Honored pilot of the Russian Federation commented on the situation with a strike on the Boeing from the air defense system "Tor"

153

The most acute topic of recent days in the international information environment remains the topic of striking at Boeing 737 of Ukraine International Airlines (UIA). We are talking about striking a passenger airliner using missiles of the anti-aircraft complex "Tor" of the air defense unit of the IRGC of Iran.

At least, Iran itself recognized the fact of the strike, noting that the plane was shot down unintentionally. Iranian officials, recall, said that the air defense system operator confused the plane with a cruise missile in anticipation of a possible missile strike by the Americans.



"Military Review" asked the honored pilot of the Russian Federation, a member of the council of senior officers of the All-Russian organization "Officers of Russia", Yuri Skrynnik, to comment on the situation.

"IN":

Yuri Mikhailovich, in your opinion, the opinion of an experienced pilot, could the Iranian calculation of an anti-aircraft missile system confuse a newly-launched civilian airliner with a cruise missile?

Yuri Skrynnik believes that such a situation is possible in the case of jamming.

Honored Pilot of the Russian Federation:

If interference was caused, and the Americans could do it, for example, as a response to the Iranian missile bombardment of their military bases, then the mark of the complex operator could not be displayed as a specific aircraft, but as an unidentified flying object. If the aircraft transponder is working, then all information is displayed, including data on altitude and speed, on the flight number. Today, such information is automatically transmitted to specialized sites, where virtually everyone can track it. The operator has a table with flight data. But if interference was made, then the operator of the complex stopped receiving reliable information. Let's not forget that all this happened at a time when the Iranian air defense systems were brought to the highest degree of readiness. And therefore, any unidentified flying object could be perceived as a target, like the same American rocket. Unfortunately, under such conditions no one is safe from making a mistake. At one time, Ukraine shot down a Russian airliner over the Black Sea. During the exercises, the Ukrainian troops themselves used the electronic jamming system, which led to an attack on a passenger plane.
153 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. +25
    14 January 2020 17: 56
    "Yuri Skrynnik believes that such a situation is possible in the event of interference."
    And who caused these interference, I wonder ..
    " And therefore, any unidentified flying object could be perceived as a target, like the same American rocket. Unfortunately, in such conditions no one is safe from making a mistake At one time, Ukraine shot down a Russian airliner over the Black Sea. During the exercises, Ukrainian troops themselves used a radio-electronic jamming system, which led to an attack on a passenger plane.".
    Yes, this is understandable. Iran, unlike Ukraine, almost immediately recognized its mistake ...
    1. +21
      14 January 2020 18: 30
      If there was a planned provocation, and in my opinion, American ears stick out 200% there, anyone could broadcast the interference - from abandoned self-destructing transmitters to UAVs. By the way, there is a lot of evidence that there was an air object on the Tor-Boeing line.
      1. +39
        14 January 2020 19: 19
        Quote: Vlad.by
        If there was a planned provocation, and in my opinion, American ears stick out 200% there, anyone could broadcast the interference - from abandoned self-destructing transmitters to UAVs. By the way, there is a lot of evidence that there was an air object on the Tor-Boeing line.

        And there was a dude who appeared to be at the right time and right place, who was filming this particular board and video, by the way, the first to unveil the Americans ....
        1. +15
          14 January 2020 20: 04
          Quote: Vlad.by
          By the way, there is a lot of evidence that there was an air object on the Tor-Boeing line.

          Which object? UAV? And where does the data come from?
          Quote: Sayan
          And there was a dude who appeared to be at the right time and right place, who was filming this particular board and video, by the way, the first to unveil the Americans ....

          But this is a really interesting fact. From which badun, in the dead of night does a person remove a SPECIFIC section of the sky where the tragedy begins to unfold?
          1. +9
            14 January 2020 20: 44
            But this is a really interesting fact. From which badun, in the dead of night does a person remove a SPECIFIC section of the sky where the tragedy begins to unfold?

