
      A_Mazkov 24 May 2021 07: 43
      +4
      Good afternoon, Alexey!
      Wonderful article!
      Thank you!
    2. A_Mazkov
      A_Mazkov 25 May 2021 19: 10
      +1
      Most likely, Rozhestvensky was well aware that his squadron also did not know how to coherently maneuver.
      There, the 1st detachment in the head of the 2nd did not work, well, what then is the "L-shaped" system?
      1. rytik32
        25 May 2021 23: 11
        +1
        And here you remember Skrydlov, in which the squadron maneuvered at 14 knots, without breaking up the formation. And the method of shooting Myakishev was developed under him.
        1. A_Mazkov
          A_Mazkov 26 May 2021 00: 06
          +2
          2TOE could not win in those conditions, but there were chances to reduce the damage and maintain combat effectiveness by the morning.
          The course of the battle until 14.40 (the exit of "Prince Suvorov" from the column) is generally strange. It was as if the 2TOE headquarters were in a stupor, and they did not understand what was happening ...
          Even Vitgeft, against the background of Rozhdestvensky, looks "nimble as an electric broom."
          1. rytik32
            26 May 2021 00: 16
            +4
            Quote: A_Mazkov
            2TOE could not win in those conditions, but there were chances to reduce the damage and maintain combat effectiveness by the morning.

            Also I think.
            1. Remove operational overload and combustible materials in Cam Ranh.
            2. In battle, the course is 12 knots.
            3. The lead ship turns away from the enemy by 2 rumba, as soon as he enters the traverse.
            4. To beat not "everything according to Mikasa", but each according to his own goal.

            This would be enough for the squadron to keep everyone except Oslyabi and Suvorov by morning.
    3. unknown
      unknown 25 May 2021 21: 53
      +1
      Stroke 13-14 knots. And this is with a construction overload of 635 tons, an operational overload of hundreds of tons, fouling of the underwater part.
      And if you first get rid of part of the construction overload, namely the thermal insulation of the interior (135 tons), hundreds of tons of boatswain supplies, which are unnecessary in battle, clean the underwater part (especially since the fouling was not so significant and was located in the waterline area) , additionally remove floating craft (which will still be damaged in battle). Then the real move of the first detachment of battleships of the "Borodino" and "Oslyabi" type will be 14-15 knots.
      Which is quite enough to bring the battle into a classic battle of parallel lines of ships. When each ship in a line fires at one enemy ship and fires at one enemy ship. Lack of concentrated fire from the Japanese, fewer hits on Russian ships, less damage to Russian ships. Even in the presence of the same damage that the Japanese ships received in reality, this would make it possible to hold out until dark.
      And if the auxiliary ships are preliminarily directed by a different route, then all cruisers and all destroyers will be additionally involved in a night battle with Japanese destroyers.
      It is not a fact that in this case the Japanese will achieve damage to most of the Russian ships.
      And, therefore, in the morning the Japanese will not resume the battle.
      PS In his monograph on Japanese battleships S.V. Balakin writes that during the RYAV years the battleship "Fuji" did not have a course of more than 15 knots. Taking into account the significant fuel overload with which the Japanese ships entered the Battle of Tsushima, the real move of this OUTDATED battleship did not exceed 14 knots. This means that the entire first Japanese detachment.
      1. rytik32
        25 May 2021 23: 09
        +2
        Quote: ignoto
        In his monograph on Japanese battleships S.V. Balakin writes that during the RYAV years the battleship "Fuji" did not have a course of more than 15 knots. Taking into account the significant fuel overload with which the Japanese ships entered the Battle of Tsushima, the real move of this OUTDATED battleship did not exceed 14 knots. This means that the entire first Japanese detachment.

        I have read both Balakin and other works on the Japanese navy.
        Fuji could not produce 14 knots in the summer and autumn of 1904 due to the wear and tear of the machines. But to Tsushima he was capitalized and the Japanese 1st squad kept 15 knots throughout the battle - this is 100% information from the SSI.

        But on the whole you are right. 15 Japanese knots versus 13-14 of ours, and if we get rid of the overload, then perhaps 14-15 is not an advantage.

        I carefully studied the testimony of our about the speed, and you can immediately see who is lying. Whoever had a deadline for surrender - they lied. And the machinists were downstairs - it is clear that they did not surrender the ship. Therefore, according to their testimony, and "Eagle" in battle gave a maximum of 14,5 knots (if counted in terms of speed), and "Nikolay" 13-14.

        And the Japanese BBO gave 15-16 nodes during tests with the same body and the same boilers and machines without major repairs.
      2. A_Mazkov
        A_Mazkov 25 May 2021 23: 28
        +2
        Well, I was talking about the coherence of the 2 TOE during maneuvering, and not its speed.
        Yes, and having an advantage in speed, Togo could not carry out a quick coverage of the head of the Russian squadron. He also had to maintain a "comfortable" distance.
        If Rozhestvensky began to turn to the right more often after 14.00, then Togo would either have to get closer to the Russians, or just "run" in a large circle, trying to cover the Russian head until dusk.
        In general, Rozhdestvensky's actions are strange, as if he was not ready for a meeting with the Japanese fleet. In any other situation, one would think that he was confused, but this is clearly not the case.
        He knew for sure that the Japanese fleet was ahead, and would soon appear.
      3. Alexander Asafiev
        Alexander Asafiev 29 May 2021 14: 46
        0
        Do not read Russian-language literature on the issue, that's all
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 May 2021 07: 30
    +3
    Well, now - you can answer :)))
    1. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 24 May 2021 12: 45
      +6
      Here, or in a separate article?
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 May 2021 13: 33
        +5
        Quote: Senior Sailor
        Here, or in a separate article?

        Of course, in a separate article, dear Ivan! hi
        1. Trapperxnumx
          Trapperxnumx 24 May 2021 14: 53
          +1
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          Here, or in a separate article?

          Of course, in a separate article, dear Ivan! hi

          we'll wait)
        2. Comrade
          Comrade 27 May 2021 03: 31
          0
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Of course, in a separate article

          Fine !
  • Dimka75
    Dimka75 24 May 2021 08: 07
    +6
    An outlet for quality information on the site. Thank you.
  • Trapperxnumx
    Trapperxnumx 24 May 2021 08: 44
    +5
    Thanks a lot to Alexey for a good article!
    On the training of gunners - as far as I remember, Andrei Kolobov also pointed out that even a three-week break in artillery preparation led to a sharp decrease in the accuracy of fire. And here our squadron has a break of almost 4 months ... I think that in such conditions, the decrease in the accuracy of Russian ships is a natural pattern.
    1. Niko
      Niko 24 May 2021 10: 20
      +3
      Quote: Trapper7
      Thanks a lot to Alexey for a good article!
      On the training of gunners - as far as I remember, Andrei Kolobov also pointed out that even a three-week break in artillery preparation led to a sharp decrease in the accuracy of fire. And here our squadron has a break of almost 4 months ... I think that in such conditions, the decrease in the accuracy of Russian ships is a natural pattern.

      The closer we got to centralized fire CONTROL, the more the class of individual gunners would become unremarkable. The Japanese were closer - the result is immediately obvious, and the point is not in the skill of the gunners, but in the system.
      1. rytik32
        24 May 2021 10: 53
        +4
        Quote: Niko
        The closer one gets to centralized fire CONTROL, the more the class of individual gunners would become less important.

