Military Review

Support ships in the Tsushima battle: a mistake or a necessity?

321

On May 12, Vice Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky released the Meteor, Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Voronezh, Livonia and Kuroniya transports under the leadership of Captain 1st Rank O. L. Radlov to Shanghai. These ships had to wait in the wings to supply coal to either the entire 2nd Pacific Squadron retreating from the Strait of Korea, or its individual ships at the entrance of cruising operations against Japan.


With the main forces, eight support ships remained, which moved to the Korea Strait and took part in the Tsushima battle. Let's consider briefly each of them.

Transport "Anadyr" had a displacement of 17350 tons. Transported 7000 tons of coal, mines, counter-mines, shells, food, spare parts, repair materials. During the Tsushima battle, Anadyr led the convoy of transports and received only minor damage, including from a collision with the tug "Rus". At night the Anadyr lagged behind the squadron, and its commander, captain of the 2nd rank V.F. Ponomarev, decided to leave through the Korean Channel. Large reserves of coal allowed not to call at the nearest ports, and the ship headed for Madagascar. For a whole month nothing was known about the fate of Anadyr, and he was considered dead in Tsushima. But on June 14, Anadyr arrived in Diego Suarez and sent a telegram to Petersburg. Further, having received instructions, he returned to Russia.


Transport "Irtysh" had a displacement of 15000 tons. Transported 8000 tons of coal, 1500 pounds of pyroxylin, shells and food. In the battle on May 14, the ship received 20 hits, including a large hole in the bow through which water began to flow. The Irtysh lagged behind the squadron, and captain 2nd rank K.L. Yegormyshev sent transport to Vladivostok along the coast of Japan. But to stop the flow of water into the holds did not work: the pumps could not cope, the patch did not hold. By the evening of May 15, the situation became critical, and the team left the sinking ship.

Transport "Korea" had a displacement of 6163 tons. Transported coal, mines and spare parts. In the battle of May 14, he received one hole in the area of ​​coal pits, which he managed to close up, and several minor damage to the superstructures. After the end of the afternoon battle, Korea followed the cruisers of Admiral O. A. Enquist, but lagged behind them. Then the ship's captain, Dr. I.O. Zubov, headed for Shanghai, where he interned along with O. L. Radlova's transports.

The towing ship "Svir" had a displacement of 611 tons. In the battle on May 14, he saved teams from the Urals and Rus, received no serious injuries, and in the evening followed the cruisers back to the Strait of Korea. But at night the tugboat lagged behind the cruisers and caught them only at dawn on May 16. Admiral O.A. Enquist ordered Svir to follow to Shanghai, where she interned along with Radlov’s transports.


The towing ship "Rus" had a displacement of 1202 tons. In a battle on May 14, he received steering damage and, maneuvering only with machines, was rammed by Anadyr. "Rus" began to sink quickly and was abandoned by the crew.


The floating workshop “Kamchatka had a displacement of 7060 tons. In the battle on May 14, she lost track of the damage she received and was finished off by Japanese ships in the evening.


Hospital ship "Eagle" had a displacement of 8175 tons. Moving in the Korea Strait behind the squadron with identification lights under the flag of the Red Cross, the Eagle was spotted on the night of May 14 by a Japanese reconnaissance vessel fleetafter which the entire squadron was discovered. During the afternoon battle, the Eagle was detained by a Japanese auxiliary cruiser.

The hospital ship "Kostroma" had a displacement of 6800 tons. In the battle on May 14, Kostroma repeated the fate of the Eagle, that is, it was detained by the Japanese.

Out of eight supply ships to Vladivostok, not one of them could break. Three ships left through the Korea Strait, the five remaining either sank or were captured by the Japanese.

Support ships not only could not benefit the squadron, but significantly complicated its position.

Firstly, the hospital ship “Orel”, moving with lights, was spotted by the auxiliary cruiser “Sinano-Maru”, which was in the third line of patrol. Approaching the "Eagle", the Japanese scout noticed the smoke from the squadron and then the ships themselves. There is an opinion that if hospital ships went without lights or outside the main forces, the Russian squadron would pass the Tsushima Strait unnoticed. Would you find her on a foggy morning on May 14? This is a separate conversation.

Secondly, not being able to move faster than at a speed of 9 knots, support ships fettered the main forces, which were also forced to limit the progress to 9 knots. It is the low speed of the Russian squadron that is considered one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Russian squadron.

Thirdly, instead of one of its main functions - reconnaissance at the squadron, the cruiser of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was involved in protecting transports. This item was noted by the commission of inquiry:

... the squadron commander’s refusal from scouts and patrol vessels had a direct consequence of the surprise attack of the enemy fleet, and this surprise, under these conditions, resulted in the complete disruption of the squadron and the death of its 2 flagships at the beginning of the battle.

Another side of the "employment" of the cruisers was the Japanese ability to freely conduct reconnaissance. In the case of active operations by the cruising detachment, Japanese sentinel ships: the armed passenger liner Sinano-Maru and the 20-year-old Elswick cruiser Izumi would not dare to go alone. And if the troops acted, they would not have to count on effective control of the Korean Strait.

Thus, there were obvious negative consequences of the movement of support ships together with the main forces across the Sea of ​​Japan. But maybe they were needed before coming to Vladivostok? Let's look at what benefits they could still bring in the campaign.

Transports Overloading coal at sea was a big problem and took a lot of time. In addition, according to the testimony of the flagship navigator Filippovsky, overloads were carried out only in certain places, favorable in terms of weather. Thus, taking into account the fact that all the ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron preloaded more than enough coal to move to Vladivostok, there was no need for transport.

Tugboats. If warships lost their course from damage or breakdowns, they might have to be towed. But in conditions of a possible Japanese attack at any moment, it’s better to pull a warship, which will be more powerful, armored and armed. Thus, there was no need for tugboats.

Floating workshop. Even if the ship loses track, it is much easier to take it in tow than to make repairs at sea in the presence of a threat from the Japanese. Thus, there was no need for a workshop.

Finally, hospital ships are the only ships that could even theoretically help the squadron en route to Vladivostok, saving crews of sinking and taking on board the wounded from damaged ships. Why only theoretically? Because in practice, during the battle, the hospital ship was kept away from flying projectiles and could not quickly approach those in distress. And even after the battle it is very difficult to take the wounded, for the launch and reception of the boat you need to stop both ships. Keep up with the squadron? Or stop the entire squadron? And if the Japanese appear? In general, the risks are too great. And, as the experience of "Mongolia" in the Yellow Sea showed, no one even thought to transfer the wounded to a hospital ship.

As a result, we see that there were no objective reasons for leading support ships together with the main forces.

Now let's look at the presence of support ships in the squadron from the perspective of the possibility of their defense in the upcoming battle. On the Russian side, cover could be provided by 5 rank 1 cruisers (of which Vladimir Monomakh and Dmitry Donskoy were obsolete armored) and 3 rank 2 cruisers (of which the Diamond was armored and had no guns larger than 75 mm). From the Japanese side, they could attack the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th combat units: 14 armored cruisers, 1 obsolete armadillo and 1 obsolete armored cruiser.

If we calculate the ratio of guns with a caliber of 120 mm or more, then against twenty-nine 152 mm and thirty 120 mm Russian guns, the Japanese had (not counting the obsolete 305-320 mm guns) four 203 mm, forty-six 152 mm and ninety-four 120 -mm Thus, we can state no less than a twofold advantage of the Japanese forces in a potential attack on Russian transports. And if you take into account auxiliary ships and destroyers, the advantage of the Japanese will be even more noticeable! It turns out that Rozhestvensky did not have the forces capable of protecting support ships in the general battle. As part of the squadron, they were doomed to death.

Now we can make an unambiguous conclusion. The presence of support ships in Tsushima is a clear mistake.

The situation in which the squadron was engaged in battle in the cover of serving transports, with the main forces of the fleet sacrificed to their own supplies, is more than strange.

It summarized historical commission in the collection "Russo-Japanese War".

Then what was to be done with the support ships? There are several options for how they could be followed to Vladivostok (I have no doubt for a second of their need for Vladivostok). You can around Japan. It is possible through the Korea Strait, but the next night after the passage of the main forces, when the Japanese ships will be distracted by them. And for escorting support ships, it would be possible to single out the cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Vladimir Monomakh.
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  1. Pavel73
    Pavel73 15 June 2020 15: 04 New
    +2
    The mistake was the Tsushima battle itself.
    1. Doccor18
      Doccor18 15 June 2020 15: 18 New
      0
      Rozhdestvensky gave preference to a heavy armored fleet to the detriment of other classes of ships and emphasis on a general naval battle as the main means of achieving victory.
      And before leaving, at the head of the squadron, he already knew in advance that there were practically no chances to win. He was sent and he went.
      1. 27091965
        27091965 15 June 2020 16: 21 New
        +4
        Quote: Doccor18
        Rozhdestvensky preferred the heavy armored fleet to the detriment of other classes of ships and emphasized the general naval battle as the main one.


        So not only he thought, such an opinion existed at that time;

        "..... there is no need to build an armored cruiser, which would be just as expensive, but inferior in firepower and armor protection to an armadillo and at best had a speed advantage of two, three knots. The armored cruiser and armadillo in the near future will be combined in one project, resulting in a ship that has the best qualities of both.... "1899

        I think it makes no sense to blame Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky for this.
        1. unknown
          unknown 15 June 2020 20: 24 New
          +1
          Why blame him.
          Japanese armored cruisers, like the Garibaldis, were not speed cruisers.
          The cruiser should have an advantage in speed over the battleships.
          But this was not.
          The four English, like Italians, could go for a long time at a speed of 17 knots, a German - 16 knots, a Frenchman - 15 knots.
          In armament, they with an 8 "main caliber, and even with light" colonial "shells - were inferior not only to armadillos with 12" guns, but also with 10 ".
          Unsuccessful ships that were only very lucky.
          1. 27091965
            27091965 15 June 2020 21: 22 New
            0
            Dear ignoto. I honestly have always been interested in the question of why you call it;

            Quote: ignoto
            light "colonial"


            I am not well aware of the history of the creation of this weapon and shells for it, but I did not meet this name. This is pure interest, not an attempt to refute you.
          2. Senior seaman
            Senior seaman 15 June 2020 22: 24 New
            0
            Quote: ignoto
            The four English, like Italians, could go for a long time at a speed of 17 knots

            I remember a colleague Zemlyak denied this.
            1. rytik32
              16 June 2020 01: 22 New
              +1
              The Italians could not. About "Izumo" and "Iwate" there is infa that were more cheerful.
              1. Senior seaman
                Senior seaman 16 June 2020 09: 32 New
                +2
                Quote: rytik32
                The Italians could not.

                Could not what? Issue 20 knots?
                Judging by the pursuit of "Silent" could ...
                1. rytik32
                  16 June 2020 11: 11 New
                  +1
                  Quote: Senior Sailor
                  Quote: rytik32
                  The Italians could not.

                  Could not what? Issue 20 knots?
                  Judging by the pursuit of "Silent" could ...

                  Toga immediately write down 22 knots to them))) What are the little things?
                  1. Senior seaman
                    Senior seaman 16 June 2020 11: 19 New
                    +2
                    Why do I need it?
                    There are simply facts that do not fit into the allegations of Ignoto’s colleague (and at the same time yours), which colleague Comrade paid attention to at one time. (I apologize, he was a countryman at AI :))))
                    1. rytik32
                      16 June 2020 11: 43 New
                      0
                      Quote: Senior Sailor
                      There are just facts.

                      I apologize, but I do not see the facts confirming the speed of the Nissin at 20 knots while chasing the Silent.
                      Maybe my knowledge is scarce, but I have only information that the “Silent” could not go more than 22 knots and that the “Nissin” chased him for 6 hours. From this I have 20 nodes “Nissin” does not work.
                      Would you be so kind as to explain where the 20 nodes came from?
                      1. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 16 June 2020 12: 02 New
                        +1
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Would you be so kind as to explain where the 20 nodes came from?

                        The aforementioned colleague, Comrade, said that the “Silent” speed in the lag was the desired 20 knots, and the “Garibaldian” did not want to lag behind. However, making sure that the distance is not shortening, the Japanese spat and returned. Fortunately, this happened before the steam line did not survive on the destroyer.
                        Something like that.
                      2. rytik32
                        16 June 2020 14: 10 New
                        +1
                        Ok, let's read together.
                        From the July 28 combat report of the assistant senior engineer-mechanic of the destroyer Silent:
                        At dawn, we saw an enemy squadron heading south; I had to make a full move to get away from it, and then the cruiser “Nissin” separated from the squadron and chased after us, trying to push us away from the coast to which we took our course. The chase lasted about 4 hours, and the distance between us and the cruiser was almost unchanged, from which we can conclude that we had a knot move of 20–22, but could not develop a greater move, partly from the overload of the destroyer, partly from the fatigue of the crew that did not sleep all the night stood on watch in the heat, reaching 50 ° R
                        1. "Silent" walked to the shore, "Nissin" across to him. Those. this is not a one-by-one race, and you cannot compare the speed of ships sailing in different courses.
                        2. There is no information that they threw the lag, on the contrary, they figured their speed according to the speed of the Nissin :)
                      3. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 16 June 2020 15: 07 New
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        There is no information that they threw a lag

                        And what is the evidence that the mechanical lag is out of order?
                        Quote: rytik32
                        on the contrary, they figured their speed by the speed of the Nissin :)

                        And this follows from what? How could they know her?
                        And as for me, the fact that the Garibaldi was chasing the 22 nodal destroyer hints that his real move was slightly higher than the 17 knots indicated by his colleague. Because with a difference of five knots, the Japanese did not shine at all.
                        Again, refer to Valentine. All information about the poor progress of the "Asamoids" comes from Balakin's monograph, in which he, in turn, refers to the English officers who served as observers on the Japanese squadron. Valentine wrote that their reports or memoirs (I don’t remember already) were published and he found them ... but this is not there! request
                        In general, here of course, it is better to turn to him directly. Maybe more will appear? repeat
                      4. rytik32
                        16 June 2020 15: 18 New
                        0
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        All information about the poor progress of the "Asamoids" comes from Balakin's monograph, in which he, in turn, refers to the English officers who served as observers on the Japanese squadron.

                        There is also information about the real speed of asamoids in two collisions with the wok. So, in the first meeting, the wok broke away from the Asamoids, in the second there was also a moment when the wok went 17,5 knots with Rurik, and Kamimura could only 17.
                      5. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 16 June 2020 15: 54 New
                        +1
                        As far as I remember, a little bit wrong.
                        In the first meeting, the wok just did not have time to catch up before dark.
                        Judging by the route of the Japanese squadron depicted in Volume 3 of Meiji, the Japanese cruisers walked: 1) from the moment they turned after the Russians to 20 hours, that is, before the destroyers attacked, at an average speed of 15-16 knots, 2) s 20 hours to 21 hours had an average speed of 14 knots and, finally, 3) from 21 hours to the moment of refusing to chase the Vladivostok detachment - 18,5 knots.

                        And the second, over time, everything was in order and the wok could not leave even without the “Rurik”. Although the Japanese also failed to overtake him. As far as I remember, in the first exit, “Russia” and “Thunderbolt” have 18,5-19 knots. That is, the Japanese had no less, but not much more power.
                        Well, on the "Azuma" question ...
                    2. Saxahorse
                      Saxahorse 16 June 2020 23: 02 New
                      +1
                      Quote: Senior Sailor
                      And what is the evidence that the mechanical lag is out of order?

                      There would be a mechanical lag, speed specifically on it would be called. Most likely, when calling a 20-22 unit, the mechanic wondered at the speed of the machine. As was often done at that time.
                    3. Comrade
                      Comrade 17 June 2020 04: 05 New
                      +1
                      Quote: Senior Sailor
                      I refer to Valentine. All information about the poor progress of the "Asamoids" comes from Balakin's monograph, in which he, in turn, refers to the English officers who served as observers on the Japanese squadron. Valentine wrote that their reports or memoirs (I don’t remember already) were published and he found them ... but this is not there!
                      In general, here of course, it is better to turn to him directly.

                      Yes, Ivan, I confirm that in the collection of reports of the English attaches, seconded to the ships of the United Fleet, no information that the "Asamoids" were supposedly slow moving.
                      These reports were published during the Russo-Japanese War by specialized magazines.
                      There is another layer of reports of the same attaches, but they were kept secret until recently. Today they can be ordered, paid and read, but Balakin did not have access to them.
                      Therefore, what he wrote about the supposedly low-speed “Asamoids” with reference to the collection of reports is fiction. Or he misunderstood something in the text.
                    4. Saxahorse
                      Saxahorse 17 June 2020 22: 40 New
                      0
                      Quote: Comrade
                      Therefore, what he wrote about the supposedly low-speed “Asamoids” with reference to the collection of reports is fiction. Or he misunderstood something in the text.

                      I believe that this fiction is not of Balakin, of course, but of the journalists of those very specialized British publications. This can be seen even by how diligently reduced the quality of manufacture of the French and German cruisers compared to those ordered in Britain. Unambiguous anti-advertising.
                2. Comrade
                  Comrade 17 June 2020 05: 34 New
                  +1
                  Quote: rytik32
                  let's read together.

                  Report of the commander of the destroyer Lieutenant Maximov about how the destroyer “Kassuga”, mistakenly mistaken for the “Nisshin”, was chasing after his destroyer.

                  There are also reports of Lieutenant Sakhnovsky and Midshipman Sakharov, and there also not it is said that the Japanese cruiser was, as you say, the destroyer
                  across
                3. rytik32
                  17 June 2020 08: 16 New
                  +1
                  Quote: Comrade
                  There are also reports of Lieutenant Sakhnovsky and Midshipman Sakharov, and it also does not say that the Japanese cruiser was, as you say, the destroyer
                  across


                  one of the meanings of the highlighted word "across."
                  Next
                  chased after us, trying to push us away from the coast to which we took our course


                  Dear Valentine, let's return to the most important, where is the confirmation that the Japanese cruiser was 20 knots?
                4. Comrade
                  Comrade 17 June 2020 16: 03 New
                  +1
                  Quote: rytik32
                  one of the meanings of the highlighted word "across."

                  Read the report of the destroyer commander carefully.
                  a) According to the commander of the destroyer, "armadillos" chased after him.
                  b) Battleships "took to the intersection."
                  c) The destroyer changed course several times.
                  Now attention!
                  d) The Japanese saw that the destroyer was leaving.
                  e) The Kassuga separated from the squadron and continued the pursuit alone.
                  Quote: rytik32
                  let's return to the most important, where is the confirmation that the Japanese cruiser was 20 knots?

                  Dear Alexei, the Japanese went to the intersection, the commander, in order to prevent this, changed course several times. And he stopped doing it when the Japanese were chasing him not on armadillos, а on a single armored cruiser. This allows us to conclude that the cruiser to the intersection not was walking.
                  And if you still walked (you can object), then why did the destroyer commander stop changing course?
                  See what the problem is?
                  You need to show the place in the report, from which it follows that
                  Quote: rytik32
                  “Silent” walked to the shore, “Nissin” across to him.

                  And so, dear colleague, you first point to the place where it is said that the armadillos were going to the intersection, and then write that the armored cruiser is supposedly walked across.
                  And what gives reason to think so? Destroyer commander stopped to change the course of the ship when the battleships left him alone, and Togo was sent for him by the cruiser.

                  PS I am writing so that they do not consider me not polite.
                  Most likely, we are in different time zones, now I'm at work, I'll be back late, so I can continue only after a day.
                5. rytik32
                  17 June 2020 16: 29 New
                  +1
                  Quote: Comrade
                  And so, dear colleague, you first point to the place where it is said that the armadillos were going to the intersection, and then write that the armored cruiser supposedly went across

                  I agree, I was wrong.
                  Quote: Comrade
                  The destroyer commander stopped changing ship rates

                  But we don’t know anything about the courses of the destroyer and the Japanese cruiser from this report: were they parallel, did they change?
                  This information is extremely important. Why, now I will explain with an example.
                  I apologize in advance, this example is a clear exaggeration of the existing problem (I will disperse the “Slush” about 2 times!).
                  Here are excerpts from the Yakumo report:
                  1 hour 48 minutes The enemy squadron is becoming more and more clear [visible], according to the flag order, the speed was increased to 15 knots.
                  2 hours 22 minutes Fired from 8 "guns on Oslyabya from a distance of 5400 [m]
                  2 hours 25 minutes Changed course to N 30 ° Ostfollowing the 1st combat detachment.
                  The 2nd combat detachment goes on the starboard side to the enemy, in a parallel course.
                  2 hours 27 minutes Oslyabya - 6200 [m]

                  If you ignore the message about the change of course, it turns out that the Yakumo was parallel to the Oslyab at a speed of 15 knots. At the same time, the distance increased. So, “Oslyabya” was noticeably faster than 15 knots)))
                6. Comrade
                  Comrade 17 June 2020 19: 10 New
                  0
                  Quote: rytik32
                  nothing is known from this report about the courses of the destroyer and the Japanese cruiser: were they parallel, were they changing?
                  This information is extremely important.

                  Yes you are right.
                  Alas, the laying of the Kassuga course is not freely available, and maps with the movements of Japanese troops the next day after the battle at Cape Shantung are poorly scanned. The images are pale, the inscriptions cannot be made out, one can only guess who is where.
                  Quote: rytik32
                  If you ignore the message about the change of course, it turns out that the Yakumo was parallel to the Oslyab at a speed of 15 knots.

                  Today’s last comment, time to go.
                  If there is time, I’ll check the Yakumo course in the evening.
                7. anzar
                  anzar 17 June 2020 20: 46 New
                  +1
                  If you ignore the message about the change of course, it turns out that the Yakumo was parallel to the Oslyab at a speed of 15 knots. At the same time, the distance increased. So, “Oslyabya” was noticeably faster than 15 knots)))

                  Or noticeably slower)))
  • Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 15 June 2020 17: 39 New
    0
    Quote: Doccor18
    Rozhdestvensky preferred the heavy armored fleet to the detriment of other classes of ships

    You might think he had a choice in this situation :)))
    In fact, ZPR very well understood the importance of small cruisers. Gribovsky has, however, only a couple of lines about this. In general, Vladimir Yulievich is a unique type. Sometimes facts that positively characterize Rozhdestvensky come up, but he disguises them so that you won’t notice without a magnifying glass!
    1. unknown
      unknown 15 June 2020 20: 27 New
      0
      According to the results of the NRW, the Japanese positively evaluated the Russian armored cruisers of the first rank.
      The British believed that the minimum displacement acceptable for an ocean cruiser was from 6000 tons.
      1. Senior seaman
        Senior seaman 15 June 2020 20: 45 New
        +1
        It is not clear what the statement based on is often found, but the fact is that the only armored cruiser that the Japanese built after the REV. was a typical elsvik "Tone" in 4100 tons of VI.
        As for the British, in 1905 they completed their last analogue of the six-thousanders ел едж ер ер "" и и and their next armored decks were scouts of the оди Bodicea ’type with a VI of about 3000 tons.
        1. 27091965
          27091965 16 June 2020 08: 42 New
          +1
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          It is not clear what the statement based on is often found, but the fact is that the only armored cruiser that the Japanese built after the REV. was a typical elsvik "Tone" in 4100 tons of VI.


          If we take authorship in England, this is W. White and other naval officers. I think it makes no sense to list them all. The United States also supported this opinion;

          " Protected (armored) cruiser is an ideal vessel for cruising purposes. The experience of exercises and campaigns shows that they should be of two sizes, four thousand and six thousand tons of displacement. The general opinion is that for six thousand tons for a larger class of protected (armored) cruisers and four thousand for a smaller class, they must reach a maximum speed of twenty-two knots. "1898

          It should be understood that six and four thousand tons is average, the most optimal value for the composition of weapons, reservations, coal reserves, etc., displacement, the rest depended on the designers of the ships and the views of a particular state on the use of cruisers.
          1. Senior seaman
            Senior seaman 16 June 2020 10: 09 New
            +1
            Quote: 27091965i
            If you take authorship in England, this is W. White

            I want to remind you that it was about events, quote:
            According to the results of the REV

            And Sir William Henry resigned in 1900.
            In general, practice is a criterion of truth. And if they stopped building 6000 after the REV, then this hardly indicates that their type was considered "ideal."
            1. 27091965
              27091965 16 June 2020 11: 30 New
              +1
              Quote: Senior Sailor
              In general, practice is a criterion of truth. And if they stopped building 6000 after the REV, then this hardly indicates that their type was considered "ideal."


              Dear Ivan. The Russo-Japanese War greatly changed the views on shipbuilding and this is not difficult to notice. Each country had its own views on the development of armored cruisers.

              And Sir William Henry resigned in 1900.
              In general, practice is the criterion of truth


              If you want to consider them you will have to start in 1883.

              " May 4 1883 year.