            And from what hangover appeared shooting starts KR from mobile phones? Really, what would it take to shoot the sky on such a night?
            1. +3
              14 January 2020 21: 15
              Apparently he had a fight with his wife, climbed onto the roof (he wanted to throw himself off) ... and there is the sky !!! Stars !!!! ..... and the plane is on fire .... "beauty" .... and changed my mind to throw myself down .... wassatstarted shooting.
          2. +9
            14 January 2020 21: 51
            by the way! it was no longer night, but a very 06.50h in the morning!
            but still, in a dark sky - waiting for this moment is very strange!
            1. +2
              15 January 2020 00: 17
              Well, after a military night I did not sleep, I saw something flying, not figuring out what exactly I started to shoot. Or, as an option, I saw a burning plane flying and photographed the hit of a second rocket.
  2. +9
    14 January 2020 17: 58
    Well, everything is clear with the Ukrainians. They interfered with themselves and set amI'm talking about Tu 154 brought down by them. And how are these interference being detected? Or is it like interference in the capital of Iran ... And so on. And it was only specifically there that there were hindrances to a specific air defense system. For Iran, were there still recorded the use of electronic warfare from outside? Question to the Iranian side ..
    1. +14
      14 January 2020 18: 28
      a hindrance to that and a hindrance that clogs the ether in the necessary spectra. It is possible to determine the direction of a point source, but the distance is no longer there, and if the grouping acted. hi here ...
    2. +5
      14 January 2020 19: 22
      Quote: Observer2014
      In Iran have been recorded yet the use of electronic warfare from outside? Question to the Iranian side ..


      If Americans used electronic warfare, do Iranians think about this modest fact they were silent? When all the more there is an opportunity to somehow justify oneself. It’s in vain that the Iranian leadership does not go to VO, Vzglyad and our other patriotic resources, because there are so many versions, and most of them are in defense of the Iranians.
      1. +2
        14 January 2020 19: 57
        Quote: Aleksandr21
        , and most in defense of the Iranians.

        no matter how - a situational ally.
      2. +5
        14 January 2020 22: 52
        I think that everything is much simpler - the transponder was switched to the mode broadcast incorrect information, or there was a jammer on board
  3. +4
    14 January 2020 18: 03
    Well, why not. At least it sounds more logical than the "blind and crooked" air defense operators of Iran.
  4. +6
    14 January 2020 18: 06
    Flightradar saw the mark correctly, but Iranian air defense did not.
    1. +1
      14 January 2020 18: 08
      The Americans did not send interference on Flightradar simply.
      1. -4
        14 January 2020 18: 14
        Flightradar collects data from a network of amateur SDR receivers for $ 8 a piece.
    2. +5
      14 January 2020 18: 59
      The air defense system (Air Defense) is starting to be a threat. This was announced on the air of the Moscow Talking radio station by Alexey Podberezkin, director of the Almaz-Antey air defense concern, where Buk anti-aircraft missile systems were developed.

      According to him, on the radar it is difficult to distinguish one plane from another, as well as a civilian side from a rocket. Podberezkin believes that more experienced people should be air defense operators, because much depends on the human factor.
      1. +3
        14 January 2020 19: 55
        Could you clarify what is the patronymic of Alexei Podberezkin? Let me clarify the question - there is Alexei Ivanovich Podberezkin, a military expert, who made reports at some conference of the Almaz-Antey JSC, but he is not the General Director of the concern.
        1. +1
          15 January 2020 00: 26
          in the press they represent him as
          Alexey Podberezkin, Head of the Center for Military-Political Studies of MGIMO and the Almaz-Antey Air Defense Concern

          taking into account the fact that there is JSC Concern EKO Almaz-Antey, and OJSC Concern PVO Almaz-Antey, it was called until 2015, the question arises: what kind of center is it that for five years did not notice that it was renamed?
          1. 0
            15 January 2020 01: 30
            At MGIMO. Here is his report:
            http://eurasian-defence.ru/?q=node/39610

            Boltology is beyond reason.
      2. +4
        14 January 2020 21: 17
        Changed the wording to "advisor to the CEO". Counselor biography:
        https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Подберёзкин,_Алексей_Иванович

