How did they know everything? Mongolian intelligence on the eve of the invasion of Russia
Enlightened sovereigns and wise generals moved and won, accomplished feats, surpassing all others because they knew everything in advance.
Sun Tzu, The Art of War (no later than the XNUMXth century BC)
Sun Tzu, The Art of War (no later than the XNUMXth century BC)
The Mongolian Empire
The phenomenon of this state is so unusual, grandiose and large-scale that it is difficult to comprehend by the philistine consciousness, and this in many cases gives rise to amateurs stories even doubts about the very fact of its existence. And in fact, how is it that suddenly a huge state, founded by wild and illiterate nomads, suddenly appears out of nowhere, does it exist for a short period of time and disappears without a trace, leaving nothing behind? This does not happen.
In fact, it’s not “out of nowhere”, and not “without a trace”, and not so wild and illiterate. But in order to understand this, you need to plunge deeply into the study of this issue, and not try, using "logic and common sense" without relying on any knowledge, to deny the indisputable, scientifically proven facts, replacing them with irresponsible fantasies of morally unscrupulous authors.
This article does not intend to put an end to the philistine skepticism regarding the existence of the Mongol Empire - a state stretching from the banana-lemon jungle of Southeast Asia to the Novgorod cranberry swamps, from the Pacific coast to the Carpathian mountains, a state in which a XNUMXth-century traveler. it could take a whole year to cross it from one end to the other. The purpose of the article is to dispel some skeptics' doubts about a single issue, namely the question of where the Mongols “knew everything” from.
Indeed, upon careful consideration of many aspects of the Mongolian military campaign conducted by them against the ancient Russian state, it seems that not stranger nomads from the distant Mongolian steppe came to Russia, but their own, local, well acquainted with the theater of operations, its natural conditions, geographical and climatic nuances, possessing information about the political situation, the military-economic potential of the enemy, as well as all other information necessary for successful planning and management tions of military operations in enemy territory. The answer to the question of how the Mongols really knew all this, we will try to get as part of this study.
Information sources
The main sources on which we will rely in the framework of this study will, of course, be the Old Russian annals and written documents left to us by contemporaries of the events described. First of all, this is “The Secret Legend of the Mongols”, recorded, according to modern studies, in 1240 in the Mongolian language, and the reports of the Catholic monks Giovanni Plano Carpini and Julian of Hungary.
Of course, when working on this study, the author also used the works of professional historians: V.V. Kargalova, E.L. Nazarova, A.P. Smirnova, R.P. Khrapachevsky, D.G. Khrustaleva, H.-D. Erenzhen and others.
XIII Century Intelligence
What was intelligence in the XNUMXth century? in general and intelligence of Genghis Khan's empire in particular?
All five ranks of spies work, and one cannot know their paths. This is called an incomprehensible secret. They are a treasure for the emperor ... Therefore, for the army there is nothing closer than spies; there are no big rewards than for spies; there are no more secret cases than spyware.
These words of Sun Tzu exhaustively determine the complexity that any author who is going to write about intelligence faces, regardless of what time he writes, if it is not about tactical intelligence during the conduct of hostilities, but about political or strategic intelligence. But in this case we are interested in it.
Of course, in the XIII century. not a single state (except, possibly, China) had political or strategic intelligence as such: with its staff, hierarchy of subordination, structure, personnel, etc. The collection of information about the enemy was not carried out by professional intelligence officers specially trained and trained for this purpose, but mostly by random people: merchants, religious missionaries, and, of course, diplomats and employees of embassy missions. All these were people standing quite high in the social hierarchy of society, because a scout (anyone), except for certain personal qualities, such as high intelligence, charm, sociability, ability and willingness to take risks, should have many qualities that are completely uncharacteristic of commoners. He must be a member of the circles that possess the information of interest to him, must have at his disposal certain (and often considerable) means to bribe or reward informants, and, not to mention elementary literacy, he must (preferably) speak the language of the country in which he works (or have a translator with you).
Perhaps, the circle of such persons in the Middle Ages was limited to nobles, merchants and representatives of the clergy. It was they, and only they, who had the opportunity to conduct intelligence activities.