        A lot depends on the gunners too. If they do not know how to make a shot in time, nothing can be done.
        For illustration, in one of Cherkasov's books there is data on the results of the Black Sea Fleet firing at Laibs in 1907-08.
        From 7 ... 8 cabs they fired 268 shells - 0 hits.
        With 4 cab. achieved 2 hits! Accuracy 0,63%.
        1. Niko
          Niko 24 May 2021 11: 59
          +5
          This is clear. It is much easier to get people to load speed and fire a shot on signal, to set the gun according to the numbers on the devices, than to try to train hundreds of gunners who are able to independently solve guidance problems. Hence the result in the Japanese Navy: races in just a few months.
  • Denimax
    Denimax 24 May 2021 11: 33
    +3
    Practical firing was apparently conducted to adjust the volley, the volley must have a certain accuracy in range. The volley was adjusted, the tables were corrected, the ship is ready for battle.
  • iouris
    iouris 24 May 2021 11: 53
    0
    We are talking about the "factors" of the dispersion of artillery shells.
  • faterdom
    faterdom 24 May 2021 12: 16
    +3
    In general, the Japanese were preparing for battle, and our squadron was just going.
    Hoping for ... what?
    For me, the question is still one of seditious: in such a composition, under such a command and such a route ... She could have won? Honestly, I can't imagine if only an extremely lazy and stupid admiral commanded the Japanese, and Togo certainly was not.
    It was a strategic mistake of the leadership of the Empire, which in a big way influenced the tragic course of History, which destroyed it (the Empire).
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 May 2021 12: 38
      +4
      Quote: faterdom
      In general, the Japanese were preparing for battle, and our squadron was just going.

      Such reasoning is a big mistake. The "just marching" squadron spent more shells on preparation during the campaign than the Japanese did during the same time.
      It's just that Alexey writes interestingly
      Unfortunately, information about other large practical firing has not reached us.

      And they did not reach us for a simple reason - they did not exist. As a result, it turns out interesting - "Mikasa" used up 8 305-mm shells on firing during the transition 2TOE. But "Eagle", for example - 40.
      As for barrel firing, they were carried out at 2TOE regularly, according to indirect data, Eagle used up only rifle bullets about 8 thousand Mikasa - 9 thousand rifle cartridges and small-caliber shells
      1. rytik32
        24 May 2021 18: 12
        +3
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        As a result, it turns out interesting - "Mikasa" used up 8 305-mm shells on firing during the transition 2TOE. But "Eagle", for example - 40.

        I have information that the barrel of Shikishima exploded on the 97th shot (11th in Tsushima). If you average the consumption of projectiles in previous battles and shelling, you get an average of 45 shots per barrel. And there will be about 40 shots left for the exercise. It is not enough?
        And other projectiles fired are also experience.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Mikasa - 9 thousand rifle cartridges and small-caliber shells

        This is only 5 days.
        For the rest of the time?
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 25 May 2021 08: 47
          +3
          Quote: rytik32
          I have information that the barrel of Shikishima exploded on the 97th shot (11th in Tsushima). If you average the consumption of projectiles in previous battles and shelling, you get an average of 45 shots per barrel. And there will be about 40 shots left for the exercise. It is not enough?

          Excuse me, but why don't you take into account the pre-war doctrines? And how did you calculate the consumption of shells during the shelling of Port Arthur? Shikishima used at least 151 rounds in battle in WM and on January 27
          Quote: rytik32
          This is only 5 days.
          For the rest of the time?

          for what - the rest? :)
          And they were, these shootings? You write
          So, starting from February 1905, "Mikasa", if there were no other events, conducted two barrel firing a day: in the morning and in the afternoon.

          Can you clarify where you got this data? Because, generally speaking, they contradict common sense. Well, the ship will not go out to sea twice a day to shoot - why?
          1. rytik32
            25 May 2021 09: 05
            +2
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Excuse me, but why don't you take into account the pre-war doctrines? And how did you calculate the consumption of shells during the shelling of Port Arthur? Shikishima used at least 151 rounds in battle in WM and on January 27

            I take everything into account. Consumption data from SSI.
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Can you clarify where you got this data? Because, generally speaking, they contradict common sense. Well, the ship will not go out to sea twice a day to shoot - why?

            From the Mikasy magazine.
            Would you like to post a screen with entries for February 22 as an example? There were 2 shooting.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 25 May 2021 11: 27
              +2
              Quote: rytik32
              I take everything into account. Consumption data from SSI.

              Sorry, but according to your data, it turns out that Sikishima used up 180 shells. Even so, we know that on January 27, he used up 11 shells, and in ZhM - I don't have an exact figure, about 140 or more (together with Fuji - 281 shells, and it is likely that Shikishima shot more than Fuji). Total for all the pre-war firing, for the bombing of Arthur - 29 rounds?
              Quote: rytik32
              From the Mikasy magazine.

              very good, but since you have it, I think it won't be difficult for you to indicate the total number of barrel firing? :)
              1. rytik32
                25 May 2021 12: 58
                +2
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Total for all the pre-war firing, for the bombing of Arthur - 29 rounds?

                No, not so.
                Data on the consumption of shells "Sikishima" in battles and shelling in 1904 is available on the net.

                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                very good, but since you have it, I think it won't be difficult for you to indicate the total number of barrel firing? :)

                The fact of the matter is that it will be.
                The magazine is in Japanese :) But I don't know him.

                For this article, I translated sources through an online translator.
                It is difficult and time consuming.
                But if you want to get to the bottom of the truth, you need to.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 25 May 2021 13: 05
                  0
                  Quote: rytik32
                  No, not so.
                  Data on the consumption of shells "Sikishima" in battles and shelling in 1904 is available on the net.

                  Well, I gave my numbers. Taking into account the data on the consumption of Sikishima that are known to me - 40 "training" shells somehow do not work
                  Quote: rytik32
                  The fact of the matter is that it will be.
                  The magazine is in Japanese :)

                  So great, but where did your phrase come from?
                  So, starting from February 1905, "Mikasa", if there were no other events, conducted two barrel firing a day: in the morning and in the afternoon.

                  If it's not from Mikasa's magazine, then where? Again, it can be assumed that in some cases the ship went out to sea and fired twice (in two exercises, for example), or that it did not go anywhere at all and fired while at anchor.
                  1. rytik32
                    25 May 2021 13: 16
                    +2
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    40 "training" shells somehow do not work

                    Well, I did it!

                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    but where, then, is your phrase

                    From Japanese literature.

                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Again, it can be assumed that in some cases the ship went to sea and fired twice (in two exercises, for example)

                    There are other entries in the journal between the shootings.
                2. Alexander Asafiev
                  Alexander Asafiev 29 May 2021 14: 57
                  0
                  Throw in, I will translate if there is not very much
        2. Comrade
          Comrade 26 May 2021 05: 09
          +1
          Quote: rytik32
          If you average the projectile consumption in previous battles and shelling, you will get an average of 45 rounds per barrel. And there will be about 40 shots for the exercise.

          Dear Alexei, doesn't it seem strange to you that none of the foreign observers in their reports said a word about these "exercises"?
          I think Andrey is absolutely right, information about shooting practice
          did not reach us for a simple reason - they did not exist

          Otherwise, they would not have been ignored by the deathly silence of the British and the Argentine.
          1. rytik32
            26 May 2021 08: 00
            +2
            Dear Valentine, good afternoon!
            Quote: Comrade
            Doesn't it seem strange to you that none of the foreign observers in their reports said a word about these "exercises"?