              Dear Captain Noble,

              I am enclosing a revised memorandum on armored and protected ships.
              I am extremely pleased that he met the approval of Sir William Armstrong and you.
              The memorandum notes that to the two previous classes of armored and unarmored vessels, an intermediate class of sheltered vessels has recently been added, which were again divided into “partially protected” and “fully protected” vessels. On "partially protected" ships, protection was limited to cars, boilers and cellars. On "fully protected" ships, the armored deck was located along its entire length, protecting the steering gear and bow and stern communications as well. Small compartments, coal pits or the location of the cork in the area of ​​the waterline above the sheltered deck retain buoyancy and stability even after significant damage has been done. The memorandum described in detail the armament and the protection provided to the gun crew from machine-gun and rifle fire, as well as how “protected” vessels could be used. For these purposes they drove out large and high speed unarmored ships such as the Inconstant and Tourville, which were used to protect and destroy trade, and if they were attached to the fleets, they performed duties previously performed by sailing frigates
              . "W. White
              1. Senior seaman
                Senior seaman 16 June 2020 11: 50 New
                0
                Quote: 27091965i
                You will have to start from 1883.

                Before giving advice to me, you will have to go up the branch and find out where the discussion began.
                Quote: ignoto
                According to the results of the NRW, the Japanese positively evaluated the Russian armored cruisers of the first rank.

                Excuse me generously, what do the calculations of 20 years ago have to do with this?

                Quote: 27091965i
                The Russo-Japanese War greatly changed the views on shipbuilding

                I completely agree. And one of the main conclusions was the awareness of the inferiority of large armored cruisers.
                1. 27091965
                  27091965 16 June 2020 12: 15 New
                  0
                  According to the results of the NRW, the Japanese positively evaluated the Russian armored cruisers of the first rank.


                  It is not clear what the statement is often based on.


                  I understand the meaning of your discussion. This assessment is more suitable for the Japanese cruisers.

                  Excuse me generously, what do the calculations of 20 years ago have to do with this?


                  This 20 year period shows a change in outlook on the development of armored cruisers and their use. The Russo-Japanese War showed that the hopes placed on them did not materialize.
                  1. Senior seaman
                    Senior seaman 16 June 2020 12: 20 New
                    0
                    Quote: 27091965i
                    This assessment is more suitable for the Japanese cruisers.

                    And English too. Since after the Challenger, limes were not built large armored decks.
                    Quote: 27091965i
                    The Russo-Japanese War showed that the hopes placed on them did not materialize.

                    Yes!
                  2. 27091965
                    27091965 16 June 2020 12: 25 New
                    0
                    Quote: Senior Sailor
                    Yes!


                    You just do not understand much of the meaning of what I wrote. Comments in their volume do not allow to fully state the idea.
                  3. Senior seaman
                    Senior seaman 16 June 2020 13: 29 New
                    0
                    I just understood, I just do not try to embrace the immense in one comment :)))
                    And if we are talking about comprehending the results of the REV, then why drag in thoughts of 20 years ago that have very little relevance to the subject of discussion. (the latter is not for you, but rather for the first commentator)
                  4. 27091965
                    27091965 16 June 2020 13: 56 New
                    0
                    Quote: Senior Sailor
                    And if we are talking about comprehending the results of the REV, then why drag in thoughts of 20 years ago


                    This is the time spent on developing a new type of ship, invested funds, creating new strategies, theories of their application and building a huge number of armored cruisers. The very existence of which was called into question by the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War.
  • AK64
    AK64 17 June 2020 16: 14 New
    0
    Rozhdestvensky gave preference to a heavy armored fleet to the detriment of other classes of ships and emphasis on a general naval battle as the main means of achieving victory.

    Firstly, I did it right.
    Secondly, it was not Rozhdestvensky but Mahan --- there was such a theorist whose theories are still considered true.

    And before leaving, at the head of the squadron, he already knew in advance that there were practically no chances to win.

    Actually, he was going to Port Arthur, and he would rather have avoided the battle
    He was sent and he went.

    In fact, he was just the initiator and enthusiast. True in April-May, and not in October.
  • Oleg Zorin
    Oleg Zorin 15 June 2020 15: 20 New
    0
    Like war in general
    1. Pavel73
      Pavel73 15 June 2020 15: 51 New
      0
      Alas, yes. If ours hadn’t thrust ourselves into Port Arthur after the Japanese were kicked out of there, then this war might not have happened.
      1. mark1
        mark1 15 June 2020 16: 49 New
        0
        I completely agree with your first post, I completely disagree with the second, it was the developing crisis in Russian-Japanese relations that prompted Russia to "chop off" Port Arthur - the war was inevitable, and we could only win if we concentrated in advance 300-500 thousandths of the group Korea and Manchuria. The reasons why they could not (and could) are another topic. Could not mean lost.
        1. unknown
          unknown 15 June 2020 20: 30 New
          +2
          The situation was somewhat different.
          Near Port Arthur was built a first-class trading port - Dalniy.
          Most of the resources went here.
          They pulled a railroad towards him.
          With whom was Russia going to trade, and what should be exported and imported at the beginning of the twentieth century in this region?
          1. Senior seaman
            Senior seaman 15 June 2020 22: 26 New
            +2
            Quote: ignoto
            what to export and import at the beginning of the twentieth century in this region?

            Do you think there are few resources in Manchuria?
          2. mark1
            mark1 16 June 2020 06: 46 New
            0
            Unfortunately, I can’t say anything about Dalniy. But Port Arthur was located almost against Sosebo and the task of the squadron based there was to prevent the delivery and landing of Japanese ground forces in Korea until the deployment of 500 Russian forces in Manjuria and Korea. Due to the low throughput capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway, this task was greatly extended in time, the Japanese managed to block the Russian squadron and land troops in Korea. If, by 000, at least 1904 200 Russian troops had been deployed in the Far East in advance (albeit with some damage to the shipbuilding program), the war would either be delayed in time or we would have won
            1. Senior seaman
              Senior seaman 16 June 2020 11: 31 New
              +2
              Quote: mark1
              But Port Arthur was located almost against Sosebo

              How many wonderful discoveries are to us ...
              1. mark1
                mark1 16 June 2020 11: 37 New
                0
                Well, yes, yes, you need to look at the map from time to time request
                1. Senior seaman
                  Senior seaman 16 June 2020 12: 08 New
                  0

                  Talienwan Bay looks something like this.
                  In principle, it was possible to build a base there, but then with the fortifications you need to be smart. Otherwise, siege guns directly from under Jingzhou will get to the raid.
                  1. AK64
                    AK64 17 June 2020 16: 36 New
                    0
                    Talienwan Bay looks something like this.

                    It seems to be small ... (It’s generally small around ....) And it’s more difficult to build defense there (as you yourself noticed).
                    1. Senior seaman
                      Senior seaman 17 June 2020 17: 29 New
                      +1
                      Port Arthur is also not deep, but also cramped. Plus the output is uncomfortable. But Lushun is still a military base, and Dalian is a major port. Apparently, they did everything right.
            2. Saxahorse
              Saxahorse 16 June 2020 23: 16 New
              0
              Quote: mark1
              If by 1904 at least 200 thousand Russian troops had been deployed in the Far East in advance

              The transfer of troops began in early 1903, the problem was that the army did not want to give up troops deployed in the west, near the borders of Germany. As a result, some improvised formations began to be transferred with a delay, with the hope of somehow replenishing them already in Manchuria. It turned out as always. request
            3. AK64
              AK64 17 June 2020 16: 34 New
              0
              But Port Arthur was located almost against Sosebo

              Is not asking for London?
              If, by 1904, at least 200 XNUMX Russian troops had been deployed in the Far East in advance (albeit with some damage to the shipbuilding program), the war would either be delayed in time or we would have won

              Rather, they would go bankrupt without any war.

              But to build the Trans-Siberian Railway a year or two earlier, and to build fortresses and the base normally --- this is quite real. And "then they would have won," indeed. (More precisely, the Japanese would not have attacked then)
      2. AK64
        AK64 17 June 2020 16: 30 New
        +1
        Alas, yes. If ours hadn’t thrust ourselves into Port Arthur after the Japanese were kicked out of there, then this war might not have happened.

        Not so easy.
        nascent Russian industry needed markets. Such was seen by China. And climbed there ugly.
        But then not only the Republic of Ingushetia climbed into China, but EVERYTHING (including the USA) --- China remained the only lone and unowned territory. Accordingly, a conflict of interests arose. So the conflict with Japan was quite expected, and did not depend on PA.

        Another thing is that
        (1) the base could have been made and not in PA
        (2) The Trans-Siberian Railway should be built faster, faster.
        (3) the base and fortress had to be seriously developed.
        Then, there could have been no war.
  • AK64
    AK64 17 June 2020 16: 06 New
    0
    The mistake was the Tsushima battle itself.


    I completely agree with you: I had to teleport to Vladik.
    Or drive along the Trans-Siberian Railway
  • Andy
    Andy 15 June 2020 15: 09 New
    0
    if the ship that lost its course is towed by another warship, then you already have minus 2 ships. given the primordial superiority of the Japanese. and the separation of Monomakh and Donskoy into a separate cover is both suicidal and useless. in the event of the death of the ship, the hospitals could be engaged in rescue, just because they were “hitched” does not mean that they were useless. I don’t put the like article
    1. rytik32
      15 June 2020 15: 24 New
      0
      Quote: Andy
      if the ship that lost its turn is towed by another warship, then you already have minus 2 ships

      Why so? If they are in the squadron, then I can both continue the battle.
      But in the version with a tug, this is not realistic due to the lack of armor in tow.
      Quote: Andy
      in the event of the death of the ship, hospitals could be engaged in rescue

      Only in theory. In practice, even warships were afraid to approach, for example, “Alexander” or “Borodino”
      1. Pane Kohanku
        Pane Kohanku 15 June 2020 15: 38 New
        +4
        If they are in the squadron, then I can both continue the battle.

        Hmm .. with all due respect, the effectiveness of such a battle on a number of factors seems dubious .... what
        Alexei, interested in the question of Kamchatka! Were there any survivors from her? hi
        1. rytik32
          15 June 2020 15: 40 New
          +7
          Only 11 crew members and 13 artisans were saved. Together with the ship, 16 officers, 4 conductors, 239 lower ranks and 68 artisans were killed. (Historical essay by Vedernikov Yu.V. "The death of ships and ships in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905")
          1. Pane Kohanku
            Pane Kohanku 15 June 2020 15: 50 New
            +6
            Only 11 crew members and 13 artisans were saved.

            Hmm ... bright memory .. Thanks for the info. hi
            Last week I flipped through the wiki, biographies of officers participating in the battle. I was surprised to learn that the commander of "Prince Suvorov", V.V. Ignatius drew very well, and left behind a selection of ship images. For example, here:

            and so. This is the card "Varangian goes to battle".
        2. rytik32
          15 June 2020 16: 42 New
          +4
          Quote: Pan Kohanku
          the effectiveness of such a battle for some factors seems doubtful

          I totally agree.
          In front of the main enemy forces, a ship without a move is doomed in any case. There is no need to destroy another ship for a heap.
          But let's compare against a detachment of armored decks.
          If they can’t master a couple of warships, then a tugboat + warship is enough.
          A tugboat is knocked out by a pair of shells, and a warship is shot as a "Rurik"
          1. Pane Kohanku
            Pane Kohanku 15 June 2020 16: 55 New
            +2
            If they can’t master a couple of warships, then a tugboat + warship is enough.
            A tugboat is knocked out by a pair of shells, and a warship is shot as a "Rurik"

            Alexei, I’ll risk assuming ... That in the conditions in which the squadron was set up in the Tsushima battle (precisely in it!), This did not play a very big role. drinks Nothing would prevent Togo, maneuvering with an advantage in speed, to shoot front ships. Even if one of the crippled armadillos went in tow, and even for a while would have disappeared from the sight of the enemy .. the enemy himself, having superiority in the number of ships (for example, auxiliary cruisers), would catch all the “cripples” the next day, which, in principle, it happened (with the exception of the Enquist squad, the Emerald, and a number of transports you indicated). That is, I do not presume to judge whether it was good or bad to leave the transports as part of the squadron .. but in the situation that developed (not even before the battle, but when planning and preparing the campaign itself!), The squadron was doomed, and the presence of transports affected only the total number of casualties incurred! soldier With respect, Nicholai hi
            1. Catfish
              Catfish 15 June 2020 17: 18 New
              +4
              Nikolay, hello! hi You forgot about the Almaz, the weakest cruiser of the Russian squadron. Alone, he broke into Vladik and pulled his nose to the admiral of Togo.
              1. Pane Kohanku
                Pane Kohanku 15 June 2020 17: 20 New
                +5
                Alone, he broke into Vladik and pulled his nose to the admiral of Togo.

                Yes, Konstantin, I forgot something about this cruiser! yes now, you wiped my nose! drinks
                1. Catfish
                  Catfish 15 June 2020 17: 34 New
                  +4
                  My God, you never had the idea of ​​“pulling your nose” in your thoughts, just for “Diamond” it became a shame. smile drinks
            2. unknown
              unknown 15 June 2020 20: 38 New
              +3
              The Japanese did not have a technical advantage in speed.
              Squad speed is the speed of the slowest ship.
              During the years of the RPE, the battleship Fuji could not go more than 15 knots.
              The battleship "Mikasa" having a construction load of 900 tons, had a total load of 3000 tons at the beginning of the battle. Did he alone have an operational load? And its speed has not fallen? It is doubtful.
              Accordingly, the speed of "Fuji", and with it the entire first squad, was even less.
              With armored cruisers a similar story.
              Azuma did not go for more than 15 knots for over XNUMX knots during the years of the RPE. And with overload?
              1. Jura 27
                Jura 27 16 June 2020 06: 10 New
                +4
                [/ quote] Accordingly, the speed of "Fuji", and with it the entire first squad, was even less. [quote]

                When it was necessary, the first detachment of Togo went to itself at 15 knots.
                1. mmaxx
                  mmaxx 16 June 2020 17: 29 New
                  0
                  I think that when necessary, and our first detachment could give 15 knots without problems. wink
              2. mmaxx
                mmaxx 16 June 2020 17: 28 New
                +1
                So you still have to understand that at max. no ship can walk for a long time! The same tale is retold. Not the Japanese, but the super samurai from the movie.
                Fuel consumption increases sharply and the reliability of mechanisms is not infinite.
                I remember that when the Dreadnought crossed the Atlantic, everyone was surprised to note that there was no breakdown of the mechanisms at a high transition speed. That is, and the English mechanisms of that time gave slack.
                It turns out that the ZPR had to be well, at least something to be done to increase the squadron speed. Really, at least hit a finger on a finger. And immediately the picture of the battle would be different. The very first thing is to send the transport in another way. As a result, after the battle they did it. Wow! If I were in the affairs of ZPR, then they would go to art. fire course NO 23 degrees.
                And break the squadron into independent units with one common goal. Here the cruisers would be useful for linking separately maneuvering units into a single whole. But this is from the realm of fantasy for those times and for ZPR. It was simply impossible for him to understand that someone could be smart in addition to the orders of the ZPR itself. Separate detachments would not be as bulky as the entire squadron and could clearly maneuver. I myself am afraid of such fantasies. But I don’t accept alternatives. But Togo did.
  • antivirus
    antivirus 15 June 2020 15: 18 New
    +1
    that's who is to blame for the defeat, and not the Korean concessions, and not the annexation of Manchuria
  • Pane Kohanku
    Pane Kohanku 15 June 2020 15: 33 New
    +8
    It turns out that Rozhestvensky did not have the forces capable of protecting support ships in the general battle. As part of the squadron, they were doomed to death.

    if you count all the Japanese forces that they could pull into the strait (at least on Wikipedia), then you can imagine that the squadron had no chance at all. From the word "completely." The Japanese, if they wanted, would simply be crushed by a number. hi unfortunately, the “Argonauts" were simply sent to death by a nearby king.
    1. Oleg Zorin
      Oleg Zorin 15 June 2020 15: 47 New
      +7
      Nicholas is not Prince Henry, where would he have special knowledge of the naval affair. The trouble, of course, is that without special knowledge in other areas, he did not have the talent to surround himself with competent specialists.
    2. unknown
      unknown 15 June 2020 20: 39 New
      +1
      On the main, heavy ships. the Japanese had no advantage.
    3. bayard
      bayard 16 June 2020 01: 47 New
      +4
      Quote: Pan Kohanku
      the "Argonauts" were simply sent to death by a nearby king.

      After an aimless tour of Africa, hoping to get Argentinean (and Chilean) cruisers, after standing at the rendezvous point (which never happened), the 2nd squadron stood at Madagascar for a long time tidying itself up, where it received the news of the fall Prot Arthur.
      All .
      Even then, the aimlessness of the further campaign was clear. And Rozhdestvensky was waiting for the decision of St. Petersburg to return or another plan of action.
      And he waited.
      3rd squadron Absolutely useless in this company.
      And the order is to go on a breakthrough to Vladivostok.
      It is difficult to expect a victory in a mathematics olympiad from a solid troeshnik. Nikolay, with his intellect, did not closely correspond to his status. He pro .... played everything. And from the very beginning. From planning a future war, starting in 1895, the development program of the Far East, the construction and equipment of Naval Aviation Base - Port Arthur and Vladivostok, the concentration of land forces in the Far East, the program for the construction of ships for the Pacific Fleet, and financing of all these projects.
      He did not even manage to take advantage of the remarkable talents of those people whom his father brought closer ... He seems to have simply not understood, or even did not know, his (father's) plans ... He simply lived happily and enjoyed this life.
      And it's hard to blame it.
      He was simply not capable of more.
      He just skipped his great inheritance.
      And after REV - too.
      Walked in the smoke.
  • andrew42
    andrew42 15 June 2020 16: 00 New
    +3
    Not surprising . In the process of rapprochement with the forces of the enemy, Rozhestvensky managed in all aspects to choose the worst option. Supporting ships had to be sent along with low-speed combat ships bypassing Japan, more or less fast cruisers should lead the wrong course ahead, imitating the vanguard, and the armored squadron squad (without low-speed ships) should lead the other course and quickly. This is even regardless of the "shell issue", "submerged armored belts" and other nuances about which spears still break today. Rozhdestvensky, on the other hand, dragged them all in a crowd (!).
    1. rytik32
      15 June 2020 16: 27 New
      +3
      I wondered this question.
      It seems to me that the answer lies in the field of psychology.
      The idea of ​​the 2nd TOE was first expressed by Skrydlov, but Rozhestsky, taking advantage of his proximity to Nikolai, managed to appoint himself at the head of the squadron. He apparently wanted fame - to come to Port Arthur and with combined forces win the war at sea. But when he found out that Port Arthur had fallen, he was “ill,” he asked to go back. But Nikolai would be adamant. And then Zinovy, apparently, broke down, his hands fell.
      1. Oleg Zorin_3
        Oleg Zorin_3 15 June 2020 18: 04 New
        +3
        I certainly agree with you that going to Port Arthur when the TOE is there is one thing. And break into Vladivostok when the TOE is no longer - quite another. And then the question goes into the moral plane - Rozhdestvensky, as a naval specialist, certainly understood that he had very few chances. However, he led the squadron, took the sin for the soul for the death of the crews.
        1. unknown
          unknown 15 June 2020 20: 41 New
          +1
          To carry a little.
          It was necessary to prepare the squadron for the battle.
        2. AK64
          AK64 17 June 2020 19: 54 New
          -1
          And then the question goes into the moral plane - Rozhdestvensky, as a naval specialist, certainly understood that he had very few chances. However, he led the squadron, took the sin for the soul for the death of the crews.


          And what was he supposed to do, like a "naval specialist"? Give up Disarm? Shoot yourself? What exactly --- give, finally, an intelligible solution to the problem.

          So, in reality, Rozhdestvensky had only one option --- to break into Vladik through the Korean Channel. Which he tried to do.
      2. AK64
        AK64 17 June 2020 16: 49 New
        0
        But Nikolai would be adamant.


        But do not tell me why there were no other people who wanted to lead the squadron?
        And not only in October was not found, but even in April?
        Why did Nebogatov literally by hook or by crook pick out from his post and send him on a campaign?

        In Russia then there were about 70 admirals - but only TWO went to fight with Rozhestvensky. And even then one of them died of labor by the road.
        It’s very easy to blame Rozhdestvensky. Here are just all the volunteers among the admirals there were five people (On Makarova and Jessen)
        1. rytik32
          18 June 2020 11: 42 New
          +2
          Quote: AK64
          But do not tell me why there were no other people who wanted to lead the squadron?

          This is called the collapse of the fleet.
          There should have been an “order - and into battle”, and not “I want - I do not want”.
          1. AK64
            AK64 18 June 2020 13: 32 New
            -3
            This is called the collapse of the fleet.
            There should have been an “order - and into battle”, and not “I want - I do not want”.

            How is it really that Rozhdestvensky is to blame?
            Or maybe Nikolai?

            Who appointed the "7 pounds of August meat" fleet to steer? (dismiss much more suitable Constantine)? Maybe Rozhdestvensky did it? Or Nikolay?

            But for this reason, for some reason, Russophobes like you (and you are Russophobes) have no complaints .... And even more than that, this Russophobe is just what you have, it’s a pleasure and terrible reverence . But it’s just he’s “to blame for everything” (if you really like to look for those responsible)

            PS: my site is strange jumping - and therefore I have to leave most of the remarks unattended - I can’t even read it. Sorry if someone does not answer
            1. rytik32
              18 June 2020 13: 36 New
              +1
              I apologize, but after insults and the transition to personalities addressed to me, I'm not interested in talking to you
              1. AK64
                AK64 18 June 2020 15: 23 New
                0
                Oh yes - that’s just what you were silent when YOUR STAH wrote here about the "sect of witnesses of Rodestvo"?

                Already yes - "this is a completely different matter!"

                So, gentlemen --- you are Russophobes. And brighter than all this was shown by the one of you who wrote there below. "only Russians could see Japanese in the North Sea "

                So don’t wash yourself (all)
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 June 2020 09: 13 New
      +2
      God, what nonsense :)))))
    3. AK64
      AK64 17 June 2020 16: 44 New
      -3
      Clever you are hindsight ....

      So: Rozhestvensky, due to the banal fact that in Vladik there was no repair base as well as any significant stocks in general, a combat squadron in Vladik would be useless without these very auxiliary vessels.
      That's why he pulled these assistants with him.
      But it’s over if he knew how the matter would end - he would certainly send it. That's just for him, "Tsushima" Novikawa-understand-Surf on the table for some reason did not lie.
      1. rytik32
        18 June 2020 11: 50 New
        +3
        Quote: AK64
        due to the trivial fact that in Vladik there was no repair base as well as any significant reserves in general, a combat squadron in Vladik would be useless without these very auxiliary vessels

        And if you look more broadly, it turns out that Japan was also a bad base: with coal tight, a lot of dependence on imports in military equipment ...
        I need it. If a raider squadron consisting of Oslyabya, Peresvet, Pobeda, Rurik, Russia and Gromoboy were made on the basis of the VOK in March 1904, the course of the war could be different. This squadron could leave Togo and fend off Kamimura. She could lay mines near Japanese ports, intercept transports ...
        1. AK64
          AK64 18 June 2020 13: 46 New
          -2
          And if you look more broadly, it turns out that Japan was also a bad base: with coal tight, a lot of dependence on imports in military equipment ...
          I need it. If a raider squadron consisting of Oslyabya, Peresvet, Pobeda, Rurik, Russia and Gromoboy were made on the basis of the VOK in March 1904, the course of the war could be different. This squadron could leave Togo and fend off Kamimura. She could lay mines near Japanese ports, intercept transports ...


          Uh, what's there, what are these little things for? --- The nuclear bomb had to be invented and bubbled up in Japan. Or New York! But the king - - did not guess ...

          So: NONE of this could be done. AND IMPOSSIBLE.
          Try to recall what the Russian (very successful!) Operations of auxiliary cruisers quickly led to. You have probably forgotten - so I will remind you: but the British said that it was piracy and demanded to stop it. And the Russians had to apologize, captured here to return and stop cruising.
          That's all.

          Moreover, none of the above could be done even technically: the breakthrough of individual Victories and Relights (I’m silent about Oslyabya) from the PA to Vladivostok is pure fantasy: they would have drowned without reaching the Korean Channel. This is not to mention the fact that cruising, based on Vladik, is quite difficult (straits s).

          Nevertheless, something could be done, indeed, it is possible --- and all this I have already listed:
          (1) fully accelerate Transib
          (2) fully accelerate the base and fortress in PA
          (3) cease saving money on preparing the fleet.
          But ... but the British had a super agent (SJV), which did not allow to do any of the above.
  • Undecim
    Undecim 15 June 2020 16: 03 New
    +9
    Tow ship "Svir"
    This ship has an interesting biography.
    The Zwarte Zee marine rescue tugboat was built in 1898 by order of the Dutch shipowning company Smits & Co.

