Military Review

Victory forty-first

143

Without a declaration of war?



The author of these lines had long intended to address the topic of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, but the immediate reason for the appearance of these notes was the publication on one Internet resource dedicated to the preparation of the USSR for the German attack. I deliberately do not name either the portal, or the name of the material, or the name of the author, since there are a lot of such texts, but it is remarkable as a typical example.

Like other similar publications, the text seems to have been written according to a training manual based on the theses of Khrushchev's report at the XX Congress of the CPSU, where Nikita Sergeevich proclaimed that the Soviet Union, through Stalin's fault, was not ready for war. The author diligently reproduced the postulates repeated a thousand times, except that he forgot to mention the tales of the prostrated leader, who spent the first weeks of the invasion in his dacha, and then, having come to his senses with difficulty, planned military operations on the globe.


But other claims to the Soviet leadership, wandering from one opus to another, are obvious. For example:

“Soviet society quickly enough mobilized, but initially it was not ready for such a development of events. In the USSR, people were convinced that the Red Army would certainly fight on foreign territory and "with little blood." Until autumn, naive citizens believed that the enemy would soon be instantly defeated, and feared that they would not have time to fight with him. "

And if you leave the mockery and ask question number 1: what did you need to convince the Soviet people of? In the fact that they will fight on their own land and bear huge sacrifices?

Undoubtedly, it would be an inspiring propaganda message that would instill in people unshakable confidence in victory and would properly prepare society "for such a development of events."

It is unlikely that the Kremlin thought about such a bold experiment. Both then and now, propaganda - from state ideology to consumer advertising - is based on positive messages and scenarios. But it turns out that the attitude of defeat is exactly what Soviet society needed on the eve of the German invasion? As for the naivety of the Soviet people, it is worth familiarizing yourself with the NKVD memorandums on the mood among the people in order to understand that such did not consist of simpletons who piously believed in all slogans.

“Joseph Stalin addressed the Soviet citizens only on July 3,” the author reprimands the leader on duty, without explaining why he was obliged to speak earlier, and what he could then say to the people. By the way, Vyacheslav Molotov also announced the start of the Soviet-Finnish war to the country. So, the frequent memoir remarks of those years, such as “waiting for Stalin's speech,” rather testify to the authority of the Soviet leader than to the accepted order.

Victory forty-first

But this, of course, is not the last reproach to Stalin. “In his speech, he again repeated the thesis about the treacherous attack, which then finally migrated into propaganda and historical science ".

And what, in fact, does not suit the author and others like him in assessing Hitler's attack as "treacherous"? Treacherous - and therefore, in breach of obligation. Germany was bound by a non-aggression pact and violated it. This circumstance does not change due to the fact that Hitler did not think to comply with the agreement, and Moscow knew about it. The use of the epithet "treacherous" is a strict statement of fact, therefore it migrated into historical science, and - God himself commanded - into propaganda.

Much more vulnerable is another propaganda thesis of those years - that the Third Reich attacked the Soviet Union without declaring war, since VM Molotov was hiding all morning on June 22 from the German ambassador von Schulenburg, who was going to hand over the appropriate note to the Soviet leadership. But by the way, Stalin did not say anything about "not declaring" war.

But here is the main thesis, which is sung in different ways: "the Soviet leadership did not take timely measures", "the potential of the German military machine was underestimated", "The Red Army was practically not ready for a clash with the Wehrmacht grouping."

It would seem that it is not difficult to refute such constructions. There are many facts that indicate that there was a comprehensive and large-scale preparation for the war. Take, for example, the size of the Armed Forces, which grew from 1,5 million on January 1, 1938 to 5,4 million by June 22, 1941 - three and a half times! And these millions of people who had to be accommodated, armed, trained, clothed, shod, etc. etc., were lost to strengthen the defense capability and productive labor in the national economy.

Question number 2... What else could the Soviet leadership have done to rectify the situation?

In April-May 1941, a covert mobilization of the military-liable reserves was carried out under the cover of the "Big Training Camps" (BUS). In total, under this pretext, more than 802 thousand people were called up, which was 24% of the assigned personnel according to the MP-41 mobilization plan. At the same time, in May, the deployment of the second echelon of cover in the western military districts began. This made it possible to reinforce half of all rifle divisions of the Red Army (99 out of 198) located in the western districts, or divisions of the inner districts intended for transfer to the west.

The next step involved general mobilization. However, it was precisely this step that Stalin could not take. As military historian Alexei Isaev notes, most of the participants in the Second World War faced an intractable dilemma: the choice between the escalation of the political conflict due to the announcement of mobilization or joining the war with an unmobilized army.

A remarkable episode is cited by GK Zhukov in his book "Memories and Reflections". On June 13, 1941, he and Timoshenko reported to Stalin about the need to bring the troops to full combat readiness. Zhukov quotes the following words of the leader:

“Do you propose to carry out mobilization in the country, raise troops now and move them to the western borders? This is war! Do you both understand this or not ?! "

Comrade Zhukov is modestly silent about his reaction. Of course, both the Chief of the General Staff and the People's Commissar Tymoshenko understood perfectly well that the announcement of a general mobilization meant a declaration of war. But their business is "small" - to offer. Let Comrade Stalin decide. And takes responsibility.


Let's say that declaring war on Germany is a way out and a way to avoid the tests of the 41st. But here's a catch: time must pass from the beginning of mobilization to the complete transfer of the army and the rear on a military track. In "Considerations on the basics of the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in September 1940" it is noted that

"With the real capacity of the railways in the southwest, the concentration of the main forces of the front armies can be completed only on the 30th day from the start of mobilization, only after which it will be possible to go over to a general offensive to solve the above tasks."

We are talking about the Kiev Special Military District. But it is clear that a similar situation developed in other districts.

Consequently, it was too late to declare war on June 13, as Zhukov and Timoshenko had proposed, and even on May 13. The Germans could have easily forced the transfer of troops and attacked all the same unmobilized units and formations of the Red Army.

It turns out that Stalin, in order to "justify" himself to future critics, had to go to war against the Third Reich in early May (or even better - at the end of April) without any reason and on the basis of contradictory information and forecasts, violating the non-aggression pact?

But even in this hypothetical given, the chances of success seem theoretical. Practice has shown that the mobilized forces of the Anglo-French, which had been in a state of war for six months, were utterly defeated during the German invasion of France in May 1940. By the way, the Poles also managed to mobilize in September 1939 and did it help them?

Moreover, if by some miracle the USSR succeeded in completely mobilizing and concentrating all the country's armed forces on the western border without any consequences, this would be a prelude to a tragic outcome, in comparison with which all the consequences of the "catastrophe of 1941" would have faded. After all, the Barbarossa plan was just based on the expectation that all Soviet troops would be located on the border and that, having destroyed them in the first weeks of the war, the Wehrmacht would continue to advance inland without encountering serious resistance, and would have achieved victory by November 1941 of the year. And this plan could have worked!

Unfortunately, even the most prompt and thoughtful actions of the Soviet military-political leadership to increase the combat readiness of the Red Army could not change the course of events in a collision with the best army in the world at that time.

Cadres didn't decide anything?


And then the next one inevitably rises question - no. 3: Why was the Wehrmacht, and not the Red Army, in this superior capacity?

Within the framework of these notes, I would like to touch upon only one aspect of this separate complex topic. Historians are quite unanimous in assessing the best "level" of the Wehrmacht officer cadres in the initial period of the war: from senior command personnel to junior commanders, primarily in operational thinking, the ability to take the initiative.

Liberal publicists and researchers explain this by large-scale repressions against the command staff of the Red Army. But, according to documented data, the total number of command and control and political personnel repressed in 1937-1938, as well as dismissed from the army for political reasons and not subsequently reinstated is about 18 thousand people. Here we can add 2-3 thousand people who were repressed in the following years. But in any case, their share does not exceed 3% of all commanders of the Red Army, which could not have any noticeable effect on the state of the officer cadres.

The results of the repressions traditionally include a large-scale rotation of the command staff of the Red Army, during which all the commanders of the military districts, 90% of their deputies, chiefs of the military and service branches were replaced. 80% of the commanding staff of corps and divisions, 91% of regiment commanders and their deputies. But it is impossible to unequivocally assess this process as negative, since in this case objective evidence is needed that the worst changed the best.

Many historians explain the shortcomings of the "red" officers by the rapid quantitative growth of the army and the huge need for command personnel, which in such a short time was not able to satisfy the training system. Indeed, the changes were incredible. From 1937 to 1941, the number of formations of the Ground Forces more than tripled - from 98 to 303 divisions. On the eve of the war, the officer corps numbered 680 thousand people, and less than ten years ago, in 1932, the entire army numbered 604 thousand people.

With such a quantitative increase, it would seem that a drop in quality is inevitable. But in terms of personnel, Germany was in an even more difficult situation. When in the late 20s the Red Army reached its minimum number of half a million people, the Reichswehr was limited by the Treaty of Versailles and one hundred thousand. Germany introduced general conscription in 1935, the USSR later in September 1939. But, as we can see, the Germans had to solve a much more difficult task, nevertheless, they coped with it much better than their Soviet opponents.

And here it is worth paying attention to the factor that is given insufficient importance. Germany and Austria-Hungary surrendered and ceased hostilities in November 1918, and the bloody Civil War continued in Russia for two more years. There are no exact statistics on human losses. By the most conservative estimate, eight million people died (were killed, repressed, died of wounds, disease and hunger) in Russia during this time, and two million more emigrants must be added to this.

In less than a decade, the country lost ten million people, a significant proportion of whom were participants in the First World War, including professional military personnel. So, with the troops of Wrangel, 20 officers were evacuated. No Germany, who knew such losses, received a huge head start in human potential: a much wider choice of people with a combat past.

But even the scarcer human resource in the USSR was poorly used. If during the Civil War a significant number of regular officers fought on the side of the Reds - the figure is 70-75 thousand, then as the army was reduced, the command staff of the Red Army shrank primarily at the expense of the "former". The transformation of the Red Army began with the territorial army, the backbone of which by that time consisted of people with a specific experience of the Civil War, moreover, fairly diluted by political workers.

At the same time, the one hundred thousandth Reyhover consisted of the country's military elite - both the officer and non-commissioned officer corps. It was a "military bone", people who, in the difficult realities of the Weimar Republic, remained faithful to their duty, military service.


The Germans had a head start in other ways. According to a number of researchers, in the First World War, the German army fought better than all other participants in the conflict, which is confirmed by the ratio of losses and the use of new military doctrines and tactics of warfare. American historian James Corum notes that the German army entered the First World War with tactical principles more balanced and close to reality than its main opponents. Even then, the Germans avoided head-on collisions and used detours and encirclements, also more effectively than others, taking into account the peculiarities of the landscape.

Germany was able to preserve both the best military personnel and the continuity of traditions. And on this solid basis, in a short time, to deploy a system of personnel training, which ensured not only the quantitative growth of the army, but also the high quality of personnel training, primarily the officer corps.

The Wehrmacht managed to enhance the high qualities of the German imperial army. At the same time, the Red Army, having severed any connection with the past, at the turn of the 30s began not even from "zero", but rather "minus".

On the beaten field marshals and marshals of Victory


In order to more substantively imagine the difference between the officer corps of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, we will have to ask question number 4: In what way were the commanders of the Red Army inferior to the German officers?

Let us first analyze the composition of the Soviet marshals who participated in the Great Patriotic War, and the field marshals general of the Third Reich. From our side, for obvious reasons, we do not consider Stalin among the professional military leaders. As for the German side, we exclude Paulus, who received the rank in a very specific situation, as well as Rommel and Witzleben, who did not fight in the East, and Blomberg, who was retired by the beginning of the war.


So, 13 marshals of the Soviet Union (Budyonny, Vasilevsky, Voroshilov, Zhukov, Govorov, Konev, Kulik, Malinovsky, Meretskov, Rokossovsky, Timoshenko, Tolbukhin, Shaposhnikov) and 15 field marshals general (Bok, Brauchich, Bush, Keichs, Keitel , Kluge, Kühler, Leeb, Liszt, Manstein, Model, Reichenau, Rundstedt, Schörner).

Almost all of our marshals fought in the First World War and very bravely, but only one Boris Shaposhnikov was then an officer and had real experience in staff work. Meanwhile, all German military leaders - except for Ernst Busch and Ferdinand Scherner - by the end of the First World War held the posts of chief of staff or chief of the operations department of a division (corps) headquarters, that is, they had direct experience in planning operations in combat conditions. It is clear that this is not an accident, but a fundamental criterion for the selection of personnel, and not only for the highest command posts.

Take the level below: the conventional Wehrmacht colonel of the 1941 model is a conventional lieutenant of the First World War. The more junior officers received excellent training and already had relevant and - what is no less valuable - victorious experience in conducting full-scale hostilities. And all this relied on a powerful non-commissioned officer corps, which consisted of professionals of military careers, carefully selected for the highest requirements and enjoyed much more prestige in society than the NCOs in the US and European armies.

Some researchers point to data, in their opinion, indicating a high level of qualification of the command personnel of the Red Army, in particular, a steady increase in the number of officers with a higher military education, which by the beginning of the war had 52% of the representatives of the Soviet high command personnel. Academic education began to penetrate even the level of battalion commanders. But the trouble is that no amount of theoretical training can replace practice. Meanwhile, only 26% of the commanders had, though insufficient, but definite combat experience of local conflicts and wars. As for the political composition of the army, most of it (73%) did not even have military training.

In the conditions of limited combat experience, it was very difficult not only to prepare worthy commanders, but also to assess their true qualities. In the Red Army, this circumstance largely determined both the personnel leapfrog (as mentioned above) and the rapid career takeoffs. The officers who distinguished themselves in rare conflicts immediately appeared "in sight".

As soon as Mikhail Kirponos received a division in December 1939 and showed himself well during the Soviet-Finnish war, six months later he became the commander of the Leningrad Military District, and six months later he headed the most important Kiev Special Military District. Did Kirponos rise to the occasion as a front-line commander in June-September 1941? The question is debatable. But in any case, the Soviet party and army leadership in pre-war conditions had no other opportunity to adequately assess its potential, as well as the potential of other senior officers.

As for junior commanders, on the eve of the war, they were trained on an industrial scale at accelerated courses. But who and what could have taught them there? Of course, all of the above does not mean that there were no competent proactive commanders in the Red Army. Otherwise, the outcome of the war would have been different. But we are talking about the average and the overall picture, which led to the objective superiority of the Wehrmacht over the Red Army during the invasion.

Not the balance of forces, the quantity and quality of weapons and the difference in the combat readiness mode, but the personnel resource became the factor that predetermined the success of the Germans in the summer of 1941. However, this advantage could not have a long-term effect. The paradox of the Great Patriotic War: the longer it lasted, the more the merits of the German army became its disadvantages.

But back to the list of the top commanders of the two armies. In both cases, the backbone, the main nucleus, stands out sharply. Among the Soviet generals, these are 9 people born in a short (four and a half years) interval: between June 1894 (Fedor Tolbukhin) and November 1898 (Rodion Malinovsky). To this glorious cohort can be added the prominent military leaders who received marshal's epaulettes soon after the end of the war - Ivan Baghramyan and Vasily Sokolovsky (both born in 1897). The same backbone (10 people) among the Germans is made up of commanders born in 1880-1885, and four of them (Brauchitsch, Weichs, Kleist and Kühler) are the same age, were born in 1881.


So, the "average" German field marshal general is about 15 years older than the Soviet counterpart, he is about 60 or more, it is more difficult for him to endure colossal physical and mental stress, to adequately and promptly respond to a change in the situation, to revise, and even more so to refuse the usual techniques that previously brought success.

Most Soviet marshals are about fifty, at this age there is an optimal combination of intellectual activity, energy, susceptibility to new things, ambitions, backed up by quite solid experience. It is not surprising that our generals were able not only to successfully learn German lessons, but also to significantly surpass their teachers, to creatively rethink and significantly enrich the arsenal of operational art.