            No, it doesn’t.
            Firstly, we have at our disposal abbreviated versions of those reports.
            It is possible that the required pages were simply not published.
            Secondly, a great deal escaped the eyes of these observers.
            For example, I describe Tsushima, they did not write about the new method of firing in volleys at all.
            Thirdly, after the appearance of Japanese sources and comparison of information, it turned out that the British were inaccurate in many issues.
    2. unknown
      unknown 25 May 2021 22: 11
      +1
      Normal composition.
      Four newest battleships, full belt at the waterline. Armor Krupp.
      Battleship with 10 "artillery. Belt incomplete. Armor Garvey.
      Battleship with 12 "artillery. The belt is incomplete.
      Armored cruiser with 12 "artillery. The belt is incomplete.
      Two outdated battleships with 12 "artillery.
      Three coastal defense battleships with 10 "artillery.
      Japanese:
      One newest battleship. Armor Krupp.
      Two modern battleships. Garvey armor. (And why is a Japanese harvey better than a Russian harvey?)
      One obsolete battleship. The belt is incomplete. It is so short that when the extremities are flooded, buoyancy is not ensured. The main caliber installations are outdated. Medium-caliber artillery is mostly uncovered by armor. Speed ​​14-15 knots. (REAL).
      Eight QUIET (15-17 knots for a long time, but taking into account a significant overload on fuel?) Armored cruisers with 8 "artillery and light" colonial "shells weighing 93,5 kg.
      A single 10 "weapon won't do the weather.
      Armor of six cruisers - Krupp.
      Two - Harvey of very poor quality (N. Chornovil - abakus).
      1. Senior seaman
        Senior seaman 25 May 2021 22: 30
        +2
        Quote: ignoto
        An armored cruiser with 12 "artillery. The belt is incomplete.

        I'm sorry, what?
    3. hjvtp1966
      hjvtp1966 26 May 2021 09: 34
      0
      [quote = faterdom] In general, the Japanese were preparing for battle, but our squadron was just going.
      Hoping for ... what?
      Taki Rozhestvensky directly indicated in the report of the Investigative Commission:
      7) I expected that the squadron would meet in the Korea Strait or near the concentrated forces of the Japanese fleet, a significant proportion of armored and light cruisers and the entire mine fleet. I was sure that a general battle would take place in the daytime, and, at night, the ships of the squadron would be attacked by all the presence of the Japanese mine fleet. Nevertheless, I could not admit the thought of the complete extermination of the squadron, and, by analogy with the battle on July 28, 1904, I had reason to consider it possible to reach Vladivostok with the loss of several ships.
  • stafford41
    stafford41 24 May 2021 14: 36
    +3
    The author does not report anything about the distance of the battle at Tsushima. And their difference is in the smaller side from those during the battle on July 28, 1904. From a distance of 25 cables, almost every Mikasa projectile will hit Suvorov in the position that Mikasa held relative to Suvorov at the beginning of the Tsushima battle. The Russian position at this time was much less convenient for improving accuracy, which appeared with a decrease in the distance to the Japanese.
    1. rytik32
      24 May 2021 16: 58
      +5
      Quote: Stafford41
      The author does not report anything about the distance of the battle at Tsushima. And their difference is downward from those during the battle on July 28, 1904.

      Your remark is correct.
      Quote: Stafford41
      From a distance of 25 cables, almost every Mikasa projectile will hit Suvorov in the position that Mikasa held relative to Suvorov at the beginning of the Tsushima battle.

      At the end of the battle in ZhM, Tsesarevich and Retvizan were approximately at the same distance from the enemy, but neither huge fires, nor many holes in the side, nor massively withdrawn artillery, nor "you can not raise your head" were observed on them.
      This confirms the sharply increased accuracy of Japanese shooting towards Tsushima.
      Quote: Stafford41
      The Russian position at this time was much less convenient for improving accuracy, which appeared with a decrease in the distance to the Japanese.

      In general, I agree with you
      1. unknown
        unknown 25 May 2021 22: 24
        0
        Or maybe not accuracy? And the use of high-explosive shells of a new type? The mythical Shimose can be ignored. One of the most competent commentators on this site, once wrote that there is information on American sites that these shells were made in Sweden.
        This is more like the truth.
        Plus combustible thermal insulation of the interior and huge deposits of caked coal dust.
        Japan's long history is fake. The real story began in the middle of the nineteenth century.
        More precisely, since 1867. Before the start of the RJAV, only 37 years old. During this time, create from scratch a country, industry, people (from the Polynesian and Macronesian tribes), a language, teach this language to ALL the population. Not funny.
  • stafford41
    stafford41 24 May 2021 18: 00
    +2
    Quote: rytik32

    At the end of the battle in ZhM, Tsesarevich and Retvizan were approximately at the same distance from the enemy, but neither huge fires, nor many holes in the side, nor massively withdrawn artillery, nor "you can not raise your head" were observed on them.


    Well, by that time the Japanese had been shooting for more than 4 hours and were simply tired. In addition, they began to limit the rate of fire and the requirements for saving ammunition, since it became obvious that the battle would continue the next day. And finally, the Russian return fire also contributed to the decrease in the effectiveness of Japanese shooting in the Yellow Sea. Mikasa lost half of the 305 mm guns, and the Japanese also had artillery losses. All this together reduced the number of hits in the Russians in absolute terms. Although Japanese accuracy (percentage of hits) increased with decreasing distance, the Russians received the maximum number of Japanese shells per unit of time during this period. Perhaps Togo had come out at the very beginning of the battle on July 28, 1904 at a distance of 25 cables, and the Japanese would have already demonstrated the Tsushima hail of hits.

    Quote: rytik32
    This confirms the sharply increased accuracy of Japanese shooting towards Tsushima.


    In no way, without challenging your thesis about the increased accuracy of Japanese shooting in Tsushima relative to other battles of the Russo-Japanese War, I note that this fact has other explanations, besides those given in your article. And this explanation is by no means exhausted by the facts of the high preparedness of the Japanese camendors and good materiel at their disposal, which certainly took place. Also very important, in my opinion, was the role of Admiral Togo in the position from which the Japanese gunners shot the Russians. And from what position the Russians were shooting at the Japanese. You can do a thought experiment. Would the result of the Tsushima battle have changed if the Russian and Japanese squadrons had exchanged their gunners?
    1. rytik32
      24 May 2021 22: 40
      +3
      Quote: Stafford41
      Also very important, in my opinion, was the role of Admiral Togo in the position from which the Japanese gunners shot the Russians. And from what position the Russians were shooting at the Japanese. You can do a thought experiment. Would the result of the Tsushima battle have changed if the Russian and Japanese squadrons had exchanged their gunners?

      I do not argue.
      In my hierarchy of reasons for Tsushima, this is # 2.
      The initial phase of the battle was blurred by Rozhdestvensky.
      First, an unfinished lane change maneuver.
      15 minutes after the start - almost "stick over T". "Mikasa" comes out of the firing of stern guns.
      Then a fight on parallel courses, but Mikasa was far ahead, and our head was under concentrated fire ...

      Togo's loop maneuver was very well thought out and tied to artillery.
      Its meaning was to quickly pass long distances, at which the Russians had an advantage in the main guns and to introduce the SK into the case.
      1. not main
        not main 25 May 2021 00: 05
        +1
        Quote: rytik32
        The initial phase of the battle was blurred by Rozhdestvensky.

        So I have a question! (I'm not naval, from the word at all, but I'm interested in the topic), so actually the question: what if (I understand that this is a subjunctive), let's say, a miracle happened! And during the turn of the Japanese squadron (sequentially), 2TE made (would) turn "all of a sudden" to meet the Japanese! Or two or three rumba sequentially to the left? It seems to me that worse is no longer possible, and in case of success, Rozhestvensky could become on a par with Nakhimov, Ushakov, Kornilov and many others !!! But lack of initiative in battle is punished with defeat! Correct me naval. Please do not kick too much, but try to explain ...
        1. A_Mazkov
          A_Mazkov 25 May 2021 18: 58
          +1
          Well, another option could be applied, a simpler one.
          First, increase the speed of the 1st detachment, then give the command "2 and 3 to the wake of the 1st", and only then turn the 1st detachment "slightly" to the left, by the same 1 or 2 rumba.
          Such a maneuver is incomparably easier to execute.
          That, too, would have to invent something on the fly, and it is not a fact that this "something" would be more successful than a loop.
          1. not main
            not main 25 May 2021 21: 55
            0
            Quote: A_Mazkov
            Well, another option could be applied, a simpler one.
            First, increase the speed of the 1st detachment, then give the command "2 and 3 to the wake of the 1st", and only then turn the 1st detachment "slightly" to the left, by the same 1 or 2 rumba.
            Such a maneuver is incomparably easier to execute.
            That, too, would have to invent something on the fly, and it is not a fact that this "something" would be more successful than a loop.