In the Mongol Empire of Genghis Khan, it was strategic intelligence that always received special attention. History has preserved for us even several names of persons who carried out such activities. First of all, this is a certain Muslim merchant named Jafar-Khoja, one of the closest associates of Genghis Khan. The Yuan-shi Chronicle, the official story of the Chinese imperial Yuan Dynasty, which, as you know, was of Mongolian origin, tells us about other Muslim merchants who performed the diplomatic and reconnaissance missions of Genghis Khan: a certain Asan (probably Hassan), a native of Turkestan, Danishmed Hajib , Mahmoud al-Khwarizmi. The latter, by the way, was “recruited” by the ruler of Khorezm and supplied him with disinformation regarding the forces and intentions of Genghis Khan. In general, Muslim merchants, with whom Genghis Khan always tried to maintain the best relations based on mutual benefit, probably played a key role in the system of collecting information about opponents of the Mongol Empire. Often they were entrusted with missions of not only intelligence, but also diplomatic nature.
In order to coordinate efforts to collect information about the enemy and its systematization, Genghis Khan created a permanent analytical body in both wartime and peacetime - a prototype of what we now call the General Staff. There were simply no analogues of such a structure in other states of that time. Of course, the functions of this “General Staff” included collecting and analyzing information not only about neighboring states, but also about the state of affairs in its own empire, that is, it combined the functions of modern ministries of the interior and the ministry of defense, but taking into account the level of development of state institutions time in the world in general it was a huge step forward. The employees of this "general staff" had the rank of "yurtaji", and the agents who collected the information, that is, the scouts themselves, were called "angins". In fact, Genghis Khan came close to creating a personnel intelligence service.
In Europe, the creation of such an organization will not come very soon.
Introduction
The first clash of the Mongol Empire and Rus occurred in 1223, when the battle on the river. Kalka.
Actually, the campaign of the two Mongolian tumens under the leadership of Jebe and Subedai was itself a deep strategic intelligence with the aim of collecting information about the natural conditions of the steppes of the Northern Black Sea Coast, as well as about the people who inhabited this area, and indeed any information about new, previously unknown territories .
Before the battle, the command of the Mongol expeditionary force tried to resort to their favorite trick, with the help of which they repeatedly managed to split the coalitions of their opponents. Ambassadors were sent to the Russian princes, convincing them not to provide military assistance to the Polovtsy. The Russians simply killed the first group of such ambassadors, possibly due to the fact that the Mongols used local wanderers as ambassadors, who knew the Polovtsian language, which the Mongols were also familiar with, and who could convey to the Russians the meaning of the message that Jebe and Subeday. Brodniks, that is, tramps, robbers, the forerunner of the late Cossacks, were not considered by the Russian princes to be “handshakes,” so negotiations with them did not work. These same "brodniks" subsequently participated in the battle against the Russians on the side of the Mongols.
It would seem, what else reason after the execution of Russian "ambassadors" did the Mongols need to open military operations? However, they send another embassy to the Russians, probably more representative (according to some researchers, it could be Arab Muslim merchants detained by the Mongols), which they never did before or after. The reason for such perseverance of the Mongols may be precisely their desire to obtain intelligence information about the number and composition of the coalition of Russian princes, the quality of their weapons. Still, this was the first contact of two civilizations, previously completely unfamiliar with each other: in 1223, the borders of the Mongol Empire were still far east of Russia and the opponents knew literally nothing about each other. Having received from their second embassy information about the possible size and, most importantly, the composition of the Russian army, the Mongols realized that they would have to deal with heavy cavalry similar to the knight’s (they were familiar with such an opponent from the wars in Persia), and were able to obtained information to make a battle plan suitable for this particular case.
Having won the battle, the Mongols for a long time pursued the defeated retreating Russian rati, far invading the territory of Russia itself. It will be appropriate here to recall the notes of Plano Carpini, compiled by him more than twenty years after the events described.
“And also many other secrets of the aforementioned emperor, we learned through those who arrived with other leaders, through many Russians and Hungarians who knew both Latin and French, through Russian clergy and others who were with them, some staying thirty years during the war and during other acts of the Tatars, all their acts were known, since they knew the language and were inseparable with them for some twenty, some ten years, some more, some less; from them we could scout everything, and they themselves told us everything willingly, sometimes even without question, because they knew our desire. ”
It is quite possible that the “Russian clergy” mentioned by Karpini appeared in the capital of the Mongol Empire precisely after the raid of Jebe and Subedei, these could be Russians who were captured after the Battle of Kalka, and there is no doubt that there were many of them. If the term "clerics" is understood exclusively as individuals of the clergy, then such persons could be captured by the Mongols in the course of the prosecution of the defeated Russian military in the territory of Russia proper. Considering that the raid itself was conceived as “reconnaissance in battle,” as well as the Mongol’s special attentive and tolerant attitude towards religion, including the religion of conquered or planned to conquer peoples, this assumption does not seem improbable at all. It was from these prisoners captured by the Mongols in 1223 that the Great Khan could receive the first information about Russia and the Russians.