It is noteworthy that, despite a number of high-profile victories of the Wehrmacht in the East in 1941-1942, not a single new "star" has risen in the German military horizon. Nearly all field marshals had earned their titles prior to the start of the Eastern Campaign. Hitler, who did not hesitate to resort to resignations, nevertheless mainly operated with a cage of recognized military leaders. And even the repression among the command staff after the July 1944 conspiracy did not lead to large-scale personnel shifts that would allow a new generation of commanders to take the first roles.

There are, of course, exceptions, which are "young" by the standards of the Wehrmacht Walter Model (b. 1891) and Ferdinand Scherner (b. 1892), who showed themselves precisely during the war against the USSR. Moreover, Scherner was awarded the rank of Field Marshal only in April 1945. Other potential "Rokossovskie" and "Konevs" of the Third Reich, even with the support of the Fuehrer, could, at best, lay claim to command of the corps, even at the very end of the war.

During the Great Patriotic War, the personnel potential of the middle and junior command echelon of the Red Army changed significantly. In the first month of the war, over 652 reserve officers were mobilized, most of whom had short-term military training. This group of commanders, along with the regular officers, took upon themselves the worst blow of the enemy. For 1941-1942. accounts for more than 50% of all irrecoverable losses of officers during the war. Only during the defeat of the Southwestern Front in September 1941, the Red Army lost about 60 command personnel. But those who remained in the ranks, having gone through an invaluable school of fierce battles, became the "golden fund" of the Red Army.

The main burden of training future commanders fell on military schools. At the beginning of the war, the selection of cadets was made among students of 1–2 courses of universities, conscripts of 1922–1923. births with education of 9-10 grades, as well as military personnel of 18–32 years old with an education of at least 7 grades. 78% of the total number of those admitted to schools were civilian youth. True, during the war, the level of requirements for candidates decreased, but for the most part the army received a highly educated, physically and intellectually developed officer, brought up in the spirit of Soviet patriotism.

In the second half of the 30s, the Soviet education system, both higher and secondary, moved to the forefront. And if in the middle of the XIX century the Prussian teacher defeated the Austrian, in the Great Patriotic Soviet school clearly surpassed the German one. During the war, military schools and Air Force schools trained about 1,3 million officers. These yesterday's boys, students and schoolchildren - and now lieutenants who commanded companies and batteries, transformed the appearance of the army, which was destined to become the Army of the Victorious.

The ending should ...
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  1. Vladimir_2U
    Vladimir_2U April 16 2021 05: 20
    +3
    An interesting and high-quality article - a reminder. There are some rather fresh thoughts:
    and what did the Soviet people need to be convinced of? In the fact that they will fight on their own land and bear huge sacrifices?

    I don’t remember such a logical excuse, "With little blood, on someone else's territory."
    1. WHAT IS
      WHAT IS April 16 2021 11: 10
      +12
      Indeed, I also did not find anything about "that they will fight on their own land and bear huge sacrifices."
      “If the enemy imposes a war on us, the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army will be the most attacking army ever attacked.
      We will wage the war offensively, with the most decisive goal of completely routing the enemy on his own territory. "
      This is chapter one, general basics, page 9.
      But about the little blood is written on the 19th page. And the following is written:
      "In any conditions and in all cases, the powerful blows of the Red Army should lead to the complete destruction of the enemy and the rapid achievement of a decisive victory with little blood." People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR K.E. Voroshilov, in his speech at the 17st All-Union Conference of the Stakhanovites on November 1935, 1937, said: "... Defeat the enemy, if he dares to attack us, with little blood, at the cost of minimal funds and possibly the least number of lives of our glorious brothers.", (Voroshilov K. E. Articles and speeches. - M., 641, p. XNUMX). The next year, Voroshilov K. Ye. Spoke at a rally in Kiev, where he said about "someone else's territory." He said: "If the enemy attacks Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Belarus or another part of the Union, we will not only not let the enemy into our homeland, but we will beat him in the territory from which he came"; "... if the enemy appears, be sure to beat him on his territory"
      1. Proxima
        Proxima April 16 2021 17: 15
        +6
        You can talk for a long time about bad personnel in the Red Army, the effect of surprise, and so on. But the main (in my opinion) reason for the defeats at the beginning of the war was different. The Red Army was inferior to the Wehrmacht in the main: The Red Army hopelessly lost to the Germans by the number of troops simultaneously entering the battle... That is, the German car, debugged over two years of war, is primitive smashed the "raw" subdivisions of the Red Army piece by piece. Unfortunately, we were doomed to suffer defeat in the initial period of the war.
        1. VS
          VS April 16 2021 19: 35
          -7
          and THIS was INCLUDED in the plans of the General Staff, in which the under-trained non-commissioned officers drove - such a deployment of troops that allowed the Germans to crush them in parts - with small forces) but the worst thing is that smart generals quite showed these things to the non-commissioners - that it will be so - in December 40 ..)))
        2. Zakirov Damir
          Zakirov Damir April 16 2021 21: 43
          +1
          This factor is also one of the main ones.
          The invasion army consisted of:
          -3 million Wehrmacht in the land;
          - 150 in the SS troops;
          - 1 Wehrmacht in the Air Force;
          - 130 Wehrmacht in the Navy;
          - about 650 - 000 of the Wehrmacht in reserve;
          - about 900 were put forward by Germany's allies.
          Total: 6.

          The troops of the Red Army in the Western Districts numbered 2 in all three branches of the army, plus about 700 mobilized for training. Of the 000, it is necessary to remove 500 defectors from Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and the Baltic States, whom the Germans liberated in the period from 000 to 2. So the real ratio is 700 million fully mobilized versus 000 million.

          Then, as if into a furnace, more and more reinforcements will be thrown in an attempt to stop the enemy's advance, having lost 3 prisoners of war and only 373 dead during the blitzkrieg.
          1. VS
            VS April 17 2021 09: 27
            -7
            FOUR western districts plus four armies of the RGK that came to them were completely equal in number to the Germans))) The Germans had a superiority in people, but not the same as you counted - you never know who squeezed out THEN to the Germans))) And in the technique we had more accurate))

            there was more than 5 million mob stock in these districts that they could not call as attributed due to the rapid drap of the Red Army))
            1. Zakirov Damir
              Zakirov Damir April 17 2021 13: 12
              +3
              The size of the army of the Red Army was 4.9 million plus 0.5 million for the training of civilians.
              Of the 4.9 million, 2.7 million were western counties. The remaining 2.1 million (0.1 million - civilian personnel of 4.9 million) were:
              - in Central Asia, in the Transcaucasus, in the Far East against Turkey, Iran and Japan, respectively (Germany, although the main one, is only one of the four alleged opponents of a possible coalition);
              - in internal districts;
              - in educational institutions.
              1. VS
                VS April 18 2021 09: 20
                -2
                There is data - Meltyukhov cites the same - data on the districts and the Wehrmacht that attacked - the forces were approximately EQUAL ..
                1. strannik1985
                  strannik1985 April 18 2021 10: 25
                  +5
                  Does it bother you that the spacecraft have these forces scattered in the PPD throughout the territory of the military districts, and the Wehrmacht has in one echelon + reserves?
                  1. VS
                    VS April 23 2021 08: 34
                    -1
                    that's another story))) Thanks to our strategists at the General Staff ...
                    1. strannik1985
                      strannik1985 April 23 2021 11: 04
                      0
                      The strategists are doing fine, in fact, on the other side of the border until May - early June, the same picture was. Concentrated - you need to attack.
          2. zenion
            zenion 6 June 2021 20: 54
            0
            Zakirov Damir. In addition to the fact that Germany attacked with its European allies, for almost a month it was not known who else would attack the USSR. Perhaps Turkey, Japan, maybe Great Britain, because Hess was not flying to England for a walk. What if you withdraw troops from other sections of the USSR border, an attack occurs that will force you to fight on several fronts, as it was during the Civil War, when Soviet Russia was attacked from all sides of the country from the South, from the North, from the East, from the West. Stalin and the party could not believe anyone, there were imperialist capitalists around, who sent Hitler to defeat the USSR. When the fog cleared a little, When the Wehrmacht entered the interior of the country, then it became clear that Hitler was doing well and he did not need help, the main thing was not to interfere with the capitalists calmed down, calmed down, Adolf would do everything himself. It was then that troops were transferred from the south and from the Far East. Winter has begun.
        3. Serg koma
          Serg koma April 17 2021 07: 30
          +1

          The author treats the topic superficially, scattering "facts" invented by him:
          Where more vulnerable another propaganda thesis those years - that the Third Reich attacked the Soviet Union without a declaration of war, since V.M. Molotov hid all morning on June 22 from the German Ambassador von Schulenburg, who was going to present the appropriate note to the Soviet leadership. But by the way, Stalin did not say anything about "not declaring" war.

          According to the rules of international etiquette, the note must precede the war itself, III Hague Convention of 1907
          "War" is declared by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, through the ambassador of the state to whom war is declared.
          Further from the memoirs - the translator of the German Foreign Ministry Paul Schmidt:
          Then at two in the morning Ribbentrop gave a signal, and Dekanozov was informed that Ribbentrop would like to see him at four in the morning of the same day, June 22 ... Dekanozov appeared at the exact time and, obviously not guessing about anything, gave Ribbentrop his hand ...
          Dekanozov quickly regained his composure; he expressed his deep regret that events had taken such a turn. “This was purely because of the non-cooperative attitude of the German government,” Pavlov translated as I took notes for the report. "In the circumstances, I have no choice but to negotiate with your head of the protocol department the departure of my mission to my homeland." Dekanozov got up, bowed casually and went out, accompanied by Pavlov, without shaking hands with Ribbentrop.

          It is unlikely that the interpreter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses Moscow time, therefore, the "Declaration of War", in fact, took place after the outbreak of hostilities.
          The rupture of the first aerial bomb in Sevastopol - 3.15
          At 03:42 Moscow time. GK Zhukov reported to JV Stalin about the beginning of military operations in Germany.
          By the way, Ribbentrop also "hid" from Dikanozov 21.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX -
          He was answered, as always before important events, that the minister was not in Berlin.

          And about the "Statement" of Schulenburg to Molotov - at 3.30 on June 22, 1941 Moscow time.

          Where and from whom Molotov "hid" on the morning of June 22, whether there was a "Declaration of War" before the outbreak of hostilities - on the conscience of the author.
          1. VS
            VS April 17 2021 09: 08
            -6
            Quote: Serg Koma
            The calculation of Schulenburg's "Statement" to Molotov - at 3.30 am on June 22, 1941 Moscow time.

            Where and from whom Molotov "hid" on the morning of June 22, whether there was a "Declaration of War" before the outbreak of hostilities - on the conscience of the author.

            Molotov received a NOTE from the ambassador AFTER the outbreak of hostilities - therefore, with a clear conscience, he announced at 12.00 - Hitler attacked WITHOUT declaring war)))
          2. sibiryouk
            sibiryouk April 18 2021 14: 09
            +2
            Molotov was not hiding from anyone, but according to the visit log, he stayed with Stalin from the night, from where he went to meet with Schulenburg at the NKID.
            1. VS
              VS April 23 2021 08: 36
              -1
              the ambassador began to call at 2 a.m. already)) And Molotov went into unconsciousness - until the war began and did not take a note))
        4. place
          place April 17 2021 18: 17
          +5
          Quote: Proxima
          Unfortunately, we were doomed to suffer defeat in the initial period of the war.

          Let's not put "we", we would have them right now, wow, how to hit them !!! And the fact that Kutuzov surrendered Moscow to the French even in a shorter period of time. How did the Germans approach Moscow in 1941, is that nothing? Heh ... heh ... the French did not have such equipment, and they reached Moscow in 1812 faster than Adolf Aloizych in 1941. Exactly that. for which they extol Kutuzov, is now called "to suffer defeat in the initial period."
          Just as Kutuzov had no other choice and it was impossible to give a general battle near Smolensk, so in 1941 it was impossible to put an end to the gigantic military might of the ENTIRE EUROPEAN UNION with one blow.

          At the end of 1941, the war passed into a different, long phase, in which the country's own cheap raw materials were of great importance. This is quite convincingly described by Guderian in his book, "Memories of a Soldier." For example, the Germans created an excellent tank "Tiger", but managed to produce only 1400 units during the entire war. The price was about 1 million Reichsmarks per piece!
          The war was won by a rationally built economy capable of mobilization and having its own resource base.
  2. avia12005
    avia12005 April 16 2021 05: 31
    -13%
    Russia is the only country in the world where they try to make victories either defeats, or proclaim them achieved "thanks to" a huge number of victims.
    1. apro
      apro April 16 2021 05: 39
      +9
      Quote: avia12005
      Russia is the only country in the world where they try to make victories either defeats, or proclaim them achieved "thanks to" a huge number of victims.

      It is not a country that decides so, but individual groups to solve their current problems, belittling the successes of their opponents.
  3. apro
    apro April 16 2021 05: 35
    +6
    And here the next question inevitably arises - No. 3: why was the Wehrmacht in this superior capacity, and not the Red Army?

    The Wehrmacht relied on the German uninterrupted education system. On the deeper traditions of the German imperial army. Without losing the connection between generations. Preserving the advanced practices of the WWII. the edges.
    The Soviet problem is the too rapid growth of the army, and the lack of full-fledged experience in WWII and the extremely harmful experience of the civil war.
  4. Konnick
    Konnick April 16 2021 06: 19
    -1
    Cadres are everything.
    VI Lenin
    1. avia12005
      avia12005 April 16 2021 06: 27
      +12
      This is what Stalin said.
      1. Konnick
        Konnick April 16 2021 06: 28
        +4
        Not awake yet, thanks.
        1. antivirus
          antivirus April 16 2021 08: 25
          +2
          it all depends on the place, time and circumstances .......................................... ..........
    2. Doctor
      Doctor April 16 2021 09: 51
      +8
      Cadres are everything.
      VI Lenin


    3. Glory1974
      Glory1974 April 16 2021 11: 17
      +1
      Everything is decided in personnel.
      Everything is decided in personnel.
      Human resources departments decide everything.
      There are many options, who said you can't figure it out.
    4. sibiryouk
      sibiryouk April 18 2021 14: 12
      +2
      A quote from J.V. Stalin taken out of context.
  5. Olgovich
    Olgovich April 16 2021 06: 27
    +6
    And if we leave the mockery and ask question number 1: what was it necessary to convince the Soviet people of? In the fact that they will fight on their own land and bear huge sacrifices?

    and a counter question to the author: what was it necessary to convince the Soviet people of? The fact that they will fight on a foreign territory and land with little blood-hatch?
    It somehow helped them tune in to correct understanding and responding to what happened?

    When they expected that the workers and peasants were not apt to flee to surrender en masse, not wanting to fight the country of workers and peasants, but did it turn out the other way around?
    Question number 2. What else could the Soviet leadership have done to correct the current situation?


    so that the troops were not shot in the barracks, the planes were not burned in hundreds at the airfields, the units were without artillery, and ALL strategic bridges were intact and taken by the enemy, and the Germans poured inland along the whole highways from the first day.

    “Do you propose to carry out mobilization in the country, raise troops now and move them to the western borders? This is war! Do you both understand this or not ?! "

    So, long ago mobilized , fighting for 2 years, the German army on our border is not a war, but our mobilization is already .. war.

    The war, yes, began exactly when Hitler was able to prepare and not a day earlier. And before he could not at all desire- he had a second front in Europe and Africa and must be resolved there ..

    And it was necessary to mobilize with the troops on alert.

    Hitler, perhaps, would not have climbed, because his "best army in the world" (in the words of the author) had the same tanks in 3,6 times smaller than the Red Army, half the number of aircraft and guns.

    Knowing these figures, the author's references to the mobilized army of Poland are very unconvincing - there was a completely different picture.
    1. Glory1974
      Glory1974 April 16 2021 11: 16
      +4
      so that the troops would not be shot in the barracks, the planes were not burned in hundreds at the airfields, the units were without artillery, and ALL strategic bridges were intact and taken by the enemy, and the Germans poured into the depths along the whole highway from the first day.

      Where it worked as expected, it was. Where they failed, unfortunately it happened. It happens that the enemy is stronger.
      So, long ago, mobilized long ago, fighting for 2 years already, the German army on our border is not a war, but our mobilization is already .. war

      In the First World War it happened. The announcement of mobilization was the reason for the declaration of war.
      Therefore, in 41, a partial mobilization was announced, under the guise of exercises.
      Hitler, perhaps, would not have climbed, because his "best army in the world" (in the words of the author) had the same tanks 3,6 times less than the Red Army, half as many planes and guns.