            Thanks for the answer and the clarification!
            1. A_Mazkov
              A_Mazkov 25 May 2021 23: 36
              +1
              For your proposed maneuvers you need:
              A) Speed,
              B) The ability of the squadron to maneuver smoothly.
              Rozhestvensky clearly doubted both "A" and "B".
      2. unknown
        unknown 25 May 2021 22: 36
        +2
        Where does the installation come from that the medium caliber has become the main one?
        Based on the experience of the Sino-Japanese War?
        And if you think about it?
        Chinese ships, with the exception of two battleships, had a displacement of 1300 tons to 2900 tons. These are, in fact, either gunboats (for nothing they were called cruisers), or cruisers of the third class maximum.
        Suliga, in his monograph on Japanese heavy cruisers, in the introduction writes that the Japanese evaluated the Russian cruisers with a displacement of 6000 tons somewhat differently.
        Their light (displacement) cruisers had not only poor seaworthiness, but also low combat stability precisely due to their low displacement.
        So don't overestimate the average caliber. Especially 6 ".
        1. Kayuk
          Kayuk 31 May 2021 17: 00
          0
          Where does the installation come from that the medium caliber has become the main one?

          I agree with you. If the SK had shown itself so well in this battle, the Dreadnought, which entered service next year, would have been armed with a main battery in the form of a couple of hundred 152mm. laughing
    2. unknown
      unknown 25 May 2021 22: 26
      0
      More precisely, the superiority in speed, which the Japanese did not technically possess, and which Rozhestvensky gave them.
  • Mooh
    Mooh 24 May 2021 19: 16
    +3
    Brilliant dilogy. Everything is logical, everything is justified. A lot of new things about the organization of fire control in squadrons. Let's see what the respected AiCh has to say. By the tone of the comments, I suppose that he will not challenge the logic, but the facts on which the constructions of the respected author are based. The more interesting is the response article for the readers.
  • Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 24 May 2021 20: 41
    +1
    senior artillery officer or ship captain

    Semyon Semyonich ... (diamond hand :))
    In general, the thought often crossed my mind, why not practice barrel firing on the move in the second squadron, as was done on the "Tsarevich" and "Bayan", during their transition to Port Arthur?
    On the other hand, these ships did not demonstrate any phenomenal accuracy in battles ...
    1. rytik32
      24 May 2021 22: 42
      +3
      Quote: Senior Sailor
      On the other hand, these ships did not demonstrate any phenomenal accuracy in battles ...

      Too much time has passed before real battles ...
      forgotten
      By the way, those Japanese shooting, about which the plate, was carried out in pairs like "Bayan" and "Tsarevich".
  • Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 24 May 2021 22: 47
    +2
    Quote: rytik32
    Although Rozhdestvensky practiced concentrated shooting at one target in Madagascar, but either the rate of fire was low, or few ships fired at one target, there were no questions about observing the falls of their shells.

    There were three targets in Madagascar. But Nebogatov's detachment was not there, i.e. three targets for 8 ships. And the rate of fire was really very low, no one fired with volleys or rapid fire, strictly in turn. Each gun was tested separately.
  • Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 24 May 2021 22: 58
    +1
    The article as a whole is wonderful, many thanks to the author! Quite simply, point by point, the differences in matters of preparation and fire control are described. It is very interesting to compare the method of fire control in battle for the battle in the Yellow Sea and for the battle of Tsushima. It turns out that the Japanese made a real breakthrough, competently summarizing the experience of battles with the Russian fleet. Unfortunately, the attempts of our officers to draw similar conclusions from clashes with the enemy essentially disappeared in vain.
  • Usher
    Usher 24 May 2021 23: 43
    -1
    As a child, I read a book about the battleship Potemkin. The book described the Russian fleet in general, trends and all that. And the experience gained after the Russo-Japanese War. And as far as I remember, there was a brigade of battleships at the World Cup, which worked out the shooting so much that it "laid down" targets at the limit of the distance, from the third volley.
    1. Trapperxnumx
      Trapperxnumx 25 May 2021 10: 23
      +3
      Quote: Usher
      at the World Cup there was a brigade of battleships, which worked out the shooting so much that it "laid down" targets at the limit of the distance, from the third salvo.

      Panteleimon hit Goeben from a distance of 100 cab. Indicator however)
      True, this happened much later than Tsushima, when all the conclusions had already been drawn.
      1. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 25 May 2021 23: 10
        +1
        Quote: Trapper7
        Panteleimon hit Goeben from a distance of 100 cab. Indicator however)

        Uh .. Panteleimon? If you are talking about the battle at Cape Sarych, then Panteleimon did not open fire at all. Eustathius got in. Once. All the other battleships of the brigade thrashed in the white light as a pretty penny, confusing the distance twice. And the distance of the beginning of the battle is 32-40 kbl.

        As you have not guessed at all.
        1. rytik32
          26 May 2021 00: 04
          +4
          As I understood the speech about the battle at the Bosphorus
        2. Trapperxnumx
          Trapperxnumx 26 May 2021 16: 12
          +1
          Quote: Saxahorse
          Quote: Trapper7
          Panteleimon hit Goeben from a distance of 100 cab. Indicator however)

          Uh .. Panteleimon? If you are talking about the battle at Cape Sarych, then Panteleimon did not open fire at all. Eustathius got in. Once. All the other battleships of the brigade thrashed in the white light as a pretty penny, confusing the distance twice. And the distance of the beginning of the battle is 32-40 kbl.

          As you have not guessed at all.

          This is in the battle at the Bosphorus. So I quite "guessed" myself)
          1. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 26 May 2021 22: 39
            +1
            You are right, I forgot about the Bosphorus. However, there are also questions about the accuracy of ours. Eustathius's detachment led the zeroing in accordance with all the rules, and again every single shell was missed. And Panteleimon offhand gave three volleys, barely catching up with the detachment, and all came out as cover. Something was still wrong with the shooting rules at the Black Sea Fleet.
  • Comrade
    Comrade 26 May 2021 04: 35
    +3
    in early 1904, Japan purchased 100 of these rangefinders.
    Thus, in the Battle of Tsushima, all Japanese ships of the battle line had at least two Barr & Stroud rangefinders of the FA3 model.

    Dear Alexey, with your permission, a little clarification.
    In January 1904 Japan through the London office of the Japanese company Takata & Co not purchased, and ordered 100 rangefinders FA 3.
    The deliveries of this batch, rangefinders for which still had to be manufactured, dragged on in time, and ended in the summer of 1905. How much FA 3 was received by the Japanese before the Battle of Tsushima is not known exactly.
    Here is a photo of the explanatory plate for the rangefinder from the Mikasa Museum (opens on "click"), the text of which says that near Togo during the Battle of Tsushima Ensign Kyoshi Hasegawa served the FA 2.


    The Japanese ships were equipped with electromechanical devices "Barr & Stroud", which transmitted distance and commands from the conning tower to artillery officers.

    Each Japanese battleship had four such systems. On armored cruisers - two or three.

    To your question about the number of rangefinders ordered by the GUKiS after the start of the Russian-Japanese war
    Quote: rytik32
    Valentine, can you ask about the source of this data?

    I answer.
    There are two sources, Russian and English, both call the number 28 :
    1) R. M. Melnikov "Cruiser" Varyag ""
    2) Range and Vision. The first hundred years of Barr and Stroud.
    The last source says that after Rozhestvensky left, we consistently received two more batches of rangefinders (thanks to Mr. Basil Zakharov), specific figures are given, and they differ from yours.
    1. rytik32
      26 May 2021 08: 17
      +3
      Quote: Comrade
      How much FA 3 was received by the Japanese before the Battle of Tsushima is not known exactly.