    Zwarte Zee and Oceaan towing boats towed a 1902-ton dock to Bermuda in 17000
    In 1903 it became the property of the German company "Diderichsen" from Kiel.
    During the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, it was bought by Dobroflot and handed over to the Maritime Department to accompany the 3rd Pacific Squadron following to the Far East. Received the name "Svir".
    Under the flag of Dobroflot, with a military team of 35 people, the lifeguard 7.2.1905 joined the squadron after passing the last Great Belt Strait. During the campaign he also served as a messenger ship. He took part in the Tsushima battle, after which he came to Shanghai, where he was interned. During the battle on the ship, one person died.
    At the beginning of 1906 it was bought from Dobroflot and included in the Siberian military flotilla as a port ship.
    In November 1906, with 10 soldiers and 2 non-commissioned officers on board, he participated in an unsuccessful expedition against the Hunhuz near Kholuvai Bay
    In October 1922, Svir left Vladivostok as part of the flotilla of Admiral Stark.
    In 1924 it was sold to a Chinese company in Hong Kong, and then to the Filipino owner, who renamed the vessel “Sugbo”.
    In 1928, was acquired by the American company Hijos de I. de la Rama & Co., Inc. and operated as a ferry under the name "Ilo-Ilo".
    In 1939 was acquired by Moller's Towage Ltd. in Shanghai and renamed "Edith Moller".
    In 1941 it was transferred to the Ministry of Military Transport, and on December 8, 1941 was confiscated by Japan and renamed to “Amoy Maru No. 4”.
    In 1942 it was renamed “Tsukumo Maru” and was used as a training vessel.
    In November 1945, it was repaired and transferred to the British.
    In April 1947, it was again returned to Hong Kong to Moller's Towage Ltd., which in October of that year sold it to Hong Kong-based firm SS Lee & Co., which renamed it Yue Kwok on October 17.
    The exact date of cancellation is unknown. That is, the ship has actively served at least 50 years.
    1. sailor roman
      sailor roman 15 June 2020 17: 17 New
      +4
      Towing steamships Rus and Svir of the voluntary fleet at the passage carried out the tasks of towing damaged ships and as messenger ships. Thanks to the author for the well-prepared material.

  • Undecim
    Undecim 15 June 2020 16: 16 New
    +4
    Transport "Irtysh" had a displacement of 15000 tons. Transported 8000 tons of coal, 1500 pounds of pyroxylin, shells and food.
    The question arises - why a ship on which 24 tons of pyroxylin and ammunition and on which there is no armor at all, a squadron that is going to fight the enemy?
    1. Sergey Zhikharev
      Sergey Zhikharev 15 June 2020 16: 40 New
      +1
      The question arises - why a ship on which 24 tons of pyroxylin and ammunition and on which there is no armor at all, a squadron that is going to fight the enemy?

      Answer. a ship on which 24 tons of pyroxylin and ammunition are needed by the squadron, which in the future is going to fight the enemy. If the railway worked normally, then there was no need for transport, but the railway barely managed to supply the army, and to supply more sailors in Vladivostok .....
      1. Undecim
        Undecim 15 June 2020 16: 43 New
        -3
        And during the battle, the ship, having 24 tons of pyroxylin on board, approaches the squadron ships to supply them with shells. And at that moment a shell hits him, but Japanese. You can think of further yourself.
        1. Sergey Zhikharev
          Sergey Zhikharev 15 June 2020 16: 59 New
          0
          And during the battle, the ship, having 24 tons of pyroxylin on board, approaches the squadron ships to supply them with shells. And at that moment a shell hits him, but Japanese
          .
          And when did this event happen?
          Or how often these events occur - during the active phase of the battle (that is, when cruisers / battleships / battleships / aircraft carriers engage in battle with the enemy) support ships begin to supply warships.
          2TE after a small battle, successfully arrives in Vladivostok, prepares for a new battle, and support vessels did not arrive (did not pass through the Kuril / Laperuzov Strait) or the Japanese took advantage of the division of the squadron and cut off the transports. In general, 2TE is now without shells, Petersburg promises to send shells somewhere in a month, or even two, in general in six months they will be.
          You can think of further yourself.
          1. Undecim
            Undecim 15 June 2020 17: 17 New
            +3
            But if, as you rightly noted, the ships were not going to be supplied during the battle with the Japanese, why did these transports need to be dragged along. Indeed, in battle they were guaranteed to be lost, which practice showed. Or was there a hope that in Vladivostok, at nine knots, it would be possible to pass over a thousand kilometers without a fight in full view of all of Japan?
            1. Sergey Zhikharev
              Sergey Zhikharev 15 June 2020 17: 42 New
              0
              The ships were supposed to supply 2TE after the battle.
              During the battle, not only transports were lost, but armadillos were the main strength of the fleet (after that, the loss of transport is no longer relevant)
              No, the fight was not ruled out. According to the experience of the battle in the Yellow Sea (the battle at Cape Shantung), and perhaps the wok battle will do, the conclusion is that the squadron will pass without serious losses; the loss of 1-2 ships of the Ushakov type is acceptable
            2. Sergey Zhikharev
              Sergey Zhikharev 15 June 2020 18: 12 New
              +2
              The ships were going to supply AFTER the battle, since Vladivostok did not have what was needed (shells, coal, ammunition + 2 hospitals)
              In battle, the battleships were lost - the main force of the fleet of that time. "After the loss of the head (armadillos) about the hair (transports) no longer cry."
              Previous experience (the Sino-Japanese War, the battle at Cape Shantung, the battle in the Korean Channel) showed that the battleships have great survivability and just do not drown. And the loss of 1-2 outdated and weak ships ("Ushakov-like") was acceptable.
              1. Nehist
                Nehist 17 June 2020 00: 38 New
                +2
                Gg, it was in Vladivostok that there were shells, because on Rozhdestvensky’s demands to send a second missile defense squadron to the squadron itself, when she was standing in Madagascar, the wise men sent train to Vladivostok
        2. rytik32
          15 June 2020 17: 34 New
          +4
          By the way, recently I found evidence that from the transport "Korea" at the very beginning of the battle, sea mines located on it were dropped overboard. Apparently understood the risks)))
          Some of these mines were seen in the area of ​​the Oslyaby’s death, the code saved the team.
          So I will support your question: why in battle such loads on unarmored ships.
          1. Undecim
            Undecim 15 June 2020 17: 51 New
            +2
            On the one hand, Rozhestvensky can be understood. He breaks into Vladivostok, the supply of which, to put it mildly, is bad. And as a base for the squadron, too, is not the best place in terms of equipment and repair facilities. Therefore, the squadron dragged on itself and on vehicles almost everything that could be found in Kronstadt.
            But on the other hand, the plans that the transports will be able to be pulled in the form of a convoy - somehow for the naval commander look completely unconvincing.
            It is clear that the task is difficult, but nevertheless one should look for options for transports to “bypass”, especially since there was enough coal for them.
          2. AK64
            AK64 17 June 2020 16: 57 New
            -1
            So I will support your question: why in battle such loads on unarmored ships.

            Then what exactly did these “unarmoured VESSELS" not go into battle. That’s why.
        3. AK64
          AK64 17 June 2020 16: 54 New
          -5
          And during the battle, the ship, having 24 tons of pyroxylin on board, approaches the squadron ships to supply them with shells. And at that moment a shell hits him, but Japanese. You can think of further yourself.


          I do not give ratings - but to you: for your great mind, set a minus.
          Was the war supposed to end in one battle? Well, Rozhdestvensky came to Vladik - and then WHAT TO FIGHT? There are empty warehouses.
          1. Undecim
            Undecim 17 June 2020 16: 56 New
            +1
            I do not give ratings - but to you: for your great mind, set a minus.
            Well, I tell you, for the small.
          2. Nehist
            Nehist 18 June 2020 14: 35 New
            +1
            For those who are in an armored train !!! - There were shells in Vladivostok, because Rozhestvensky’s requirements to send a second missile defense squadron to the squadron itself when the wise men were in Madagascar sent them to Vladivostok by train
      2. mmaxx
        mmaxx 16 June 2020 06: 46 New
        +2
        Duc, and it was necessary to send him to Vladik. Around Japan. Already this Rozhdestvensky showed his stupidity. Or simply decided: if the king drives, then I’ll kill everything.
    2. AK64
      AK64 17 June 2020 16: 52 New
      -2
      The question arises - why a ship on which 24 tons of pyroxylin and ammunition and on which there is no armor at all, a squadron that is going to fight the enemy?


      Then, that in Vladik, in the sense of reserves, it was completely empty.
      On Vladik a maximum could be based detachment of cruisers. And .... that's it. Even coal was not stocked on the squadron, not to mention shells and more.
      That is precisely why Rozhdestvensky was dragging with himself a Wagon.
  • Sergey Zhikharev
    Sergey Zhikharev 15 June 2020 16: 37 New
    0
    You can around Japan.

    Oldgamy tried. The captain, who knows the Kuril Straits, selected the team himself, and the ship was lost. If there are 8 transports, then there is a danger of losing one or two ships, and in vain.
    It is possible through the Strait of Korea, but the next night after the passage of the main forces, when the Japanese ships will be distracted by them. And for escorting support ships, it would be possible to single out the cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Vladimir Monomakh.

    And if the Japanese did not remove the curtain or at sea (and near Vladivostok), this detachment will be spotted by "dogs", and other Japanese "dogs" will catch up? Not to mention the cruiser Kamimura ....
    The squadron somehow has more protection.
    And the speed of the Russian squadron of 12 knots will not save the "father of Russian democracy": Crossing T is carried out with a superiority of 2 knots ....
    1. rytik32
      15 June 2020 16: 59 New
      +6
      Quote: Sergey Zhikharev
      Crossing T is carried out with a superiority of 2 knots ....

      Very doubtful statement. I will refute it 101 times (before me on this site they already did it 100 times).
      Yes, the British came to this conclusion, but the French decided that 2 nodes is not enough.
      The Americans felt that their fleet, having a speed of just 2 knots less than the likely enemy, could perfectly avoid crossing the “T” by simply deviating from the enemy from time to time, retreating to the inner circle.
      But what about practice?
      Could Togo put crossover “T” to Wittgeft? That's it! Not enough 2 knots.
      Yes, and Tsushima is an excellent marker. It was not by chance that I brought the ratio of light forces - the situation there was much worse than the main ones. But the disaster did not happen. Enquist held out until the night. And why? Because he did not lead his ships as a slaughter, but at 18 knots he actively maneuvered.
      1. Sergey Zhikharev
        Sergey Zhikharev 15 June 2020 17: 08 New
        0
        Very doubtful statement. I will refute it 101 times (before me on this site they already did it 100 times).
        Yes, the British came to this conclusion, but the French decided that 2 nodes is not enough.
        The Americans felt that their fleet, having a speed of just 2 knots less than the likely enemy, could perfectly avoid crossing the “T” by simply deviating from the enemy from time to time, retreating to the inner circle.

        Given that Great Britain is the "mistress of the seas", the opinion of the famous sailors has more confidence than the French or Americans.
        But what about practice?
        Could Togo put crossover “T” to Wittgeft? That's it! Not enough 2 knots.
        Yes, and Tsushima is an excellent marker. It was not by chance that I brought the ratio of light forces - the situation there was much worse than the main ones. But the disaster did not happen. Enquist held out until the night. And why? Because he did not lead his ships as a slaughter, but at 18 knots he actively maneuvered.

        But Togo caught up with Vitgeft, and if you remove 2 nodes, then the Russian squadron could come to Vladivostok.
        And here, dear author, your comment contradicts your own article.
        1. rytik32
          15 June 2020 17: 20 New
          +3
          Quote: Sergey Zhikharev
          But Togo caught up with Vitgeft, and if you remove 2 nodes, then the Russian squadron could come to Vladivostok.

          So Rozhdestvensky could break up with Togo counter-courses

          here is an understandable diagram from the Tsushima forums.
          I think that our 12 nodes could be kept. Togo - 15 knots. Total for a couple of hours would drag out a day fight. And in the evening they could have lasted a couple of hours before sunset.
          1. AK64
            AK64 17 June 2020 17: 04 New
            0
            So Rozhdestvensky could break up with Togo counter-courses

            Rozhdestvensky made a mistake in the intentions of Togo: he apparently considered that Togo would go along the left weak column. But Togo recognized his mistake and risked making a loop. (Rozhdestvensky did not expect this and was a little confused)
      2. Senior seaman
        Senior seaman 15 June 2020 18: 16 New
        -1
        Quote: rytik32
        I will refute it 101 times

        Most of your claims have been refuted no less. request
        Quote: rytik32
        The Americans felt that their fleet, having a speed of just 2 knots

        If you are about dreadnought, then
        a) by that time increased the distance.
        b) the Americans did not have the opportunity to test their conclusions in practice. If they had a battle with a worthy opponent, it is likely that they would regret such recklessness.
        c) During their war with Spain, the advantage in speed was with the USS ships.
        Quote: rytik32
        Could Togo put crossover “T” to Wittgeft?

        in fact, just did not have time. “Tsesarevich” failed earlier.
        Quote: rytik32
        Because he did not lead his ships as a slaughter, but at 18 knots he actively maneuvered.

        shaw, again ?! The third in their convoy was the Monomakh, did it also accelerate to 18 knots?
        1. rytik32
          15 June 2020 23: 16 New
          +2
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          If you are about dreadnought

          Of course not. It was just during the REV.
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          in fact, just did not have time

          And he couldn’t catch it. The sun was already setting.
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          The third in their column was the Monomakh, which also accelerated to 18 knots

          I'm talking about the fight on the counter courses 14:20 - 14:40
          1. Senior seaman
            Senior seaman 15 June 2020 23: 33 New
            0
            Quote: rytik32
            Of course not. It was just during the REV.

            Then it’s not at all clear. The American battleships built at that time (starting with the Maine) had the same speed as their European counterparts.
            Quote: rytik32
            And he couldn’t catch it. The sun was already setting.

            This is because Togo did not understand what the first part of the battle was.
            Quote: rytik32
            I'm talking about the fight on the counter courses 14:20 - 14:40

            1) Until 14-30 cruisers did not take part in the battle. Then there was a shootout, in which, from the Japanese side, among others were Kataoka ships. It would be strange if an ancient mammoth, "Chin-Yen," set Crossing to Enquist :)))
            1. rytik32
              16 June 2020 01: 00 New
              +2
              Quote: Senior Sailor
              Then it’s not at all clear. The American battleships built at that time (starting with the Maine) had the same speed as their European counterparts.

              During the REV, the United States had as many as three Maine with a passport speed of 18 knots. And how much did the rest give? )))
              Quote: Senior Sailor
              This is because Togo did not understand what the first part of the battle was.

              Let's look at the other side of the coin: Witgeft forced Togo to do this)))
              1. Senior seaman
                Senior seaman 16 June 2020 09: 01 New
                -1
                Quote: rytik32
                During the REV, the United States had as many as three Maine with a passport speed of 18 knots. And how much did the rest give? )))

                Do not give out need for virtue. This is not a consequence of the tactical delights of the American admirals, but only the consequences of the financial policy of the government, which for a very long time did not give money for normal ships.
                Quote: rytik32
                Let's look at the reverse side of the coin: Witgeft made Togo do this

                No. It was a Togo initiative. Wilhelm Karlovich has nothing to do with it. He just walked forward ... like Zinovy ​​Petrovich a little later. But Togo had time to realize the depth of his errors and didn’t deal with such garbage anymore.
                1. rytik32
                  16 June 2020 11: 20 New
                  +3
                  Quote: Senior Sailor
                  Do not give out need for virtue. This is not a consequence of the tactical delights of the American admirals, but only the consequences of the financial policy of the government, which for a very long time did not give money for normal ships

                  Tactical delights are precisely the result of deliberation of plans "how to fight this."
                  Quote: Senior Sailor
                  No. It was a Togo initiative. Wilhelm Karlovich has nothing to do with it. He just walked forward ... like Zinovy ​​Petrovich a little later.

                  Oh, I do not agree with you.
                  Firstly, Wittgeft did not go with 9 knots, but squeezed the maximum that he could, even as much as the Poltava and Sevastopol could not.
                  Secondly, Witgeft at the beginning of the battle effectively avoided attempts at coverage. Rozhdestvensky did not do this. On the contrary, sales made a 2-point turn to the left, toward the Japanese. What for???

                  Here is the natural result. In this position of the squadrons, our gunners were already powerless.
                  1. Senior seaman
                    Senior seaman 16 June 2020 11: 44 New
                    0
                    Quote: rytik32
                    First, Witgeft did not go with 9 knots

                    PTE had a lot of time and opportunities to maintain mechanisms in working condition, however, knowing the real course of the breakthrough, we can state that this opportunity was not used.

                    Quote: rytik32
                    Secondly, Witgeft at the beginning of the battle effectively avoided attempts at coverage. Rozhdestvensky did not do this

                    Compare distances.
                    Quote: rytik32
                    Our gunners were already powerless.

                    Rather, shells. Over three dozen hits in the first half hour, this is serious
                    1. rytik32
                      16 June 2020 13: 06 New
                      +2
                      Quote: Senior Sailor
                      Rather, shells. Over three dozen hits in the first half hour, this is serious

                      Let me disagree.
                      The armadillos (both ours and Mikasa) held 20-30 shells in the REV and were not going to sink.
                      And Togo’s tactical escape in the first half hour of the battle was precisely expressed in the fact that “Mikasa” came out of the fire, and “Suvorov” and “Oslyabya” were suppressed. I do not impose my opinion, but in the last article it turned out that Oslyabya took at least 30, and in fact most likely 40-50 shells. “Suvorov” at the beginning of the battle - comparable. Total we see a clear advantage in the number of hits. In addition, our result was "smeared" by ships and time. And who got into Mikasu in the first half hour? In the applicants, only the first three Borodinians. “Eagle” could not shoot, “Oslyabyu” was quickly carried out, “Sisoy” shot at others, and the rest were too far away and (or) had outdated artillery.
                      Thus, it is appropriate to talk about the quality of shells with an approximately equal number of hits. But alas!
                      1. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 16 June 2020 13: 35 New
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        The armadillos (both ours and Mikasa) held 20-30 shells in the REV and were not going to sink.

                        Right. That's only about the combat effectiveness of our ships after such a portion, as a rule, we can only speak conditionally.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Thus, it is appropriate to talk about the quality of shells with an approximately equal number of hits.

                        Not necessary. You can compare individual hits and the damage they cause. Colleague Andrei, by the way, did it.
                      2. rytik32
                        16 June 2020 15: 25 New
                        +2
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        You can compare individual hits and their damage

                        Let's compare.
                        Presumably, the 254-mm shell hit the upper edge of the gun port of the 76-mm gun No. 14 on the upper deck, hit the guns of the machine and exploded, breaking the left side of the shield and dropping the gun itself onto the deck. The fragments of the shell caused an explosion of 23 76-mm rounds that were behind the gun. The boat deck above the site of the explosion was damaged and bulged upward for 4 meters, the upper (armored) deck above the casemate number 10 was also damaged. Serious damage was caused to boats and boats, the lower part of the rear chimney, ventilation bells, and the hatch of the 76-mm round supply shaft. A strong fire arose, smoke from which was observed on Russian ships.

                        As a result, 8 people died and 21 people were injured (6 - seriously, of which 4 were subsequently commissary). The servant of the 76-mm guns was especially hard hit. Gun 14 killed 6 people (including the commander of an average battery of 76-mm guns on the port side, Midshipman Savamoto, and all 4 people at the gun’s base). In a symmetrical starboard gun, No. 13, 1 person was killed and 2 wounded (1 - seriously), all 4 people in calculating gun # 12 were seriously injured (they were all commissary), 10 people were injured in gun No. 3 (1 - heavy). Another 5 people were injured in the casemate of the 152-mm gun No. 10 located under the site of the explosion (3 - from the calculation of guns No. 10, 2 - from the calculation of guns No. 9). The ship’s senior mine officer, Captain Lieutenant Oyamada, was also wounded.

                        Not bad?
                      3. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 16 June 2020 16: 03 New
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Not bad?

                        In fact, so-so. Despite the successful hit and detonation of Japanese ammunition, the Japanese’s combat effectiveness was practically unaffected. Because 76mm guns are about nothing.
                        In addition, for comparison, you need a Japanese shell of the same caliber bursting in an open battery without bulkheads. It seems to me that there would be no witnesses left from the Kasuga shell.
                      4. rytik32
                        16 June 2020 16: 39 New
                        +3
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Japanese combat readiness practically did not suffer

                        Most of all, the Japanese combat readiness suffered from their own shells)))
                      5. Saxahorse
                        Saxahorse 16 June 2020 23: 28 New
                        +1
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Most of all, the Japanese combat readiness suffered from their own shells)))

                        Iwate alone was a good substitute. It seems that the Russian ships did not have such hits from the Japanese, with penetration of armor and undermining of ammunition.
                      6. rytik32
                        17 June 2020 12: 02 New
                        +3
                        Totally agree with you.
                        Unfortunately, not everyone understands that Japanese shells with an instant fuse (even armor-piercing!) Are good only if there is a large concentration of hits, the so-called the effect of "hail of shells".
                        Japanese shells basically could not explode for armor and therefore be as effective as the Russians. I will give three examples. Japanese shells could not produce such an effect (or a potential effect, as in example No. 3).
                        1. Tsushima. Hit in “Asamu”, deprived of control. Equivalent as if half of Asama’s guns were out of order (this is if we compare the number of shells fired).
                        2. Ulsan. Hit in the Iwate casemate with detonation of ammunition. The bloodiest hit in the history of the REV: 40 killed and 36 wounded.
                        3. Tsushima. Hit the roof of the Fuji barbet. Only by miracle did the Japanese escape the fire in the cellars.
                      7. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 17 June 2020 13: 15 New
                        +1
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Unfortunately, not everyone understands

                        ... that the Russian shells had an insignificant armor-less effect, and because of the low explosive content they could not inflict such damage as the Japanese.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Hit in “Asamu”, deprived of control.

                        The correction of which took exactly 15 minutes. The rest of the time, the cruiser simply caught up with the convoy.
                        How many times during the war did Russian ships lose control?
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Ulsan. Hit in the Iwate casemate with detonation of ammunition.

                        The most interesting, from what weapon and with what shell was this hit made?
                        That's right, an outdated eight-inch thirty-five caliber sample of 1885 (if I did not confuse anything :)) with a Baranovsky pipe.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Tsushima Hit the roof of the Fuji barbet. Only by miracle did the Japanese escape the fire in the cellars.

                        They disassembled the same, and also with Valentin :)))
                        In short, all these heartbreaking details about the breakthrough of fire in the cellar are doubtful. And the breakdown of the 152mm armored hood itself is not such a big achievement.
                      8. rytik32
                        17 June 2020 13: 39 New
                        +3
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        that the Russian shells had an insignificant armored effect, and because of the low content of explosives could not inflict such damage as the Japanese

                        The fact of the matter is that the Japanese shells exploded on the armor and did not have an armored effect. Only a few shells in one place could tear off the plate and then already cause damage behind it.
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        The rest of the time, the cruiser simply caught up with the convoy.

                        Another point about the real speed of asamoids. Let me remind you, Kamimura then held 15 knots.
                      9. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 17 June 2020 14: 13 New
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Another point about the real speed of asamoids. Let me remind you, Kamimura then held 15 knots.

                        Nope. as far as I remember, Rokuro led his cruiser in an arc, so as not to once again stand under the fire of the BWO. (there’s just evidence that the shell that knocked it out was 10 ")
                      10. rytik32
                        18 June 2020 11: 54 New
                        0
                        I already
                        laid out the scheme
                        Asama follows the rest of the cruisers and distance 27 cab
                    2. Saxahorse
                      Saxahorse 17 June 2020 22: 32 New
                      +1
                      Quote: rytik32
                      The fact of the matter is that the Japanese shells exploded on the armor and did not have an armored effect.

                      There is one more nuance. Japanese ships are relatively poorly protected from longitudinal fire. (On which Iwata got caught catching a shell by the side wall) The same Asama has 152 mm on-board protection of the casemates, but the side and back walls of the casemates are 51 mm, the roof is 25 mm. With a sufficient number of hits, Russian armor-piercing shells are very dangerous for such a reservation scheme. Especially given the love of the Japanese to stockpile ammunition near the guns.
                  2. rytik32
                    19 June 2020 02: 08 New
                    +1
                    Quote: Senior Sailor
                    They disassembled the same, and also with Valentin :)))
                    In short, all these heartbreaking details about the breakthrough of fire in the cellar are doubtful.

                    I gave the details of that hit a little lower in response to Valentine.

                    Oh, I’ll probably have to write an article about the effect of shells now :)
                2. AK64
                  AK64 17 June 2020 17: 11 New
                  -3
                  Unfortunately, not everyone understands that Japanese shells with an instant fuse (even armor-piercing!) Are good only if there is a large concentration of hits, the so-called the effect of "hail of shells".

                  And is it nothing that the British fought all WWII with exactly the same lidditovye shells?
                3. Comrade
                  Comrade 17 June 2020 19: 03 New
                  0
                  Quote: rytik32
                  Tsushima Hit the roof of the Fuji barbet. Only by miracle did the Japanese escape the fire in the cellars.

                  Dear colleague, there was no miracle, in fact
                  this is one of the Tsushima myths

                  Barbet "Fuji" at the time of the hit of the projectile was abruptly deployed, and access to the cellar was fire blocked off.
                  If you really need it, I can provide a Japanese drawing on this issue, but not earlier than next Tuesday, when I have a day off, and I will have time to start looking for him in the bins.
                4. rytik32
                  19 June 2020 02: 01 New
                  +2
                  Quote: Comrade
                  Barbet "Fuji" at the time of the hit of the projectile was abruptly deployed, and access to the cellar was blocked by fire.

                  Dear Valentine, I will give a screen from Krestyaninov, written according to a Japanese medical description. In principle, Campbell (in the Feinberg translation) has the same text, only a more clumsy translation

                  Key:
                  the gun was loaded at the time of the hit,
                  the explosion was at the top of the charging compartment, for clarity, I marked this place on the diagram

                  In this charging compartment were both shells (maximum 18, but 12 had already been fired, so there were 6 left) and charges. The charges burned out, but the shells did not detonate. Do we remember the tendency of Japanese shells to self-tear? But not here!
                  And yes, an armored tube goes straight down to the cellar from the charging compartment.
                5. Comrade
                  Comrade 19 June 2020 05: 58 New
                  -1
                  Quote: rytik32
                  Dear Valentine, I will give a screen from Krestyaninov, written according to a Japanese medical description. Key: the gun at the time of impact was charged.