      And he climbed where he managed to organize the superiority of his group of forces over ours. In the areas of the main attack.
      Yes, on the other hand, our intelligence was unable to determine the direction of the main attacks. War. Who will deceive whom.
      1. Olgovich
        Olgovich April 16 2021 13: 06
        +2
        Quote: glory1974
        Where it worked as expected, it was. Where they failed, unfortunately it happened. It happens that the enemy is stronger.

        captured intact ALL strategic bridges
        Quote: glory1974
        In the First World War it happened. The announcement of mobilization was the reason for the declaration of war.
        Therefore, in 41, a partial mobilization was announced, under the guise of exercises.

        Quote: glory1974
        In the First World War it happened. The announcement of mobilization was the reason for the declaration of war.
        Therefore, in 41, a partial mobilization was announced, under the guise of exercises.

        Quote: glory1974
        In the First World War it happened. The announcement of mobilization was the reason for the declaration of war.
        .

        Germany mobilized long ago - in 1939 - and there were no reasons for war
        Quote: glory1974
        And he climbed where he managed to organize the superiority of his group of forces over ours. In the areas of the main attack.

        directions and highways were known, only the emphasis was not on the southwest, but on the west.
  6. Andrei Nikolaevich
    Andrei Nikolaevich April 16 2021 06: 47
    +2
    I just read the words "Internet portal" and everything became clear to me. Apparently, the grandmothers-housewives decided to practice their interpretation of the history of the Second World War. And all such theories, as a rule, are sucked from the thumb and do not even have a hint of objectivity and reliability under them.
    In any case, eternal glory to the heroes of the Second World War,
    1. Glory1974
      Glory1974 April 16 2021 11: 09
      +1
      I just read the words "Internet portal" and everything became clear to me. Apparently, the grandmothers-housewives decided to practice their interpretation of the history of the Second World War. And all such theories, as a rule, are sucked from the thumb and do not even have a hint of objectivity and reliability under them.

      Not only on Internet portals, in stores all the shelves are littered with books by Mark Solonin and other pseudo historians, where they write and promote the theories of the notorious Rezun-Suvorov.
      1. Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
        Paragraph Epitafievich Y. April 16 2021 11: 24
        0
        Quote: glory1974
        Not only on Internet portals, in stores all the shelves are littered with books by Mark Solonin and other pseudo historians, where they write and promote the theories of the notorious Rezun-Suvorov.

        Come on, on store shelves you can find reading materials for every taste. Well, buy Starikov's writings - who's in the way? His books are also littered with.
        1. Glory1974
          Glory1974 April 19 2021 09: 58
          0
          Yes, you can find it for every taste. But if the taste has not yet formed, then it will already be a poison for the younger generation. And then, with a distorted view of reality, people come to power and begin to rewrite history according to their ideas. In this I see the danger of Solonins-Rezuns, and in this the leadership sees a danger, therefore, it organized a commission to combat the falsification of history.
          1. Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
            Paragraph Epitafievich Y. April 19 2021 10: 09
            +1
            Quote: glory1974
            But if the taste has not yet formed, then it will already be a poison for the younger generation.

            What the fuck is poison? Is everyone concerned about the younger generation? Yes, they do not care about these virtual lists and whining about rewriting history. But even if we assume that some 13-year-old puberty is suddenly puzzled by a deep study of the history of WWII, then let him study all points of view. Lack of alternatives leads to stupefaction.
            1. Glory1974
              Glory1974 April 19 2021 10: 55
              0
              concerned about the younger generation? Yes, they do not care about these virtual lists and whining about rewriting history.

              nobody cares. And some do not. And if you don't care about the younger generation, you will have to cry when it grows up. You will not deny the importance of upbringing? I gave you an example of what this can lead to. I'm not even talking about Ukraine.
              Lack of alternatives leads to stupefaction.

              I agree with this. But in these historical fables there is no alternative, sheer lies.
              1. Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
                Paragraph Epitafievich Y. April 19 2021 15: 39
                0
                Quote: glory1974
                But in these historical fables there is no alternative, sheer lies.

                How do you know this? On subjective feelings? Or are those whom you unconditionally believe are the bearers of the ultimate truth?
                1. Glory1974
                  Glory1974 April 21 2021 11: 27
                  0
                  How do you know this? On subjective feelings? Or are those whom you unconditionally believe are the bearers of the ultimate truth?

                  One can argue about a lot, prove. One can remember what is truth, falsehood and truth, etc. etc.
                  But objectively, there is an officially accepted version, and there are alternative ones. In many countries, denial of the official version is subject to criminal penalties (for example, denial of the Holocaust).
                  It is from these positions that I judge.
                  1. Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
                    Paragraph Epitafievich Y. April 21 2021 11: 47
                    0
                    Quote: glory1974
                    But objectively, there is an officially accepted version

                    That is, for you officialdom always objective ??? Then I have a question - how do you understand objectivity?
                    Quote: glory1974
                    In many countries, denial of the official story is subject to criminal penalties (for example, denial of the Holocaust).

                    No one denies the crimes of Nazism, we are talking about different interpretations of the historical events that took place. You are an adherent of the declarative imposition of dogma (akin to a religious dictate), which is not subject to public discussion, and all heresy and dissent should be prohibited by law. Am I getting it right?
                    1. Glory1974
                      Glory1974 April 21 2021 13: 30
                      0
                      Is officialdom always objective for you ??

                      Of course not. I don’t say that. I write that there is an "officially accepted VERSION".
                      This is what the textbooks should say and how the emphasis is placed.
                      No one denies the crimes of Nazism, we are talking about different interpretations of the historical events that took place.

                      This is exactly what is happening. They deny the crimes of Nazism on the territory of the USSR, equate Stalin with Hitler, claim that the communists and the Nazis are no different. Accordingly, the interpretation completely changes. Hitler did not attack first, but simply outstripped Stalin.
                      You are an adherent of the declarative imposition of dogma (akin to a religious dictate), which is not subject to public discussion, and all heresy and dissent should be prohibited by law.

                      What area do you refer to? If we talk about physics, do we impose it declaratively or not?
                      And is the belief in the Higgs boson dissent or what?
                      To know whether it is heresy or not, you need to know the basics. As for the history of the Second World War, the foundation that should be laid in the school, you can call it a dogma, should be official. History textbooks should write about the Battle of Stalingrad, not about the rescue of Private Ryan.
                      But when you have mastered the official data, please join the discussion. Refute if you can.
                      But not the other way around, when American and European schoolchildren are sure that Berlin was taken by storm by the Americans and they won the war.
            2. Kwas
              Kwas April 20 2021 16: 36
              0
              For truth to prevail, public lies must be legally prohibited.
  7. Dilettante grandfather
    Dilettante grandfather April 16 2021 07: 14
    +7
    No one doubted that there would be war. The fact that fighting "with little blood, on foreign territory" - will not work, I think, not everyone believed. Including in the country's leadership. Are there many tanks? Lot. Is there a numerical superiority over the Germans? There is. Did you develop aviation at an accelerated pace, did you train pilots? Yes. It didn't turn out that way, alas. Preparing for war and being ready are two different things.
    1. zenion
      zenion 6 June 2021 21: 12
      0
      And there were tanks and planes. But to put trained fighters in them - that was not the case. In addition, the author wrote that commanders who were officers in the tsarist army were dismissed from the army. This was not the case, but the fact that they carried out retraining of officers and memoranda of how they served. Those who could not command a regiment were promoted to company commanders. Those who drank and played the fool, who did not deal with the entrusted units from the army were fired. Others, after exams, were promoted in rank and official position.
  8. Doctor
    Doctor April 16 2021 07: 28
    +1
    By the way, Vyacheslav Molotov also announced the start of the Soviet-Finnish war to the country. So, the frequent memoir remarks of those years, such as “waiting for Stalin's speech,” rather testify to the authority of the Soviet leader than to the accepted order.

    Yeah, they testify. laughing

    Imagine, we started a war with NATO and Lavrov announces this.wink
    1. Glory1974
      Glory1974 April 16 2021 11: 07
      +3
      Imagine, we started a war with NATO and this is announced by Lavrov

      Announcer Levitan announced the beginning of the war.
      Then Molotov made a speech, then Stalin.
      Are you waiting for Putin to announce the start of the war to you?
      1. Doctor
        Doctor April 16 2021 11: 49
        +5
        Announcer Levitan announced the beginning of the war.
        Then Molotov made a speech, then Stalin.
        Are you waiting for Putin to announce the start of the war to you?

        This is an old feature of managers. There are also managers in modern textbooks.

        Give the good news yourself first, the bad news - entrust your deputies. wink
  9. Doctor
    Doctor April 16 2021 07: 39
    -1
    But, according to documented data, the total number of command and control and political personnel repressed in 1937-1938, as well as dismissed from the army for political reasons and not subsequently reinstated is about 18 thousand people. Here we can add 2-3 thousand people who were repressed in the following years. But in any case, their share does not exceed 3% of all commanders of the Red Army, which could not have any noticeable effect on the state of the officer cadres.

    The question is WHAT POSITIONS were occupied by these commanders. wink
    Let's repress 3% of the command now.
    From Shoigu to the division commander-brigade commander.
    And let's see how this affects combat readiness. wink
    1. Doliva63
      Doliva63 April 17 2021 18: 29
      0
      Quote: Arzt
      But, according to documented data, the total number of command and control and political personnel repressed in 1937-1938, as well as dismissed from the army for political reasons and not subsequently reinstated is about 18 thousand people. Here we can add 2-3 thousand people who were repressed in the following years. But in any case, their share does not exceed 3% of all commanders of the Red Army, which could not have any noticeable effect on the state of the officer cadres.

      The question is WHAT POSITIONS were occupied by these commanders. wink
      Let's repress 3% of the command now.
      From Shoigu to the division commander-brigade commander.
      And let's see how this affects combat readiness. wink

      Well, the army will not notice the loss of Shoigu laughing And 3% of the division commanders is a drop in the ocean, they are easily replaced by deputies or chief of staff and nothing terrible happens in the army. I’ll tell you more: often during exercises they give an "introductory" - the division commander and chief of staff are killed by the enemy's sabotage group, the command is taken over by the deputy and chief of the first department of the headquarters. And nothing. All according to plan.
      1. Doctor
        Doctor April 17 2021 19: 53
        0
        And 3% of the division commanders is a drop in the ocean, they are easily replaced by deputies or chief of staff and nothing terrible happens in the army.

        3% of the entire army. 18 commanders starting with the highest in 000 years.
        Who will replace them? belay
        1. Doliva63
          Doliva63 April 18 2021 17: 10
          0
          Quote: Arzt
          And 3% of the division commanders is a drop in the ocean, they are easily replaced by deputies or chief of staff and nothing terrible happens in the army.

          3% of the entire army. 18 commanders starting with the highest in 000 years.
          Who will replace them? belay

          18 commanders have 000 deputies - not enough ?!
          1. Doctor
            Doctor April 18 2021 17: 44
            +3
            18 commanders have 000 deputies - not enough ?!

            Do you represent the structure of cleaning? The higher the position, the greater the chances of getting under the knife.

            In 1936, the Red Army consisted of 62 corps commanders.
            By 1941 69 were repressed.
            MORE than it was.
            That is, they took one, a deputy took his place, after a while they took him, etc.

            In general, in 1936, the Red Army consisted of 767 senior command personnel. This is from Marshal to Kombrig, i.e. generals.
            Of these, 503 were repressed (irrevocably). 65%.

            For comparison, during the Second World War, the combat losses of generals were 289. wink

            And the rest of the 18 are just deputies, below - the regiment commander, wider - staff rear, and so on.

            Someone slaughtered half of the top and middle command personnel, and then wondered at the German near Moscow. winked
            1. Doliva63
              Doliva63 April 18 2021 18: 28
              0
              Quote: Arzt
              18 commanders have 000 deputies - not enough ?!

              Do you represent the structure of cleaning? The higher the position, the greater the chances of getting under the knife.

              In 1936, the Red Army consisted of 62 corps commanders.
              By 1941 69 were repressed.
              MORE than it was.
              That is, they took one, a deputy took his place, after a while they took him, etc.

              In general, in 1936, the Red Army consisted of 767 senior command personnel. This is from Marshal to Kombrig, i.e. generals.
              Of these, 503 were repressed (irrevocably). 65%.

              For comparison, during the Second World War, the combat losses of generals were 289. wink

              And the rest of the 18 are just deputies, below - the regiment commander, wider - staff rear, and so on.

              Someone slaughtered half of the top and middle command personnel, and then wondered at the German near Moscow. winked

              "Someone cut" is strong! laughing
              Once, of course, I used numbers, but I already forgot, and I'm too lazy to dig. But I remember for sure that the numbers were not critical, and they were planted for a reason - perhaps, otherwise there could be much more Pavlovs. Was it necessary? Everything was done correctly. Practice is the main criterion, right? In practice, the Union won. Do you think there could have been less losses? Not a fact, however. And now, well, we have retained the command staff. But several million stupid fighters were called in - do you think personnel can fix this? No. There was such an experiment in the USSR Armed Forces - single-draft tank battalions (well, what I experienced myself) - it was a complete kapets! Both experienced officers and warrant officers with sergeants to help them! But after six months of service, when the TB came out on alarm, the tank of the TB commander, my company commander and mine, the platoon commander, came out of the boxes. 3 tanks out of 31! So this is the 80s, with their level of education in the country! And what happened to that in the early 40s? Nothing. And how will you quickly teach this stupid mass to fight? No way. Only through experience and loss. Alas.
              1. Doctor
                Doctor April 18 2021 18: 39
                +1
                There was such an experiment in the USSR Armed Forces - single-draft tank battalions (well, what I experienced myself) - it was a complete kapets! Both experienced officers and warrant officers with sergeants to help them! 3 tanks out of 31! So this is the 80s, with their level of education in the country! And what happened to that in the early 40s? Nothing. And how will you quickly teach this stupid mass to fight? No way. Only through experience and loss. Alas.

                You just confirm my idea. I also fell under this experiment in 1988.

                Now imagine: someone laughing removes 2 senior conscripts from conscripts.
                What will happen to combat readiness?

                Roughly this was done in the 30s with an officer corps, only they knocked out not just the most experienced, but, naturally, the most senior in position.

                Company commanders and battalion commanders actually remained in the troops.
                Above - half was cut, below (platoon commander) did not have time to recruit due to the increase in the number of armed forces.

                Moreover, the process began long before 1937 and continued until the end of the war. No.
                1. Doliva63
                  Doliva63 April 18 2021 19: 07
                  0
                  Quote: Arzt
                  There was such an experiment in the USSR Armed Forces - single-draft tank battalions (well, what I experienced myself) - it was a complete kapets! Both experienced officers and warrant officers with sergeants to help them! 3 tanks out of 31! So this is the 80s, with their level of education in the country! And what happened to that in the early 40s? Nothing. And how will you quickly teach this stupid mass to fight? No way. Only through experience and loss. Alas.

                  You just confirm my idea. I also fell under this experiment in 1988.

                  Now imagine: someone laughing removes 2 senior conscripts from conscripts.
                  What will happen to combat readiness?

                  Roughly this was done in the 30s with an officer corps, only they knocked out not just the most experienced, but, naturally, the most senior in position.

                  Company commanders and battalion commanders actually remained in the troops.
                  Above - half was cut, below (platoon commander) did not have time to recruit due to the increase in the number of armed forces.

                  Moreover, the process began long before 1937 and continued until the end of the war. No.