      I have information from "Armourclad fuso to kongo class battlecruisers".

      Quote: Comrade
      Here is a photo of the explanatory plate for the rangefinder from the Mikasa Museum

      Everything is messed up there. MK2 is an electromechanical transmitter model. And on "Mikas" now there is a rangefinder FA3.

      Quote: Comrade
      Each Japanese battleship had four such systems. On armored cruisers - two or three.

      Not certainly in that way. There was only one system, but there were probably as many receiving devices as you say. For comparison, there were much more such devices on Borodino (in each turret, in batteries of 75-mm guns, etc.).

      Quote: Comrade
      There are two sources, Russian and English, both call the number 28

      Do these sources include delivery dates?
      The fact is that in the circulars, some of the rangefinders are referred to as already installed, some as in stock, and some as planned for delivery. And it is possible that this delivery could be delayed or broken.
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 27 May 2021 03: 16
        +1
        Hello, Alexey!
        Quote: rytik32
        I have information from "Armourclad fuso to kongo class battlecruisers".

        It not correct.
        At the beginning of 1904, Barr & Stroud did not physically have a hundred ready-made and not contracted FA 3s, this is fiction. Please note in our in reality, the delivery of one hundred such instruments to the Japanese navy took one and a half year.

        Quote: rytik32
        Everything is messed up there. MK2 is an electromechanical transmitter model. And on "Mikas" now there is a rangefinder FA3.

        Alas, dear colleague, your assumption is wrong.
        Mk2 (Mark II) is the designation for an improved rangefinder that went into production in 1895 and is also known as the FA 2.
        This is a well-known fact, confirmation of which can be found, for example, in the following sources.
        1) "Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland: The Question of Fire Control":
        By 1901, Barr & Stroud instruments, mainly the improved Mark II, otherwise FA2, were in full service, though they were inadequate at long range, and, since 1899, the Admiralty had been attempting to procure a more accurate rangefinder. In 1903, Barr & Stroud introduced a new 41/2-foot model, the FA3

        2) "Range and Vision. The first hundred years of Barr and Stroud".
        Everything is detailed here. By the way, the photo caption literally says the following
        FA Mark 2.
        Thus, there is nothing in the text on the plate. not confused. In the Battle of Tsushima, on a bridge near Togo, the distance was determined using MK 2 aka FA 2.
        Of course, this does not mean that the Japanese did not have FA 3 at all.

        Quote: rytik32
        Not certainly in that way. There was only one system, but there were most likely as many receiving devices as you say

        Sorry, yesterday your humble servant inadvertently made a mistake, after a busy day I read the wrong paragraph.
        You are right, there was only one system, but there were much more receiving devices. The battleships had target indicators and distance indicators, in total thirty three device.

        Quote: rytik32
        For comparison, there were much more such devices on Borodino.

        How much exactly?
        Quote: rytik32
        Do these sources include delivery dates?

        Twenty-eight rangefinders were delivered in one batch to St. Petersburg in October 1904.

        Quote: rytik32
        a great deal escaped the eyes of these observers.
        For example, I describe Tsushima, they did not write about the new method of firing in volleys at all.

        Do you think this technique assumes the same shot rate for all guns?

        Quote: rytik32
        after the appearance of Japanese sources and comparison of information, it turned out that the British were inaccurate in many issues.

        Dear colleague, it's not about whether the British were accurate or not, it's about the fact that only one training caliber shooting is described in the entire collection of reports.
        There are no others, albeit with incorrect data.
        1. rytik32
          27 May 2021 08: 28
          +1
          Dear Valentine, good afternoon!
          Quote: Comrade
          Mk2 (Mark II) is the designation for an improved rangefinder that went into production in 1895 and is also known as the FA 2.

          The F in the name of the rangefinder means the product type "rangefinder"
          A - base 4,5 feet
          2/3 - serial number of model / modification
          So "Mk2 (Mark II)" is some kind of alternative marking

          Quote: Comrade
          How much exactly?

          In every plutong. More precisely, I did not count.

          Quote: Comrade
          Twenty-eight rangefinders were delivered in one batch to St. Petersburg in October 1904.

          According to the circulars, it turns out that in August 14 rangefinders were already installed on ships and 19 were in storage.

          Quote: Comrade
          Do you think this technique assumes the same ammunition consumption for all guns?

          Not necessary. Zeroing could be carried out with one barrel. There could be weapons failures, incl. temporary.

          Quote: Comrade
          Dear colleague, it's not about whether the British were accurate or not, it's about the fact that only one training caliber shooting is described in the entire collection of reports.
          There are no others, albeit with incorrect data.

          In Japanese sources, even this shooting is not (((
          1. Comrade
            Comrade 28 May 2021 03: 56
            0
            Hello, Alexey!

            Quote: rytik32
            The F in the name of the rangefinder means the product type "rangefinder"
            A - 4,5 feet base 2/3 - serial number of model / modification
            So "Mk2 (Mark II)" is some kind of alternative marking


            В our In reality, the letter "A" meant that this rangefinder was ordered by the Admiralty.
            By the way, sometimes the Mark II model was converted into the Mark III model.
            In the photo, rangefinder No. 174, made in 1898.

            The arrow points to the metal plate.

            Pay attention to the inscription on the metal plate attached to the rangefinder. See, it says there
            Rangefinder No. 174
            Mark II converted to Mark III

            This is the official, factory name, or, if you prefer, the marking of this instrument.
            No FA... I didn't even upload a photo with the signature FA Mark 2, already specially made for you, so that there would be no opportunity to accuse the authors of "Range and Vision. The first hundred years of Barr and Stroud" in ignorance.
            The factory label with the official name of the rangefinder looks more convincing.

            Later, when the number of types of Barr & Stroud rangefinders increased, letters ("A", "Q", "T", "X") and indicate the number to designate the model.

            Once I wrote a small article on the topic of Russian-Japanese rangefinders, I planned to post it on a popular website.
            But after my previous article "Firing practice of the battleship" Mikasa "in the spring of 1905" nobody was interested there, I decided that the topic of rangefinders would not be interesting to anyone either.
            And only seven years later, you and several other members of the forum left your comments there.


            Quote: rytik32
            According to the circulars, it turns out that in August 14 rangefinders were already installed on ships and 19 were in storage.

            Data from Barr & Stroud suggests that the rangefinders were shipped to Russia in the second half of September.
            The total amount you have is 33, but in fact it was ordered and received 28.
            28 pointed out R. M. Melnikov, who could not read about it in "Range and Vision. The first hundred years of Barr and Stroud", since this book has not yet been written.
            And when this book was published, there we saw the same 28 rangefinders.
            Everyone makes a conclusion for himself.
            1. rytik32
              28 May 2021 08: 28
              0
              Quote: Comrade
              In our reality, the letter "A" meant that this rangefinder was ordered by the Admiralty.

              Has the Admiralty ordered an FQ?
              Quote: Comrade
              No FA.


              Please: FA

              Quote: Comrade
              The factory label with the official name of the rangefinder looks more convincing.

              Is there a photo of the same Mikasa rangefinder tag?

              Quote: Comrade
              Data from Barr & Stroud suggests that the rangefinders were shipped to Russia in the second half of September.

              Circular 155 of August 10 has the lines "In addition to 14 rangefinders already accepted on ships"

              Once again, the information from the book "Range and Vision. The first hundred years of Barr and Stroud" does not match other sources.
              This time the circular is a much more accurate and important source. Therefore, I had objective doubts about the information contained in "Range and Vision. The first hundred years of Barr and Stroud"
              1. Comrade
                Comrade 29 May 2021 05: 18
                0
                Hello, Alexey!

                Quote: rytik32
                Has the Admiralty ordered an FQ?