                  With all due respect to Krestyaninov, the originals of Japanese documents, including schemes of specialists from Sasebo, impress me more.
                6. rytik32
                  19 June 2020 10: 57 New
                  +4
                  Put yourself in the place of the reader. On the one hand, Campbell and Peasants, Kofman and Belov believe that “Fuji” almost died. This is the data in the medical description.
                  On the other hand you. You claim that there was no risk of death.
                  Who will the reader believe?
                  And do not you find it strange that the schemes you are talking about make a greater impression only on you?
                  Although I would not mind looking at these schemes - they may well change my mind.
                7. Saxahorse
                  Saxahorse 19 June 2020 22: 40 New
                  +1
                  Quote: Comrade
                  With all due respect to Krestyaninov, the originals of Japanese documents, including schemes of specialists from Sasebo, impress me more.

                  With all due respect to you, your Japanese abilities raise serious doubts. Let me remind you that I several times asked you for clarification on the diagrams or maps you gave in Japanese. Alas, I do not remember that you managed to do this.

                  PS Cons are not mine, but on the whole I understand the negative reaction of readers to the open disregard of a famous author. I have never once noticed behind Krestyaninov a tendency towards obvious fraud.
  • ser56
    ser56 16 June 2020 11: 49 New
    +4
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    Wilhelm Karlovich has nothing to do with it. He just walked forward ... like Zinovy ​​Petrovich a little later.

    Seriously? Those. when did the VKV go at the maximum speed available to it, including with a lag of poltav, is it the same as 9uz ZPR, when could it keep at least 11,5-12? And for Bordeaux and 14?
    Or maybe the VKV made a bunch of things in view of that? bully
    1. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 16 June 2020 11: 55 New
      0
      The maximum available speed of the squadron that has just left the base and spent more than six months in sailing is slightly different speeds. \
      So yes. Seriously.
      And if they did not forget, the third detachment regularly lagged by 9.
      1. ser56
        ser56 16 June 2020 12: 01 New
        +2
        Quote: Senior Sailor
        So yes. Seriously.

        I recommend reading the testimonies of officers of the tsarist commission - the speeds are indicated there ... request and the digital I took from there repeat
        Quote: Senior Sailor
        And if they did not forget, the third detachment regularly lagged by 9.

        and his artillery played a role in the beginning of the battle? It’s like I didn’t shoot ... request And there is a commonplace - in a naval battle, it is important to start while the ships are intact, namely, the chance at the beginning of the ZPR missed request
        1. rytik32
          16 June 2020 14: 41 New
          +2
          Quote: ser56
          and his artillery played a role in the beginning of the battle? It’s like I didn’t shoot ...

          Nicholas 1 with one of the oldest cannons in the squadron became the most productive ship, knocking out Asama and loading the stern barbecue Fuji into the roof.
        2. ser56
          ser56 16 June 2020 21: 03 New
          +2
          Quote: rytik32
          Nicholas 1 with one of the oldest cannons in the squadron became the most

          and this is the role of Nebogatov, who understood the absurdity (or not accuracy, which does not change the meaning) of the ZPR order (to hit everything on Mikasa) and transferred the fire to convenient targets hi
        3. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 17 June 2020 13: 32 New
          0
          Sergey, how much can you? Dismantled it more than once.
          This order concerned only the first detachment.
        4. AK64
          AK64 17 June 2020 17: 14 New
          0
          and this is the role of Nebogatov, who understood the absurdity (or not accuracy, which does not change the meaning) of the ZPR order (to hit everything on Mikasa) and transferred the fire to convenient targets

          Would be ashamed --- there was no such order. It concerned only the 1st detachment
      2. Senior seaman
        Senior seaman 17 June 2020 13: 24 New
        0
        If this, of course, was "Nikolai" :)))
  • rytik32
    16 June 2020 13: 11 New
    +3
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    And if they didn’t forget, the third detachment regularly lagged behind by 9

    This is one of the Tsushima myths.
    I remind you that the 3rd detachment overtook the 2nd detachment after the failure of Suvorov. What lag is it about then?
    Yes, there are sources of information about the backlog of 3 detachments at the very beginning of the battle. But this is understandable. When the ships left the "heap" formed behind the "Oslyaby", they inevitably extended the formation. Objectively, there is no other way. Ships do not accelerate instantly.
    1. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 16 June 2020 13: 40 New
      0
      Quote: rytik32
      3rd detachment overtook 2nd detachment after the release of "Suvorov"

      And not later? :)))
      And by the way, the maximum speed of the ship and the maximum speed of the connection, consisting of these ships, are slightly different speeds. It is not at all a fact that a squadron of 14 nodal battleships will be able to maneuver at 14 knots. Rather, the fact that he could not.
    2. rytik32
      16 June 2020 13: 51 New
      +1
      Quote: Senior Sailor
      And not later? :)))

      A report from Michman Rozhdestvensky.
      K.-a. Nebogatov, even before the battle semaphore on "Nakhimov": "if you are behind, I will overtake you and take your place," ahead of the II armored squad at the beginning of the 4th hour
      Testimony of Lieutenant Ovander.
      At the same time, the squadron battleship “Nikolay I”, having failed to the left, increased its speed, began to bypass the vessels, which showed that he wanted to take the lead in the convoy after the failure of the squadron battleship “Suvorov”.
      Testimony of Michman Messer.
      After the failure of the Oslyaby, the sequence in the line of armadillos is violated. III armored squad moves forward and follows the first, and the second enters the tail of the column.
    3. ser56
      ser56 16 June 2020 21: 05 New
      0
      Quote: rytik32
      After the failure of Oslyaby,

      with a dead flagship ... repeat
  • ser56
    ser56 16 June 2020 21: 04 New
    0
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    that a squadron of 14 nodal battleships will be able to maneuver at 14 knots.

    minus 1-1,5 knots ... request and in a straight line it is possible for the weakest - see woks or Fight in ZhM campaigns ...
  • ser56
    ser56 16 June 2020 11: 51 New
    +1
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    and no longer engaged in such garbage.

    at the beginning of Tsushima Togo did such a stupid thing with his loop that only the still greater stupidity of the ZPR saved him ... request
  • ser56
    ser56 16 June 2020 11: 46 New
    +1
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    in fact, just did not have time. “Tsesarevich” failed earlier.

    And therefore Togo began to give a signal about leaving the battle before the varnish shots in Tsesarevich? bully
    By the way - what would Mikasa shoot in this crossing? repeat
    1. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 16 June 2020 11: 56 New
      0
      There were three more battleships. Given the fact that the Russian squadron almost lost its combat capability, it would be enough.
      1. rytik32
        17 June 2020 00: 01 New
        0
        If the Russian squadron hadn’t run away, it could have entered some Shanghai, repaired the most serious injuries, loaded coal and headed for Vladivostok.
        But the Japanese could not grow their guns in a couple of days ...
        1. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 17 June 2020 12: 45 New
          +1
          Quote: rytik32
          If the Russian squadron hadn’t fled, it could have entered some Shanghai, repaired the most serious injuries, loaded coal

          And all of the above in 24 hours. Sorry, but troubleshooting and contracting would take more time.
          Quote: rytik32
          go to Vladivostok.

          Faced along the path of his yesterday’s opponents, plus the cruiser Kamimura.
          This engine will not fly.
          1. rytik32
            17 June 2020 13: 29 New
            +1
            Quote: Senior Sailor
            Sorry, troubleshooting and contracting would take more time.

            Close up dangerous holes in the sides with shields?
            To sew holes in pipes with sheets of iron?
            It is possible to meet the deadline in 24 hours.
            Quote: Senior Sailor
            Faced along the path of his yesterday’s opponents, plus the cruiser Kamimura.

            There are a lot of questions the Japanese will have.
            1. We need to have time to fix the Mikasu. In addition to the trunks, he had injuries preventing him from participating in the battle.
            2. Throw cover for the supply of the army, leaving the Korean Strait? Very dangerous. Even on the way to the Korea Strait, our squadron can melt many transports.
            3. Therefore, most likely the “Mikasu” will be sent to be repaired in Sasebo, and the rest will be in front of Shanghai.
            And then there are too many options ...
            1. Senior seaman
              Senior seaman 17 June 2020 14: 03 New
              +1
              Quote: rytik32
              Close up dangerous holes in the sides with shields?

              At a minimum, Retvisan and Peresvet need a dock. Before staging, you need to pump out water, unload coal and ammunition.
              Quote: rytik32
              It is possible to meet the deadline in 24 hours.

              There is nothing impossible for a person who will not do this personally :)
              Quote: rytik32
              We need to have time to fix the Mikasu. In addition to the trunks, he had injuries preventing him from participating in the battle.

              What are these?
              The battleship received quite unpleasant blows, but nothing that threatened the buoyancy or combat effectiveness of the ship. The most serious damage was damage to the 178 mm armor plate in the area of ​​the nose barbette, because of which the battleship, following the damaged side to the swell, could receive flooding in the bow, as well as the failure of the 305 mm barb feed station.

              Quote: rytik32
              Throw a cover for the supply of the army, leaving for the Strait of Korea? Very dangerous.

              Nothing dangerous. Order transport to stay in ports.
              Quote: rytik32
              Even on the way to the Korea Strait, our squadron can melt many transports

              Not more than a wok, but rather a lot less.
              Quote: rytik32
              Therefore, most likely, “Mikasu” will be sent to repair in Sasebo

              Yes of course. The much less damaged Mikasa will be stuck in a repair for a year, and the battered Russian battleships will be repaired in a day.
              Quote: rytik32
              the remaining will be in front of Shanghai.

              Together with Kamimura.
              1. rytik32
                17 June 2020 14: 14 New
                +1
                Quote: Senior Sailor
                What are these?

                Read https://naval-manual.livejournal.com/56888.html
                1. Senior seaman
                  Senior seaman 17 June 2020 15: 46 New
                  +1
                  So what?
                  Of the injuries sustained by the ship, the most important was, of course, the failure of the main caliber aft tower. The remaining damage can be attributed to either "minor", "superficial", "decorative" (although serious), or potentially dangerous.

                  Russian ships suffered much more.
                  But let's say you're right (although this is not obvious) and Mikas needs to be sent for repair. In addition to the almost uninjured three armadillos and two Garibaldians, Togo has six more Asamoids. And how to strengthen our squadron?
            2. anzar
              anzar 17 June 2020 16: 57 New
              0
              Close up dangerous holes in the sides with shields?
              To sew holes in pipes with sheets of iron?
              It is possible to meet the deadline in 24 hours.

              Fantasy? I like it)) In real life, serviceable ships "did not have time" even to load coal and happily interned.
  • AK64
    AK64 17 June 2020 17: 00 New
    0
    Could Togo put crossover “T” to Wittgeft? That's it! Not enough 2 knots.

    You are mistaken simply because you do not consider the length of the line: a short line (in Togo in the Yellow Sea the line was very short) requires a higher speed for crossing.
  • unknown
    unknown 15 June 2020 20: 47 New
    +5
    Not implemented.
    In one of his articles, Andrei referred to these English teachings.
    In the comments I provided information that the French conducted similar exercises, and in no less quantity. Based on the results of their exercises, the French came to the conclusion that a speed advantage of at least six nodes is needed.
    In fact, the British agreed with them, since the speed of battlecruisers did not exceed the speed of battleships by two knots.
    1. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 16 June 2020 00: 36 New
      +5
      Quote: ignoto
      Based on the results of their exercises, the French came to the conclusion that a speed advantage of at least six nodes is needed.
      In fact, the British agreed with them, since the speed of battlecruisers did not exceed the speed of battleships by two knots.

      I absolutely can not understand this idea about some kind of "Crossing-T" on steam ships. These are not sailboats, nothing prevents them from maneuvering in any direction. Just turning the inside radius from the enemy and even an advantage of 200 knots is not enough to overtake the head of the column.

      In my opinion, it is impossible to make "Crossing-T, you can only substitute for it ..
      1. Senior seaman
        Senior seaman 16 June 2020 09: 02 New
        -2
        Quote: Saxahorse
        I absolutely can not understand

        This is just not surprising. yes
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 June 2020 09: 17 New
      0
      I don’t remember something that you brought it. Maybe repeat it?
    3. Nehist
      Nehist 17 June 2020 00: 49 New
      +2
      Absolutely right! The Britons themselves later admitted that convincing crossing requires superiority of at least 5 knots
  • rytik32
    15 June 2020 22: 38 New
    +5
    Quote: Sergey Zhikharev
    Oldgamy tried.

    This is afterglow. Rozhdestvensky himself and his headquarters said something else. There was not enough coal to cross over and there was no suitable place for transshipment at sea. And the risk of losing ships in the fog.
    Quote: Sergey Zhikharev
    And if the Japanese did not remove the curtain or at sea (and near Vladivostok), this detachment will be spotted by "dogs", and other Japanese "dogs" will catch up? Not to mention the cruiser Kamimura ....

    As a curtain, the Japanese could leave one of the auxiliary cruisers. But if the entire squadron was able to quietly pass through two lines of the patrol, then its small fraction ... Moreover, I remind you, the squadron was noticed by smoke. We will have much less smoke ...
    Tsushima’s experience says that the 4 Don cruisers couldn’t flood the Don, with the Monomakh they would have fought back ...
    But Kamimura would not be 100% - he would not have thrown Togo in a linear battle!
    1. Sergey Zhikharev
      Sergey Zhikharev 17 June 2020 10: 55 New
      0
      This is afterglow. Rozhdestvensky himself and his headquarters said something else. There was not enough coal to cross over and there was no suitable place for transshipment at sea. And the risk of losing ships in the fog.

      Aftertaste of what? What will a single steamboat ship sink? Or is there a risk of losing ships in the fog and there will be more lost ships?
      As a curtain, the Japanese could leave one of the auxiliary cruisers. But if the entire squadron was able to quietly pass through two lines of the patrol, then its small fraction ... Moreover, I remind you, the squadron was noticed by smoke. We will have much less smoke ...

      Well, if the Russian squadron was able to go unnoticed, then why divide it into two parts?
      If the Russian squadron passed the spotted, then what prevents to find part of the squadron?
      Tsushima’s experience says that the 4 Don cruisers couldn’t flood the Don, with the Monomakh they would have fought back.
      ..
      The experience of Tsushima just suggests that the Donskoy in the battle with 6 cruisers (yes, he damaged two cruisers) received heavy injuries and was forced to self-flood.
      And it’s one thing when the battle of the cruiser is against the cruisers, and another thing is when the cruiser must protect something.
      Suppose we have a “Donskoy”, “Monomakh” (you can also “Nakhimov” to the heap) and 10 supply ships, going behind the squadron. Appear (the line of patrols did not go unnoticed) Japanese lungs CR - 4 pieces. The Russians are successfully fighting back. Reinforcements arrive for the Japanese - another 4 cruisers. Now 6 Japanese missiles are fighting 2 Russian missiles, and the remaining 2 Japanese are attacked by transports. If 8 yap. Kr little - then another 4 can come up.
      But Kamimura would not be 100% - he would not have thrown Togo in a linear battle!

      And here is the mistake.
      Under the new condition, 2TE is divided into 2 parts - a high-speed one that rushes to Vladivostok and a transport one behind. 2TE with a battle (analogue to the battle in the Yellow Sea) but safely reaches Vladivostok, but transports still did not arrive in Vladivostok. Moreover, the Russians successfully repel all attacks. Since there is nothing to do with the Japanese squadron at Vladivostok, the armadillos of Togo and the cruiser Kamimura (or just the cruiser Kamimura) go to meet the vehicles that are protected by Donskaya, Monomakh and let Nakhimov ....
      1. rytik32
        17 June 2020 12: 47 New
        +2
        Quote: Sergey Zhikharev
        Aftertaste of what? What will a single steamboat ship sink?

        Yes.
        The fact that “Novik” passed - they knew that “Oldgamy” would not work - they did not know.

        Quote: Sergey Zhikharev
        Reinforcements arrive for the Japanese - another 4 cruisers. Now 6 Japanese missiles are fighting 2 Russian missiles, and the remaining 2 Japanese are attacked by transports. If 8 yap. Kr little - then another 4 can come up.

        It is unlikely that Togo and Kamimura would be left without light cruisers.
        In fact, after all, on May 15, the Japanese pulled almost all of their light forces to the Nebogatov squadron. Although they had someone to catch: “Oleg”, “Aurora”, “Pearls”, “Diamond” + auxiliary cruisers. So I evaluate the detachment for the protection of the Tsushima Strait in 4 light cruisers maximum, and obviously not the 3rd detachment (the strongest) + auxiliary cruisers.
        Quote: Sergey Zhikharev
        Since there is nothing to do with the Japanese squadron at Vladivostok, the armadillos of Togo and the cruiser Kamimura (or just the cruiser Kamimura) go to meet the vehicles that are protected by Donskaya, Monomakh and let Nakhimov ....

        And their coal reserves do not run out? In fact, the Japanese went to Vladivostok with additional loading in Genzan.
        1. Sergey Zhikharev
          Sergey Zhikharev 17 June 2020 13: 58 New
          0
          Yes.
          The fact that “Novik” passed - they knew that “Oldgamy” would not work - they did not know.

          "Novik" - a single ship - noticed and intercepted. Finding a squad is much easier. And to intercept and sink is not difficult.
          It is unlikely that Togo and Kamimura would be left without light cruisers.
          In fact, after all, on May 15, the Japanese pulled almost all of their light forces to the Nebogatov squadron. Although they had someone to catch: “Oleg”, “Aurora”, “Pearls”, “Diamond” + auxiliary cruisers. So I evaluate the detachment for the protection of the Tsushima Strait in 4 light cruisers maximum, and obviously not the 3rd detachment (the strongest) + auxiliary cruisers.

          those. option, when 6 cruisers are connected in battle 2 Russian cruisers, and 2 other Japanese drown transports normal?
          And didn’t the Japanese find themselves in a situation “without light cruisers” after the start of the Tsushima battle?
          And can't reinforcements come up to the Japanese detachment?
          And their coal reserves do not run out? In fact, the Japanese went to Vladivostok with additional loading in Genzan.

          In theory, 2TE also end up the same. Nevertheless, the cruisers of Kamim can still cross T to Russian armadillos - and from the side of Togo. So the battle was not won automatically. Well, 2 TE is moving forward, Togo and Kamimura are lagging behind (still far from Vladivostok), and here the Japanese report that Russian ships entered the Tsushima Strait, which the light cruisers cannot overcome. In this situation, Togo and Kamimura just go south (most likely south-west) to meet Russian transports
          1. rytik32
            17 June 2020 14: 07 New
            +2
            Quote: Sergey Zhikharev
            And to intercept and sink is not difficult.

            Well, some "Naniva" will notice our squadron, and so what? At night he will lose her. And where to go Togo? And if the admiral is normal, then this "Naniva" will be drowned by "Oleg", "Aurora" and pebbles.
            Togo from Mozampo in an economical move will not be in time. Either he will, but he will burn all the coal. Japanese destroyers generally do not have enough range - they need to refuel along the way. Or they will be towed, but then again they will not have time ...
            1. Sergey Zhikharev
              Sergey Zhikharev 17 June 2020 14: 23 New
              0
              Well, some "Naniva" will notice our squadron, and so what? At night he will lose her. And where to go Togo? And if the admiral is normal, then this "Naniva" will be drowned by "Oleg", "Aurora" and pebbles.
              "Naniva" will transmit a message that it sees the ships, is observing. Will try to direct his strength. Not the fact that he will lose, besides, where to look for the Russians (where they are going) is clear.
              What does it mean "if the admiral is normal" and did not understand about "Oleg" and "Aurora" it seems that the transports are guarded by "Monomakh" and "Donskoy"
              Togo from Mozampo in an economical move will not be in time. Either he will, but he will burn all the coal. Japanese destroyers generally do not have enough range - they need to refuel along the way. Or they will be towed, but then again they will not have time ...

              Russian support ships in the absence of armadillos can accelerate over 9 knots? Who slowed down whom ...
              1. rytik32
                17 June 2020 14: 26 New
                0
                I apologize, I misunderstood your idea
  • mmaxx
    mmaxx 16 June 2020 06: 49 New
    +3
    If yes. Shooting with the squadron was obvious stupidity. To be afraid of hypothetical dogs is not clear where far and not to be afraid of the main forces under the nose is somewhat strange.
  • mmaxx
    mmaxx 16 June 2020 08: 29 New
    +4
    I did not cross Togo to Rozhdestvensky. Generally. He controlled the head fire.
  • mmaxx
    mmaxx 16 June 2020 17: 04 New
    +3
    Quote: Sergey Zhikharev
    Crossing T is carried out with a superiority of 2 knots ....

    Only if the enemy does not try to maneuver.
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 June 2020 16: 46 New
    +4
    Alas, it is extremely difficult to agree with the conclusions of the article.
    Transports Overloading coal at sea was a big problem and took a lot of time. In addition, according to the testimony of the flagship navigator Filippovsky, overloads were carried out only in certain places, favorable in terms of weather. Thus, taking into account the fact that all the ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron preloaded more than enough coal to move to Vladivostok, there was no need for transport.

    Oddly enough, but even the coal reserve left at 2TOE did not guarantee access to Vladivostok. That is, some of the ships could receive such serious damage that the available stock would not be enough. Accordingly, the conclusion is extremely controversial.
    Tugboats. If warships lost their course from damage or breakdowns, they might have to be towed. But in conditions of a possible Japanese attack at any moment, it’s better to pull a warship, which will be more powerful, armored and armed. Thus, there was no need for tugboats.

    On the contrary, in the conditions of the general superiority of the Japanese fleet, there was no sense in distracting warships from towing. It would be much better to use tugboats for towing. So the conclusion in the article is completely wrong.
    Floating workshop. Even if the ship loses track, it is much easier to take it in tow than to make repairs at sea in the presence of a threat from the Japanese. Thus, there was no need for a workshop.

    There was, and some. Vladivostok is completely heavenless in terms of the base of the fleet, and a repair workshop there would be extremely useful - both in the part of artisans and in terms of the equipment installed on it. Again, the conclusion of the article is wrong.
    Finally, hospital ships are the only ships that could even theoretically help the squadron en route to Vladivostok, saving crews of sinking and taking on board the wounded from damaged ships. Why only theoretically? Because in practice, during the battle, the hospital ship was kept away from flying projectiles and could not quickly approach those in distress.

    Unfortunately, the author is limited solely to the use of ships at sea. And in Vladivostok? Two hospital ships are two well-equipped hospitals. And what about the hospitals in Vladivostok? Without an analysis of this issue, it is impossible to talk about the uselessness of hospital courts. So the conclusion on them is not supported by evidence.
    Now let's look at the presence of support ships in the squadron from the perspective of the possibility of their defense in the upcoming battle.

    We will see:))
    Thus, we can state no less than a twofold advantage of the Japanese forces in a potential attack on Russian transports. And if you take into account auxiliary ships and destroyers, the advantage of the Japanese will be even more noticeable! It turns out that Rozhestvensky did not have the forces capable of protecting support ships in the general battle. As part of the squadron, they were doomed to death.

    Here, the author, alas, made two whole mistakes. Having considered the superiority of the Japanese in light forces, he lost sight of the fact that they, these forces, were constrained and could not take part in the battle of the main forces. That is, Rozhestvensky, having a weaker fleet, in the secondary direction (and transports are still secondary) tied the big forces with smaller forces :))) This should be seen as an undoubted success, but not a mistake :))) And, finally, the second mistake the author is that he was too keen on counting guns and completely forgot that out of 8 auxiliary ships, the Japanese sank / caused decisive damage to only two of Kamchatka and the Irtysh before the main forces of the squadron were defeated. True, they still captured hospital ships, but, apparently, Rozhestvensky did not expect that anyone would encroach on them, they kind of like a red cross.
    That is, at least part of the ships our cruisers managed to protect (4 out of 6), and the two lagging hospitals, as I understand it, were specially left behind so as not to be hooked by accident. Accordingly, the author’s conclusion
    Now we can make an unambiguous conclusion. The presence of support ships in Tsushima is a clear mistake.

    somehow not confirmed :)
    1. rytik32
      15 June 2020 17: 11 New
      +3
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      That is, some of the ships could receive such serious damage that the available stock would not be enough. Accordingly, the conclusion is extremely controversial

      In case of serious damage, there will be no boats or crane rails left. How to ship a corner?
      And the main question. Why should the Japanese regret transports? They will drown them!

      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      On the contrary, in the conditions of the general superiority of the Japanese fleet, there was no sense in distracting warships from towing. It would be much better to use tugboats for towing. So the conclusion in the article is completely wrong.

      The tug will be destroyed by any Japanese armored cruiser.

      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      even some. Vladivostok - absolutely no manna from heaven

      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      And in Vladivostok?