                  You are back for yours. I repeat - the "purges" did not affect the army's capabilities in any way. Well, there was not, even without them, the required number of personnel to prepare a conscript contingent for war. And they had no combat experience. For that matter, mobilization a year earlier could have rectified the situation, but it wasn't. Do you remember how the reports were written in the USSR Armed Forces? To the commander of the 20 Guards OA, report ... no rank, no surname. Because Ivanov / Petrov / Sidorov was killed / removed / convicted, and the army commander is always in place and fulfills his duties. The army is structured in such a way that the detachment will not notice the loss of a soldier by definition.
                  1. Doctor
                    Doctor April 18 2021 19: 21
                    +2
                    Do you remember how the reports were written in the USSR Armed Forces? To the commander of the 20 Guards OA, report ... no rank, no surname. Because Ivanov / Petrov / Sidorov was killed / removed / convicted, and the army commander is always in place and fulfills his duties. The army is structured in such a way that the detachment will not notice the loss of a soldier by definition.

                    You think so? If the previous commanders are removed for every sneeze and taken to the jail, will the new one be better at fighting? laughing

                    He will adjust his activities to the wishes of his superior and the NKVD. This is at its best.
                    And at worst - Vlasov. He wrote in his little letter:

                    From 1938 to 1939 I was in China as a military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. When I returned to the USSR, it turned out that during this time the top commanding staff of the Red Army had been destroyed without any reason on the orders of Stalin. Many, many thousands of the best commanders, including marshals, were arrested and shot, or imprisoned in concentration camps and disappeared forever. The terror spread not only to the army, but to the entire people. There was no family that somehow escaped this fate. The army was weakened, the frightened people looked to the future with horror ...
                    1. Doliva63
                      Doliva63 April 18 2021 19: 33
                      0
                      Quote: Arzt
                      Do you remember how the reports were written in the USSR Armed Forces? To the commander of the 20 Guards OA, report ... no rank, no surname. Because Ivanov / Petrov / Sidorov was killed / removed / convicted, and the army commander is always in place and fulfills his duties. The army is structured in such a way that the detachment will not notice the loss of a soldier by definition.

                      You think so? If the previous commanders are removed for every sneeze and taken to the jail, will the new one be better at fighting? laughing

                      He will adjust his activities to the wishes of his superior and the NKVD. This is at its best.
                      And at worst - Vlasov. He wrote in his little letter:

                      From 1938 to 1939 I was in China as a military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. When I returned to the USSR, it turned out that during this time the top commanding staff of the Red Army had been destroyed without any reason on the orders of Stalin. Many, many thousands of the best commanders, including marshals, were arrested and shot, or imprisoned in concentration camps and disappeared forever. The terror spread not only to the army, but to the entire people. There was no family that somehow escaped this fate. The army was weakened, the frightened people looked to the future with horror ...

                      Vlasov is not an authority to draw conclusions.
                      1. Doctor
                        Doctor April 18 2021 19: 44
                        +2
                        Vlasov is not an authority to draw conclusions.

                        Repression is one of the reasons for mass betrayal during the Second World War.

                        Almost a million army ROA, how's that?
                        And this despite the fact that everyone already understood who Hitler was.

                        Napoleon did not intend to turn the Russians into Untermens and flood Moscow, but the FORTRESS peasants did not go over to his side in droves.
                      2. Kwas
                        Kwas April 20 2021 16: 47
                        0
                        Quote: Arzt
                        Almost a million army ROA, how's that?
                        And this despite the fact that everyone already understood who Hitler was.

                        Napoleon did not intend to turn the Russians into Untermens and flood Moscow, but the FORTRESS peasants did not go over to his side in droves.

                        So the fact of the matter is that the soldiers of the Red Army who surrendered in 1941 were put by the Nazis before the choice "betray or die." Unlike in 1812.
                2. Doctor
                  Doctor April 18 2021 19: 26
                  +2
                  You are back for yours. I repeat - the "purges" did not affect the army's capabilities in any way.

                  But how did it not affect !?
                  Have you looked at the table?

                  If out of 201 division commanders 153 (75%), THREE out of FOUR, were knocked out, how could this not affect? request
                  1. Doliva63
                    Doliva63 April 19 2021 17: 29
                    +3
                    Quote: Arzt
                    You are back for yours. I repeat - the "purges" did not affect the army's capabilities in any way.

                    But how did it not affect !?
                    Have you looked at the table?

                    If out of 201 division commanders 153 (75%), THREE out of FOUR, were knocked out, how could this not affect? request

                    I have seen other tables where everything is wrong. But even if it were so, I have already explained - each division commander has 2 trained deputies - the army is arranged in such a way that the loss of 1 person cannot affect the troops. As an example - after the death of Vatutin and Chernyakhovsky, the fronts staked out? And about repression - so this is a promoted stamp from the not very distant past. There were no repressed, there were convicted under a specific article. Remember the designer Tupolev, for example? In "sharashka" then he designed airplanes. And the article on the case - he wasted state money for his needs when he went to America, and not a little. So for the military it is necessary like this: name, article, sentence. And with "repression" - this is to Khrushch (ugh, damn it!) And Solzhenitsyn - one name is worth something! laughing
                    1. Doctor
                      Doctor April 19 2021 18: 01
                      +2
                      I have seen other tables where everything is wrong. But even if it were so, I have already explained - each division commander has 2 trained deputies - the army is arranged in such a way that the loss of 1 person cannot affect the troops.

                      You will appreciate the ratio. According to the author of the article, 18 were repressed.
                      And the commanders from the marshal to the brigade commander consisted of 767. Of which 503 were popped.
                      18 000 - 503 = 17 497. Deputy. Kompolka. NSh at all levels. Headquarters, rear, etc.

                      ... So for the military it is necessary like this: name, article, sentence.

                      Where do you think the numbers come from? All were installed by name a long time ago, check, look at the posts, evaluate the scale:

                      https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Список_репрессированных_высших_командиров_и_начальников_Вооружённых_сил_СССР_(1935—1945)

                      Here it is true not only the command, but also the commissars, the rear and even their executioners such as the armored military lawyer Naum Rozovsky. laughing
                  2. zenion
                    zenion 6 June 2021 21: 19
                    0
                    Arzt (Yuri). "Oleg continued to bend his line so much so that no one uttered a peep, he only once remembered the Magi and chuckled so sarcastically, well, you have to talk to him or her ...". V. Vysotsky. Here you remind that Prince Oleg. But the Third Reich with its allies bent!
            2. Doctor
              Doctor April 18 2021 18: 47
              +1
              Once, of course, I used numbers, but I already forgot, and I'm too lazy to dig. But I remember exactly that the numbers were not critical, and they were planted for a reason - perhaps, otherwise there could be much more Pavlovs.

              At the highest level, they are critical.



              Was it necessary? Everything was done correctly. Practice is the main criterion, right? In practice, the Union won. Do you think there could have been less losses? Not a fact, however.


              Of course less. There is no substitute for experience and no drink. laughing
              1. Doliva63
                Doliva63 April 18 2021 18: 54
                0
                Quote: Arzt
                Once, of course, I used numbers, but I already forgot, and I'm too lazy to dig. But I remember exactly that the numbers were not critical, and they were planted for a reason - perhaps, otherwise there could be much more Pavlovs.

                At the highest level, they are critical.



                Was it necessary? Everything was done correctly. Practice is the main criterion, right? In practice, the Union won. Do you think there could have been less losses? Not a fact, however.


                Of course less. There is no substitute for experience and no drink. laughing

                What experience are you talking about? Where does the military experience of the command staff of the Red Army come from? Neither PMA nor Civil War counts. Another war.
                1. Doctor
                  Doctor April 18 2021 19: 13
                  +1
                  What experience are you talking about? Where does the military experience of the command staff of the Red Army come from? Neither PMA nor Civil War counts. Another war.

                  You are raising a very good question.
                  Look at the list of repressed 4 Marshals of the Soviet Union.

                  1. Blucher Vasily Konstantinovich.
                  2. Egorov Alexander Ilyich
                  3. Kulik Grigory Ivanovich
                  4. Tukhachevsky Mikhail Nikolaevich

                  Blucher in WWI - non-commissioned officer.
                  Kulik is a senior noncommissioned officer.
                  Tukhachevsky is already a pro. Aleksandrovskoe military school, PVM - lieutenant.

                  But Egorov ...



                  Freelance - 4th Nesvizh Grenadier Regiment.
                  Kazan infantry cadet school, first class.
                  Second lieutenant - 13th Life Grenadier Erivan Regiment.
                  With the rank of captain! - Lecturer at the Alekseevsk military school, then in Tiflis, at the same time being an assistant to the head of the school.
                  Headquarters officer for the instructions of the headquarters of the 2nd Caucasian Cavalry Corps.
                  Lieutenant Colonel-Kombat, then Colonel, Commander of the 132nd Infantry Regiment of Bendery.
                  He was wounded and shell-shocked 5 times.

                  Awards:
                  Order of St. Stanislav III degree (VP of March 10, 1907).
                  Cross “The 50th Anniversary of the End of the Caucasian Wars” (EaP from August 31, 1909).
                  Medal "In memory of the 100th anniversary of the Patriotic War of 1812" (August 15, 1912)
                  Medal “In memory of the 300th anniversary of the reign of the Romanov dynasty” (February 21, 1913)
                  Order of St. Anne of the III degree (VP of April 6, 1914).
                  Order of St. Anne of the IV degree (VP of March 30, 1915).
                  swords and bow to the Order of St. Anne of the III degree (VP from March 30, 1915).
                  Order of St. Stanislav II degree with swords (VP ​​of May 30, 1915).
                  Order of St. Anne of the II degree with swords (VP ​​of October 23, 1915)
                  St. George's weapon - for the battle of Busk on August 13, 1914 (VP from January 24, 1917.)
                  Order of St. Vladimir of the IV degree with swords and bow (VP from February 12, 1917).

                  In Civil - the commander of the Southwestern Front, the immediate superior of Budyonny.

                  And again the awards:
                  Two Orders of the Red Banner (31.07.1919/22.02.1930/XNUMX, XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX).
                  Order of the Red Banner of the Azerbaijan SSR (1922).
                  Order of the Red Banner of the Georgian SSR (12.05.1924/XNUMX/XNUMX).
                  An honorable revolutionary weapon - checker (1.03.1921).


                  Did he have the right experience? wink
                  1. Doliva63
                    Doliva63 April 19 2021 17: 43
                    0
                    Quote: Arzt
                    What experience are you talking about? Where does the military experience of the command staff of the Red Army come from? Neither PMA nor Civil War counts. Another war.

                    You are raising a very good question.
                    Look at the list of repressed 4 Marshals of the Soviet Union.

                    1. Blucher Vasily Konstantinovich.
                    2. Egorov Alexander Ilyich
                    3. Kulik Grigory Ivanovich
                    4. Tukhachevsky Mikhail Nikolaevich

                    Blucher in WWI - non-commissioned officer.
                    Kulik is a senior noncommissioned officer.
                    Tukhachevsky is already a pro. Aleksandrovskoe military school, PVM - lieutenant.

                    But Egorov ...



                    Freelance - 4th Nesvizh Grenadier Regiment.
                    Kazan infantry cadet school, first class.
                    Second lieutenant - 13th Life Grenadier Erivan Regiment.
                    With the rank of captain! - Lecturer at the Alekseevsk military school, then in Tiflis, at the same time being an assistant to the head of the school.
                    Headquarters officer for the instructions of the headquarters of the 2nd Caucasian Cavalry Corps.
                    Lieutenant Colonel-Kombat, then Colonel, Commander of the 132nd Infantry Regiment of Bendery.
                    He was wounded and shell-shocked 5 times.

                    Awards:
                    Order of St. Stanislav III degree (VP of March 10, 1907).
                    Cross “The 50th Anniversary of the End of the Caucasian Wars” (EaP from August 31, 1909).
                    Medal "In memory of the 100th anniversary of the Patriotic War of 1812" (August 15, 1912)
                    Medal “In memory of the 300th anniversary of the reign of the Romanov dynasty” (February 21, 1913)
                    Order of St. Anne of the III degree (VP of April 6, 1914).
                    Order of St. Anne of the IV degree (VP of March 30, 1915).
                    swords and bow to the Order of St. Anne of the III degree (VP from March 30, 1915).
                    Order of St. Stanislav II degree with swords (VP ​​of May 30, 1915).
                    Order of St. Anne of the II degree with swords (VP ​​of October 23, 1915)
                    St. George's weapon - for the battle of Busk on August 13, 1914 (VP from January 24, 1917.)
                    Order of St. Vladimir of the IV degree with swords and bow (VP from February 12, 1917).

                    In Civil - the commander of the Southwestern Front, the immediate superior of Budyonny.

                    And again the awards:
                    Two Orders of the Red Banner (31.07.1919/22.02.1930/XNUMX, XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX).
                    Order of the Red Banner of the Azerbaijan SSR (1922).
                    Order of the Red Banner of the Georgian SSR (12.05.1924/XNUMX/XNUMX).
                    An honorable revolutionary weapon - checker (1.03.1921).


                    Did he have the right experience? wink

                    I remember that Joseph Vissarionovich, looking at what was happening, answered your question a long time ago - this is a harmful experience.
                    1. Doctor
                      Doctor April 19 2021 18: 09
                      +1
                      I remember that Joseph Vissarionovich, looking at what was happening, answered your question a long time ago - this is a harmful experience.

                      What experience do you mean? As far as I understand, participation in PVM, since Civil does not suit you.
                    2. zenion
                      zenion 6 June 2021 21: 21
                      0
                      Kulik was kicked after the war.
  • parusnik
    parusnik April 16 2021 07: 43
    +7
    The USSR was preparing for war, but was not ready for war on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.
    1. antivirus
      antivirus April 16 2021 08: 32
      +2
      all preparations rest on literacy - to read and correctly understand the instructions, drawing. by 1939, complete illiteracy was eliminated .. 10-15 years was not enough to prepare the country for the realities of the mid-20th century.
      Aldr3 is to blame - it was necessary to start with him (it can be done earlier) with complete literacy in reading and writing. .... and the number of higher education in 15-20 years (by 1900). all the following rulers quickly corrected miscalculations.
      "in 79 the USSR reached the average European level for the number of doctors" -and doctors and military personnel are part of the average level of culture and education of the peoples of the country.
      1. apro
        apro April 16 2021 08: 45
        +3
        Quote: antivirus
        "in 79 the USSR reached the average European level for the number of doctors" -and doctors and military personnel are part of the average level of culture and education of the peoples of the country.

        And many do not want to understand this. And they are measured with trunks. And who will manage all the hardware and personnel. It is not interesting. The numbers are mesmerizing.
    2. Pane Kohanku
      Pane Kohanku April 16 2021 10: 25
      +7
      Colleagues, I did not like the construction of the phrase ...
      Almost all of our marshals fought in the First World War and very bravely, but only one Boris Shaposhnikov was then an officer and had real experience in staff work.

      Officers during WWI were also Tolbukhin, Vasilevsky, Govorov. The fact that it was Shaposhnikov who had the experience of staff work during that war is true. yes
      That is, the phrase should sound like this: "Almost all of our marshals fought in the First World War, and very bravely, some of them were officers, but only one B.M. Shaposhnikov then received real experience in staff work. " I didn't want to offend anyone, I just corrected the phrase! stop Yours faithfully, hi
      1. Sugar Honeyovich
        Sugar Honeyovich April 16 2021 13: 50
        +3
        Quote: Pane Kohanku
        Officers during WWI were also Tolbukhin, Vasilevsky, Govorov.

        Baghramyan too. Met the statement that Tymoshenko.
  • antivirus
    antivirus April 16 2021 08: 19
    +3
    As for the political composition of the army, most of it (73%) did not even have military training.