                Admiralty them also ordered.

                Quote: rytik32
                Please: FA

                Let me draw your attention to the fact that the official name of the rangefinder from the advertising illustration you have posted is FT 4


                Quote: rytik32
                Is there a photo of the same Mikasa rangefinder tag?

                I do not have.

                Quote: rytik32
                Once again, the information from the book "Range and Vision. The first hundred years of Barr and Stroud" does not match other sources. This time the circular is a much more accurate and important source.


                1) The book you condemn was written by request the firm Barr & Stroud for the centenary of this firm, at the end of it - twelve pages in small print with a list of archival sources used in writing the book.
                The bibliography takes one more page.
                2) This book says that after the start of the Russo-Japanese War, Russia ordered 28 rangefinders (later two more orders were made, details are given).
                3) This book says that a batch of 28 rangefinders was delivered to Russia in early October 1904.
                4) You declare (without source indication) that there were much more Barr & Stroud rangefinders
                Quote: rytik32
                sold as many as 47 units in 1904 and put them on 2TOE ships

                6) I can upload photos from two books (Soviet and English), where it is said that 28 rangefinders were ordered, and you, as proof that rangefinders were delivered in much larger quantities, and not in the fall, but in the summer, provide information from the "circular", the scanned image of which should be presented not you can.

                Output.
                The information of the Soviet historian R.M.Melnikov and two English historians Michael Moss and Iain Russell does not correspond to the information from a certain Word document that has the name "Circular No. 121 dated August 3, 1904".
                Therefore, you and
                Quote: rytik32
                there were objective doubts about the information contained in "Range and Vision. The first hundred years of Barr and Stroud"
                1. rytik32
                  29 May 2021 08: 31
                  0
                  Valentine, good afternoon!
                  Quote: Comrade
                  Let me draw your attention to the fact that the official name of the rangefinder from the advertising illustration you posted is FT 4

                  This is the length of the base :)
                  Quote: Comrade
                  4) You declare (without attribution) that there were many more Barr & Stroud rangefinders

                  I pointed out the source: the circulars 2TOE and even in the last topic made a tablet.

                  Quote: Comrade
                  I can post photos from two books (Soviet and English), where it says that 28 rangefinders were ordered, and you, as proof that rangefinders were delivered in much larger quantities, and not in the fall, but in the summer, give information from the "circular" whose scanned image you cannot present.

                  So no one argues with the fact that 28 were ordered. The question is whether there have been orders for 2TOEs before these 28 rangefinders.

                  Valentin, I honestly expected to hear your objections not on rangefinders. Indeed, in my article, I stated two important points that were the subject of our heated discussions earlier:
                  1. The accuracy achieved by the Japanese in previous battles cannot be taken as a basis for assessing accuracy in Tsushima, because the Japanese radically changed the method of firing.
                  2. According to a Japanese source, in the first 6 minutes of the battle, the Japanese achieved more hits in Suvorov than the Russians in Mikasa in 15 minutes. And this data makes you think about the number of hits. Gribovsky's data already seem to be strongly underestimated.
                  1. Comrade
                    Comrade 30 May 2021 02: 37
                    0
                    Hello, Alexey!
                    Quote: rytik32
                    It's base length

                    Please tell me why you decided so?

                    Quote: rytik32
                    I pointed out the source: the circulars 2TOE and even in the last topic made a tablet.

                    No offense, Alexey, but I will only take the data from the circular seriously after seeing its scanned image.

                    Quote: rytik32
                    The question is, were there any orders for 2TOEs before these 28 rangefinders?

                    Did not have.
                    After it was, during the Russian-Japanese, two more orders were placed.

                    Quote: rytik32
                    In my article, I stated two important points that were the subject of our heated discussions earlier:
                    1. The accuracy achieved by the Japanese in previous battles cannot be taken as a basis for assessing accuracy in Tsushima, because the Japanese radically changed the method of firing.


                    Not so long ago, you held the opposite point of view.
                    To begin with, let's say that the accuracy of Japanese fire in the Tsushima tie could not be worse than in the Yellow Sea, that is, 10% for a 305 mm.
                    But we have not taken into account the objective factors affecting the accuracy of the Japanese. These are gunmen full of strength and serviceable devices (the beginning of the battle), this is a noticeably shorter battle distance in Tsushima, this is accumulated experience. Can it be assumed that these factors allowed the Japanese to be 1,5 times more accurate than in the Yellow Sea and thus reach at least 30 hits - the minimum of the estimated values? I think you can!


                    Quote: rytik32
                    2. According to a Japanese source, in the first 6 minutes of the battle, the Japanese achieved more hits in Suvorov than the Russians in Mikasa in 15 minutes.

                    Very interesting.
                    Wouldn't it bother you to list the time and calibers of the shells hit by "Prince Suvorov"?
                    1. rytik32
                      30 May 2021 09: 14
                      0
                      Quote: Comrade
                      Please tell me why you decided so?

                      This is a common abbreviation!

                      Quote: Comrade
                      Not so long ago, you held the opposite point of view.

                      Then I myself have not yet investigated the issue in detail, so let this message be included in the word "experience", since the new technique is just the result of the processing of the experience of the battle in the GM.
                      Quote: Comrade
                      Very interesting.
                      Wouldn't it bother you to list the time and calibers of the shells hit by "Prince Suvorov"?

                      See the diagram for yourself. There is a timeline there.
                      "Big" clouds are HA hits (12 dm, 6 pcs), small ones - SC (6 dm, 17 pcs).
                      1. Comrade
                        Comrade 31 May 2021 03: 14
                        0
                        Hello, Alexey!
                        Quote: rytik32
                        This is a common abbreviation!

                        This is an abbreviation, just in this leaflet there are no dots after the letters, this circumstance has misled you.
                        Here is a photo of the token from the rangefinder FT 4 (it cannot be ruled out that there FT 6 - the text was composed illiterately). You see, after the letters "F" and "T" there are dots (photo opens on click). Likewise in the drawings of rangefinders.

                        The red line underlines the official name of the rangefinder, to the right you can see the size bases, he was 80 centimeters.


                        Quote: rytik32
                        See the diagram for yourself. There is a timeline there.
                        "Big" clouds are hits from GC (12 dm, 6 pcs)


                        Got it, thanks, figured out what's what.
                        Let us assume for a moment that the Japanese observers were not mistaken, although the experience of domestic observers, who "saw" hits where they have never been, and also "saw" mutually exclusive things, forces us to treat the observations of observers critically.
                        For example, Schensnovich insists that "Mikasa" fired from main battery guns until the end of the battle (he personally saw), and Lutonin claims the opposite.

                        If we assume that the first eight minutes of the Tsushima battle on "Prince Suvorov" were fired by three Japanese battleships, then the six 12 '' shells that hit the Russian flagship in six of those eight minutes do not make much of an impression.
                        You compare these six hits in six minutes with the hits of Russian shells in fifteen minutes.
                        I think it is correct to compare Japanese shooting not with Russian, but with Japanese, you are trying to prove that the Japanese fired much better in the Tsushima battle than in the battle at Cape Shantung.

                        So let's compare, but first, a few facts.
                        "Shikishima" - 17:20 Russian time one of the bow barbette guns went out of order.
                        "Asahi" - 17:27 Russian time, both guns of the stern barbet installation were out of order.
                        "Mikasa" - 17:15 Russian time, both guns of the stern barbet installation were out of order.
                        In total, of the sixteen 12 '' guns, eleven remained in the ranks, how many of them fired at the Tsarevich is unknown.

                        Nevertheless, the accuracy of the shooting was so accurate that, as stated in Emelin's article "The flagship was out of order"
                        At about 17 o'clock a high-explosive shell of a large caliber pierced the deck and exploded in a bakery. Soon, at intervals of several minutes, the battleship was hit by two 305-mm shells. The first hit the foremast 0,7 m above the deck of the forward lower bridge, interrupting it by 9/10 of the diameter (see diagram, pos. 11). The second, walking a couple of meters closer to the stern, broke through the bed nets and exploded in the air in front of the radio room.