Mongols ... in Smolensk
After the defeat of the Russians on Kalka, the Mongols went towards the Middle Volga, where they were defeated by the troops of the Volga Bulgaria, after which they returned to the steppes and disappeared for some time, contact with them was lost.
The first appearance of the Mongols in the field of vision of Russian chroniclers after the battle on the river. Kalka is celebrated in 1229. This year, the Mongols came close to the borders of the Volga Bulgaria and began to disturb its borders with their raids. The main part of the forces of the Mongol Empire at that time was engaged in the conquest of southern China, in the west there were forces only of the Jochi ulus proper under the command of Khan Batu, and even those, in turn, were busy continuing the war with the Polovtsy (Kipchaks), who resisted stubbornly and steadfastly. During this period, only small military contingents could set up against Bulgaria, for which there were no serious tasks to conquer new territories, therefore, despite the fact that the Mongols managed to expand the territory of their influence on the interfluve of the Volga and Yaika rivers (the Urals) over the next three years ) in their lower reaches, the southern borders of the Volga Bulgaria remained insurmountable for them.
We in the context of this study will be interested in the following fact.
Not later than 1229 a tripartite trade agreement was concluded between Smolensk, Riga and Gotland, one of the lists of which contains an interesting article.
“And on which courtyards are the Germans or the guest of the Germans, do not put the prince in that courtyard of either the Tatar or any other ambassador.”
It is this list that most researchers date back to just 1229.
The following conclusions and assumptions can be drawn from this short article.
Shortly before the drafting of the treaty in 1229, the Tatar embassy was present in Smolensk (that is how the Russian chronicles called the Mongols) the embassy, which the Smolensk prince (probably it was Mstislav Davydovich) placed on the German farmstead. What happened to this embassy, which entailed the need to make an appropriate registry entry in the trade agreement, we can only speculate. Probably, it could be some kind of quarrel, or simply the Mongolian ambassadors with their presence something greatly constrained the Germans in Smolensk. It is impossible to talk about this with any certainty. However, the fact of the presence of the Mongolian embassy in Smolensk, as well as the fact that the arrival of similar embassies from the Mongol empire was completely allowed by both the Smolensk prince and Riga residents with the Scots, is not in doubt.
It should also be noted that not one of the Russian chronicles of the facts of the Mongolian embassies in Russia until 1237, literally on the eve of the invasion, fixes, from which we can conclude that such facts were not recorded by chronicles at all, and, therefore, the assumption that that there could be many such embassies has certain grounds.
What kind of embassy could this be?
Historians know the Mongolian, and not only the Mongolian custom of notifying all neighboring countries of the death of their ruler and the ascension to the throne of his successor. Genghis Khan died in 1227, and it would be at least strange if the new Khan Ugedei had not followed this custom and sent his embassies to all neighboring states. The version that the indicated embassy had one of its goals to notify the Russian princes of the death of Genghis Khan and the election of Ogedei the Great Khan is indirectly confirmed by the fact that it was 1229 that the death of Genghis Khan was marked by some Russian chronicles.
We do not know whether the path of this embassy ended in Smolensk and in general what its fate was. However, the very fact of its presence in Smolensk, on the extreme western borders of Russia, allows us to assume that before the Smolensk the Mongols could visit Vladimir or Suzdal with their mission (depending on where Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich was at that time), if it followed the shortest path through the Volga Bulgaria, or, possibly, Chernigov and Kiev, if moving through the steppes. Such a route, however, is unlikely, since at that time there was a war with the Polovtsi in the steppe and the path through the steppe was very unsafe.
If the Mongolian embassy had not “inherited” in Smolensk, we would not have known anything about its fact, but now we can very likely assume that similar embassies (or the same, Smolensk) visited Vladimir and in Kiev, and in Novgorod, and in other cities - centers of Russian lands. And on our part, it would be completely strange to assume that these embassies had exclusively diplomatic tasks that did not include intelligence.