      I do not doubt for a second their necessity in Vladivostok



      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      of the 8 auxiliary ships, the Japanese before the defeat of the main forces of the squadron sank / caused decisive damage to only two - Kamchatka and the Irtysh

      This is because the line has not reached them. I remind Togo expected to fight 3 days and 2 nights. But in fact, only those who went back to the Strait of Korea were saved.
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      and the two lagging hospitals, as I understand it, were deliberately left behind so as not to accidentally hook

      But what about "saving people", "accepting the wounded"?
      1. Senior seaman
        Senior seaman 15 June 2020 18: 20 New
        0
        Quote: rytik32
        In case of serious damage, there will be no boats or crane rails left. How to ship a corner?

        It seems that without boats and cranes, it is still easier to load coal than in the absence of coal.
        While damage to all of the above is possible, but not necessary.
        1. rytik32
          15 June 2020 23: 26 New
          +3
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          It seems that without boats and cranes, it is still easier to load coal than in the absence of coal.

          I dare to suggest that it is even easier to take the ship in tow.
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          While damage to all of the above is possible, but not necessary

          I also ask you to consider that coal loading took a very long time. And even if far away from the Korean Channel, the Japanese destroyer imagined it, then a submarine re-search, what is to be seen in the Sea of ​​Japan? Fersen exploded the ship with fear, not even seeing the Japanese. Is there enough neuros? - I doubt it very much!
          1. Senior seaman
            Senior seaman 16 June 2020 09: 37 New
            0
            Quote: rytik32
            I dare to suggest that it is even easier to take the ship in tow.

            This is if the towing coal itself is enough ...
      2. unknown
        unknown 15 June 2020 21: 02 New
        +4
        What the hell are boats?
        Getting ready for a fight, or for a walk?
        Construction loading of battleships of the Borodino type - 678 tons.
        Unlike the overload of 900 tons of Mikasy, a significant part of the construction overload of Borodino was possible and needed to be disposed of. This is the thermal insulation of the cubicles and watercraft.
        The battleships should have been unloaded as much as possible: in addition to part of the construction overload, part of the operational overload should have been transferred, primarily “boatswain supplies,” which would not be needed in battle.
        Clean the sides of the fouling.
        And raise the speed to 14 knots.
        Real japanese speed.
        1. mmaxx
          mmaxx 16 June 2020 07: 03 New
          +2
          Such mental delights were unavailable to either ZPR or its headquarters. That is, even the available experience of the war was not taken into account at all.
        2. AK64
          AK64 17 June 2020 17: 23 New
          -2
          The battleships should have been unloaded as much as possible: in addition to part of the construction overload, part of the operational overload should have been transferred, primarily “boatswain supplies,” which would not be needed in battle.
          Clean the sides of the fouling.
          And raise the speed to 14 knots.

          .... and 6-inch guns for 12 inches to replace!
      3. bayard
        bayard 16 June 2020 02: 33 New
        +2
        Quote: rytik32
        But what about "saving people", "accepting the wounded"?

        These are still HOSPITAL vessels, not sanitary evacuation vessels.
        And the destroyers were engaged in salvation on the water and receiving the wounded during the battle, which is also handy for them, in view of the high speed and low side.
    2. Undecim
      Undecim 15 June 2020 18: 02 New
      +1
      Alas, it is extremely difficult to agree with the conclusions of the article.
      About "extremely difficult" - this is, perhaps, extremely strong.
      No one denies the need for supply vessels and the cargo on board both in the event of a breakthrough into Vladivostok and an "organized retreat." Discussion about why they were to take with them to battle. What positive role did they play in the Tsushima battle?
      1. Sergey Zhikharev
        Sergey Zhikharev 15 June 2020 19: 11 New
        0
        No one denies the need for supply vessels and the cargo on board both in the event of a breakthrough into Vladivostok and an "organized retreat." Discussion about why they were to take with them to battle. What positive role did they play in the Tsushima battle?

        As part of the squadron, support vessels are better protected, an independent breakthrough (alone or by squad) is a high probability that ships will be lost.
        What role should support vessels play in ANY battle?
        1. Undecim
          Undecim 15 June 2020 19: 49 New
          +1
          Well, it's all about Young.
          As part of the squadron, support vessels are better protected
          Well, and how in practice did the supply court squadron defend it?
          1. Sergey Zhikharev
            Sergey Zhikharev 15 June 2020 19: 58 New
            +1
            The answer is in the style of classical Russian literature:
            "Having lost their head, they do not cry through their hair"
            1. Undecim
              Undecim 15 June 2020 20: 14 New
              +2
              What role should support vessels play in ANY battle?
              Give an example, except for Tsushima, when the squadron pulled a caravan of supply vessels into battle.
              1. Sergey Zhikharev
                Sergey Zhikharev 15 June 2020 20: 23 New
                +1
                Are there examples of a squadron traveling during a war that does not have supply bases, and at the same time abandons supply ships?
                Returning to Tsushima:
                Option 1. 2TE warships + transports after a small battle, is in Vladivostok. Loss of 1-2 "Ushakov". The squadron receives the necessary resources, and can enter into a new battle. The role of transport ships is obvious.
                Option 2. 2TE from warships safely arrives in Vladivostok, transports are lost (as a result of the battle, or intercepted when trying to break through alone). The squadron does not receive resources, and is not ready for a new battle. The role of transport ships is obvious.
                Option 3. 2TE does not stay in Vladivostok, as it is defeated. Both armadillos and transports were sunk, and the question "here are lost transport ships" is not a little relevant
                1. Undecim
                  Undecim 15 June 2020 20: 53 New
                  -1
                  Returning to Tsushima:
                  Your options in the style of a true naval commander. For luck. What kind of "small battle" can we talk about if the Japanese were not allowed to break through the squadron to Vladivostok and they understood this?
                  1. Sergey Zhikharev
                    Sergey Zhikharev 17 June 2020 11: 17 New
                    0
                    Your options in the style of a true naval commander

                    Well, since I speak like a naval commander, I look like a naval commander (in my hands a spyglass and a cat on my shoulder), I move like a naval commander (in a short ride), then most likely I am a naval commander. And if so, then
                    CENSORING (further explained by a sea bend why all sorts of "land" should be obeyed, because as a naval commander I have more knowledge
                    For luck.

                    Given that no plan can stand the clash with reality, we can say that there are simply no work plans for the battle / battle (because what kind of plan is it that becomes invalid in the first minutes of the battle?). And if not, then all the battles and battles are fought, as you noticed
                    For luck.

                    What kind of "small battle" can we talk about if the Japanese were not allowed to break through the squadron to Vladivostok and they understood this?

                    Option 1. The Tsushima battle is almost analogous to the battle at Cape Shantung (let us leave the question “how exactly did this happen”). The Russian squadron, having lost 1-2 ships, is in Vladivostok. Since the “breakthrough of the squadron” is not equal to the “victory in the war,” 2TE after repair should go to sea, defeat the Japanese fleet, and when the Japanese fleet is sunk (and the Russian ships block the entire supply of the Japanese army on the mainland), then it will be possible talk about victory in the war. 2TE receives the necessary resources from supply ships, (for example, shells) and can engage in a new battle. The role of transport ships is obvious.
                    Option 2. The Tsushima battle is almost the same as the battle at Cape Shantung. A Russian squadron not affiliated with support vessels is developing at a high speed (the battle is on parallel courses), having lost 1-2 ships, is in Vladivostok. Since the “breakthrough of the squadron” is not equal to the “victory in the war,” 2TE after repair should go to sea, defeat the Japanese fleet, and when the Japanese fleet is sunk (and the Russian ships block the entire supply of the Japanese army on the mainland), then it will be possible talk about victory in the war. That's just the support ships do not stay in Vladivostok, because they were intercepted (maybe one by one, maybe when they marched around Japan, maybe when they entered the Tsushima Strait). As a result, 2 fuel cells do not receive resources, and are not ready for a new battle, the war is dragging on. The role of transport ships is obvious.
                    Option 3. 2TE does not stay in Vladivostok, as it is defeated. Both armadillos and transports were sunk, and the question "here are lost transport ships" is not a little relevant
                2. rytik32
                  15 June 2020 23: 50 New
                  +1
                  Quote: Sergey Zhikharev
                  Are there examples of a squadron traveling during a war that does not have supply bases, and at the same time abandons supply ships?

                  Von Spee, Servers, Dewey acted away from their bases, but nobody guessed to bring supply ships into battle :)
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 June 2020 08: 40 New
                    0
                    Sit down, deuce. The last squadron von Spee was accompanied by 2 vehicles and a hospital ship. I will answer the rest in the evening
                    1. rytik32
                      16 June 2020 09: 19 New
                      +1
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Sit down, deuce. The last squadron von Spee was accompanied by 2 vehicles and a hospital ship. I will answer the rest in the evening

                      Dear Andrey, I beg you to prepare well for the evening.
                      Namely indicate:
                      1. Build the von Spee ships in the Falkland Battle and place 2 transports and a hospital ship in it.
                      2. The distance between the 2 transports, the hospital ship and the Scharnhorst, at least estimated.
                      3. Which warships covered 2 vehicles and a hospital ship in the Falkland Battle?
                      I look forward to the evening!
                      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 June 2020 20: 06 New
                        +1
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Dear Andrey, I beg you to prepare well for the evening

                        Yes, I’m always ready, Norm can’t always scribble comments :)
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Namely indicate:
                        1. Build the von Spee ships in the Falkland Battle and place 2 transports and a hospital ship in it.

                        The von Spee ships in the Falkland Battle were composed of 3 units with which he went to storm the Falklands. The first consisted of 2 DBKR, the second - from light cruisers, the third - from transports with a hospital ship. All three detachments obeyed the admiral’s order, "save whoever can!" and tried to scatter in different directions. This tactic, alas, did not bring success, since all three detachments were intercepted by British warships.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        2. The distance between the 2 transports, the hospital ship and the Scharnhorst, at least estimated.

                        I can’t say that.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        3. Which warships covered 2 vehicles and a hospital ship in the Falkland Battle?

                        None.
                        It’s completely clear to me where you are driving, but alas. The fact is that Spee really dragged his auxiliary ships for a combat operation. As in the case of 2TO, the transports went to battle, being near the main forces. Moreover, they came so close to the place of events that they were discovered by an observer from the Canopus, who mistook them for transports with a landing party (!) Going to capture the Falklands (!! )
                        Von Spee’s order to “break away” was heard after the Germans discovered the main British forces and realized that they were opposed by much larger forces than they expected to meet. And this should be seen as maneuvering in battle. In principle, Spee’s order differs little from telling the Rozhdestvensky vehicles to stay away. And the fact that Spee did not allocate power to cover them affected the fate of transports in the most dramatic way. The Russians in Tsushima lost 2 vehicles out of 6. I do not consider hospitals, because the EMNIP, in accordance with international law, should have expected that the Japanese would give them unhindered access. Spee lost 2 of 3 vehicles.
                        And now - on other issues
                        Quote: rytik32
                        In case of serious damage, there will be no boats or crane rails left. How to ship a corner?

                        Boats and beams will remain in transport, but even in their absence, loading is still possible (bags are transmitted along the ropes between 2 ships)
                        Quote: rytik32
                        And the main question. Why should the Japanese regret transports? They will drown them!

                        And why did the Japanese in the daytime battle in ZhM regret the Russian armored cruisers that received minimal damage? Maybe because they were occupied by the main forces of the 1st TOE? :))) Heating transports is, in fact, not even the third, but the thirty-third priority among the Japanese in Tsushima.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        The tug will be destroyed by any Japanese armored cruiser.

                        Let's clarify. Under fire, towing a ship is impossible. Neither for the tugboat, nor for the nuclear aircraft carrier. And outside the shelling, the tug will cope no worse than a warship.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        This is because the line has not reached them. I remind Togo expected to fight 3 days and 2 nights.

                        Correctly. But Rozhestvensky believed that a battle would be held on the model of LM and he could break into Vladivostok with the loss of several ships. So he had reason to believe that the Japanese would be occupied with his main forces, and the transports would pass.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        But what about "saving people", "accepting the wounded"?

                        But what about the materiel? Who and when intended to use hospital ships to “save people” from sinking ships?
                      2. rytik32
                        16 June 2020 23: 26 New
                        +2
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        All three detachments obeyed the admiral’s order, "save whoever can!" and tried to scatter in different directions

                        So the difference is that von Spee did not count on the battle.
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        In principle, Spee’s order differs little from telling the Rozhdestvensky vehicles to stay away.

                        The fundamental difference is that von Spee, when he smelled of battle, sent the transports to escape on his own, while Rozhdestvensky kept them at the squadron and set the task for the cruisers to protect them.
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        loading is still possible (bags are transmitted along the ropes between 2 ships)

                        I did not know 2 TOE of such technology. Only boats or overboard.
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        And why did the Japanese in the daytime battle in ZhM regret the Russian armored cruisers that received minimal damage?

                        "Askold" even caught a 305-mm shell, "regretted" wow!
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        so that he had reason to believe that the Japanese would be occupied with his main forces, and the transports would pass.

                        And what will the light forces of the Japanese do? Why they will not be able to attack transports?
                      3. Comrade
                        Comrade 17 June 2020 03: 42 New
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        loading is still possible (bags are transmitted along the ropes between 2 ships)

                        I did not know 2 TOE of such technology. Only boats or overboard.

                        So is this a fake in the picture?
                      4. rytik32
                        17 June 2020 08: 18 New
                        +3
                        Quote: Comrade
                        So is this a fake in the picture?

                        "Initially, it was supposed to load coal according to the method of the American Spencer-Miller. In this method, a military vessel tows a coal miner; mass of fittings, electric winches, which must give hundreds of revolutions per minute and move bags of coal with great speed over the cable over the water. This method seems to be which had not yet been tested by anyone, was heavily advertised by the Americans. During the formation of the squadron, Spencer-Miller instruments were purchased for almost 1,5 million rubles. In Kronstadt, experiments were carried out on ships of the squadron of Admiral Rozhestvensky, ships were loaded at sea. Although, in the end, it turned out the complete unsuitability of this method of loading, nevertheless, Spencer-Miller’s bulky devices were taken on a hike and occupied a lot of space on the decks of ships, without ever bringing any benefit. "

                        Source: https://statehistory.ru/books/V--S--Kravchenko_CHerez-tri-okeana/75
                    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 17 June 2020 17: 16 New
                      0
                      Quote: rytik32
                      So the difference is that von Spee did not count on the battle.

                      Really? :))) Let's clarify. Some of his officers spoke out against calling at the Falklands, as they considered it possible for British cruisers to be there. And Spee's plan called for landing from two cruisers, while the rest had to carry out their cover. As for me, this proves quite precisely that, although von Spee did not think that the British would be waiting for him in the Falklands, he still did not exclude this possibility.
                      Quote: rytik32
                      The fundamental difference is that von Spee, when he smelled of battle, sent the transports to escape on his own, while Rozhdestvensky kept them at the squadron and set the task for the cruisers to protect them.

                      Alexey, I understand your point of view. You are guided by the fact that:
                      1. Von Spee did not expect a serious naval battle during the Falkland raid
                      2. As soon as it became clear that this battle was not something that was possible, but even inevitable, he sent off auxiliary vessels from the warships of his squadron. Moreover, the fact that Spee sent the transports after the start of the battle, that is, after his ships were fired upon by the British, does not bother you at all. Okay:)))
                      Based on these two points, you postulate that von Spee did not bring his transports into battle, and in this you see the difference between the actions of the German commander at the Falklands and the Russian in Tsushima. Well, at first glance, the way it is. Alas, the analogy is purely imaginary.
                      To begin with, let's note that von Spee had absolutely no need to carry transports to the Falklands with him. Well, absolutely not. He could only go "to business" with warships, and assign the vehicles a rendezvous somewhere else, at the point where he was going to go after the "Falking" of the Falklands. Von Spee was, after all, a military admiral, who, by the way, achieved the only indisputable victory of the Kaiserlichmarin over the British in a naval battle during the years of WWII (at Coronel). And he, obviously, was far from stupid. As mentioned above, he was well aware that there was a non-zero probability that his squadron would meet the Falklands with the British cruisers. He could consider such a meeting unlikely, but he could not completely exclude it - this is a war, after all.
                      So, it is quite obvious that when meeting with a more or less equivalent opponent, von Spee would be bound by his transports. Of course, you can order the vehicles to run, but, excuse me, they simply did not have the speed to evade the cruisers of His Majesty. That is, taking transports with him, von Spee made a rather unpleasant choice for himself - if, for example, he were to meet less fast, but superior British forces (for example, light cruisers with the same Canopus at the head), then he’s on an even he risked losing his transports for nothing - he could not fight the British, and the transports did not have time to escape from the British. When meeting with forces approximately equal and equal in speed (say, with two or three armored cruisers), he had to either accept the battle and defeat the British, or, evading the battle, lose transports. The option to simply retreat without accepting a fight for him in this case no longer existed.
                      Conclusion: taking transports with him to the raid on the Falklands, von Spee for some reason significantly narrowed down his tactical capabilities - he had to either defeat the British naval forces that could be there, or lose transports. While von Spee could provide 100% protection for his vehicles, just not taking them with him to the raid, in this case nothing would happen to them even if the von Spee squadron were completely destroyed.
                      Von Spee made a dilemma for himself: either everything goes according to his plan, or the transports will be lost.
                      Attention, a question. Well, and how does this differ from the position of Rozhdestvensky? :) I will answer you - how. Rozhdestvensky did not really have much choice. He could risk transport, taking them with him. He could risk transport and the fact that the same tugs would not be at the right time in the right place sending them to Vladivostok, bypassing Japan. He could risklessly send his auxiliary ships to intern with the Chinese, only in this case he could not reliably count on the help of tugboats on his way to Vladivostok and was guaranteed to lose transport in Vladivostok. That is, ANY decision of Rozhdestvensky contained a risk for one reason or another to lose the transports he needed. And he led them with him, in the hope that his plan would work.
                      And von Spee had a 100% chance not to expose his transports to any risk - it would be enough to assign them a rendezvous point where there is a thread in the sea, on the route of the squadron of German warships departing from the Falklands. But he did not seize this opportunity, and for some reason he dragged transports to the area of ​​the military operation. And, when everything went wrong, he out of the blue lost 2 of his auxiliary ships out of 3, although he could have avoided it.
                      Further. Rozhdestvensky gave transport protection, but von Spee did not. The result is known - out of 6 Russian transports, which were covered by Russian cruisers, 4. Two-thirds survived in the devastating Tsushima for the Russians.
                      But von Spee ordered his light cruisers "save who can." The solution is understandable - there was a chance that they would be able to escape from the light forces of the British, and not that absolutely fantastic. Yes, 2 German cruisers greatly lost track of what they showed on the measured mile, but, firstly, Spee could not know the condition of the British cruisers (who knows, maybe it is even worse?), And secondly - there’s also Madame Good luck (breakdown, extremely successful hit in the pursuer, etc.). So I’m not at all inclined to von Spee to blame something, in my IMHO, he, having no our afterthought, could not do otherwise. But, in fairness, we note that if he ordered his two most slow-moving cruisers to cover the transports, then with a high degree of probability they, albeit at the cost of their death, would distract the enemy and give the chance for the vehicles to escape. If it’s all the same to die, it’s not in vain ... That is, if we analyze the Falklands, then the refusal to protect transports should be recorded as a von Spee error - more than excusable, for the reasons stated above, but, taking into account the afterthought, everything -so error.
                      In addition, Rozhdestvensky achieved no tactical gain - in a daytime battle, he almost eliminated the light forces of the Japanese from the battle of the main forces. He gave them the target "in strength" and tied the armored cruisers of the United Fleet to half their number. This, though a little, but still eased the position of the armored troops of the Russian fleet, but did not cause much harm to the Russian cruisers who defended the transports.
                      Findings. Both the German and Russian commanders led transports to the area of ​​the military operation. The German commander could well not take them with him, and the Russian did not have any particular alternatives (around Japan - the same risk). In the Falklands and in Tsushima, transports could only survive if everything went according to plan for Rozhdestvensky and von Spee. Both commanders did not go according to plan. But at the same time, the Russians saved two-thirds of their transports, and the Germans - one-third. Having allocated the cruiser to protect transports, the Russian commander achieved even a small, but still tactical success, and the German commander, without protecting his transports, achieved nothing.
                      Nevertheless, von Spee is doing great, but Rozhdestvensky is not a good person :) Well, how is that? :) I understand that you are biased towards Rozhdestvensky, but let's still try to objectivity :)
                      Z.Y. And yes, I completely forgot, there is another 200% proof of your wrong. Saxahorse agrees with you :) laughing
                      Quote: rytik32
                      I did not know 2 TOE of such technology. Only boats or overboard.

                      I knew.
                      Quote: rytik32
                      "Askold" even caught a 305-mm shell, "regretted" wow!

                      During the daytime battle (before the dispersal of the main forces of the 1st TOE) 2 shells hit Askold, one shell each at Diana and Pallada, and not one at Novik. That's what you regretted :)
                      Quote: rytik32
                      And what will the light forces of the Japanese do? Why they will not be able to attack transports?

                      They attacked in reality. And reality has shown that the 2TOE cruisers managed to protect them pretty well.
                    3. Comrade
                      Comrade 17 June 2020 18: 55 New
                      0
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      if he ordered his two slowest cruisers to cover transports

                      they would have done it jokingly, because the light cruiser "Bristol" was chasing two Spee vehicles.
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      von Spee you have done well, but Rozhestvensky is a bad person:

                      "There is no prophet in his own country."
                    4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 18 June 2020 16: 16 New
                      +1
                      Good day, dear colleague!
                      The very first - I apologize for the forgetfulness. I just realized that I didn’t answer your letter, so today I’ll be sure to unsubscribe. Alas, on the subject of WWII in the Pacific, I have nothing to especially please you with, but - how rich ...
                      Quote: Comrade
                      they would have done it jokingly, because the light cruiser "Bristol" was chasing two Spee vehicles.

                      Yes, but I believe that if Spee had sent them to guard the transports, the British would not have limited themselves and sent others who pursued the light cruisers. So, IMHO the German KRL were doomed, but could die not without benefit ...
                      Quote: Comrade
                      "There is no prophet in his own country."

                      drinks
                    5. Comrade
                      Comrade 18 June 2020 16: 39 New
                      +1
                      Hello, dear Andrey!
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      The very first - I apologize for the forgetfulness. I just realized that I did not answer your letter

                      It's okay, I thought that you probably have worries above the roof.

                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Yes, but I believe that if Spee had sent them to guard the transports, the British would not have limited themselves and sent others who pursued the light cruisers. So, IMHO the German KRL were doomed, but could die not without good.

                      Yes you are right.
                      Interestingly, the transports, after leaving south, changed course and went almost parallel with the main forces of Spee, leading the battle, course.
                      In addition to Bristol, there was still the ship Macedonia, perhaps it was armed with something, and fired on vehicles.

                      He drew attention to a characteristic detail, before there were anti-Soviet, today Russophobia. And even earlier, before the anti-Soviet, there were also Russophobia. In the diaries of M. Paleolog, the Ambassador of France to the Russian Empire, they are given a place. The Frenchman was very surprised at this phenomenon, which blooms in an especially lush color during the difficult years for the Fatherland.

                      Their credo can be formulated briefly: everything is bad (by definition), everything is fine with them (by default).
                3. Saxahorse
                  Saxahorse 17 June 2020 23: 08 New
                  0
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Findings. Both the German and Russian commanders led transports to the area of ​​the military operation. The German commander could well not take them with him, and the Russian alternatives didn’t have much

                  As usual, distort. Trying to fill a hole in the logic with a large number of beeches. laughing

                  The battle and the "combat operation area" are not a bit synonymous. Spee himself would not go to the Falklands if he had expected a serious battle with the enemy. Rozhdestvensky knew for sure that the battle was ahead, with the main forces. Spee immediately ordered the vehicles to flee. Well, ZPR, as usual, just never thought about anything.
                4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 18 June 2020 16: 17 New
                  +1
                  Quote: Saxahorse
                  Trying to fill a hole in the logic with a large number of beeches

                  For those to whom the "multi-bukof" there is highlighted in bold.
              2. rytik32
                18 June 2020 11: 31 New
                +1
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                And Spee's plan called for landing from two cruisers, while the rest had to carry out their cover.

                I would say otherwise. Von Spee divided the squadron into two squads. One went on a combat operation and the other remained at sea. English observers did not even see the ships of the second detachment, despite the fact that the weather was excellent. Can we say that the German coal miners participated in that phase of the battle? Definitely “no.” Yes, and that phase of the battle itself was strange. "Canopus" sat aground and fired a crossfire controlled by spotters. The Germans "Canopus" did not even see.

                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                But he did not seize this opportunity, and for some reason he dragged transports to the area of ​​the military operation.

                The transports were out of sight, and the radars had not yet been invented))) Therefore, there is no difference in 20 or 200 miles they were from the British. In the same way, coal miners could later be spotted anywhere else in the ocean. This is another fundamental difference. The Korean Channel was a bottleneck - both Togo and Rozhdestvensky understood this very well. But for von Spee, the danger was evenly distributed across two oceans.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                He could risk transport, taking them with him

                It is easier to say in which case there was no risk. There would be no risk if our main forces inflicted a decisive defeat on the Japanese within a few hours. And then our battleships could reliably protect their cruisers and transports. Fiction, right? In all other cases, the light forces of the Japanese would attack our cruisers and transports, the balance of forces was known, the result is predictable.
              3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                Andrei from Chelyabinsk 18 June 2020 16: 19 New
                +1
                Unfortunately, you were mistaken, and twice. You write
                Quote: rytik32
                I would say otherwise. Von Spee divided the squadron into two squads. One went on a military operation and the other remained at sea

                Both detachments went into combat operation, one detachment was supposed to land an landing on the Falklands, and the second carried out its cover.
                Quote: rytik32
                English observers did not even see the ships of the second detachment, despite the fact that the weather was excellent.