    - in most cases they were teachers
  • java1124
    java1124 April 16 2021 10: 52
    +6
    April 16, 1945 the storming of Berlin began
  • Knell wardenheart
    Knell wardenheart April 16 2021 11: 08
    -1
    I personally see Stalin's mistake in the fact that he pecked at the Trojan horse - Poland-Baltic. The problem was not that he got his hands on it - there were probably no options, the problem was that the defense plans had to be interrupted "on the knee" already seeing what the Wehrmacht was capable of and where Hitler was aiming. The second disadvantage, in my opinion, was the almost complete inattention to the two-year study of the tactics and strategy of the Wehrmacht - on June 22, 1941, for almost two years we observed how the GG was working with tanks and aircraft in various landscapes and countries, against armies, against defense, etc. Was it possible for almost 2 years to prepare theoretical considerations on flexible defense in this regard? Judging by the way we met the Germans, such theoretical work and the implementation of its fruits simply WASN'T FUCKED.
    The third minus is that a country with three times the demo potential of the GG, with an equal Armed Forces and in defense, behaved extremely timidly immediately before the war. We could diplomatically act harder in relation to the GG and dispel our doubts about the concentration of troops, taking advantage of the fact that the GG had problems with Britain and part of the forces were connected in European operations. I think that this position of a sacrificial animal, which obediently awaits its fate, also played a role - we knew that all this would happen, our game had to combine delaying the moment with entangling cards - but we only delayed the moment, leaving a clean deck in the hands of the opponent. Meanwhile, it is precisely the greater pressure and mistrust on our part before the war that could give us casus beli to prepare our forces for the future and at the same time test the waters regarding the timing of the enemy's preparation and the degree of his intentions.
    1. Vladimir_2U
      Vladimir_2U April 16 2021 11: 19
      0
      Quote: Knell Wardenheart
      We could diplomatically act harder in relation to the GG and dispel our doubts about the concentration of troops, taking advantage of the fact that the GG had problems with Britain and part of the forces were connected in European operations.
      The Non-Aggression Pact is a brilliant victory for Stalin's diplomacy. So don't talk about the sacrificial animal.
      1. Knell wardenheart
        Knell wardenheart April 16 2021 11: 54
        -3
        Useless crap this pact. In order to adequately conduct military operations against the USSR, Germany would still need a Polish bridgehead, and this inevitably led to a confrontation with France and the WB. How do you imagine an analogue of "Barbarossa" through the territory of sovereign Poland?) Taking into account the fact that Poland would not have acted in such a structure as an ally of Germany without solid acquisitions from the European part of the USSR, which Hitler himself was aiming at. Accordingly, it is one thing to derail a neighboring trifle in hand with Poland - and quite another is a war against the USSR, in which Poland and Polish plans simply did not combine with GG from the word at all. Consequently, for an adequate war against the USSR, Germany in ANY CASE would have to finish off Poland - from considerations of a bridgehead, from considerations that this is a large state hanging over the flanks and a conductor of Atlanticism, etc. In this scenario, England / France also automatically enter the war - and everything happens according to the canon.
        Apart from razderbaneniya Poland and "freedom of hands" in the Baltic states-Finland, this pact did not give us anything. The war wouldn’t have started before 1941 anyway, and we already knew the price of agreements with the Germans for a long time - plus the anti-Comintern pact had already existed for 3 years, which was very badly combined with Molotov-Ribbentrop. But it didn't really bother us, we needed to pull off another piece of territory to our 1/7 of the land, we didn't look further. It was later, in the legends and myths of "ancient Greece", that they began to sing an asana to this pact in retrospect, they say "there were no options, it gave us blablablaa time" - it didn’t give us a damn thing, except for a spot on historiography.
        1. Vladimir_2U
          Vladimir_2U April 16 2021 16: 38
          +2
          Quote: Knell Wardenheart
          Taking into account the fact that Poland would not have acted in such a structure as an ally of Germany without solid acquisitions from the European part of the USSR, which Hitler himself was aimed at
          And why not?

          Quote: Knell Wardenheart
          In ANY CASE, Poland would have to be finished off - for reasons of a bridgehead, for reasons that this is a large state hanging over the flanks and a conductor of Atlanticism, etc.
          Oh, nonsense, Germany could, through Romania and through the Baltic states, without touching the territory of Poland, but in alliance with it, attack the USSR.

          Quote: Knell Wardenheart
          Apart from razderbaneniya Poland and "freedom of hands" in the Baltic states-Finland, this pact did not give us anything.
          It was precisely the Sovietization of the Baltic States that allowed Poland to be torn apart and prevented from entering into an alliance with Germany.
    2. Sugar Honeyovich
      Sugar Honeyovich April 16 2021 13: 52
      +3
      Quote: Knell Wardenheart
      I see Stalin's mistake in the fact that he pecked at the Trojan horse - Poland-Baltic.

      Not at all. He acted quite deliberately - on the eve of an obviously inevitable war, to push the border as far as possible and deprive the enemy of advantageous positions. The same is with Finland.
      1. Knell wardenheart
        Knell wardenheart April 16 2021 14: 04
        -1
        The logic is simply divine! We have historical chronicles that show that all this did not work for 99.99% - Germany attacked the USSR simply super efficiently - in terms of the dynamics of the invasion, in the number of equipment and aircraft lost by the Soviets, in the number of surrounded troops, in what Achtung and what blood we needed evacuate the Baltic Fleet and so on ..
        All our efforts on the part of Finland were not crowned with success - the Finns quite easily reached the old border. These are all historical facts. And after that, you will argue that this has deprived the enemy of "advantageous positions"? Much more profitable. Moreover, the Soviet-Finnish war unequivocally turned Finland against us - if we look at the worst-case neutrality of the Scandinavian states during the war, it will be generally obvious that most likely, had it not been for the bloody Soviet-Finnish war, there would not have been Finland in Hitler's allies - after all, the pre-war Finnish society was not at all militarized. However, our actions "sawed down" the Nazis +1 ally - is this also Stalin's visionary genius?
        1. Sugar Honeyovich
          Sugar Honeyovich April 16 2021 16: 46
          +3
          Quote: Knell Wardenheart
          The logic is simply divine!

          Poorly said! good
          Quote: Knell Wardenheart
          all this did not work 99.99% - Germany attacked the USSR just super efficiently

          Is it possible, having included the ORDINARY logic, to argue that without all this, Germany would not have been able to attack so effectively? laughing
          Quote: Knell Wardenheart
          All our efforts on the part of Finland were not crowned with success - the Finns quite easily reached the old border.

          If they attacked directly from the old border, would the consequences be no worse for us? fool
          Quote: Knell Wardenheart
          And after that, you will argue that this has deprived the enemy of "advantageous positions"?

          Are you going to assert something else? Curious how you do it!
          Quote: Knell Wardenheart
          The Soviet-Finnish war unambiguously turned Finland against us

          True, but exactly the opposite - the winter war itself was caused by Finland's hostile attitude towards the USSR and its aggressive plans to create a "great Finland".
          Quote: Knell Wardenheart
          If we look at the worst-case neutrality of the Scandinavian states during the war, it will be generally obvious that most likely, if it were not for the bloody Soviet-Finnish war, there would be no Finland as Hitler's allies

          It is true about the Scandinavian countries that refused to vote in the League of Nations for the exclusion of the USSR from it. About Finland - absolutely not. Hitler's allies would have been indispensable. hi
          1. Knell wardenheart
            Knell wardenheart April 16 2021 16: 55
            -5
            Typically, the effectiveness of actions is measured by the degree of change in effectiveness relative to inaction. In this case, I do not see the difference between actions and inaction, because in both cases the regular army was defeated and the equipment was captured and destroyed, and the defensive lines were not significantly delayed. For me, this is clear evidence of the collapse of the plan, if it existed.
            Kamoon what kind of hostile Finland? Are you overeating whites? The Finns had one cartridge factory and 2 battleships, there were no tanks and they had been investing their scanty defense budget in the Mannerheim line for several years. Let's wake up, stop gushing with fantasies ..
            Finland-Sweden-Norway at that time already thoroughly coordinated their foreign policy. Expecting the Finns to be Hitler's allies without Sweden is a big naivete, but our actions pushed Finland to this.
            1. Sugar Honeyovich
              Sugar Honeyovich April 16 2021 17: 26
              +3
              To fully appreciate the effectiveness of actions, you need to replay history, and this is impossible. But the border passing at Brest, and not at Minsk and at Vyborg, and not Leningrad, is still not the same thing. We can say that the pre-war actions did not bring the EXPECTED result, but that there would be no difference at all in both options - this, you know, is a strong fantasy ...
              Quote: Knell Wardenheart
              Kamoon what kind of hostile Finland?

              The same one. One and only.
              Quote: Knell Wardenheart
              The Finns had one cartridge factory and 2 battleships, there were no tanks

              And at the same time, there was confidence in the ability to resist the USSR alone for at least six months, an attempt to attack in the first week of the winter war and the intentions "to get the Svir and the White Sea-Baltic Canal" and even "to unite all the peoples kindred to the Finns up to the Urals." And in general, "With its East Karelian policy, Finland more and more alarmed the Soviet government and made them think about strengthening the security of Leningrad", "Finland, due to the adventurousness of its government, got involved in the Winter War that determined its fate" (all quotes from H. Seppel).
              So I don't know who the henbane ate ... of you, but facts are a stubborn thing.
              Quote: Knell Wardenheart
              Expecting the Finns to be Hitler's allies without Sweden is a big naivete

              At that time, a distinct reality. With one clarification - for the time being the Finns wanted to be friends with England against the USSR, but when it turned out that Hitler was stronger ...
              1. Zakirov Damir
                Zakirov Damir April 16 2021 23: 03
                0
                To fully appreciate the effectiveness of actions, you need to replay history, and this is impossible. But the border passing at Brest, and not at Minsk and at Vyborg, and not Leningrad, is still not the same thing. We can say that the pre-war actions did not bring the EXPECTED result, but that there would be no difference at all in both options - this, you know, is a strong fantasy ...

                I agree! And one more thing - the territories of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and the Baltic states were joined, with an extremely unfriendly population, Russophobic and anti-Soviet. I wonder how much they would have managed to recruit into the Wehrmacht from the 22 million population of these territories from September 1939 to June 1941 and "run in" in the fields of Europe in two years? I believe that Germany's allies would not be needed!
                1. Knell wardenheart
                  Knell wardenheart April 16 2021 23: 59
                  -1
                  In fairness, these people deserted and surrendered in batches at the beginning of the war. You can't be cute, you know ..
                  So in this regard, it was exchanged for soap, and then this is not the whole story - these "Russophobic" moods did not arise out of nowhere, advice came and made people hello, imposing on them their OWN, SOVIET understanding of how you have to live, what to believe, who is good, who is bad (and who needs to go on a tour of Siberia). Before all this splendor, many of these people (but, of course, not all) did not give a damn about the USSR or Germany - as, in fact, many Spaniards from the "blue division", before their relatives died in the Civil or many of the Spanish antifa, who were forced to emigrate to the USSR. Events do happen - and these events often determine people's attitudes towards certain countries.
                  Russophobia always has roots in general, this phenomenon does not arise from scratch. You can cause these ferments, you can support them, but the fact is that for the above territories, our policy has become a part of their history - small, insignificant episodes for our history and our scale, have become the worst that happened in their history. For example, you go and crush a small anthill - for you this event is insignificant, small - but for ants it is the end of the world. This difference in perception comes from the incomparability of values, it must be understood when we do something at the state level. Perhaps then our country will make friends more often than lose them, win sympathy more often than antipathies.
                  1. Kwas
                    Kwas April 20 2021 17: 01
                    0
                    As for the allied peoples, I think the USSR outplayed Germany outright. Okay, for Germany there are different "banderlogs" and "forest brothers", and for the USSR - the peoples of the USA, England, China, France ...
                2. Sugar Honeyovich
                  Sugar Honeyovich April 17 2021 05: 36
                  +1
                  Quote: Damir Zakirov
                  with an extremely unfriendly population, Russophobic and anti-Soviet

                  And so and not so. Let's say in Zap. In Belarus, the Poles could treat the Russians badly, but the Belarusians and Jews, whom the "Red Army liberated from the Poles" - quite the opposite. The Poles confirm this. On the West. Ukraine earlier opposed the Austrians, then against the Poles, then against the "Muscovites". Tradition, however. From Hungary, when the border with the USSR was formed in 1939, Rusyns fled to it. In the Baltics, especially in Lithuania, in 1940 they jumped for joy that they were being annexed to the USSR, but feeding at a common table is one thing, and working, let alone fighting, is ... In our time, too: on the one hand. " forty years of occupation ", on the other:" Russians, conquer us back! " Mysterious Baltic soul ...
        2. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA April 19 2021 10: 37
          +1
          Quote: Knell Wardenheart
          The logic is simply divine! We have historical chronicles that show that all this did not work for 99.99% - Germany attacked the USSR simply super efficiently - in terms of the dynamics of the invasion, in the number of equipment and aircraft lost by the Soviets, in the number of surrounded troops, in what Achtung and what blood we needed evacuate the Baltic Fleet and so on ..

          Now let's imagine the Baltics-41, but from the border of Narva. Or a strike from the Baltic states to the flank-rear of the ZOVO. Plus, without the Baltics, the front at the beginning of the war increases by 600 kilometers relative to the real.
          Or do you think that without the PribOVO and the reunited territories, the Red Army-41 will magically transform into the Red Army at least 1943 by the beginning of the war? There is no such thing. I'll tell you more - it won't even become RKKA-41, but it will remain the same RKKA-39, which is described in the NCO Transfer Act. And so Voroshilov will be the people's commissar - for in order to overthrow him, the SPF was needed, which exposed the gaping heights of the failure of the combat training of the Red Army.
          Quote: Knell Wardenheart
          Moreover, the Soviet-Finnish war unequivocally turned Finland against us - if we look at the worst-case neutrality of the Scandinavian states during the war

          The neutrality of the Scandinavian states - is Finland fighting on the side of the Reich, Quisling's Norway and Sweden actively cooperating with the Germans, passing troops and military cargo through its territory? wink
    3. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA April 16 2021 14: 36
      +6
      Quote: Knell Wardenheart
      The second drawback, in my opinion, was the almost complete inattention to the two-year study of the tactics and strategy of the Wehrmacht - on June 22, 1941, for almost two years we observed how the GG was working with tanks and aircraft in various landscapes and countries, against armies, against defense, etc.

      We haven't watched. We peeped through the keyhole through the cloudy glass of "press reports" and "intelligence". And then, on the basis of fuzzy pictures, they tried to understand - what was it, and how could we use it?
      Here, for example, is the French campaign as presented by our intelligence:
      ... for the offensive, the Germans deployed 90 divisions on the Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourgish border, including 15 tank and motorized ones, and 40 more divisions on the French border (and on May 10, 1940, according to intelligence, the Germans had more than two hundred divisions). Acting under the cover of about nine thousand combat aircraft, widely using "new techniques and methods of warfare" and "new offensive weapons (heavy tanks, motorcycle units, dive bombers, airborne troops)", German troops in the shortest possible time "penetrated deep into the territory of France, reached the coast of northern France and thus separated the Belgian group of allies from the main forces of France, surrounded the Belgian group of allies of up to 60-70 divisions, "however, losing two thousand combat aircraft and about half a million people killed and wounded. "Only in the vicinity of Rotterdam was a landing of 15 thousand people armed with machine guns, light weapons, anti-aircraft guns and light tanks." The Wehrmacht, according to Soviet intelligence, broke into the fortifications of the Maginot Line with heavy tanks armed with 100-mm cannons (however, the data on the combat weight of heavy tanks differed - according to some sources, the German T5 and T6 heavy tanks weighed 60 tons , other sources were limited to "only" 32 tons). At least 2-3 German tank divisions, according to the same valiant reconnaissance, had one regiment of heavy tanks each, however, other sources reported the creation of two divisions from 35-ton heavy tanks. German motorcyclists, according to comrades Stirlitz, rolled across the fields and roads of Belgium and northern France in groups of up to sixty thousand people.
      © Ulanov / Shein
      Quote: Knell Wardenheart
      Was it possible for almost 2 years to prepare theoretical considerations on flexible defense in this regard?