What information could such embassies collect? Passing through Russian lands, visiting Russian cities, staying in them or near them for the night, talking with local princes and boyars, even with smerds, you can collect almost any information about the country in which you are. To learn trade routes, to examine military fortifications, to get acquainted with the armament of a potential enemy, and having spent quite a long time in the country, you can also familiarize yourself with climatic conditions, with the way and the rhythm of life of the taxable population, which is also of great importance for planning and carrying out a subsequent invasion. If the Mongols did just that before, waging or preparing wars with China or Khorezm, they are unlikely to have changed their rules in relation to Russia. The same embassies, without a doubt, collected information about the political situation in the country, the genealogy of the rulers (to whom the Mongols always paid special attention) and other aspects no less important for planning a subsequent war.
All this information, of course, was collected and analyzed at the rate of both Batu Khan and Ugadei himself.
Mongolian diplomatic activity in Europe
We also have one direct evidence of the high diplomatic activity of the Mongols both in Russia and in Europe. In a letter intercepted by Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich sent by Khan Batu in 1237 to the Hungarian King Bela IV and transmitted by the Prince to the Hungarian monk Julian (we will dwell on this letter in more detail in the next article), we see this phrase:
I am Khan, the ambassador of the king of heaven, to whom he gave power over the earth to exalt the obeying me and suppress those who are opposing, I wonder at you, the king (exactly like that, with neglect. - Auth.) Hungarian: although I sent ambassadors to you for the thirtieth time you will not send one of them back to me, and you will not send me your ambassadors or letters.
For the present study, one fragment is significant from the contents of this letter: Khan Batu reproaches the Hungarian king for not answering his messages, although he already "Thirtieth time" sends an embassy to him. Even if we assume that the number “thirty” here has figurative significance, as we say “one hundred” (for example, “I have already told you a hundred times”), it nevertheless follows from this letter that at least several Batu embassies in Hungary already sent. And again, it is not entirely clear why in this case he should have been limited exclusively to communication with the Hungarian king, while forgetting about the king, for example, Polish, numerous Russian princes and other hierarchs of Central and Eastern Europe?
Considering that embassy activity always and always went hand in hand with intelligence, Batu, and probably Ugadei, was probably well informed about European affairs, while Europeans began to establish diplomatic relations with Mongolian empire, sending its emissaries only after the end of the Western campaign of the Mongols, the defeat of Russia, Poland and Hungary.
The following fact also gives an idea of the level of preparation of the Mongols for the Western, or, as they called it, the “Kipchak” campaign, as well as the level of readiness of Russia and Europe to repel Mongol aggression.
We know that the Mongols did not have their own written language, therefore, for correspondence, including diplomatic, he used Uyghur writing, applying it to his own language. No one was able to translate the letter intercepted from the Mongolian ambassador at the court of Prince Yuri. Failed to do this and Julian, to whom the prince handed this letter for delivery to the addressee. Here is what Julian himself writes about this:
Therefore, he (meaning Khan Batu. - Auth.) Sent ambassadors to the King of Hungary. Passing through the land of Suzdal, they were captured by the Prince of Suzdal, and he took the letter sent to the King of Hungary; I even saw the ambassadors themselves with satellites, given to me by data.
The above letter, given to me by the Prince of Suzdal, I brought to the King of Hungary. The letter is written in pagan letters in the Tatar language. Therefore, the king found many who could read it, but did not find anyone who understood.
The above letter, given to me by the Prince of Suzdal, I brought to the King of Hungary. The letter is written in pagan letters in the Tatar language. Therefore, the king found many who could read it, but did not find anyone who understood.
Apparently, Yuri Vsevolodovich had no illusions about the immediate prospects for relations with the Mongols - he expected an inevitable war. Therefore, when the Mongolian embassy tried to follow through his lands to the Hungarian king Belé IV, he ordered the embassy to be detained, and the letter of Khan Batu addressed to Belé IV opened and tried to read. However, here he faced one insurmountable difficulty - the letter was written in a language completely incomprehensible to him.
An interesting situation: war is about to break out, and neither in Russia, nor in Hungary can one find a person who can read a letter written in the language of the enemy. A stark contrast against this background is the story of the same Julian, recorded by him after returning from his first trip, which took place in 1235-1236.
In this country of Hungarians, the said brother found the Tatars and the ambassador of the Tatar leader, who knew Hungarian, Russian, Kuman (Polovtsian), Teutonic, Saracen and Tatar ...
That is, the "ambassador of the Tatar leader" knows the languages of all potential opponents of the Mongol Empire in the foreseeable future already in 1236. It is unlikely that he was the only one and by chance he came across Julian "in the country of Hungarians". Most likely, among the Mongolian diplomatic corps, this state of affairs was the norm. It seems that this says a lot about the level of preparation of the parties (Europe and Asia) for the war.
To be continued ...
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