                This is completely wrong. In fact, the British saw all 7 German ships. Just data on their detection in different sources is different. If, for example, you focus on the Patients, then the Gneisenau and Nuremberg were spotted at about 08.00:09.00, and at XNUMX:XNUMX, other von Spee forces were already seen along with the transports. And the Germans were spotted precisely from the Canopus. You say that you couldn’t see them from Canopus, but this is something else. The Canopus was supposed to demonstrate cross-shootings (in fact, that was exactly how it got to Gneisenau), and, of course, there were spotters who controlled its shooting. And then they saw the Germans.
                There is also an opinion that Bristol noticed the German transports when it left the harbor at 11.30.
                But even if we assume that the transports were first spotted by Bristol, then it turns out that the German transports came so close to the Falklands that even 2 hours after they received the order “to scrub quickly!” were still within sight of Port Stanley.
              4. rytik32
                18 June 2020 19: 11 New
                +2
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                and at 09.00:XNUMX already saw other forces of von Spee along with transports

                I’ll clarify, they saw the smoke of these ships.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                that even 2 hours after they received the order "to scrub quickly!" were still within sight of Port Stanley.

                I’ll also clarify: within the visibility of the “Bristol” that came to intercept.
              5. Comrade
                Comrade 19 June 2020 07: 13 New
                0
                Quote: rytik32
                I’ll also clarify: within the visibility of the “Bristol” which entered the interception

                Since this booze has gone, let me specify.
                laughing
                В 11:00 the distance between the transports and Bristol was five miles greater,
                than the distance between transports and Port Stanley. Accurately measure laziness.
                From Bristol, dear Alexei, see transports not could. And in confirmation of this, the laying of his course. At 11:00 he went for Spee, and at 11:45, apparently, on a tip from the “Macedonia”, he abruptly changes course and goes to transport.
          2. Comrade
            Comrade 18 June 2020 18: 46 New
            0
            Quote: rytik32
            Transports were out of sight

            "Line of sight", dear colleague, how many nautical miles do you think?
          3. rytik32
            18 June 2020 19: 12 New
            +1
            This is a very relative concept, highly dependent on the weather, time of day
          4. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 18 June 2020 22: 35 New
            +3
            Quote: rytik32
            This is a very relative concept, highly dependent on the weather, time of day

            In the extreme case of perfect weather, the visibility of the ship is limited by the horizon. Usually it’s about 18 km from the mast of the ship. "https://planetcalc.ru/1198/" The link is an online calculator for those who want to calculate for sure.

            But above, you correctly noticed that because of the horizon you can notice some kind of smoke.
  • Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 16 June 2020 23: 44 New
    +3
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    It’s completely clear to me where you are driving, but alas. The fact is that Spee really dragged his auxiliary ships to a combat operation.

    How familiar it all is! lol You were asked to substantiate your statement that Spee had dragged transports and a hospital ship with him to battle. The flow of imagination does not replace a specific answer to the question, our dear friend Andrei laughing

    Let me answer in your place. Spee did the exact opposite, he was not Rozhdestvensky .. Spee immediately ordered the vehicles to flee, he barely saw the inevitability of battle. The normal admiral, of course, had no illusions about the safety of the convoy in battle.
  • Comrade
    Comrade 18 June 2020 19: 46 New
    +1
    Quote: Saxahorse
    Let me answer in your place. Spee did the exact opposite, he was not Rozhdestvensky .. Spee immediately ordered the vehicles to flee, barely saw the inevitability of the battle.

    Let me object, old friend, to your fantasies.
    Let's start with historical facts.
    a) Two auxiliary vessels went behind the Spee cruisers and approached Port Stanley less, than on fifteen miles (It is believed that at the same time they remained out of sight) By the way, what do you think, is it realistic to make out two ships for fifteen miles in fair weather, or not?
    b) Two battlecruisers at that time were already in seven to eight miles from Port Stanley.

    Thus, three scenarios can be suggested.
    1) Spee not gave the transport orders to leave at the moment authoritatively indicated You,
    2) Spee gave an order approximately an hour later after he realized with whom he will have to fight,
    3) Transports received the order on time, but ignored its for the time being.
  • Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 18 June 2020 22: 15 New
    +2
    Quote: Comrade
    Two support vessels followed Spee's cruisers and approached Port Stanley for less than fifteen miles. (It is believed that at the same time they remained out of sight). By the way, what do you think, is it realistic to make out two ships for fifteen miles in clear weather, or not?

    I think that it is impossible to make out. The horizon, even with the masts of the battleship, is approximately 18 km, and 15 miles is approximately 27 km. In this case, smokes can be seen beyond the horizon, especially in good weather.

    However, I want to note that you, like our friend Andrei, are trying to replace the essence of the issue. The fact that Spee's transports fell under the hand was a mistake. As well as the campaign of Spee to the Falklands. And we see that Admiral Spee took all sorts of measures in order to avoid this. Rozhdestvensky set his convoy under fire quite deliberately. And attempts to find common sense in this decision, in my opinion, are initially doomed to failure.

    In the comments on this article, this is especially noticeable. Generally! There is not a single sound thought explaining the presence of a wagon train on the battlefield at a critical moment in the clash of the main forces of the two empires.

    Alas, I can only repeat my opinion about Christmas. The admiral was stupidly stupid, and he was often unable to foresee even the immediate consequences of his actions. We see this in the analysis of literally any episodes of this sad campaign. It is unfortunate that the king did not respond to the requests of the ZPR, and did not accept his resignation off the coast of Madagascar. The squadron was very unlucky.
  • Comrade
    Comrade 19 June 2020 06: 48 New
    0
    Quote: Saxahorse
    I think that it is impossible to make out.

    Wrong think, the British discerned and sent a chase. Well, judge for yourself, why would they send a light cruiser and an auxiliary vessel to where there is nothing?
    At the same time, the English ships saw perfectly where exactly it was necessary to go, the course laying was ideally even, which means that they saw the target, and did not look for it by touch.

    Quote: Saxahorse
    The fact that Spee's transports fell under the hand was a mistake. As well as the campaign of Spee to the Falklands. And we see that Admiral Spee took all sorts of measures in order to avoid this.

    Dear colleague, we are opening something like the battle diary of the battle cruiser "Inflexible". More precisely, a brief transcript of the handwritten text (opens on a "click").

    Time 10:00, a distance of more than nine miles. German cruisers identified.
    And now we are looking at laying the courses for the auxiliary vessels of Spee, what are they doing at this time?
    And they continue to go in the direction where Spee was at that time. And they continue to do this for almost an hour.
    Do you understand now what is the problem?
    a) Spee is being chased, he sees who is chasing him.
    b) You wrote that he immediately ordered the vehicles to escape.
    c) The transports continue for almost an hour to go the same course, until they saw the approaching English ships and gave the gang.

    Output.
    The behavior of the two transports in the context of the events suggests that there is no order to escape from Spee to transports not reported.
    As an option, there was an order, but both captains of the steamers beat him. But this is hardly believed.

    Or can you provide a documentary source saying that Spee ordered the vehicles to escape?
    If there is, let him here so that those who read our discussion do not mistake you for dreamerwishful thinking.
  • Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 19 June 2020 22: 30 New
    0
    Quote: Comrade
    If there is, let him here so that those who read our discussion do not mistake you for a dreamer who wishful thinking.

    Communication with you on this issue begins to resemble dialogs with AK64. You about Thomas and you about Yerema .. smile

    For those who are in the tank! I repeat for the fifth time !! A comparison of the orders of Spee and Rozhestvensky in relation to transports is incorrect !!! They are directly opposite. wassat
  • Comrade
    Comrade 20 June 2020 06: 00 New
    0
    Quote: Saxahorse
    Communication with you on this issue begins to resemble dialogs with AK64. You about Thomas and you about Yerema

    I knew that you could not confirm your words.
    Quote: Saxahorse
    A comparison of the orders of Spee and Rozhestvensky in relation to transports is incorrect !!!

    So give here the text of the order addressed to the transport, so that I can compare.
    Notice, I do not ask you to write that I ordered Spee to his light cruisers, this is well known.
    But the contents of the order to transport I do not know, but it, in your words, is known to you.
  • Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 20 June 2020 21: 20 New
    0
    Quote: Comrade
    So give here the text of the order addressed to the transport, so that I can compare.

    Let's try to solve the problem in parts. Does your question mean that Rozhestvensky pulled his transports into battle by mistake, as Spee clearly did. Can you show that the ZPR had some other orders for their transports?
  • Comrade
    Comrade 16 June 2020 23: 53 New
    +1
    Quote: rytik32
    The distance between the 2 transports, the hospital ship and the Scharnhorst, at least estimated.

    The distance has changed over time, you what is it time that interests you, colleague?
    At first, the cruisers and auxiliary vessels ("Baden" and "S-ta Isabel") stayed together, then the "Gneisenau" detached from the connection, approaching Port Stanley. At 9:25 the battleship “Canopus” fires a salvo from a main caliber gun on this armored cruiser, the German cruiser turns east, then makes a loop and goes southeast.
    Auxiliary vessels at this time make a sharp turn and go south. The distance begins to increase, reaching to 10:50for example about twenty miles Other distances between warships and auxiliary vessels can also be given, depending on time.

    And now you have a question, if you may.
    And at what distance from our head battleships were our vehicles, say, at 14:32, can you say?
  • rytik32
    17 June 2020 00: 25 New
    +3
    Quote: Comrade
    And now you have a question, if you may.
    And at what distance from our head battleships were our vehicles, say, at 14:32, can you say?

    2-3 miles.
    But we have already found out the fundamental difference. Von Spee, as soon as he smelled of battle, sent the transports to rescue, and Rozhestvensky led them with him and put the cruiser for protection.
  • Comrade
    Comrade 17 June 2020 01: 11 New
    0
    Quote: rytik32
    But we have already found out the fundamental difference.

    We reveal the fundamental similarities.
    Quote: rytik32
    Von Spee, as soon as he smelled of battle, sent the transports to rescue, and Rozhestvensky led them with him and put the cruiser for protection.

    This is a matter of third importance, he took with him transports or let him go home.
    Christmas didn't let go transports and his squadron was broken.
    Spee let go transports but still his squadron was broken.
    So what is the argument?
    Or did the Russian cruisers, while protecting transports, not shoot Japanese cruisers?
  • rytik32
    17 June 2020 13: 33 New
    +1
    Quote: Comrade
    Spee let go of the transports, but still his squadron was defeated.

    And at Cape Coronel?
  • Comrade
    Comrade 19 June 2020 07: 02 New
    0
    Quote: rytik32
    Von Spee, as soon as the smell of battle, sent transports to escape

    Let me ask you a curiosity, how do you know that Spee gave orders for vehicles to escape?
  • Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 19 June 2020 22: 53 New
    0
    Quote: Comrade
    Let me ask you a curiosity, how do you know that Spee gave orders for vehicles to escape?

    Are you trying to find fault with the words? The fact that the commanders of the Spee squadron had orders to disperse in different directions in a critical situation is known from the testimonies of the surviving officers. The fact that such an order was actually given, we see the actions of light cruisers. To interrogate Spee personally, and to clarify the details, as far as we know, did not work.
  • Comrade
    Comrade 20 June 2020 06: 08 New
    +1
    Quote: Saxahorse
    Are you trying to find fault with the words?

    In no case.
    Just the behavior of transports does not give reason to believe that they had an order to "make legs."
    Quote: Saxahorse
    The fact that the commanders of the Spee squadron had orders to disperse in different directions in a critical situation is known from the testimonies of the surviving officers

    Do not shy away from the topic, dear colleague, otherwise we risk getting confused.
    I know about the order for the cruisers, I don’t know about the order for transports, therefore I ask the source.
    Quote: Saxahorse
    The fact that such an order was actually given, we see the actions of light cruisers.

    I draw your attention to the fact that I do not dispute the issuance of the order to the cruisers, but I question the issuance of the order to the transport.
    The reason is the laying of the course of transports, which continued to go towards Port Stanley at a time when the German cruisers, who had received orders to leave at full speed, were already in full compliance with the order.

    Now the reasons for my perseverance are clear?
  • Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 20 June 2020 21: 15 New
    0
    Quote: Comrade
    Now the reasons for my perseverance are clear?

    No, not clear. The numbers, and as a consequence of the reverse receipt of the correct receipt of the data packet, were not yet available at that time. Trucks really could not receive Spee's order in a timely manner and were forced to act according to the situation, taking into account previously received orders.

    However, this does not in any way mean that Spee's intentions included a battle with the enemy, with the participation of his transports. This is obvious nonsense that you are now trying to lead to normality ..
  • 27091965
    27091965 20 June 2020 22: 01 New
    +2
    Not a big scan. Everyone should decide on this issue himself.
  • Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 20 June 2020 22: 29 New
    0
    Good document. Thank!
  • rytik32
    15 June 2020 23: 53 New
    +3
    Rozhdestvensky’s actions led to varinat 3.
    The role of transports is obvious.
    1. Sergey Zhikharev
      Sergey Zhikharev 17 June 2020 11: 25 New
      -1
      As you said yourself
      This is the afterlife

      those. you have a position, since Rozhdestvensky lost, then all his actions and orders are a priori wrong, and he had to act in a completely different way, and then there would be a victory
      1. rytik32
        17 June 2020 12: 38 New
        +2
        Please do not simplify.
        The issue is the availability of transports 2-3 miles from the main forces at the height of the battle. This is an obvious mistake!
        In the history of steam fleets, no one before or after Rozhdestvensky thought of such a thing.
        1. Sergey Zhikharev
          Sergey Zhikharev 17 June 2020 12: 44 New
          0
          Please do not simplify.
          The issue is the availability of transports 2-3 miles from the main forces at the height of the battle. This is an obvious mistake!

          The obvious mistake is if the transports were on the heels of the squadron or went around Japan.
          In the history of steam fleets, no one before or after Rozhdestvensky thought of such a thing.

          And in the history of steam fleets, there have been many battles like Tsushima? Moreover, where does one country have difficulties replenishing ammunition?
        2. Saxahorse
          Saxahorse 17 June 2020 23: 15 New
          +1
          Quote: Sergey Zhikharev
          The obvious mistake is if the transports were on the heels of the squadron or went around Japan.

          Several dozen steamships slipped into Port Arthur and Vladivostok during the RIA. From 30 to 50 pieces approximately. Moreover, the Japanese tried to blockade. Why are you sure that 6 more transports could not get to the same Vladivostok?
        3. Sergey Zhikharev
          Sergey Zhikharev 18 June 2020 09: 59 New
          0
          And how many did not slip? It is worth distinguishing exactly how many steamships broke into Port Arthur (and it is much easier to break into it) and how many to Vladivostok. By the way, which way did the steamboats go to Vladivostok? 6 transports (in theory, two more guard cruisers) - this is a detachment that is easier to notice than a single cruiser.
          P.S. I am sure that during the world, 6 transports (or more) can reach Vladivostok
        4. Saxahorse
          Saxahorse 18 June 2020 21: 48 New
          0
          Quote: Sergey Zhikharev
          And how many did not slip?

          A few pieces did not slip. I remember a large number of British ships surprised, despite the fact that England was considered as if an ally of Japan in that conflict.

          The topic is interesting, but it probably makes sense to discuss it within the framework of a separate article. And yes, the materials were not from modern alternative specialists, but from officers of the then Naval Headquarters. They directly pointed out that the blockade declared by Japan essentially broke. The supply of the sea turned out to be quite real.
  • AK64
    AK64 17 June 2020 17: 25 New
    -2
    Give an example, except for Tsushima, when the squadron pulled a caravan of supply vessels into battle.

    And where and who else ever went to a breakthrough in similar conditions?

    Ah, no one anywhere? Then what is this requirement for?
    1. Undecim
      Undecim 17 June 2020 17: 48 New
      0
      Conditions are created by appropriate actions. The fact that Rozhdestvensky placed himself in such conditions is the result of him, and not only his actions, or rather, inaction. The tsar hoped for a chance, and Rozhestvensky hoped for a chance, "swam with the flow." As a result, he sailed. For two days, the All-Russian Emperor was left almost without a fleet, a fleet, and his naval commander, ditching for more than 5 thousand sailors, was captured together with 7282.
      The result is obvious. Against this background, the loss of several transports no longer looks fatal.
      1. AK64
        AK64 17 June 2020 18: 20 New
        -3
        Conditions are created by appropriate actions.

        Truth? That is, if, for example, it is raining outside, then you probably just need to pray well?
        The tsar hoped for a chance, and Rozhestvensky hoped for a chance, "swam with the flow."

        No need to lie and slander people whose motives are unknown to you. It is more respectful to treat a figure of the past, more respectfully.

        So Rozhdestvensky, for example, back in February-March, was eager for help .... Port Arthur - not Vladik at all. Don't you think these are two big differences? And if the squadron would be sent in May or July - then there is no doubt that she would have managed to Arthur (after which the Japanese would only have to cry).

        But the "fifth column" of the Japanese came to the rescue --- and they held the 2nd TOE for the fold, under a bunch of pretexts. And they released (more precisely, they had already taken out) only at the end of October ---- when there were no more chances to be in PA.

        What do you think Rozhdestvensky should have done? After all, it was precisely those who kept the dispatch to the last - now shouted to him "but you yourself promised and were eager for battle!" And the fact that he was running around and was torn in fact in March-April, and not at all in October, well, these are “trifles”.
        And what was left to do to a man of honor brought up in the concepts of the 19th century? Go and shoot yourself? Would this help the sailors?

        You are trying to judge people based on your ignorance --- giving them very heavy sentences. Rozhdestvensky did what he should - and as he could.
        There are situations when you just need to "stand and die"
        1. Undecim
          Undecim 17 June 2020 18: 27 New
          -1
          And what was left to do to a man of honor brought up in the concepts of the 19th century?
          Try to think with your head. And you have a tantrum. All the best.
          1. AK64
            AK64 17 June 2020 19: 05 New
            -3
            Try to think with your head. And you have a tantrum. All the best.


            This is your hysteria - and initially.
            You don’t know the history of your country. O REV You don't know ANYTHING. About Rozhdestvensky, Makarov, Nebogatov, and the same Togo, you also know nothing. At the same time, sit here on a soft chair and undertake to judge people who are not worthy to clean their shoes.
            This is your tantrum
          2. Undecim
            Undecim 17 June 2020 19: 07 New
            -1
            I already said goodbye to you.
  • rytik32
    18 June 2020 12: 03 New
    +1
    Quote: AK64
    Ah, no one anywhere?

    Why did you miss the server?
    His situation was even worse.
  • mmaxx
    mmaxx 16 June 2020 08: 25 New
    +2
    Burned shed, burn and hut.
  • mmaxx
    mmaxx 16 June 2020 07: 01 New
    +5
    Call ANY battle, where did the commander drag the supply ships? Any midshipman then understood that this was nonsense. Practice has confirmed. Rozhdestvensky arranged a sort of wiring convoy with a fight. Such things, even with good organization and excellent commanders, rarely turned out to be completely successful. And when following the herd and the complete loss of control of the chances 0. The most important thing is that the plan for the battle was just that. That is, no plan at all.
    1. mmaxx
      mmaxx 16 June 2020 08: 23 New
      -1
      Minus, apparently, the one who believes that Rozhdestvensky won laughing wink wink
      1. rytik32
        16 June 2020 09: 28 New
        +1
        Quote: mmaxx
        Minus, apparently, the one who believes that Rozhdestvensky won laughing wink wink

        I corrected;)
      2. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 16 June 2020 23: 47 New
        +1
        Quote: mmaxx
        Minus, apparently, the one who believes that Rozhdestvensky won

        Oddly enough it sounds, but there are many of them here. wassat
      3. Operator
        Operator 17 June 2020 20: 12 New
        -1
        The local sect of witnesses of Rozhestvensky and Andrei Chelyabinsky, his interpreter laughing
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 June 2020 08: 42 New
      0
      Minus the one who knows that the same Spee took with him a raid on the Falklands 2 vehicles and a hospital ship. And for the "herd" with loss of control, of course
      1. rytik32
        16 June 2020 09: 22 New
        +3
        Andrei, please do not replace the subject of the dispute.
        The question is not about "led with me to the raid", question about the availability of transports at the squadron during the battle.
        If Rozhdestvensky let go of the transports early in the morning of May 14, when it became clear that the squadron was discovered, it would be much more correct. By the way, transports would have a chance to slip along the coast of Japan to Vladivostok.
        1. Comrade
          Comrade 16 June 2020 19: 02 New
          +1
          Quote: rytik32
          a question about the availability of transports at the squadron during the battle.
          If Rozhdestvensky let go of transports early in the morning of May 14, when it became clear that the squadron was discovered, it would be much more correct.

          The absence or presence of transports at the squadron did not matter, there is no point in breaking the spear.
          The Witgeft squadron had no transports and went at 12-14 knots, but this did not help her.
          Yes, the Japanese didn’t drown anyone, but they hurt so much that it was not worth dreaming of “Tsesarevich” and “Poltava” about Vladivostok. The rest would not have survived yet another battle, which Togo and Kamimura were preparing on the approaches to the Tsushima Strait.
          Let’s say a miracle, the “Cesarevich” associates from Qingdao and Port Arthur will be transferred by air to Vladivostok, who and how will repair them there, if only one “Bogatyr” was repaired for about a year?
        2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 June 2020 19: 19 New
          +3
          Quote: rytik32
          Andrei, please do not replace the subject of the dispute.

          So do not substitute. The question was
          Quote: mmaxx
          Call ANY battle, where did the commander drag the supply ships? Any midshipman then understood that this was nonsense.

          Spee dragged the transports to a combat operation.
          Quote: rytik32
          The question is not about "led to the raid", the question of the availability of transports at the squadron during the battle.

          Do not play with words, please. Otherwise, I can also say that Rozhdestvensky did not take transports into battle - he did not put them in the battle order of the main forces. "The vehicles left at the last crossing at the squadron should have moved away from it before the start of the battle"
      2. mmaxx
        mmaxx 16 June 2020 16: 53 New
        +4
        And I am in Israeli: did Spee protect his transports in battle? Or did he set the main goal of posting transports from point A to point B?
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 June 2020 19: 20 New
          +2
          Quote: mmaxx
          I'm Israeli

          That is, having merged in one question, without blushing, rush to ask another? :))))) Do not play Israeli games with me, you won’t win 100% of the Jews (I consider myself Russian, but my mother’s grandmother is 100% Jewish so I can even move to Israel now :)))
          1. mmaxx
            mmaxx 17 June 2020 14: 12 New
            +3
            Without any plums, etc., forum shnyaga. I’m not at all shy. Who in battle kept the transport with him and made the main forces dependent on transports in battle? Post convoys to Malta, etc. please do not carry out. These were originally convoy operations.
            Although, if you put the question so that the task of ZPR was to conduct transport in Vladik, and he did not succeed, then I will not mind. I agree with such a statement of the question. The task was clearly impossible, adventurous, and Petersburg was to blame. ZPR, to the best of his ability, tried to complete the task. Steadfast, courageous and a little talented admiral. Which is just out of luck. But he fulfilled his duty.
            To understand events, you need to look at them from all sides. Maybe then they will teach not to make mistakes in the future. Although, this is not for people.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 17 June 2020 17: 27 New
              0
              Quote: mmaxx
              Without any plums, etc., forum shnyaga.

              It is touching. That is, you write absurdity, but the fact that I refute it is shnyaga? :))) You wrote
              Quote: mmaxx
              Call ANY battle, where did the commander drag the supply ships? Any midshipman then understood that this was nonsense.

              I answered you that von Spee did just that. It has become inconvenient for you, you do not want to admit your mistake, and now you are jumping to another question. You no longer argue with the fact that von Spee brought his transports to the battle, but say: "But he did not treat them like Rozhdestvensky during the battle!" This is a substitution of the subject of the dispute, and when I point this out, you start talking to me about shnyah :)))))
              I answered all of this in a detailed commentary to Alexei above.
              Quote: mmaxx
              I’m not at all shy.

              Usually, the lack of good manners is not boasted.
              Quote: mmaxx
              Who in battle kept the transport with him and made the main forces dependent on transports in battle?