      Theoretical - you can. The problem is that in practice there is nothing to implement the theory. Flexible defense involves maneuvering fire weapons. And we have only two tractors for the artillery, which provide a towing speed comparable to that of motorized mechanized units. The first one is "Komsomolets", which does not pull more than 45 mm (and 45 mm with its armor penetration is no longer an anti-tank gun). The second - "Voroshilovets", which are worth their weight in gold in ARGK and rembats. And that's all.
      Why are there tractors - in the pre-war Red Army, even the usual three-ton trucks are not enough.
    4. zenion
      zenion 6 June 2021 21: 44
      0
      It was also bad that there was no wireless connection. Only two factories produced radio tubes for receivers and transmitters. Several factories made resistors, capacitors, and wires. There was not enough copper for the wires. The Red Army was supplied with radio communications by Germany under a treaty. In addition, there was sabotage. You can swing your fists if you are stronger than your opponent. So the West was waiting for the USSR to make a mistake and declare the country an aggressor and help Hitler with all his might. Hitler was convinced that they would not go against him, and they held out for three years. But when the Red Army began to liberate Europe, the capitalists could not stand it. The rhino is already lying, it is necessary to quickly settle down and eat as much as possible, not to let the bear rip off its skin completely.
  • Shiden
    Shiden April 16 2021 12: 09
    -1
    The article was clearly written to justify the party-military leadership of the USSR for being unprepared for war, while the leadership constantly reminded that the country was in a hostile ring of capitalist countries, and that sooner or later the capitalists would attack the state of workers and peasants. Saying that Germany retained military cadres in the 20s seems to be inappropriate and what the Soviet military did in those years, they did not make a career for themselves. After all, in the 20s and mid-30s the economic situation in Germany and the USSR was almost the same, the army did not there was money and the political leadership did not seem to pay attention.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA April 16 2021 14: 42
      +6
      Quote: Shiden
      Indeed, in the 20s and mid-30s, the economic situation in Germany and the USSR was almost the same,

      The political situation was different. After the solution of the Silesian question, Germany in the 20s was practically in hothouse conditions - its borders were kept by Versailles and the League of Nations. Accordingly, von Seeckt could build an "army of commanders" with near-zero combat value and serving exclusively to train commanders for the future Wehrmacht.
      We have ... a cordon sanitaire (Romanians, Poles, Finns), the boiling cauldron of Central Asia, the same boiling cauldron of China, smoothly growing into Manchuria with the Kwantung Army. And two loosely coupled theaters, in one of which the war broke out in 1929. Here army commanders not to build - traditional armed forces are needed, and in a quantity sufficient to fight off the Chinese or Japanese on the same Far East.
      1. Shiden
        Shiden April 16 2021 16: 42
        0
        I would not say that the political and economic situation in Germany in the 20s and early 30s was hothouse, President Ginsburg hoped only for the Reichswehr so ​​that the country would not slide into a civil war between the right and the left. And in those years, some senior military leaders went to study in Germany that von Seeckt's secrets were not seen or did not read the works of German military leaders where they analyzed the lessons of the First World War. What prevented the preparation of junior and middle command personnel. And at 41, the Germans waged a mobile war, the civil war in the USSR was also like that. But the heroes of the civil war were not ready for such a turn.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA April 16 2021 18: 04
          +3
          Quote: Shiden
          I would not say that the political and economic situation in Germany in the 20s and early 30s was greenhouse

          Foreign policy the situation was hothouse. There was no need to build an army on the assumption that they would have to fight tomorrow.
          Quote: Shiden
          What prevented the preparation of junior and middle command personnel.

          To begin with, there is a low level of literacy of future commanders.
          For example, in 1929, 81,6 percent (and 90,8 percent in infantry schools) of ground forces admitted to military schools had only elementary education or none at all! In January 1932, 79,1 percent of cadets of military schools had primary education, in January 1936, 68,5 percent (but in armored ones, 85 percent).

          Plus - money. More precisely, there is a shortage of them even for food for military personnel. Until the beginning of the 30s, the Red Army lived approximately like the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the 90s.
          Quote: Shiden
          And at 41, the Germans waged a mobile war, the civil war in the USSR was also like that.

          Our army has not yet waged a real, serious war. Civil war is not a real war, because it was a war without artillery, without aircraft, without tanks, without mortars. Without all this, what a serious war is this? It was a special war, not a modern one.
          © IVS
          1. Shiden
            Shiden April 16 2021 19: 44
            0
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Our army has not yet waged a real, serious war. Civil war is not a real war, because it was a war without artillery, without aircraft, without tanks, without mortars. Without all this, what a serious war is this? It was a special war, not a modern one.

            Yes, and Comrade Stalin did not fight under Tsaritsin where for the first time the whites used tanks and the artillery saved the situation. Kakhovka, the Soviet-Polish where both aviation and tanks were used, and not on the same scale as in World War II, but it was used. After all, from the experience of these battles already in the 20s. began to create experimental tank, aviation structures and it was for mobile warfare.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA April 19 2021 11: 13
              0
              Quote: Shiden
              After all, from the experience of these battles, already in the 20s, they began to create experimental tank and aviation structures, and precisely for mobile warfare.

              Uh-huh ... and as a result, they ordered tank brigades, suitable only for escorting infantry. For a huge number of plans rested on the budget and industry. And "tank brigades of mobile warfare" in practice found themselves without motorized infantry and artillery.
  • ccsr
    ccsr April 16 2021 13: 00
    +3
    In general, the article is quite balanced and well-reasoned, which commands respect for the author of the study - at least for me. During my stay at the VO forum, there have been so many "professional military historians" who carried all sorts of heresy that this material can serve as an example for everyone else, at least from the point of view of studying little-known facts of our military history, and in particular for assessing the personalities of that time.

    True, in my opinion, the author allows a somewhat arbitrary interpretation of Zhukov's words, if only because Zhukov is not a member of the government, and it is not in his competence to go to the government with a proposal to declare war or not, because he is only a deputy. People's Commissar of Defense, and no one canceled the subordination in the army:
    Author: Maxim Zarezin
    Consequently, it was too late to declare war on June 13, as Zhukov and Timoshenko had proposed, and even on May 13. The Germans could have easily forced the transfer of troops and attacked all the same unmobilized units and formations of the Red Army.

    Yes, and they offered to carry out mobilization, and without specifying which one, so this could hardly be interpreted as an obligatory reason for Hitler to go to war.
    «You propose to conduct mobilization in the country, to raise the troops now and move them to the western borders?

    Moreover, it is now known that the date of the war had already been determined on June 10, and on June 13, the proposal of Timoshenko and Zhukov looked quite reasonable:
    June 10, 1941 by Order No. 1170/41 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Halder "On the appointment of the date for the start of the offensive against the Soviet Union" was determined; "one. June 1, 22 is proposed to be considered the D-day of Operation Barbarossa. 2. In case of postponing this deadline, the corresponding decision will be made no later than 18 June.

    One can guess why their proposal was not accepted, but I think in this case Stalin did not have accurate data from our intelligence structures that Halder's directive went to the troops and is being executed. I do not exclude that RU KA learned about this directive by some signs and data, and Golikov reported to Zhukov about it, which is why they rushed to the Kremlin to Stalin with their proposals.
    However, everyone is free to assess this proposal of June 13 as he pleases, but I do not see anything unnatural in it, and if the mobilization began at least from May 15-16, then Hitler would hardly have begun to cancel Halder's directive, and gave the order about an urgent attack. But why Tymoshenko and Zhukov did not insist on their proposal, we are unlikely to find out when, although in my opinion, they were simply not those personalities whose opinion the leader of the peoples would appreciate.
    1. VS
      VS April 16 2021 19: 47
      -10%
      Quote: ccsr
      One can guess why their proposal was not accepted, but I think in this case Stalin did not have accurate data from our intelligence structures that Halder's directive went to the troops and is being executed.

      You, like Isaev, do not want to understand the simple logic of Stalin - the OBJECTIVE POLITICAL reality of those days! ANY bunch in this matter and the more official MOBILIZATION that will immediately become known in Berlin HERE gives Hitler JUSTIFICATION for his ATTACK on the SSR as a PREVENTIVE - WITH ALL the ensuing consequences for the SSR, and this - the position of the United States was like this - the AGGRESSOR should not be helped! TOKYO will be obliged to help the VICTIM of aggression - according to the Berlin Pact of 27 Sept. 40th! and for us this is the second front right there in the Far East Military District! And AGGRESOR in this case is no longer Germany but the USSR!
      1. ccsr
        ccsr April 16 2021 21: 46
        0
        Quote: V.S.
        You, like Isaev, do not want to understand the simple logic of Stalin - the OBJECTIVE POLITICAL reality of those days! ANY bunch in this matter and the more official MOBILIZATION that will immediately become known in Berlin HERE gives Hitler JUSTIFICATION for his ATTACK on the SSR as a PREVENTIVE - WITH ALL the ensuing consequences for the SSR and this - the position of the United States was like this - the AGGRESSOR should not help!

        Mobilization itself without crossing the border cannot be considered a declaration of war, so there is no need to frighten us with this, especially since Britain and France did not declare war on the USSR even after the partition of Poland in 1939. But even then they could call us aggressors, but somehow they abstained, and later they also became allies.
        Quote: V.S.
        And AGGRESOR in this case is no longer Germany but the USSR!

        Well, why after 1939 we were not called the aggressor and did not start a war against us, since we had a Treaty with Germany?
        1. VS
          VS April 17 2021 09: 18
          -9
          Quote: ccsr
          You, like Isaev, do not want to understand the simple logic of Stalin - the OBJECTIVE POLITICAL reality of those days! ANY bunch in this matter and the more official MOBILIZATION that will immediately become known in Berlin HERE gives Hitler JUSTIFICATION for his ATTACK on the SSR as a PREVENTIVE - WITH ALL the ensuing consequences for the SSR and this - the position of the United States was like this - the AGGRESSOR should not help!

          Mobilization itself without crossing the border cannot be considered a declaration of war, so there is no need to frighten us with this, especially since Britain and France did not declare war on the USSR even after the partition of Poland in 1939. But even then they could call us aggressors, but somehow they abstained, and later they also became allies.

          Ie Stalin was once the mobilization OFFICIALLY refused to cut in at the request of the genius Zhukov Before the start of the war BEFORE the German attack?

          Finya introduced mobilization on June 17 and the SSR hit them after June 22! Although the Finns did not cross the border first !! ARE WE A AGGRESSOR or NOT? NO - NOBODY except the idiot Markushka Solonin considers the SSR an aggressor in THIS case!

          Often times - the official MOBILIZATION introduced in those days by us - which will immediately become known in Berlin - HERE gives Hitler the JUSTIFICATION for his ATTACK on the SSR as a PREVENTIVE - WITH ALL the consequences for the SSR, and this - the position of the United States was like this - the AGGRESOR should not be helped!

          You read Hitler's NOTE WHAT he accuses of the SSR and HOW does he justify his attack? correctly - as an ACT OF PROTECTION against the impending attack by the SSR - as a PREVENTIVE blow because SSR has already started MOBILIZATION !! Did the Germans come out to prove this? NOT! And they created on June 17 the Abwehr team to search for DOCUMENTS confirming that the mobilization was started in the SSR, including but they could not find ANYTHING!

          Shaposhnikov's words about what MOBILIZATION is and is it an act of war to lead or will you find it yourself? You are not tired of shielding the fool of Zhukov like Isaev?
          1. ccsr
            ccsr April 17 2021 16: 35
            +2
            Quote: V.S.
            Often times - the official MOBILIZATION introduced in those days by us - which will immediately become known in Berlin - HERE gives Hitler the JUSTIFICATION for his ATTACK on the SSR as a PREVENTIVE - WITH ALL the consequences for the SSR, and this - the position of the United States was like this - the AGGRESOR should not be helped!

            Generally speaking, mobilization can be of several types, including those related only to military districts and the People's Commissariat of Defense, for which each district developed its own mobilization plan. I have already explained to you more than once that the mobilization plans of the districts began to be introduced even before Molotov's speech, approximately from 11.00:22 on June 22. What prevented the introduction of the district plans of the four border districts with the established cipher telegram before the start of the war, without announcing the mobilization of the entire country on June XNUMX?
            What type of mobilization Tymoshenko and Zhukov proposed to Stalin on June 13, neither you, not everyone else writing on this topic, do not know, because this issue could be discussed during the meeting itself, and not be documented. So your assertion that mobilization measures mean the beginning of a war is devoid of common sense if mobilization was carried out selectively for the border districts.
            Quote: V.S.
            Shaposhnikov's words about what MOBILIZATION is and is it an act of war to lead or will you find it yourself?

            Our mobilization was announced on June 22, 1941, but for some reason Japan, Germany's ally, did not attack us - it turns out that Shaposhnikov did not foresee this for Japan?
            Moreover, did the mobilization activities of some districts and the GSVG in 1968 in connection with the Czechoslovak events served as the beginning of the war on the part of NATO? Maybe it's enough to speculate on theoretical statements and consider facts from our real history?
            Quote: V.S.
            FORMALLY, the USA and England HAD NO claims to the SSR - because the SSR did not attack Poland together with Germany - they observed the formalities and brought in the troops AFTER the Polish government fled and then the LYAKHI gave the order - not to fight with the Red Army !!

            Formally, they were obliged to declare war on us, because the Polish government in exile was in London, i.e. the British recognized him as the plenipotentiary representative of the Polish authorities, and they did not sign the act of surrender. So no need to refer to dead examples - just with Poland, this option does not work, because the Polish government existed throughout the war and even led the Home Army, which fought against Hitler and against our Red Army.
            1. VS
              VS April 18 2021 09: 18
              -5
              Quote: ccsr
              your assertion that mobilization measures mean the beginning of a war is devoid of common sense if mobilization was carried out selectively for border districts.

              This is not my statement ... This is NOT the beginning of the war, but a reason for the Germans to ACCUSE the SSR as the aggressor with whom they have a Treaty of Friendship and Borders and that means this justifies a preventive strike on us from their side!
              You have already said more than once, WE DO NOT SHOULD project what you know from YOUR service in the SSR of the 80s without thinking about the events of those days))

              Molotov explained to Chuev - we will move the troops and here they will even declare us AGGRESSORS! WHAT were the allies of the SSR in those days?

              Quote: ccsr
              Our mobilization was announced on June 22, 1941, but for some reason Japan, Germany's ally, did not attack us - it turns out that Shaposhnikov did not foresee this for Japan?

              Stalin foresaw that Japan would not attack))
              There was NEUTRALITY from Tokyo and mobilization was introduced AFTER Germany attacked us - and we DIDN'T ATTACK FIRST on her ally and NOBODY could prove that we were the aggressor - although Hitler tried to prove this in NOTICE and throughout the war constantly convinced himself and those around him that he attacked in defense! That is, Tokyo HAD NO reason to enter the war, although the one who signed neutrality with Stalin in April and was removed from the prime minister))



              Quote: ccsr
              Maybe it's enough to speculate on theoretical statements and consider facts from our real history?

              may be enough to consider Stalin id..tom not understanding what he was doing? Or do you think you are smarter than STALIN? You do not want to take into account the POLITICAL moments of the situation and constantly project YOUR experience of service as universal on the events of those days literally. And there were OTHER people and situations)) in JUNE 41, Stalin could not afford to substitute the SSR for the role of the aggressor, because at that time he did not have allies, and those who dragged Hitler to power were just waiting for the opportunity of the SSR to DESTROY - and substitute Stalin with the mobilization of FORMAL - we would be a ZVIZDETS - the USA would stupidly take FULL neutrality towards us, and there they would also OPENLY help Germany ..

              Cho you to this mobilization as id.ot Isaev clung then? In the General Staff, the plans were so detailed that there was NO mobilization in them BEFORE the war began, YOU WOULD be foreseen! Well, there was not, and that's all))) They wrote that there is enough SD on the border brought up to 12 thousand, and while they are fighting and the rest of the army is mobilized - after all, the Germans will not hit us with their TGs! THIS WAS in your Zhu's plans. scheduled !!
              THAT was the reason. Well, Stalin would have introduced mobilization - June 1 - WHAT would his mother change in the plans of the General Staff - Would the front ON THE BORDER become LESS for those 42nd SDs that were registered there? Well, it would not be 12, but 14 thousand fighters in them - for 40 KM OF BORDER they have - WHAT WOULD CHANGE IT ??
              INSTEAD of formal mobilization, the BUS carried out this with NORMAL, sharpened not for our retaliatory strike, but for field defense against the TG Germans - it would be quite ENOUGH! IF the plans in the General Staff would be adequate to what had to be expected from the tank blitzkrieg of the Germans !!!