                        There is also other information, for example, in Polomoshnov's book "The Battle of July 28, 1904" it is said that at 17:37 - 17:40 two 12 '' shells hit the "Tsarevich". And around 17:45 - two more 12 '' shells hit, successively hitting both chimneys.

                        As you can see, the frequency of 12 '' shells hitting the "Tsarevich" in some episodes is comparable to that achieved when the Tsushima battle started in "Prince Suvorov".
                        By the way, at least twelve 12 '' guns could fire on "Prince Suvorov", and a maximum of eleven on "Tsarevich".
                        Perhaps I am wrong here, if so, you will correct me.
                        And for contrast, a couple of words. On "Prince Suvorov" they fired still fresh, and on "Tsarevich" - already tired gunners.

                        All this, colleague, private, occasional cases of particularly well-aimed shooting, and no reasons to draw far-reaching conclusions on their basis.
                      2. rytik32
                        31 May 2021 18: 10
                        0
                        Valentine, good afternoon!
                        Quote: Comrade
                        Here is a photo of the tag from the FT 4 rangefinder.

                        FT 4 is a separate model, that's right

                        Quote: Comrade
                        Let us assume for a moment that the Japanese observers were not mistaken, although the experience of domestic observers, who "saw" hits where they have never been, and also "saw" mutually exclusive things, forces us to treat the observations of observers critically.

                        It is clear from the article that the Japanese method of fire control required that the number of undershoots / hits / flights of each salvo be known. Therefore, there is nothing supernatural in this information.

                        Quote: Comrade
                        By the way, at least twelve 12 '' guns could fire on "Prince Suvorov"

                        Only eight: Mikasa and Asahi.
                        Quote: Comrade
                        All these, colleague, are special, episodic cases of especially well-aimed shooting, and there is no reason to draw far-reaching conclusions based on them.

                        Valentine, all the facts add up to one big picture:
                        1. In those six minutes, 23 shells hit "Suvorov", but it has not received significant damage yet. Exactly the same picture was on the battleships 1TOE with a commensurate number of hits.
                        2. The peak of hits was at 14:40 (yap): from the smoke of explosions of shells "Suvorov" even disappeared from view. Was there something like that in WM? This indicates a much greater accuracy of Japanese fire in Tsushima than in ZhM.
                        3. The data of Kostenko / Shvede about about 40 hits with a caliber of 12-8 dm (in the later version of Kostenko) and about 100 6-dm no longer look fantastic. By the way, I have a Japanese damage report for the Eagle in English and even a few previously unknown photos of the damage. And there is a hit in the bow tower.
                        4. Eyewitness testimonies that "the head could not be raised" or "the deck was covered in yellow smoke from exploding shells" also indicate a very high hit rate. There was no such thing in the FM.
                      3. Comrade
                        Comrade 1 June 2021 04: 57
                        0
                        Hello, Alexey!
                        Quote: rytik32
                        It is clear from the article that the Japanese method of fire control required that the number of undershoots / hits / flights of each salvo be known. Therefore, there is nothing supernatural in this information.

                        N. von Essen in an article devoted to the participation of the battleship "Sevastopol" in the battle at Cape Shantung, published in the collection "Society of Zealots of Military Knowledge", claimed that he personally observed 12 '' shells fired by "Sevastopol" hit the battleship "Mikasa" ... I have repeatedly held the collection in my hands, it is in one of the scientific libraries of Ukraine.
                        I don’t remember the exact figure for the range of years, but it was about no less than ten hits of 12 ”shells from Sevastopol alone.
                        One can also recall the Japanese destroyers "sunk" by the cruisers "Varyag" and "Askold".
                        I do not question the figures you are proposing from Japanese observers, I am only explaining why they should be treated with large caution. Moreover, you yourself somehow laid out an excerpt from one of the English reports, where it is said that the visibility was so bad that it was difficult even to count the Russian ships.
                        It turns out that visibility prevented the Englishman from counting ships, but did not prevent the Japanese from observing the flight of shells and fixing their hits?

                        .
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Only eight: Mikasa and Asahi

                        Thanks for the clarification, in that case we will try to clarify the "Tsarevich" as well.
                        According to the "Description of military operations at sea", the fire of the Japanese battleships in the period of the battle of interest to us was distributed as follows.

                        "Mikasa" - two 12 '' guns in service.
                        He fired at "Retvizan" and "Victory".
                        "Asahi" - two 12 '' guns in service.
                        He fired at the "Tsarevich" and "Sevastopol".
                        "Fuji" - four guns in service.
                        He fired at "Retvizan", "Victory", "Peresvet" and "Sevastopol"
                        "Shikishima" - three 12 '' guns in service.
                        He fired at Sevastopol, Retvizan and Tsarevich.



                        Thus, out of eleven serviceable 12 'guns, the "Tsarevich" could fire five 12 '' guns (battleships "Asahi" and "Shikishima"). And so they hit the Tsarevich at 17:37 - 17:40 with two 12 '' shells. And around 17:45 - two more 12 '' shells.
                        By the way, Melnikov writes that the first two 12 '' shells hit the "Tsesarevich" almost simultaneously, within one minute.
                        If this is the case, then the Japanese had accuracy at that moment. above, as demonstrated by the shooters of "Prince Suvorov" "Mikasa" and "Asahi".
                        The last of the eight guns had six hits in six minutes, while the Asahi and Shikishima of the five guns had two hits in one minute.


                        Quote: rytik32
                        Kostenko / Shvede's data on about 40 hits with a caliber of 12-8 dm (in the later version of Kostenko) and about 100 6-dm no longer look fantastic.


                        Doesn't look.
                        Get forty two 12 '' shells (information 1955 Mr.), but at the same time keep the course, both pipes, both masts and not even fail - this is very daring and very stupid alternative.
                      4. rytik32
                        1 June 2021 23: 09
                        0
                        Valentine, good afternoon!
                        Quote: Comrade
                        It turns out that visibility prevented the Englishman from counting ships, but did not prevent the Japanese from observing the flight of shells and fixing their hits?

                        The Japanese observers were on fore-mars and a good telescope, unlike the British.
                        Quote: Comrade
                        And so they hit the Tsarevich at 17:37 - 17:40 with two 12 '' shells. And around 17:45 - two more 12 '' shells.
                        By the way, Melnikov writes that the first two 12 '' shells hit the "Tsesarevich" almost simultaneously, within one minute.

                        These are just successful volleys or successive shots from one tower on one tip.

                        Quote: Comrade
                        this is a very cocky and very stupid alternative

                        Now I have skimmed the Japanese report (I could be wrong) and it turned out to be 11 12-dm and up to 12 8-dm (some may be 6-dm).
                        However, this report did not record armor hits.
  • Andrey152
    Andrey152 26 May 2021 06: 30
    0
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    As a result, it turns out interesting - "Mikasa" used up 8 305-mm shells on firing during the transition 2TOE. But "Eagle", for example - 40.
    As for barrel firing, they were carried out at 2TOE regularly, according to indirect data, Eagle used up only rifle bullets about 8 thousand Mikasa - 9 thousand rifle cartridges and small-caliber shells

    Andrey, what was the accuracy of the shooting in our practice shooting?
  • Andrey152
    Andrey152 26 May 2021 07: 14
    +1
    Quote: ignoto
    Where does the installation come from that the medium caliber has become the main one?