              There is no such episode in the history of the Russo-Japanese war. If you are talking about Tsushima, then the transports did not hamper Rozhestvensky in maneuvering and speed during the battle.
              1. mmaxx
                mmaxx 17 June 2020 18: 39 New
                +2
                Okay, I changed. I am not one of those who, like a ram, stands its ground no matter what.
                But I can’t write articles. I am writing comments. Therefore, there is a comment, there is a comment, a remark or a question to it. Answered - another comment or question. This is a controversy. Or are you the ultimate truth ?? They answered and this is a court verdict? Uncontested? Spee was with transport. Yeah. And then the transport calmly followed the fleeing Spee and did not interfere at all. And Spee fired back, protecting his vehicles. belay Mentioning him, we must mention about the battle.
                But the result is this: our squadron went into battle with vehicles. And that’s all. It is justified only: 1) if it is necessary to carry out these transports; 2) resistance is not expected. Then the convoy lays down with bones and protects them or goes his own way, chuckling at a weak enemy. Yes, and then the squadron of large ships provides some kind of cover for the operation. There, the British just dropped the PQ-17 and went to catch the Tirpitz. And here I am justifying them.
                And to say that these transports did not constrain ZPR .... Well, well. This is only in terms of your justification for his actions. Hoping that he will succeed in loading coal after the battle is somewhat strange from the point of view of today. Yes, and then it was not evaluated as a tactical find. At least I have not heard. Do you have other data? Bring. Well, at least one. I will listen with gratitude. I learn new things. No irony.
                And my remark about the herd: only when the Suvorov failed and the ZPR was nailed down, the squadron began to maneuver somehow meaningfully. But such large squadrons are uncontrollable in principle. Therefore, even in this case, nothing good happened, given the heterogeneity of the composition. And the stories about the talent of Rozhdestvensky in the number of shells that Mikas received were pleasant. But at the same time, the Russians lost Oslyabyu and Suvorov went into the red.
                And the last one. The most recent is to translate the conversation into personalities. This is popular here. And I will ask you not to evaluate my personality by my comments (and anyone else either). It's my opinion. I express it. And the arguments in support of ZPR regarding transports are ridiculous to me. To go into battle with the convoy is a must have talent. Personally, you do not know me and write about me what you want - this is the very last. In a personal meeting, please. And on the Internet ... somehow I don’t ... I will not continue.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 18 June 2020 16: 24 New
                  +1
                  I don’t know where you saw my transition to personalities. I seem to be everywhere commenting on your statements, and not on you personally. I suggest hushing it for clarity: my intention was to comment on your words with a certain degree of maliciousness, and not to offend you with the transition to personalities. If nevertheless offended - I apologize.
                  Now about the transports.
                  Both von Spee and Rozhdestvensky brought transports to the scene of the battle. The only difference was that von Spee, faced with large enemy forces, ordered the transports to flee and did not give them any escort, while Rozhdestvensky demanded that his transports should follow at some distance from the main forces of the squadron, and the cruisers should be protected. Accordingly, von Spee ordered the vehicles to flee after the first English shots. From that moment they were left to their own devices and did not constrain German warships. But, it is obvious that the same thing applied to the squadron of Rozhdestvensky.
                  Let's consider 2 options - how it could be in reality, and how Z.P. saw it. Christmas
                  How could it be
                  The main Russian forces entered the battle on May 14 at about 14.00 p.m., and finished it at about 19.00 p.m. In total, the battle lasted a little more than 5 hours, take with an excess of 5,5 hours. Suppose that the maximum speed of the transports was 9 knots (which is underestimated), and the main forces of Rozhestvensky could go at 13 knots (which is obviously unrealistic, but I'm good today). So in this case, provided that the whole battle and transports and armadillos 2 and 3TOE go to Vladivostok in a straight line without turning, the maximum speed of the divergence of transports and main forces would be 4 knots, and for 5,5 hours of battle the main forces and transports the Russian squadron could disperse extremely 22 miles.
                  But the whole question is that Russian armadillos under no circumstances could escape to Vladivostok at 13 knots (even if they could develop such a speed). The main forces in the battle maneuver, and - quite abruptly, turning around 45, somewhere 90 and sometimes 180 degrees. That is, even having a squadron speed of 13 knots, the Russian main forces, taking into account their maneuvering, would shift towards Vladivostok at a much lower speed. At the same time, it was not necessary for vehicles to engage in complex maneuvers - moving under the guise of cruisers in the distance behind armored detachments, they could go almost in a straight line, changing course only occasionally, when approaching enemy cruisers. And therefore, even if Rozhestvensky had the opportunity to fight at 13 knots, and his transports gave only 9 knots, their real speed of divergence, taking into account the maneuvers of the main forces necessary in the battle, would hardly exceed 2 knots, which gives an increase in distance over time the battle between armadillos and vehicles is only 11 miles away.
                  And now let's take into account that the Russian squadron, nevertheless, could not have walked at 13 knots in any way even before the battle, and even more so during the battle. There is a fact - 1TOE, which stood a lot of time in Arthur and had a lot of opportunities to put its chassis in order, and it just showed 13 knots on average in a battle in LM. Witgeft repeatedly tried to give more, but then one or another ship began to have problems, so the speed had to be reduced. And 2 and 3 TOEs broke through half the world and the ships were clearly in worse technical condition than 1TOE. Therefore, we can well assume that the real speed of the divergence of transports and armadillos would be less than 2 knots, and that even actively maneuvering at their maximum speed, the main Russian forces during the battle would be 5-7 miles ahead of transports.
                  Conclusion: the presence of transports did not interfere with Z.P. Rozhdestvensky should lead the main forces 2 and 3 TOE into battle at the maximum available squadron speed, the exact value of which can be argued, but which, apparently, still exceeded 9 knots with which the Russian squadron entered the battle.
                  And one more consideration, which for some reason did not occur to any of the apologists of the theory “transports - a weight on the foot of a squadron”. As we recall, von Spee gave orders to the transports after his ships, approaching the Falklands, were fired. That is, in fact, he released the transports after the start of the battle.
                  Attention, a question. What prevented the Russian commander from doing the same if, for some unknown reason, the transports would slow down his main forces? I gave reasons above why this could not be, but let's say it happened. The vicissitudes of fate, the machinations of Cthulhu. So what then prevented the release of transports or even allowed them to surrender to the enemy?
                  In other words, putting ourselves in the place of Rozhdestvensky and taking into account our aftercare, we see that even taking into account the difference in speed of the main forces and transports, the latter would not at all slow down the warships of the Russian squadron. And if, nevertheless, they suddenly began to slow down, no one would have prevented us from letting them go at the moment when this happened, allowing, in the absence of another way, to surrender.
                  Now let's see how Rozhdestvensky saw the situation.
                  He believed that 3TOE could go at a maximum of 11,5 knots (obviously, it was a detachment speed of Nebogatov) and that in the 2nd armored Navarin it could not go faster than 12,5 knots. Rozhdestvensky considered it necessary to fight in a closed formation, for which, during evolution, ships should develop a little higher speed than the flagship. Therefore, he believed that the maximum speed of the flagship EDB should not exceed 10 knots, so that during evolutions the others keep up with him without breaking the ranks, developing, as necessary, the very 11,5-12,5 knots that they were capable of in order to keep system.
                  At the same time, according to the reports of mechanics Rozhestvensky, the slowest transports just gave 10 knots. Accordingly, Rozhestvensky had no reason to believe that his transports could delay the main forces of the squadron.
                  Quote: mmaxx
                  There, the British just dropped the PQ-17 and went to catch the Tirpitz.

                  If they went to catch, to use them, but they retreated
                  Quote: mmaxx
                  And my remark about the herd: only when the Suvorov failed and the ZPR was nailed down, the squadron began to maneuver somehow meaningfully.

                  This is completely wrong, Rozhdestvensky acted quite sensibly. And the loop of Togo is precisely the result of the rebuilding of Russian ships
                  Quote: mmaxx
                  And the stories about the talent of Rozhdestvensky in the number of shells that Mikas received were pleasant. But at the same time, the Russians lost Oslyabyu and Suvorov went into the red.

                  That speaks about the quality of the shells, and not about the talent of the naval commander
      3. AK64
        AK64 17 June 2020 19: 07 New
        -1
        Minus the one who knows that the same Spee took with him a raid on the Falklands 2 vehicles and a hospital ship. And for the "herd" with loss of control, of course


        Yes, none of us “minuses” them --- cons are their usual argument: there are no others, just as there is no knowledge.
    3. andrew42
      andrew42 16 June 2020 13: 39 New
      +1
      It was necessary to share power, to pour! Transports and "irons" - bypassing Japan clearly. “Borodintsev” and the cruiser faster - forward at full speed with constant maneuvering to diverge from “Mikasa” in the counter-courses. But this is against the canons, - "power to share!" What if you scold ?! “No, we’ll drown according to the rules,” decided ZPR, “all together!”
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 June 2020 19: 21 New
        0
        Quote: andrew42
        It was necessary to share power, to pour!

        Stupidity.
        1. andrew42
          andrew42 17 June 2020 15: 23 New
          +1
          Well, you are already with Rozhdestvensky himself on the same team! Of course, "stupidity." Only earlier Spiridov, Ushakov and Nakhimov had such "nonsense" in another way. But “Apraksin” and “Ushakov” in the same convoy with the “Borodinians” - with the task of “slip through” - this is the height of genius! For this, of course, it was necessary to study naval affairs for decades (sarcasm).
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            Andrei from Chelyabinsk 17 June 2020 17: 32 New
            +4
            Quote: andrew42
            Well, you are already with Rozhdestvensky himself on the same team!

            Not in one.
            Quote: andrew42
            Only earlier Spiridov, Ushakov and Nakhimov had such "nonsense" in another way.

            But for some reason you put yourself in the team for Spiridov, Ushakov and Nakhimov.
            Well, let me then ask - who and when of the aforementioned naval commanders achieved success by dividing the forces and engaging in battle with the enemy with only part of their forces, obviously not having the opportunity to get the support of the rest of the units (as you suggested)
            Quote: andrew42
            But “Apraksin” and “Ushakov” in the same convoy with the “Borodinians” - with the task of “slipping through” - this is the height of genius!

            The top of genius is to crush forces, as you proposed to do. Let it be known to you that even the best Russian EDBs were still inferior to the Japanese in speed, so the Japanese would have easily destroyed the Borodin detachment in Tsushima, and then they would have just as easily gone to the Laperuz Strait or even to Vladivostok to meet the second part there squadrons - and would also easily destroy them there. They had more than enough time for this.
            1. andrew42
              andrew42 18 June 2020 14: 46 New
              0
              I already understood your position about "crushing forces". This is if it is really FORCE. In the case of Tsushima, half of the vessels of the “Rozhdestvensky convoy” are not force, but “ballast”, and dragging the “ballast” into battle (and the battle is supposed to be done during the breakthrough) - this is unforgivable stupidity. Neither speed nor maneuver, plus the distraction of the already scarce real forces to cover.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                Andrei from Chelyabinsk 18 June 2020 16: 06 New
                0
                Quote: andrew42
                This is if it is really FORCE. In the case of Tsushima, half of the vessels of the “Rozhdestvensky convoy” are not force, but “ballast”, and dragging the “ballast” into battle (and the battle is supposed to be done during the breakthrough) - this is unforgivable stupidity.

                As for me, unforgivable stupidity is an attempt to judge the history of those times without having the minimum knowledge of materiel. And I’ll tell you more simply - put yourself in the place of Rozhdestvensky and try to invent other tactics that could lead to success. I already commented on your pearl about the separation of forces and, as I see it, you have nothing to cover. Maybe your next attempt will be more successful? :)
                1. andrew42
                  andrew42 19 June 2020 14: 31 New
                  -1
                  But I see that this is nothing to cover you, dear. Cling to the "right to judge." And in my “pearl” everything was already said: not to drag obviously battle-worthy ships into battle, to break through Tsushima with a really combat-capable “fist” at 16-18 knots without being constrained in maneuver, while at the same time diverting the main forces of Togo, allowing slow-moving and security vessels bypass Japan. And Togo would have to keep the “Kamimurovites” along with its EDB., And keep in Tsushima. It is necessary to surprise the enemy, and not "fulfill the duty" of self-drowning. It is because of such naval commanders that the stationery rats baptized the moyarks with "self-propelled weapons".
      2. AK64
        AK64 17 June 2020 19: 16 New
        +1
        It was necessary to share power, to pour! Transports and "irons" - bypassing Japan clearly.

        And not one would have come, guaranteed. That is simple - not a single one. No chance.
        Unguarded defenseless ships would simply be hijacked.
        “Borodintsev” and the cruiser faster - forward at full speed with constant maneuvering to diverge from “Mikasa” in the counter-courses.

        Yeah - cruisers in line - that's right, yeah.
        Yes, God bless him that the cruisers are in line --- and who will command the slow-moving tail, will you tell me? What is this name?
        How many admirals did Rozhdestvensky have? That Togo has 2 admirals per combat detachment. And at Christmas?

        Moreover, even funnier --- dividing the squadron into high-speed and low-speed units (even if the second part would be someone to lead) would simply simply give Togo to tear to pieces the slow-moving part. That Togo would happily do.
        And after that, Rozhdestvensky could only go and shoot himself.

        But this is against the canons, - "power to share!" What if you scold ?! “No, we’ll drown according to the rules,” decided ZPR, “all together!”

        Yes, we understand that for forum “thinkers”, charters and instructions are not written, we understand. What did he have charters and instructions if he reached the 128th level in the boats?
        1. mmaxx
          mmaxx 18 June 2020 03: 44 New
          +1
          [Quote] [/ quote]
          In general, there are always commanders in the army and navy. Appointed by order of a man to command and all. Now he is responsible for the question. The presence of admiral epaulettes is not necessary.
          And the fact that Rozhestvensky had problems with this is to blame. He does not know how to lead people. NOBODY could stop him from doing this.
          But, apparently, the order in the empire was such that even such thoughts did not occur. This, if you remove the guilt from the ZPR.
          1. AK64
            AK64 18 June 2020 07: 33 New
            -2
            In general, there are always commanders in the army and navy. Appointed by order of a man to command and all.

            Your problem is that you never commanded anything at all --- you do not have such experience. But come to judge. So: you can not send people to the feat of the order - they can only go themselves.
            And if you try "just to appoint by order - and that's it" --- then the lights will turn out to be sick, unfit and unhealthy. Worse even that --- they’ll arrange an accident or something else --- but they won’t go anyway.
            This lower ranks can simply be sent. And just "send command" - will not work. It will turn out some kind of accident as a result of which no one will go anywhere anyway.

            And even if they do, then there will be no sense: well, they forced Witgeft to go - and what, is there a lot of sense? Or Napoleon did this, besides all his wishes, with a bunch of orders, he made him go into battle --- well, did it bring much sense?
            You can not force the bosses to exploit - it is useless and simply harmful. That forced Nebogatov --- and how much use?

            Now he is responsible for the question. The presence of admiral epaulettes is not necessary.

            Oh yes - neither experience nor knowledge is important - I sat down and went. Here you are playing karabliki without any experience!
            But only Rozhdestvensky and the captains of the 1st rank did not have superfluous --- just as there was no power to make them admirals.

            And the fact that Rozhestvensky had problems with this is to blame. He does not know how to lead people. NOBODY could stop him from doing this.

            The CHARTER interfered, my dear, just US-TAV. Yes, and it’s useless --- it’s not going to happen: not every excellent cap-time can be at least a satisfactory admiral. Today for this purpose they are taught in academies.

            But, apparently, the order in the empire was such that even such thoughts did not occur. This, if you remove the guilt from the ZPR.


            Oh yes - the orders in the empire - how could it be .... But what about Stalin without the orders of the empire, almost the entire army surrendered in the 41st --- who is to blame? Also "empire orders"?

            You, darling, are simply incompetent to such an extent that even the level of your incompetence is not able to realize.
            1. mmaxx
              mmaxx 18 June 2020 13: 43 New
              +3
              But let's not talk about competency. How is it there? A holy place is never empty. I did not look for ZPR and did not intend to. And the battle did not organize. I did not carry out any advice. I didn’t ask any opinion and didn’t want to know him. I didn’t set anyone a task for the battle. The order that was given, reasonable, at first glance, spoke only about one thing: to Vladivostok. We’ll get there somehow. And the whole "organization" talks about something big somehow. Therefore, transport at the squadron. The most interesting thing is that “he didn’t put them into operation”, and all the best cruisers singled out to guard them.
              I served. Only in CA. Academiev did not finish - yes. There was always someone who commanded and answered. Is always. And I sat and performed officer duties. Most interesting, better than some. Well, this is offtopic.
              Again. The Bolshevik principle - there are no suitable people, so you do not know how to lead. Now the leader himself. And everything remains the same - I have no other people. Work with who you are. You can’t - go to hell.
              Refer to charters ... Which charters? Have you read them? There are many charters.
              If your capracks are not good enough to take the place of an admiral, then he himself is d u r ak (the word doesn’t let the site go, in a normal way). There is no such thing. Do not become a commander of a rank I ship without admiral’s ambitions.
              Felkersam died. Bera was left by default. So he could act as an admiral? Nobody asked Nebogatov anything. And he didn’t baffle plans. Is this your guide? In admirals to make ZPR nobody can. This is not his competence. But to organize a squadron is his duty. Apparently, the strong-willed qualities of ZPR extended only to the pressure on others. Only the obstruction of subordinates should have a purpose. ZPR pushed and everyone was afraid to do something. For example, Cunningham (in WWII) acted so that all of his pants jumped out to do something.
              I’m all saying this even because it’s not Rozhdestvensky himself that such a scoundrel. And the fact that he is just part of the system. Systems of incompetence, irresponsibility and unwillingness to learn whatsoever.
              1. AK64
                AK64 18 June 2020 15: 48 New
                +1
                But let's not talk about competency. How is it there? A holy place is never empty.

                It happens. How it happens!
                The most famous example (including you) example: Makarov died - and there is no boss at the 1st TOE.
                But there were admirals, and a bunch of caperans. That's just the place - left empty.
                And such examples are darkness.

                I did not look for ZPR and did not intend to.

                Did he have anyone to look for? Did he have extra people on the squadron? WHO was there at least a slightest fit at least lead a detachment? You name the surname and the position --- and then after all, on an empty, without facts, everyone is strong to rant.

                And the battle did not organize.

                Organized - just as much as he could --- organized. He won exactly the beginning of the battle. Something in the loop (a very dubious maneuver) did not climb from a good life.

                I did not carry out any advice.

                Oh yes - our advice is all - how could it be without them, without advice.
                Well, the Arthurians only did what they consulted and conferred. And what is the conclusion from their advice? And the decision of their advice was simple: "we won’t go anywhere --- here in shallow water we drown and surrender." That’s the whole value of “advice.”

                Advice to the commander is needed only for one thing: to smudge responsibility for his indecent decision on the team: "I did not scare myself - the council decided so!"
                WHAT could the “council” advise Rozhdestvensky? Vaughn Dobrovolsky - an experienced commander --- only advised Enquist that "you need to take a back, beat back !!!"
                (An Enquist should personally lay down the volunteer in place and keep track 23. But Dobrovolsky was also supported by the wardroom, so go and shoot him)

                I didn’t ask any opinion and didn’t want to know him.

                Yeah. Witgeft wondered and asked. And the opinion was "let's not go anywhere - in any way it is impossible for us to go somewhere!"

                I didn’t set anyone a task for the battle.

                Not true - everyone had tasks. And the main thing is to break into Vladik. And what - fathers-commanders strongly rushed to execute the order?

                The order that was given, reasonable, at first glance, spoke only about one thing: to Vladivostok.

                Exactly. And this was the most correct and only possible order: "follow the squadron to Vladivostok" --- this should be nailed to the masts.
                And there could be no other orders.

                Okay, enough for you for now --- first deal with this.
                1. mmaxx
                  mmaxx 18 June 2020 17: 25 New
                  +2
                  There was not a single moron to take directly with transports at random to Vladik. One was found. Cited. And he didn’t get there. And the word Tsushima became a household word. I did not even think of launching a bullet in the forehead.
                  And Dobrovolsky, oddly enough, was right. At least some ships survived for the fleet. Even if that story is not heroic at all.
              2. andrew42
                andrew42 19 June 2020 14: 42 New
                0
                From me you are a plus. Rozhdestvensky - part of the "system", sadly. Even the staff officer Wittgeft was an order of magnitude more creative. It is a pity that the one-of-a-kind "non-systemic" admiral died with Petropavlovsk. On the role of personality in history ...
  • unknown
    unknown 15 June 2020 20: 52 New
    +6
    Andrei’s position is clear by all means to defend the position of Rozhestvensky.
    But, it is necessary to separate tasks.
    Rozhdestvensky was about to fight.
    It was worth preparing for it in all available ways.
    Instead, the tactical task was replaced by a strategic one.
    The result is a loss.
  • mmaxx
    mmaxx 16 June 2020 06: 54 New
    +2
    One could count on a quiet loading of coal only if the Japanese did not organize reconnaissance and did not go to sea. What would any normal Russian admiral do at that time wink
    And the option with the package - in advance! - transport around Japan in order to meet the erupted squadron is already my alternative nonsense. So I understand that such a flight of thought is completely impossible.
  • mmaxx
    mmaxx 16 June 2020 16: 45 New
    +3
    Ndaa. In fencing ZPR you have somehow gone too far. Well yes. With his brilliant design, ZPR held down the forces of Japanese cruisers at transports, three times superior to Russian cruisers. Suppose I agree.
    And the fact that after this squadron could go at the speed of transports and could not do anything at all - how is it?
    On the contrary, with this decision, he allowed us to tie our cruisers three times superior to the Japanese.
    True, it is not clear how our talented naval commanders would have disposed of these cruisers in general. And so, there is reason to be proud of the heroic protection of transports.
  • The comment was deleted.
  • Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 16 June 2020 00: 30 New
    +6
    Good article, good photos. Images of Tsushima transports are rare. Thanks to the author!

    In general, I agree with the conclusions of the author. Dragging a convoy into battle is a reckless adventure initially. The enemy could destroy the transports simply by chance approaching them with the main forces during a chaotic maneuver. Cruisers would immediately have to flee and the convoy would remain between a rock and a hard place, armadillos and “dogs”.

    If it was proper to supply Vladivostok with the sea, it was necessary to do this with secretive breakthroughs. It is interesting to note that during almost the entire siege of Port Arthur, English and German steamboats made their way into it, delivering the necessary supplies. Only a couple was lost, the sea is still quite large.
    1. Jura 27
      Jura 27 16 June 2020 06: 06 New
      +3
      Dragging a convoy into battle is a reckless adventure initially.

      The usual is not the professionalism of the higher command of the tsarist officers, who vividly demonstrated that Rudnev, that ZPR.
  • Comrade
    Comrade 16 June 2020 16: 44 New
    +1
    There is an opinion that if hospital ships went without lights or outside the main forces, the Russian squadron would pass the Tsushima Strait unnoticed. Would you find her on a foggy morning on May 14?

    This opinion is erroneous.
    Rozhdestvensky’s squadron was discovered by the Japanese several times, just the telegram sent by the cruiser Idzumi was received at Togo’s headquarters first.
    The first fishermen spotted Rozhestvensky Japanese fishermen, the third, after the "Idzumi", he was seen by observers from one of the islets.
    In May 1905, the naval areas and bases included 96 SNiS posts (surveillance and communication services), of which 19 were equipped with wireless telegraph stations, 52 with telegraph and 44 with telephone communications.

    There were stationary points, images and descriptions of them are available.
    Secondly, not being able to move faster than at a speed of 9 knots, support ships fettered the main forces, which were also forced to limit the progress to 9 knots. It is the low speed of the Russian squadron that is considered one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Russian squadron.

    How could Navarin with Emperor Nicholas I and Sisa the Great go at least fourteen knots?
    In a situation where the enemy goes on sixteen and can go even faster without problems, nine knots or twelve knots at Rozhestvensky does not matter anymore.
    Thirdly, instead of one of its main functions - reconnaissance at the squadron, the cruiser of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was involved in protecting transports.

    And what were our cruisers supposed to scout? The presence of Togo on the way to Vladivostok? He was there, the Russian squadron was on guard, this was understandable without any intelligence.
    And if the troops acted, they would not have to count on effective control of the Korean Strait.

    I have already laid out the patrol map of the Japanese auxiliary cruisers by sector. The observation there was at several levels, so the mistake is to reduce the observation of the sea to the actions of "Idzumi". The fate of the empire was on the map of the Japanese, and they "grazed" the Tsushima Strait and the adjacent waters seriously.
    Then what was to be done with the support ships? There are several options for how they could be followed to Vladivostok (I have no doubt for a second of their need for Vladivostok).
    You can around Japan.

    It is impossible, the straits on the eve of the advent of Rozhestvensky were reliably mined.
    1. rytik32
      16 June 2020 18: 55 New
      +4
      Quote: Comrade
      How could Navarin with Emperor Nicholas I and Sisa the Great go at least fourteen knots?

      I am of the opinion that the maximum speed of the slowest ships was 13 knots, respectively, the squadron speed was 12 knots.

      Quote: Comrade
      In a situation where the enemy is sixteen and can go even faster without problems

      I apologize, but I did not meet the data that Togo's detachment for a long time held more than 15 knots. Do you have such data?

      Quote: Comrade
      The fate of the empire was on the map of the Japanese, and they "grazed" the Tsushima Strait and the adjacent waters seriously

      Unfortunately, at that time there were no radars as well as night vision devices. Therefore, to pass the strait at night was quite possible. Yes, and in the fog, too.
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 16 June 2020 19: 10 New
        0
        Quote: rytik32
        I am of the opinion that the maximum speed of the slowest ships was 13 knots.

        "Emperor Nicholas I" could not show such speed in the evening of May 15. There are either 10 or 11 knots, that's all that Nebogatov could squeeze out of his battleship.
        By the way, the Japanese, according to the report of the English attache, were of the opinion that the maximum speed "Fuji" at which he could go for a long time was 15 knots.

        Quote: rytik32
        I have not seen any evidence that Togo’s detachment has held more than 15 knots for a long time. Do you have such data?