              Quote: ccsr
              Formally, they were obliged to declare war on us, because the Polish government

              So they did not announce it - thanks to the wisdom of STALIN that did not immediately enter the troops at Hitler's REQUEST, but presented it as an act of saving the PEOPLE from the GERMANS!)))
              Did you read HOW the TASS message of June 13 appeared ??
              https://liewar.ru/nakanune-vojny/361-pisal-li-gitler-pismo-stalinu-14-maya-41-go-ili-kak-poyavilos-soobshchenie-tass-ot-14-iyunya-1941-g.html

              read - HOW EVERYTHING was not easy in those days - as YOU want ...
              How Stalin constantly left in 41 from the role of the aggressor and at the same time squeezed everything that was needed for the country and the United States from the Germans as much as possible)))
              1. ccsr
                ccsr April 18 2021 17: 28
                -1
                Quote: V.S.
                may be enough to consider Stalin id..tom not understanding what he was doing? Or do you think you are smarter than STALIN?

                I do not consider myself smarter, and I do not understand why Stalin did not give the command on June 13 to carry out a partial mobilization, especially since the Germans decided on the exact date of the attack on June 10. Moreover, I do not know why Stalin did not give the command on June 21 to enter cover plans in four border districts, but limited himself only to the Directive w / n, which in itself introduced disorganization in the districts, because the military councils of the districts did not receive a conditional signal to enter The PPs themselves began to improvise with their instructions to the troops.
                I don’t know who is more to blame for this, Stalin, Molotov, Timoshenko, but I think that in this case Stalin was simply a prisoner of his fears, and did not act decisively in the hope that it would be possible to delay the start of the war. This was his mistake in that situation, especially after Golikov reported that the war would begin in a few hours. And all your excuses about the "aggressor" at the end of the day on June 21 are already untenable, because the introduction of the Covering Plan did not provide for crossing the border without special instructions, which means that no one would have a reason to declare us aggressors.
                Quote: V.S.
                How Stalin constantly left in 41 from the role of the aggressor and at the same time squeezed everything that was needed for the country and the United States from the Germans as much as possible)))

                In April-May it played a role, in the first half of June - I admit, but on June 21 it was already nonsense and this is obvious to any military professional.
        2. VS
          VS April 17 2021 09: 19
          -8
          Quote: ccsr
          why after 1939 we were not called the aggressor and did not start a war against us, since we had a Treaty with Germany?

          WHAT did we have an agreement with Germany - on the section of POLAND or what?
          FORMALLY, the USA and England HAD NO claims to the SSR - because the SSR did not attack Poland together with Germany - they observed the formalities and brought in the troops AFTER the Polish government fled and then the LYAKHI gave the order - not to fight with the Red Army !! That is why England and the United States - since the Poles themselves are not at war with the SSR - they did not begin to roll a barrel on the SSR .. But HOW the Anglo-Saxons change their policy - Stalin knew better than you - at any moment, removing Hitler, they could declare Germany an innocent victim of aggression and if they did not help her openly, and they helped her until 1944, then they would not help US and they would not become our allies for sure ..
          1. zenion
            zenion 6 June 2021 22: 00
            0
            The Poles thought that the Germans would move and would not stop. The remaining Polish troops will join up with the Red Army and jointly hammer the Wehrmacht. Stalin warned Hitler that the Red Army had an order to reach the border, which would stop the Curzon line. Hitler gave the order to stop. And it turned out that the Poles had no one to unite with. But then they created the Polish army, which did not fight Hitler on the side of the USSR, but fled from the USSR with all its weapons.
  • strannik1985
    strannik1985 April 16 2021 13: 36
    +3
    Question 1
    Indeed, the slogans of official propaganda and the steps of the Soviet government were very different, propagating "with little blood, on foreign territory" the same people, in particular Voroshilov, increased the number of regions and enterprises exported at the beginning of the war.
    Question 2
    Unfortunately, BUSS 1941 was not a hidden mobilization, pay attention to the number of conscripted horses, cars and tractors, and then compare with the BUSS of 1939 (which were really hidden mobilization). Yes, indeed, units and formations were replenished with an assigned composition, but without means of propulsion / transportation, the division cannot raise the assigned weapons, ammunition, food and much more when leaving the PPD to the concentration areas.
    1. cavl
      cavl April 17 2021 09: 43
      +3
      1941 fees are just regular fees, the same as 1940 fees. Their dates have nothing to do with the expectation of the start of the war on June 22. Therefore, more than 50% of the recruited appointees were away from the border districts. Therefore, more than 100 thousand were to be called up later.
      Nobody writes that more than 1,6 million who were drafted in 1940 and returned to the national economy in the same year after the end of the training is an expectation of war in 1940.
      The number of those called up for training camps in 1941 is a pull on the ears of the alleged genius of the NPO leadership in anticipation of the war on June 22.
      I would ask a third question. How many of the 802 thousand people were untrained conscripts?
      If the leadership of the NPO is confident in the imminent start of the war, then it is necessary to call for the replenishment of the divisions with a trained staff. If these are planned fees, then not a small part of the contagent called up for fees should include an untrained composition
  • Alexey RA
    Alexey RA April 16 2021 13: 43
    +3
    And if we leave the mockery and ask question number 1: what was it necessary to convince the Soviet people of? In the fact that they will fight on their own land and bear huge sacrifices?

    Comrade Mehlis answers the question.
    The thesis about the invincibility of our Red Army was widely propagated in our country, but history does not know invincible armies. The wars of the past show us that even armies that have won brilliant victories for decades, in certain cases not only suffered setbacks and defeats, but even completely scattered and ceased to exist. Such a fate, for example, befell Napoleon's army, which for nearly two decades kept Europe under the soldier’s boot. You can also refer to the Japanese army, which was twice beaten by our Red Army in separate sections.

    War is an equation with many unknowns; this alone refutes the thesis of invincibility. The army, of course, needs to be educated so that it is confident in its abilities. The army needs to instill a spirit of confidence in its power, but not in the sense of boasting. Bragging about invincibility harms the army. Meanwhile, in the conditions of the Red Army and in the entire system of propaganda and agitation, a false understanding of the invincibility of the Red Army was most widely reflected. So, the draft field Charter of 1939 directly indicates that the Red Army "... exists as an invincible, all-destructive force. It is such, it will always be like that" (Art. I).

    These harmful trends manifested themselves quite widely during the battles near Lake Khasan and on the Khalkhin Gol River. They were especially acute in the first period of the war in Finland, and we had to pay extra blood for them.

    Conversations about invincibility lead people to conceit, oversight and disregard for the art of war, as well as individual defeats and temporary failures ... "

    That is, you need to know when to stop, comrades. Otherwise, the collision of propaganda with reality can have an absolutely demoralizing effect on citizens.
  • BAI
    BAI April 16 2021 14: 10
    +2
    The next step involved general mobilization. However, it was precisely this step that Stalin could not take.

    Here the following immediately comes to mind:
    Marshal of the Soviet Union Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov:

    “Mobilization is not only a sign of war, but also the war itself. A government order to declare mobilization is an actual declaration of war. ... In modern conditions, the mobilizing state must make a firm decision in advance about the conduct of the war. ... Under the general mobilization is meant such a fact when there can no longer be a return to a peaceful situation. ... We consider only general mobilization to be an expedient type of mobilization, as the exertion of all forces and means necessary to achieve victory. Mobilization is war, and we cannot imagine any other understanding of it ”.

    Zhukov could not help but know this.

    Here's another good fact about the quality of the command staff of the Red Army:
    In January 1924, the Central Committee appointed a special commission chaired by S.I. Gusev as part of M.V. Frunze, K.E. Voroshilov, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, N.M. Shvernik and others for a comprehensive examination of the state of the Red Army. After several months of work, the commission made a disappointing conclusion. “The Red Army, - said in the report of the commission, - as an organized, trained, politically educated and provided with mobilization reserves of force, we do not currently have. In its present form, the Red Army is incapable of combat. " The same destructive assessment was contained in the resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee, adopted based on the results of the work of the commission:

    "Having heard the report of the commission and the resolutions unanimously adopted by it, the plenum of the Central Committee states that there are serious shortcomings in the army (colossal turnover, complete unsatisfactory organization of supply, etc.) that threaten the army with collapse." (Antoshin AM Military reform 1924-1928. M .: RIO VYuA. 1951. S. 8.)
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA April 16 2021 18: 06
      +4
      Quote: BAI
      Here's another good fact about the quality of the command staff of the Red Army:

      My favorite:
      As a result of all these activities, the operational training of senior officers significantly increased and evaluated mediocre.

      © Report to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on the results of the combat training of the ZOVO for the winter of 1940-1941
      Then everything is no less beautiful.
      "Infantry.
      ...
      Conclusion: the units and formations of the district, fulfilling your demand for the coordination of companies and battalions, are quite ready for solving simple combat missions "


      “The training of mortar units and subunits is mediocre, with the exception of the 24th OMB, which is poor. The training of the 45th and 76th regiments of artillery is mediocre.
      ...
      The conducted artillery firing and viewing exercises showed that the division’s artillery of the District was prepared to perform combat missions in the main types of combat mediocre.
      ...
      The training of the regiments of the ARGK is mediocre, with the exception of 311 popes and 318 hap RGKs, whose training is poor. "
      © uv. A. Ulanov
    2. VS
      VS April 16 2021 19: 51
      -7
      But then in his memoirs he made an idiot actvino from STALIN)))
  • Alexey RA
    Alexey RA April 16 2021 14: 18
    +5
    In April-May 1941, a covert mobilization of the military-liable reserve was carried out under the cover of the "Big Training Camps" (BUS). In total, under this pretext, more than 802 thousand people were called up, which was 24% of the assigned personnel according to the MP-41 mobilization plan.

    We must look not at the number of personnel, but at the equipment. It is precisely the mobilization of technology that distinguishes BUSS from simple control systems.
    Here is the US-41:
    Allow non-profit organizations to attract 45 horses and 57.500 cars for training camps from the national economy for a period of 1.680 days, with distribution by republics, territories and regions according to the appendix.

    And here are the real BUS-39:
    Troops also received 634 horses, 117 vehicles and 300 tractors.
    © Meltyuhov
    As the saying goes - feel the difference. smile
    Moreover, out of the total number of those called up from the reserve, 466 people went to replenish the SD - for the entire European part, Siberia, Transcaucasia and Central Asia.
    And I still don't remember about the subtle moments of the US-41, like:
    - "The Military Council of the okrug / front, taking into account the interests of the national economy and local conditions, is allowed, without exceeding the total number of people attracted to the training camp, to make changes to the indicated dates for the training camp and to the number of people recruited for each formation and individual unit."

    - "When organizing training camps, require commanders of units to inform the heads of industrial enterprises, collective and state farms in advance about the forthcoming attraction of military personnel from these enterprises and farms to training camps."

    Source: https://litl-bro.livejournal.com/4736.html
    This made it possible to reinforce half of all rifle divisions of the Red Army (99 out of 198) located in the western districts, or divisions of the inner districts intended for transfer to the west.

    This made it possible to expedite the future transfer of these divisions to wartime states. The combat capability of the divisions increased slightly - for the means of propulsion, vehicles, and rear services in them remained according to the states of peacetime.
    1. zenion
      zenion 6 June 2021 22: 07
      0
      My grandfather said that from the MTS, already during the war, tractor operators, combine operators and car drivers were called up. But the strangest thing is that they did not get into the troops by specialty, but they were sent to the infantry and they were immediately surrounded. Who gave this order? Before the war, this region was subordinate to the Kiev district. Who commanded so. Grandfather got into the infantry and they had to be uniform and painted on the regiments, this was also not done.
  • Martin
    Martin April 16 2021 16: 21
    0
    After all, the Barbarossa plan was just based on the expectation that all Soviet troops would be located on the border and that, having destroyed them in the first weeks of the war, the Wehrmacht would continue to advance inland without encountering serious resistance, and would have achieved victory by November 1941 of the year.

    How shoud I understand this? Fully mobilized for DEFENSE from the German attack, the Red Army had to line up along the border? Not to occupy fortified areas, not to organize an echeloned defense, but to stand in dense rows in front of the border and wait for it to be surrounded? And on this was the Barbarossa plan built?
    Of course, I am not a military strategist, but for me this is nonsense.
  • Hagen
    Hagen April 16 2021 17: 02
    +1
    It would be correct to name the preparations for the relocation of critical production to areas inaccessible to enemy aircraft to those measures to prepare for war that the author pointed out. We already knew who this opponent would be. I would like to note that the transfer of industry was carried out not in the "bare field", but on the sites prepared for this according to the program approved back in 1938. Then the issue of creating a duplicate production for a wide range of products was considered. In 1941, evacuated production basically settled on those sites that were prepared before the war, with routes for the supply of raw materials and products, power supply, etc. necessary equipment. It was the preservation of production potential in 1941 that marked the collapse of the blitzkrieg and our future victory, albeit not a quick one. And this preservation began long before the beginning of the Second World War. We were preparing, therefore. And thoroughly.
  • Operator
    Operator April 16 2021 18: 31
    +1
    Well, general mobilization could provoke Germany to form the "Barbarossa" plan, well, the commanding personnel of the Red Army were raw, well, a multiple increase in the staff of the active army did not make it possible to ensure the military rallying of the newly created units and formations - so what?

    In 1941, the political and military intelligence of the USSR was eaten by Stalin with absolutely confirmed data on the concentration of most of the Wehrmacht on the western border of the USSR. Moreover, the same one-on-one was officially confirmed by the German government in response to a request from the USSR government - such as the indicated concentration is a disinformation measure under the plan to prepare for an attack on Britain.

    Even if you hammer in a bolt (as Stalin did) on intelligence information about an imminent attack on the USSR, then the concentration of troops of a potential enemy should automatically lead to an order with a date no later than May 1, 1941 about the withdrawal of Red Army units in the western military districts to field positions , the evacuation of the wives and children of command personnel into the interior of the country, preparation for blowing up all bridges without exception to a depth of 200-300 kilometers from the border, relocation of artillery depots and military hospitals from the border line, etc. etc.

    What prevented Stalin from doing this without any general mobilization, regardless of the degree of combat training of command personnel and the number of newly formed units and formations of the Red Army? The answer is nothing but Stalin's conceit.
    1. VS
      VS April 16 2021 19: 25
      -6
      Quote: Operator
      What prevented Stalin from doing this without any general mobilization, regardless of the degree of combat training of command personnel and the number of newly formed units and formations of the Red Army? The answer is nothing but Stalin's conceit.

      do not repeat nonsense from fools))))
      1. Operator
        Operator April 16 2021 21: 09
        +4
        Better tell me some of your cleverness - and we will appreciate.
        1. VS
          VS April 17 2021 09: 20
          -6
          you are unlikely to be able to))
          1. Operator
            Operator April 17 2021 11: 30
            +1
            Your attempt failed - see evaluation bully
            1. VS
              VS April 17 2021 13: 08
              -5
              there are a lot of us...
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA April 19 2021 11: 22
      +2
      Quote: Operator
      In 1941, the political and military intelligence of the USSR was eaten by Stalin with absolutely confirmed data on the concentration of most of the Wehrmacht on the western border of the USSR.

      They are the ones who portray themselves so clever in their memoirs. But in fact, the political and military intelligence of the USSR in 1941 was eaten by Stalin with absolutely confirmed data that until the end of the war with Britain, Germany would not attack the USSR, and before the start of the war the Reich would put forward claims through diplomatic channels.
      And as for the attack, the reconnaissance played a game of "attack, not attack". In the spring of 1941, intelligence agencies reported three times that an attack was imminent and canceled three times.

      And about the concentration of most of the Wehrmacht on the western border of the USSR - these are the intelligence officers after the war, so smart became when they learned the true number of the Wehrmacht. And before the war, they were blue-eyed about the fact that the Reich had 300 divisions, of which 120-130 were stationed along the border with the USSR. This does not seem to be a concentration of forces, but a barrier - and it coincided quite well with the misinformation about "120 divisions will ensure the safety of the Reich from the East during the landing on the Island."
      1. Operator
        Operator April 19 2021 11: 56
        -5
        You obviously missed everything - one adherent of the mistakes of Soviet intelligence on VO has already eaten the whole baldness of the readers with a series of articles with his overvalued ideas. However, a bunch of Soviet-German documents cited in the articles of the adherent only confirmed that the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, with the submission of its intelligence, slightly overestimated (in comparison with the fact) the number of Wehrmacht divisions on the western border, therefore the General Staff operated in reports to Stalin in the amount of more than 50% of the total number of German divisions of the first half of 1941 and made conclusions about the achievement of their critical number in May of this year.