    Klado "Modern naval artillery" 1903 unequivocally says that medium caliber is our main

    1. Kayuk
      Kayuk 31 May 2021 17: 16
      0
      Klado "Modern naval artillery" 1903 unequivocally says that medium caliber is our main

      Again this Klado .... In terms of its coefficients, including the GK, 2 and 3, TOE surpassed the Japanese fleet in firepower.
      1. rytik32
        31 May 2021 18: 11
        0
        Well, read the instructions of Myakishev.
        What is the main caliber there?
        1. Navigator_50
          Navigator_50 1 June 2021 09: 01
          0
          By the way, Alexey, there were photos both here and on Tsushima - photos of the upper bridges of the Japanese, there were information boards on the handrails that were visible to all the gunners on the sides and there was no need to drive the messengers - just raise your head ...
  • Andrey152
    Andrey152 26 May 2021 07: 47
    +3
    Quote: MooH
    Let's see what the respected AiCh has to say. By the tone of the comments, I suppose that he will not challenge the logic, but the facts on which the constructions of the respected author are based. The more interesting is the response article for the readers.


    Alexey, a very informative dilogy for me. The final table is especially eloquent. After Tsushima, all the dogs were hung on the MTK, on ​​"backward equipment", "bad shells". And the technique was on the same level with the Japanese.
    But the accusations that ours did not know how to shoot, I do not remember in the official documents. And the article clearly shows this.
    I subscribe to the previous post, I would like to see the response article by Andrey from Chelyabinsk. Despite the clearly visible allergy of Andrey and Alexei to each other, an alternative opinion is always interesting to read
  • Andrey152
    Andrey152 26 May 2021 08: 27
    +1
    But "Eagle", for example - 40.
    As for the barrel firing, they were carried out at 2TOE regularly, according to indirect data, the Eagle used up about 8 thousand rifle bullets alone.

    Andrey, do I understand correctly, what is this about practical shooting in Madagascar? The results of which Rozhdestvensky was very dissatisfied with? When one of our battleships fired all 3 main battery shells in short order, without making adjustments based on the results of previous shots? And, if I remember correctly, this was the only practical shooting for the "Eagle", since he was late for the Revel stadiums? And who needed to "Study, study and study," "as the great Lenin bequeathed"?
  • Andrey152
    Andrey152 26 May 2021 08: 44
    0
    By the way, there is a question for all experts.
    Enlighten who knows. What specific data was transmitted from the fire control post to the gun? Heading angle? Range? How and by whom were they transferred to the horizontal and vertical aiming angles of the gun? What amendments were made, how and by whom?
    And further. And how was the sight used in general with the central aiming?
    And what about group shooting?
    What did the gunner see and how did he make the corrections? Besides the crosshairs, was there anything else you could see, some serifs on the axes?
    The sight was rigidly attached to the gun, i.e. its axis always coincided with the axis of the barrel, or could they be misaligned so that you could keep the target in the crosshairs and direct the gun barrel to the lead point?
    1. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 26 May 2021 22: 59
      +1
      Quote: Andrey152
      Enlighten who knows. What specific data was transmitted from the fire control post to the gun?

      This is written in the article. They transmitted the target number, sight (range), rear sight (lead).

      Yes, both the sight and the rear sight are installed by the gunner directly on the sight, after which both gunners accompany the target holding it in the crosshair while waiting for the command to fire.
      1. Andrey152
        Andrey152 27 May 2021 06: 36
        0
        Quote: Saxahorse
        Yes, both the sight and rear sight are installed by the gunner directly on the sight

        How is this done?
        1. Saxahorse
          Saxahorse 27 May 2021 22: 40
          +1
          Quote: Andrey152
          How is this done?

          Twist the little handles on the scope. wink

          Look at the picture of the Japanese sight in the article, the handle is clearly visible. And to aim the gun itself, the large handles are already turned at the gun. good
  • Andrey152
    Andrey152 26 May 2021 20: 02
    +1
    A very good illustration for Alexei's article. "Mikasa" in the battle of Tsushima

    https://fb.watch/5Ke1ORjITm/
  • A_Mazkov
    A_Mazkov 27 May 2021 15: 11
    +3
    But today is May 27 (14 o'clock)!
    116 years have passed ...
    1. The comment was deleted.
  • Ivan Hangoverov
    Ivan Hangoverov 27 May 2021 19: 21
    +2
    The tsarist officers surrendered - they had nothing to fight for. It was more profitable for them to surrender personally.
    Under RI, cowards were not punished - as in the British Navy or in the USSR. The frigate "Raphael" surrendered in 1829 - none of the traitors and cowards was executed. Everyone knew this very well. After Tsushima, all this window dressing, with fake punishments, was repeated. But the British happened to execute even their admirals (!!), and on the deck of their own ship - like Admiral Byng. Although this is nonsense for RI. Under the Republic of Ingushetia, the Decembrists were executed, but cowards and traitors were never - so, for the sake of appearance, they scolded, then quietly otmazyvali. They were all noblemen; for that rotten system, some people were not subject to jurisdiction - even when they were cowards.
    British naval officers have always remembered Byng's incident. Tsarist officers always remembered the frigate Raphael. Well, they behaved accordingly. For the Japanese to surrender, it seemed like it was not according to the concepts of "Bushido" - the people would not understand.

    Since it will be possible to surrender later, then why bother now, organize something and increase some kind of combat readiness of your ship ??! Either you defeat enemies with a numerical advantage - well, or you buy goods and then safely surrender. Profit.
  • Ivan Hangoverov
    Ivan Hangoverov 27 May 2021 19: 46
    +3
    Admirals Rozhdestvensky and Nebogatov, Generals Stoessel and Alexander Fock risked nothing. Captivity, Japan, geisha - it's even interesting. Then resignation, a life of pleasure. Maximum for the species will not be kept in prison for long - and by no means on a general basis. Dishes will still be delivered there from the restaurant - there will be hazel grouses and pineapples sometimes.
    Why should they strain and increase the combat readiness of their ships and their troops ??!

    Why would a tsarist general or an admiral do what Togo did ??!
    For what such a philosophical purpose ??!

    N.I. Nebogatov and three commanders of the ships V.V.Smirnov, N.G. Lishin and S.P.Smirnov were sentenced to death, but the court immediately, without leaving the cash register, petitioned for the replacement of the death penalty with imprisonment. We got a period of 10 years for the species. They served for 2 years, understandably.
    I would like to remind you again about another surrender of the Russian ship - the frigate "Raphael", which happened in very distant 1829. Initially, the officers were sentenced "to death" (yeah), but then, of course, the sentence was commuted
  • Navigator_50
    Navigator_50 29 May 2021 13: 53
    +2
    The article is good, dense - no water. Respect to the author!
    I would also give an example, a more understandable one .. The effectiveness of the damaging factors of the Japanese artillery fire was enhanced by the almost simultaneous explosion of volley shells that reached the target. That is, the area of ​​damage caused by the simultaneous impact of explosive shells increased.
    If within the scattering circle from a single aiming point they fall, say 12 shells and explode .. the damaging effect is much higher than with individual gun firing and successive fall of shells.
    If anyone has served, then he has not forgotten the reception of concentrated firing by a subunit of small arms at a low-flying or dive target ... This is in the Manual on Small Arms ... Look. The effect is clearer there ..
  • Kayuk
    Kayuk 1 June 2021 23: 02
    0
    Thanks to the author! The article is interesting. The conclusions seem to be correct and confirmed by the officialdom. But there is an effect of some kind of understatement. An article in the style for those who - "Particularly displeased with them are the readers' doubts about the" genius "of the Japanese commander-in-chief, the" ordinariness of Japanese shells "and the" skill of Japanese gunners "who" easily "drowned the enemy.
    Alexei! Remaining a supporter of facts and logic in the articles of Andrey Nikolaevich !!! (AiCh), nevertheless I look forward to the continuation of your articles. hi
    PS
    If the Japanese were doing so well with the key factors of artillery accuracy, then why are there such disagreements in the heading angle of flagships at the time of opening of fire to this day?