        One of the English observers in his report devoted the speed of the Japanese in the battle at Cape Shantung a whole paragraph. 15 knots for Togo was not a problem.
        Quote: rytik32
        Unfortunately, at that time there were no radars as well as night vision devices. Therefore, to pass the strait at night was quite possible.

        The impossible happens, of course.
        But Rozhdestvensky, I repeat, spotted again after discovering with "Idzumi", this time from an islet. And where it was transferred.
        But a cruiser entered history, not two or three observers, because its telegram came first.
        1. Comrade
          Comrade 16 June 2020 19: 37 New
          +2
          Sorry, mechanical error. I did not mean "Idzumi", but "Shinano-Maru".
          By the way, regarding your assumption that
          to pass the strait at night was quite possible
          .
          To get there at night, you need to go to the channel in the evening. To do this, I would have to cross the Japanese outer sentinel line in broad daylight. And there, not only are auxiliary cruisers patrolling, but there are also plenty of fishermen.
          How to slip through before their eyes in the afternoon ?
          That is the fundamental question.
          1. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 16 June 2020 23: 56 New
            +4
            Quote: Comrade
            How to slip in front of them in the afternoon?
            That is the fundamental question.

            You will have to cross the sentinel line anyway, but the battle will be delayed in the morning. There will be no battle in the darkness, except for the attacks of destroyers. It is doubtful that they would be effective in an organized squadron. So the battle is not in the strait, but somewhere beyond the island of Dazhelet, when Vladivostok is ahead. The chances of a breakthrough are immediately an order of magnitude greater.
            1. Comrade
              Comrade 17 June 2020 00: 22 New
              +2
              Quote: Saxahorse
              the battle will be delayed in the morning.

              In real history, the Tsushima battle began after lunch, and the Japanese coped. If the battle in your alternative begins in the morningwhy can't the Japanese cope?
              1. Saxahorse
                Saxahorse 17 June 2020 22: 11 New
                +3
                Quote: Comrade
                If the battle in your alternative begins in the morning, why can't the Japanese cope?

                Because instead of a breakthrough, a fight on the withdrawal is obtained, and in the light of day. There is a good chance that the withdrawal will occur in a more or less organized group that will increase the likelihood of survival of badly damaged ships, the Japanese will not have another day to finish off. In real history, the Japanese managed barely. The cellars are not rubber, but Borodino and Alexander died literally in the last minutes of the battle. It is enough to bring the ships to normal displacement, and even with all the shortcomings of the RI fleet, they will most likely get to Vladivostok.

                Although ZPR certainly will be able to come up with a way to merge. laughing
                1. rytik32
                  18 June 2020 16: 16 New
                  +2
                  Quote: Saxahorse
                  It is enough to bring the ships to normal displacement, and even with all the shortcomings of the RI fleet, they will most likely get to Vladivostok.

                  I will support.
                  Comparing why Peresvet held shells, Oslyabya sank, why Poltava held on, and Sisoy quickly deflated with a similar reservation scheme, the first thing that comes to mind is an overload.
          2. rytik32
            18 June 2020 01: 02 New
            +3
            Quote: Comrade
            Sorry, mechanical error. I did not mean "Idzumi", but "Shinano-Maru".
            By the way, regarding your assumption that
            to pass the strait at night was quite possible
            .
            To get there at night, you need to go to the channel in the evening. To do this, I would have to cross the Japanese outer sentinel line in broad daylight. And there, not only are auxiliary cruisers patrolling, but there are also plenty of fishermen.
            How to slip through before their eyes in the afternoon ?
            That is the fundamental question.

            Peasants have long described this alignment:
        2. rytik32
          16 June 2020 22: 45 New
          +2
          Quote: Comrade
          "Emperor Nicholas I" could not show such speed in the evening of May 15. There are either 10 or 11 knots, that's all that Nebogatov could squeeze out of his battleship.

          1. Comrade
            Comrade 17 June 2020 00: 18 New
            -1
            This speed is taken from the testimony of which of the crew of the Emperor Nicholas I or the headquarters of Nebogatov?
            I have come across information that the battleship went on ten and a half knots.
            Incidentally, about 12 knots it not 13 nodes.
            1. rytik32
              17 June 2020 00: 43 New
              0
              Quote: Comrade
              This speed is taken from the testimony of which of the crew of the Emperor Nicholas I or the headquarters of Nebogatov?

              This is from the book Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The work of the historical commission to describe the actions of the fleet in the war of 1904-1905. at the naval General Staff. Tsushima operation book 7
              Quote: Comrade
              I have come across information that the battleship went on ten and a half knots

              Please provide this data.
              And I will quote from the testimony, as you like:
              "the detachment speed did not exceed 12 - 13 knots," "even at night, at 12 - 13 knots, the battleship took a lot of water into the bow compartment of the battery deck."
              Quote: Comrade
              By the way, about 12 nodes is not 13 nodes.

              I am talking about the speed of the squadron and Nicholas 1 as part of this squadron.
              Although the quote above says that up to 13 knots the speed sometimes rose.
              1. Comrade
                Comrade 17 June 2020 01: 15 New
                0
                Quote: rytik32
                Please provide this data.

                I do not remember the source, there is no time to look. Therefore, I do not insist.
                Quote: rytik32
                I am talking about the speed of the squadron and Nicholas 1 as part of this squadron.
                Although the quote above says that up to 13 knots the speed sometimes rose.

                Even thirteen, it’s still less than Vitgeft’s, and the Japanese caught up with him and rolled him out.
                And yes, as with the Navarin, are there indications of its speed?
                1. rytik32
                  17 June 2020 11: 37 New
                  +4
                  Quote: Comrade
                  And yes, as with the Navarin, are there indications of its speed?

                  The last test of the speed of "Navarina" before sending it as part of 2 TOE showed EMNIP, 14,8 knots without voltage machines. Apparently, on the basis of these data, the Peasants indicated the actual speed of 15 knots at the time of sending the squadron.
                  In the testimony of Rozhdestvensky, Navarin could not develop more than 12, and the third detachment had a top speed of 11½ knots.
                  As we figured out above, the 3rd detachment actually went faster than 11,5 knots. There is even data, although it is very doubtful that “Nikolay 1” in the evening of May 14 accelerated even faster than 13 knots, but then dropped to 12 knots, because other ships began to lag.
                  So Rozhdestvensky clearly downplayed the maximum speed of our ships.
                  But at the speed of the squadron of 12 knots after a day’s battle, it’s quite possible to focus on the maximum possible.
                  1. Comrade
                    Comrade 17 June 2020 16: 40 New
                    0
                    Quote: rytik32
                    So Rozhdestvensky clearly downplayed the maximum speed of our ships.

                    It doesn’t matter, as we recall, Witgeft not fourteen knots saved the speed, because the Japanese were even faster.
                    As well as the lack of transports, the presence of which you blame Zinovy ​​Petrovich.
                    There are transports, there are no transports, thirteen nodes or fourteen - all this, dear colleague, in practice does not matter.
                    The Japanese defeated as a fast opponent without transports and slow adversary с by transport.
                    Thanks for the topic, of course, you can talk about your favorite topic, but seriously take the factor of the presence of transports at Rozhestvensky as one of the causes of defeat not worth it.
                    1. rytik32
                      17 June 2020 17: 01 New
                      +2
                      Valentine, I do not agree with you in the term "defeated" regarding the battle in the Yellow Sea.
                      There was a disintegration of the squadron due to loss of control, and not defeat. If you compare the loss of the crew or the failure of the guns, it is rather a "draw".
                      1. Comrade
                        Comrade 17 June 2020 18: 28 New
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        If you compare the loss of the crew or the failure of the guns, it is rather a "draw".

                        And if you compare damage the battleships of Wittgeft and Togo, then rout.
                  2. mmaxx
                    mmaxx 18 June 2020 14: 01 New
                    +2
                    Interestingly, we are now catching some pieces of information about the possible speed of the ships. Someone from the headquarters of the ZPR in the future generally said what opportunities the squadron had along the way? After all, the headquarters should have known such things. One must understand how to maintain a squadron. It turns out that ZPR counted 9 nodes for everything about everything. Where did he get this from?
                    Any land explorer knows how long his unit, etc., can go through to the Civil, supposedly semi-literate Budyonny, perfectly calculated the possible march into the Soviet-Polish war and completed it. For sailors, this is generally elementary. Even just to calculate the possibility of passage of the strait by time of day. What, green-trees, did the headquarters have at ZPR?
        3. rytik32
          19 June 2020 11: 54 New
          +2
          Quote: Comrade
          One of the English observers in his report devoted the speed of the Japanese in the battle at Cape Shantung a whole paragraph. 15 knots for Togo was not a problem.

          This is Pekingham. The original sounds like this:
          It was at about this time (3.25) that the Japanese at last, and unwillingly, recognized their present speed was inadequate, and put on their last knot, bringing their speed thus 15 knots, beyond which the Fuji could not be match trusted
          I will translate into Russian:
          Around the same time (3:25), the Japanese finally reluctantly admitted that their current speed was unsatisfactory and added their last knot, thus increasing their speed to 15 knots, and then it was no longer possible to vouch for the "Fuji"
    2. Nehist
      Nehist 17 June 2020 01: 08 New
      +3
      Dear Valentine !!!! It is not possible to mine the Kuril Straits due to strong currents, and the Japanese did not mine them by the way, where do you get such information?
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 17 June 2020 03: 26 New
        +1
        Dear Alexander !
        Quote: Nehist
        It is not possible to mine the Kuril Straits due to strong currents, and the Japanese did not mine them by the way, where do you get such information?


        In August 1904, by order of the Supreme Commander’s Headquarters, concerned about the actions of the EQA, a general mine defense plan for the Tsugaru Strait was adopted, within the framework of which the Yokosuka Naval District Mine Department began experiments on testing special Makimura floating mines and developing equipment for them staging. In January-April 1905, the mine department commission and the Tsugaru mine defense detachment jointly conducted tests and exercises with new mines in the strait, the purpose of which was to search for ways and areas of mine clearing to block the eastern entrance to the strait, taking into account the direction and speed of the current. The new method of laying mines turned out to be effective, and on April 18, 1905, the Hakodate Naval Defense Area was abolished by order of the Minister of the Sea and instead the Tsugaru Strait Naval Defense Area was established, reorganized on May 25 as the Tsugaru Strait Combat Command.
        The Moscow State School did not exclude the possibility of a breakthrough of 2TE in the Tsugaru Strait and decided to strengthen the sentinel and guard service and mine defense in this direction. On May 16, Musashi, Nihon Maru, Hong Kong Maru, and the 4th detachment of destroyers began patrolling on the approaches to the eastern and western entrances to the Tsugaru Strait20. On May 22, the head of the Moscow State School ordered the head of the naval defense district Tsugar: “Due to the high probability of the appearance of an enemy squadron near the Tsugaru Strait on May 24-25, you should take appropriate measures without delay.”
        From May 22 to 26, Karasaki-Maru delivered two (with a mile between them) 6-mile obstacle lines with 17 bundles of 4 floating mines each, and auxiliary vessels set 100 floating false vessels north and south of them to simulate the complete overlap of the strait. The area was chosen according to the results of exercises and Japanese calculations of the speed and direction of the current, so that mine ligaments blocked the eastern entrance at the narrowest point just during the supposed passage of the Russian squadron through it. Thus, it can be concluded that the navigational and hydrographic difficulties of sailing along the Tsugaru Strait, repeatedly reinforced by the mine danger, seriously questioned the possibility of breaking through 2 TOEs through it. In May 1905, the naval areas and bases included 96 SNiS posts, of which 19 were equipped with wireless telegraph stations, 52 with telegraph and 44 with telephone communications. The task of detecting 2 TOEs in the case of following it to the Tsugaru or Laperuza Strait was assigned to the 21st SNiS post of the Yokosuka Naval Areas located on the islands of Iturup, Hokkaido and the east coast of Honshu Island. On May 25, in connection with the possible passage of 2 TOE to the Tsugaru Strait, three SNiS posts were additionally deployed on the Hatizo Island, equipped with one wireless telegraph station and communication via an underwater telegraph cable. In addition, along the coast of the metropolis there were SNiS army posts, and all governors, mayors, elders and police officers of coastal settlements were charged with the duty to monitor the situation at sea and report on the appearance of any ships and ships. In mid-April, an additional force of observers was sent to the coast by directive of the Minister of the Sea. Proceeding from this, a secretive passage of 2 TOE to the Tsugaru and Laperuz straits through the areas of active shipping and fishing off the eastern coast of Japan was hardly possible, although such cases are known in the history of wars at sea.
        The Japanese fleet took into account the possibility of a breakthrough of 2 TOE through the Tsugaru Strait. The monitoring and communication service system practically did not give a chance to ensure the secrecy of the transition to the strait, in which a minefield of 136 minutes was set.

        (Source - article by A. Polutov)
        1. rytik32
          17 June 2020 12: 15 New
          +3
          Well, a couple of ships on these mines would be blown up.
          And the rest would come to Vladivostok.
          1. Comrade
            Comrade 17 June 2020 16: 23 New
            -1
            Quote: rytik32
            Well, a couple of ships on these mines would be blown up.
            And the rest would come to Vladivostok.

            No one would come to Vladivostok. The vessels that did not explode in the mines would first be fired by coastal batteries, and at the exit from the strait they would be finished off by coastal defense vessels. There, if memory serves, three units were counted.
            So it’s a bad idea, colleague, to send transports through the straits. There is no chance, for an obstacle of three levels.
            1. rytik32
              17 June 2020 18: 31 New
              +3
              Quote: Comrade
              would come under fire from shore batteries

              laughter was there, not batteries
              Quote: Comrade
              three units there were

              screw corvette and two armed vehicles
              1. Comrade
                Comrade 18 June 2020 06: 15 New
                +1
                Quote: rytik32
                laughter was there, not batteries

                Dear colleague,
                let's speculate out loud.
                1) We have six transports and two hospital ships.
                2) Christmas sent them around Japan.
                3) Transport "Anadyr"
                Transport "Irtysh"
                Transport "Korea"
                Tow ship "Svir"
                Towing ship "Rus"
                Floating workshop "Kamchatka"
                Hospital ship "Eagle"
                Hospital ship "Kostroma"
                began to force a minefield.
                4)
                Quote: rytik32
                a couple of ships in these mines exploded.

                5) The remaining six enter the strait and fall under the fire of ten 76-mm quick-firing guns.
                6) Steamboats do not have armor protection, so they didn’t see much there.
                7) Suppose that it was not possible to sink anyone, but the ships received a certain number of hits.
                8) And now they come out of the strait, and towards them
                Quote: rytik32
                screw corvette and two armed vehicles

                9) Question.
                What are the odds six damaged and unarmed steamboats to reach Vpadivostok if they were attacked three armed enemy ships?
                1. rytik32
                  18 June 2020 11: 05 New
                  +3
                  Quote: Comrade
                  1) We have six transports and two hospital ships.

                  My proposal has slightly different forces.
                  Quote: Comrade
                  The remaining six enter the strait and fall under the fire of ten 76-mm quick-firing guns

                  These guns did not control the strait, read Polutov carefully.
                  Quote: Comrade
                  unarmed steamers

                  There were weapons on some of our transports! "Anadyr" and "Irtysh" at 8 57mm guns.
                  https://topwar.ru/98079-slavnaya-sudba-transporta-anadyr.html
                  Quote: Comrade
                  if they were attacked by three armed enemy ships

                  all these three armed pelvis half an hour before they are drowned by the "Donskoy" and "Monomakh"
                  1. Comrade
                    Comrade 20 June 2020 06: 15 New
                    +1
                    Quote: rytik32
                    My proposal has slightly different forces.

                    Ah, then another thing.
                    Quote: rytik32
                    all these three armed pelvis half an hour before they are drowned by the "Donskoy" and "Monomakh"

                    It is logical to assume that these two cruisers headed the convoy of transports, which means that they should go to the bottom in minefields.
                    1. rytik32
                      21 June 2020 09: 17 New
                      +1
                      Quote: Comrade
                      It is logical to assume that these two cruisers headed the convoy of transports, which means that they should go to the bottom in minefields.

                      It seems to me more logical to put the cruiser first and last.
                2. rytik32
                  18 June 2020 12: 44 New
                  +3
                  I can’t resist, I’ll write what a Musashi screw corvette was that patrolled the Sangarsky Strait. It was an ancient mast ship with a displacement of 1,5 thousand tons with a composite (i.e. wood + steel frame) case without any armorarmed with obsolete guns.
                  1. AK64
                    AK64 18 June 2020 14: 10 New
                    -4
                    I can’t resist, I’ll write what a Musashi screw corvette was that patrolled the Sangarsky Strait. It was an ancient mast ship with a displacement of 1,5 thousand tons with a composite (i.e. wood + iron frame) hull without any armor, armed with outdated cannons.


                    You are well done!
                    There was nothing left --- to write how many and which guns were on the supply vessels.
              2. AK64
                AK64 18 June 2020 14: 09 New
                -2
                laughter was there, not batteries
                screw corvette and two armed vehicles


                Neither batteries nor corvettes are important: the convoy was most likely intercepted even before reaching the Kuril Islands: traffic to the east of Japan was very busy, and they would be spotted and guided by a couple of auxiliary cruisers (which after the Tsushima from the Japanese in love case would be free).

                Further: after Tsushima (at any outcome), the Japanese would most likely have known that the convoy was outfitted somewhere. To find out exactly where it would be easy --- and to the north, along short internal lines. would have thrown heels of auxiliary and light cruisers (and enough advice is enough). On the passage of the Kuril Straits, the convoy would be spotted - and voila.

                Allocating cruisers to guard the convoy would not change anything --- in this case, the Japanese would simply add Kamimura to the outfit of forces.

                The only place theoretically possible to send a convoy is Petropavlovst-Kamchatsky (and then along the coast through the Tatar Strait to Vladik). But it would take a couple of months WITHOUT supplies and workshops. That is, in this case, the squadron, if it had broken through to Vladik, would have cooked there without supplies (even those modest ones that carried convoy ships) and repairs.

                You do not want to understand any of this.

                This train was generally the most insignificant of the problems of Rozhdestvensky. And he had problems - a little above the roof. The reason for TsUSima was not a convoy, but a delay in the squadron leaving until October, which was completely impossible - this is where the reasons must be sought.
        2. anzar
          anzar 17 June 2020 14: 07 New
          +2
          special Makimura floating mines and the development of equipment for their deployment
          ... Karasaki-Maru delivered two (with a mile between them) 6-mile obstacle lines of 17 bundles of 4 floating mines in each ...

          Dear Comrade, although this is not your text, can you answer how the floating mines and mine bundles were fastened so that they would not be carried away by the current?
          At first I thought of a large cable fixed to the shores, or anchors near the shores, but ... it is said about two different lines with a distance between them. Perhaps there were places in the middle of the strait suitable for anchors? In addition, it is said:
          according to Japanese calculations of the speed and direction of the current, so that the mine ligaments overlap the eastern entrance at the narrowest point just in time the proposed passage through it of the Russian squadron

          Those. didn’t think that the fence would stay in place for a long time?
          Thus, we can conclude that the navigational and hydrographic difficulties of navigation along the Tsugaru Strait, repeatedly reinforced by mine danger, seriously questioned the possibility of a breakthrough through it 2 TOE

          Silently pass, no, but a breakthrough is completely possible. After all, the distance between the mines is 100m and they count on a bunch to attract to the board. The first ship that blew up (let's say Almaz, a scout coming forward)) would kill the cable and the whole line would fan out over the course. The rest of the squadron will pass without problems. True, then she will be met by Togo, but ...
          But we say everything now, and then the Japanese too tensed))). It was enough to spread the rumor (in the newspapers) that the strait was mined and that’s it! No Russian (commander) will even think about doubting ... They shot at the North Sea against Japanese destroyers in the North Sea (? !!)) smile
          1. Senior seaman
            Senior seaman 17 June 2020 15: 54 New
            +1
            Quote: anzar
            How did the children attach floating mines and mine bundles so that they would not be carried away by the current?

            The question is not for me, but I had the impression that they were not attached at all, and the calculation was that they would drift slowly along the course.
            Quote: anzar
            The first blown up ship (let's say Almaz, a scout coming forward)) the cable will be killed and the whole line will be broken

            Well, I don’t know, one bundle gently hugs an enemy ship and drowns it nafig almost simultaneously. The rest, where will they go?
            1. anzar
              anzar 17 June 2020 16: 39 New
              +2
              I had the impression that they were not attached at all, and the calculation was that they would slowly drift with the stream.

              It is unlikely that then the danger will be more likely to Japanese cabotage)). And then what will the phrase "meanKarasaki-Maru delivered two (with one mile away between them) 6 mile fence lines " ?
              The rest, where will they go?

              Drift to another place))) The eskadra moves in a column, and not build a "front"!
              But it is interesting that the Japanese actually scattered the drifting floating ligaments widely, not at all worrying that after some time some kind of tramp (including theirs) could be blown up. Perhaps in 1-2 days they lost buoyancy and sank?
            2. rytik32
              18 June 2020 01: 09 New
              0
              Quote: Senior Sailor
              and the calculation was that they would slowly drift with the flow

              In the Sangar Strait, there is a strong current from the Sea of ​​Japan to the ocean. On average about 5 knots.
          2. Comrade
            Comrade 17 June 2020 16: 34 New
            +1
            Dear anzar,
            Quote: anzar
            can you answer how the floating mines and mine bundles were fastened so that they would not be carried away by the current?

            I do not know this. There is a map of minefields there and a few photos, but I don’t have time to search through the folders. I couldn’t find it right away.

            Quote: anzar
            a breakthrough is entirely possible.

            Theoretically, for some of the ships of the squadron.
            First, part of the ships is blown up by mines (what to do with them is an interesting question).
            Those who have not been blown up fall under the fire of coastal batteries, and then, a few tens of miles from the exit, a battle with the United Fleet begins.
            Quote: anzar
            They fired at the Japanese destroyers in the North Sea.

            Everyone panics in extreme situations, and the Russians, and Japanese, and Austrians.
            1. anzar
              anzar 17 June 2020 17: 25 New
              0
              A map of minefields there and ...

              Do not look, since the card means attached (to the bottom) But probably the whole 6-mile bunch.
              First, some ships are blown up by mines

              It is unlikely that more than 1-2- (as I wrote already) the squadron is not building the "front" is moving)) and you can choose who to let go in front)))
              Whoever hasn’t been blown up comes under the fire of coastal batteries

              This can be omitted, there are no serious calibers.
              and then a few tens of miles from the exit, the battle with the United Fleet begins

              Well, yes, and the result for 2Toe is likely to be similar. Well, not really, most yap. the destroyers will not have time to come, and Vladivostok is closer ... However, this is already a fabrication of how the map will fall unknown. But even the arrival of half of the squadron in stock will not change much.
              Everyone panics in extreme situations, and Russian, and Japanese, and Austrians

              But only the Russians could see the Japanese in the North. sea! Teleported apparently, so as not to "glow" when passing Suez?)))
              1. Comrade
                Comrade 17 June 2020 18: 22 New
                0
                Quote: anzar
                The result for 2ToE is likely to be similar. Well, not really, most yap. destroyers do not have time to come

                Even as they have time.
                The transition to the island of Oshima Togo was planned to be completed in two days at a speed of twelve knots.

                Quote: anzar
                But only the Russians could see the Japanese in the North. sea!

                The Russians said they saw destroyers or a destroyer.
                The Russians did not specify at the same time that the destroyers were Japanese.
              2. AK64
                AK64 17 June 2020 19: 20 New
                0
                But only the Russians could see the Japanese in the North. sea! Teleported apparently


                No need to lie: the Russians didn’t say “they saw the Japanese” --- the Russians said “they saw the destroyers”.
                Moreover, the Russians drew schemes for their maneuvering.

                It is believed that the destroyers were .... Germanic, and the aim was precisely a provocation and diplomatic problems with Britain.
                1. anzar
                  anzar 17 June 2020 21: 32 New
                  +2
                  No need to lie: the Russians didn’t say “they saw the Japanese” --- the Russians said “they saw the destroyers”.

                  Who lies and lies in what? If the Russians not considered the "seen" destroyers Japanese, then why shot?? Russia still fought with someone else?
                  And (if) the Japanese considered that, then how did they explain them imperceptible appearance there, half the world? Destroyers then! Then why not straight in the marquise puddle?
                  1. AK64
                    AK64 18 June 2020 07: 50 New
                    -1
                    Who lies and lies in what?
                    you're lying

                    I have strange jumps in the site window - therefore I will not explain
                    1. anzar
                      anzar 18 June 2020 10: 33 New
                      0
                      ... because I will not explain

                      Conveniently))) That's when the "jumps" disappear, explain who they thought (and explained in the process) that shoot Russians in the North Sea.
                      The "ubiquitous" Japanese (destroyers) and then "saw" everywhere - and in Madagascar, and ... Straight mass psychosis.
                      Fersen also blew up the Emerald "so that the Japanese would not capture him." Only in this vein did I write that the yapes were too difficult to mine (like that) the Sangar Strait. It was easy enough saythat the strait is "mined".
        3. Nehist
          Nehist 18 June 2020 05: 13 New
          +2
          Dear Valentine! Strait of Tsugaru, aka Sangarsky, is between Hokkaido and Honshu and has nothing to do with the Kuril Islands