        Therefore, your assumption about the belittling of the enemy's troops by Soviet intelligence does not correspond to the picture that Stalin possessed.

        Once again, the planning of defense measures is not based on fortune-telling "will attack / will not attack" on the daisy, but on information about the concentration of enemy forces on the border (it does not matter if this corresponds to the actual state of affairs or not). The result of receiving this information is automatic preventive actions - the withdrawal of their troops (what they are, in any quality and quantity) to field positions, etc. (see above).

        In addition to information about the military situation on the border, Stalin received political clicks on the nose from Hitler throughout the first half of 1941, who consistently rejected all Soviet proposals for an additional division of spheres of influence (such as the Black Sea Straits), which was in sharp contrast to the situation in 1939-40 with the surrender of the Baltic States, parts of Finland and Romania by Hitler.

        Any sane politician in Stalin's place would have concluded that in the process of preparing an attack on a third country (according to the German legend, Britain), they do not behave this way with the country in their rear (the USSR).

        Stalin got into a mess with Hitler not only as the Supreme Command, but also as a political leader.
    3. Vladimir
      Vladimir April 21 2021 13: 47
      +2
      As far as I know, the Fritzes were able to concentrate troops near our borders in just 5 days, incl. transfer from the Balkans. By May Day, there was no concentration yet.
      1. Operator
        Operator April 21 2021 13: 59
        0
        Are you talking about the data of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces on the number of Wehrmacht divisions in the border zone as of May 1, 1941?
  • VS
    VS April 16 2021 19: 24
    -7
    Avtar writes - "" Stalin did not say anything about the "non-declaration" of war. ""))

    Molotov spoke at noon on June 22 - Hitler attacked the declaration of war))) He secretly told Stadnyuk how it was - Stalin gave an order at 2 o'clock - until the military reported the invasion Not to take the note of the attack from the German ambassador))

    Avtar writes - clearly quoting "lessons and conclusions" - "" In April-May 1941, a covert mobilization of the military-liable reserves was carried out under the cover of the "Great Training Camps" (BUS). In total, under this pretext, more than 802 thousand people were called up, which was 24% of the assigned personnel according to the MP-41 mobilization plan. At the same time, in May, the deployment of the second echelon of cover in the western military districts began. This made it possible to reinforce half of all rifle divisions of the Red Army (99 out of 198) located in the western districts, or divisions of the inner districts intended for transfer to the west.

    The next step involved general mobilization. However, it was precisely this step that Stalin could not take. ""))

    And then he refers to the liar Isaev, who assures naive readers and viewers that Stalin only from JUNE 9 decided to press the red buttons))

    Avtar writes - "" Let's say that declaring war on Germany is a way out and a way to avoid the tests of the 41st. But here's the catch: from the beginning of mobilization to the complete transfer of the army and the rear to the military rails, time must pass ""))

    not so .. THIS was not a problem))) Declaration of war by us - or rather the very fact of mobilization and the more declaration of war on Germany is an ACT of aggression that would JUSTIFY Hitler his "preventive" blow about which he constantly whined later - they say he attacked USSR defending itself from the impending attack by Stalin!))) And this would also allow Tokyo to attack the USSR as an aggressor - in defense of Berlin - according to the Berlin practice of 27 Sept. 40th)))

    Avtar writes - "" If by some miraculous way the USSR succeeded in completely mobilizing and concentrating all the country's armed forces on the western border without any consequences, this would be a prelude to a tragic outcome, in comparison with which all the consequences of the "catastrophe of 1941" would have faded. After all, the Barbarossa plan was just based on the expectation that all Soviet troops would be located on the border and that, having destroyed them in the first weeks of the war, the Wehrmacht would continue to advance inland without encountering serious resistance, and would have achieved victory by November 1941 of the year. And this plan could have worked! ""))

    NOT SO)) ANY mobilization and withdrawal according to the plans of the General Staff of the troops would not have saved the situation because the plans themselves laid down the catastrophe of the Red Army! After all, according to these plans, the General Staff, which were basically written on the patterns of the plans of the General Staff from 1914, still - because of Timoshenko's stupidity, first of all - we are not preparing defense from the German TG, but we ourselves will trample into our dashing victorious offensive !!))) Because we are setting ourselves our own way the main forces are not against the main forces of the Germans - NORTHERN Polesie - but against the minor forces of the Germans - in UKRAINE!

    Avtar writes - "" None of even the most prompt and thoughtful actions of the Soviet military-political leadership to increase the combat readiness of the Red Army could change the course of events in a collision with the best army in the world at that time. "" _))

    Not this way.)))
    THIS was not the point))) the Wehrmacht was not so direct was omnipotent and omnipotent in comparison with the Red Army
    there was enough of a mess and a madhouse, and the tanks they had in principle were firewood)))
    The catastrophe was laid down in the PLANS of our General Staff initially - Timoshenko and Meretskov, which Zhukov brought to complete ...
  • VS
    VS April 16 2021 19: 49
    -8
    Quote: strannik1985
    Question 1
    Indeed, the slogans of official propaganda and the steps of the Soviet government were very different, propagating "with little blood, on foreign territory" the same people, in particular Voroshilov, increased the number of regions and enterprises exported at the beginning of the war.
    Question 2
    Unfortunately, BUSS 1941 was not a hidden mobilization, pay attention to the number of conscripted horses, cars and tractors, and then compare with the BUSS of 1939 (which were really hidden mobilization). Yes, indeed, units and formations were replenished with an assigned composition, but without means of propulsion / transportation, the division cannot raise the assigned weapons, ammunition, food and much more when leaving the PPD to the concentration areas.

    and WHO ripped off these BEADS?))) WHY were the communication parts on these BEADS not involved at all?
    1. strannik1985
      strannik1985 April 18 2021 10: 30
      +5
      and WHO ripped off these BEADS?

      No one tore them down, these are training camps for the preparation of the conscripts, nothing more.
      1. VS
        VS April 23 2021 08: 46
        -1
        Quote: strannik1985
        these are training camps for the preparation of conscripts, nothing more.

        yeah - and the withdrawal of the RGK armies to the western districts according to the plan of the General Staff on THESE days - they went for mushrooms))
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA April 19 2021 11: 32
      +3
      Quote: V.S.
      and WHO ripped off these BEADS?))) WHY were the communication parts on these BEADS not involved at all?

      You cannot disrupt what was not.
      There were no large training camps in 1941 - that is, hidden mobilization. There were the usual training camps. Which, after the war, in their memoirs turned into a BUS - so that the military, at least on paper, could show their foresight and foresight of the situation.
      Well, there is no hidden mobilization, the terms of which "for each formation and separate unit" can be postponed depending on local conditions, and about which the directors of factories and heads of collective farms are notified in advance. And there is no bus without mobilization of equipment either.
      1. VS
        VS April 23 2021 08: 44
        -1
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Quote: V.S.
        and WHO ripped off these BEADS?))) WHY were the communication parts on these BEADS not involved at all?

        You cannot disrupt what was not.
        There were no large training camps in 1941 - that is, hidden mobilization. There were the usual training camps. Which, after the war, in their memoirs turned into a BUS - so that the military, at least on paper, could show their foresight and foresight of the situation.
        Well, there is no hidden mobilization, the terms of which "for each formation and separate unit" can be postponed depending on local conditions, and about which the directors of factories and heads of collective farms are notified in advance. And there is no bus without mobilization of equipment either.

        Zakharov, why should he put himself in the best light in his work that only m .. would call his memoirs, if he did not sit in the General Staff in those days?)) Why would Makara call these fees to the General Staff in our time?))
  • Ryaruav
    Ryaruav April 16 2021 20: 04
    +5
    Khrushchev is a low-browed aphid
  • hermit
    hermit April 17 2021 01: 24
    0
    But in any case, their share does not exceed 3% of all commanders of the Red Army, which could not have any noticeable effect on the state of the officer cadres.

    And let's imagine that the Wehrmacht was subjected to repression on the same scale. I wonder how he would have fought in 1941? And in 1939, and in the 40th. Hitler would have shot Manstein, Guderian, Rundstedt, Halder and others. It's not worse, right?
    1. VS
      VS April 17 2021 09: 21
      -4
      Quote: hermit
      Hitler would have shot Manstein, Guderian, Rundstedt, Halder and others. It's not worse, right?

      did you put a number of military men like Guderians and Mansteins with Tukhachev's?)) funny)))
      Hitler also carried out purges in the Wehrmacht and then regretted that, following Stalin's example, he did not clean it anymore))
    2. Konnick
      Konnick April 17 2021 09: 31
      +4
      Would shoot Hitler Manstein, Guderian, Rundstedt, Halder

      History does not tolerate the subjunctive mood, but if Model had commanded a tank group instead of Guderian, then perhaps he would have taken Tula. And what is good about Guderian, Manstein? Yes, compared to the rest, they are the best, but during the war, Model, Scherner, Wenck and many others appeared.
      The retirement staff of the generals of the German army would turn into energetic and full of strength generals, capable of working 20 hours a day and giving orders on time.
    3. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA April 19 2021 11: 37
      0
      Quote: hermit
      Hitler would have shot Manstein, Guderian, Rundstedt, Halder and others. It's not worse, right?

      He-he-he ... I remember a famous scene from "Bunker" (Let Keitel, Jodl, Krebs and Burgdorf stay):
      It was necessary to kill the entire officer corps long ago, as Stalin did! I didn't go to the academy. But I myself, alone, conquered all of Europe! Traitors!

      Moreover, in 1945, he actually had such thoughts: the aristocratic officers betrayed the Fuhrer, it was necessary to get rid of them even before the war and train / educate new officers, loyal not to their caste, but to the Fuhrer and the Reich. Here Stalin did it - and where are the Russians now, and where are the German professionals.
    4. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA April 19 2021 11: 40
      0
      Quote: hermit
      Hitler would have shot Manstein, Guderian, Rundstedt, Halder and others. It's not worse, right?

      Von Rundstedt is the one who first gave stop orderand then persuaded the Fuhrer to approve it? Or the one who first left the Bastogne "corner post" on his flank, and then reported to the Fuehrer that the last offensive in the West must be urgently stopped and the units withdrawn to their original positions - otherwise they could be surrounded by a blow from Bastogne? wink
      1. zenion
        zenion 6 June 2021 22: 20
        0
        Hitler had a new officer cadre. In addition to the Wehrmacht, everyone forgot the SS, which was almost equal in number to the Wehrmacht. But the commanders of the Wehrmacht were outraged by the SS troops, who went ahead without fear of anything. In fact, France was conquered by the SS troops, not only France, but also the allies of France and England. When the SS were eager to finish off the troops in Dunkirk, they were surprised by Hitler's order to stop and not to attack. Thus, he gave Churchill the opportunity to later say that it was a real victory.
  • Avior
    Avior April 18 2021 23: 21
    +2
    The author simply avoids inconvenient facts.
    For example, the position of the USSR at the beginning of World War II on supporting Germany in its war with Britain and France, for example, expressed in the fact that England and France are aggressors, and they must stop an aggressive war against Germany, which was directly stated by the Soviet government in the person of Comrade ... Molotov. A similar move was made through the communist movement controlled by the USSR - the communists of France were categorically against the war of France against Germany, the American communists fought against the entry of the United States into the war against Germany.
    An inconvenient fact - after all, if the leadership of the USSR, in principle, allowed a war with Germany, then such a position played into Germany's hands, hence the conclusion - either German agents sat down in the Soviet leadership, which is absurd, or the position was erroneous.
    But the author pretends that none of this happened. And so on many positions.
    The topic is very important and interesting, but since the author analyzes it, it would be better not to undertake ...
  • Vladimir
    Vladimir April 20 2021 21: 25
    -1
    The most important thing: there would not have been 1917, and there would not have been 1941 either. I’m not even talking about the VOSR, but about the abolition of the one-man command of the Soviets during the period of diarchy. This is how it all started, or rather the army just ended.
    Further more. They tried to teach each cook to run the state. And every sergeant major to become a marshal. No wonder the best generals were not in the Red Army and, in the end, behind the cordon. Not the best several hundred generals from the General Staff were successfully cleared by 1941. Of the 250 thousand officers of the imperial army who fought on the side of the Reds, by June 1941 they remained in the ranks of 253. That is, 0,1 percent.
    In 1935-1937, academies and schools were cleared of the "former". Well, who could raise the new team shift? That's right, there is no one. The new generation of marshals did not graduate from either gymnasiums or real schools. Unless Rokossovsky had 5 classes at the Polish gymnasium. Can the art of war lie on such a shaky foundation? Probably not. Without high school - this is rubbing breeches.
    The German soldier learned the science of winning for six months and from dawn to dawn. Compare this to our Young Fighter Course. We add that 35 percent of the Soviet draft was generally illiterate. And this is 18 million - more than the entire German draft.
    My father, with a height of 170 cm, was always right-flanked. And the enemy had it on the left flank. After all, they never thought of the Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Germany.
    "A rare conscript climbs out for dimensions of 160 cm and 50 kg", - stated Alexander Bazarov, having studied the documents of the draft commissions that worked before the war in the present Kurgan region. 279 recruits - fellow villagers of Bazarov had an average height of 153 centimeters, an average weight of 52 kilograms "...

    The Finnish war showed Germany who xy is in the Red Army. The only tsarist general Gustav Karlovich Mannerheim with his amusing army wiped the noses of his Soviet colleagues for a long time. In the Second World War, by the way, too. It was the completely different level of the command staff of Germany and the USSR that caused the catastrophes of the first year of the Second World War. And the reason for the war itself, too. For otherwise, with such differences in the demographic, economic and geographical potential of the two countries, the leaders of the Reich obviously did not shine.
  • Tagil1
    Tagil1 April 29 2021 10: 57
    0
    Generally speaking, Khrushchev, of course, is right in many ways. In particular, the fact that the Red Army was not prepared at all to repel the aggression, therefore, a huge part of the blame for the catastrophic results of the war lies both with the leadership of the Red Army and with the leadership of the country as a whole and personally with Stalin. Another thing is that today, against the background of the adopted anti-constitutional laws and the policy of the site, it has become dangerous to discuss even these problems because of the threat of criminal prosecution.
  • Igor Ushakov
    Igor Ushakov 21 May 2021 18: 51
    0
    By the way, the Poles also managed to mobilize in September 1939 and did it help them?
    curiously, only recently an article was published about how the Poles did not have time to mobilize the entire army.
    Moreover, if by some miraculous way the USSR succeeded in completely mobilizing and concentrating all the country's armed forces on the western border without any consequences, this would be a prelude to a tragic outcome, in comparison with which all the consequences of the "catastrophe of 1941" would have faded.
    controversial statement. The Wehrmach smashed the Red Army in parts right up to Moscow itself, and only the Army Group "Center" actually achieved the intended tasks. It is not known whether the Germans would have been able to break into the defenses of the western districts if they had managed to concentrate the forces of the Red Army.
    The Red Army, having severed all ties with the past, at the turn of the 30s began not even from "zero", but rather "minus".
    In the Red Army there were a considerable number of officers of the tsarist army, and the analysis of losses by prisoners on the fronts of the First World War and the Second World War does not speak in favor of the quality of training for the officers.
    Did Kirponos rise to the occasion as a front-line commander in June-September 1941? The question is debatable.
    not at all. Negligently allowing the encirclement of the armies near Kiev, he had 2 adequate options - to keep the defense waiting for release, or to send troops to a breakthrough. He preferred to leave the command and with the headquarters try to escape the encirclement of the gardens, sacrificing troops at every clash with the enemy. The result is death, by no means heroic.
    Not the balance of forces, the quantity and quality of weapons and the difference in the combat readiness mode, but the personnel resource became the factor that predetermined the success of the Germans in the summer of 1941.
    human resources at all levels and determines the quantity and quality of weapons and combat training. What did the Red Army cost Tukhachevsky's miscalculations in the design and production of weapons, especially tanks.