        It is related to air defense, as I am to ballet. Those. does not have.
        1. +3
          15 January 2020 00: 40
          in fact, the honored pilot of the Russian Federation is the honorary title of a civil aviation pilot and it is not entirely clear how the expert in the article relates to air defense
          1. -2
            15 January 2020 01: 55
            I believe that the editorial board of VO has every right to publish and whom to invite as an expert.
            1. +4
              15 January 2020 08: 35
              You are absolutely right. And I, as a reader, can ask myself why this particular expert?
      3. +7
        14 January 2020 22: 15
        to distinguish a rocket from an airplane, even when exposed to interference - is it difficult?
        do not tell my slippers!
        these are tales for "dodgers" (who did not serve in the Army) and poor students (who did not study physics)!
        1. EPR missiles - 0,1 sq.m, Boeing-737 - 100 sq.m! Do not see the difference hundreds of times?
        2. takeoff aircraft speed: 350 .... 500km / h, cruise missile speed-700-800km / h 2 times difference!
        3. The plane flew with climb! the rocket flies either parallel to the ground or even dive!
        The operator, already by these signs, could and should have selected it.
      4. +1
        14 January 2020 22: 30
        And commentators here wrote that the false targets of the ADM-160A MALD are nonsense.
    3. +12
      14 January 2020 19: 13
      Quote: ender
      Flightradar saw the mark correctly, but Iranian air defense - not

      Well, why not. Flightradar operates at a frequency of 1090 MHz. Tor works at frequencies above 3 GHz. It is possible that there was something hanging out in the airport area and still interfered with the microwave. While the whole world on the fly radar saw everything that was allowed to it, Iranian air defense tried to land what was invisible to ordinary inhabitants.
      1. -9
        14 January 2020 19: 35
        Well, why only for the simple. there are also the most-most S-300 were

        it turns out there will no longer giggle over the concept of Stealth ..
      2. -2
        14 January 2020 19: 50
        Quote: BABAY22
        Well, why not. Flightradar operates at a frequency of 1090 MHz. Tor works at frequencies above 3 GHz.
        Not a flyradar operates at a frequency of 1090 MHz, but a civil transponder operates at a frequency of 1090 MHz. If Thor reads civilian transponders (to recheck this statement, by the way. It seems to me that not everything is so simple with him), then he does it at the same frequencies as the others, including the flyradar.
        1. +5
          14 January 2020 21: 40
          Let's dig into the words?
          Good. To score interference with a fly radar, it is necessary and sufficient to score a frequency of 1,09 GHz. So okay?
          Do you think that an ATC interrogator is on the TOR Iranian combat vehicle. It seems to me that such issues are solved by a couple of levels higher. It should be as stupid as a traffic jam "your own - not your own", it is not known the truth of what is there for "your" at the Iranian SSS, but clearly not NATO and the mod3 civilian respondent ATC regime does not understand.
  5. -1
    14 January 2020 18: 08
    The operator has a table with flight data.
    That is, it is assumed that when a target is detected, the operator looks at its flight number and (in case of successful reading) starts to check from the table whether the flight with this number should be in this area?
    1. +5
      14 January 2020 19: 38
      Do not forget that there was a flight delay, and quite possibly deliberate. And the drone could very well substitute the Ukrainian side for a missile like Israel our side in Syria. One wonders why Iran so quickly admitted its guilt before the investigation ended?
      1. 0
        14 January 2020 19: 42
        The version that the Ukrainian Boeing itself intentionally interfered with to be shot down by Iranian air defense is still more beautiful.
      2. -3
        14 January 2020 19: 58
        Iran officially stated: the flight was delayed due to baggage overload.
        More interestingly, two passengers, Ukrainian citizens who checked in and checked in their luggage, did not fly.

        Maybe there was an explosive in their baggage?
        1. +1
          15 January 2020 00: 55
          one of them, a Canadian, was simply not allowed on the flight - something is wrong with the issuance of tickets
          his wife flew without him. Wife died sad
          Mohsen Ahmadipour and his wife Roja Azadian
          Canadians, by last name, are of Iranian descent, like most Canadians on board
          via Kiev it was convenient to fly to Canada

          https://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/tehran-crash-last-minute-mixup-leaves-ottawa-man-in-terminal-while-his-wife-gets-aboard-doomed-flight
          both who did not get on board were not citizens of Ukraine
    2. +4
      14 January 2020 20: 22
      Quote: Vyacheslav Viktorovich
      The operator has a table with flight data.
      That is, it is assumed that when a target is detected, the operator looks at its flight number and (in case of successful reading) starts to check from the table whether the flight with this number should be in this area?

      In the case of the Ukrainian flight, there was also an hour delay of departure ...
    3. +2
      15 January 2020 00: 43
      I don't think so simple
      flight delay is a common occurrence in aviation, if you shot down every time, then you won’t get any planes
  6. +3
    14 January 2020 18: 09
    Yes, such things happen precisely because of
    // Yuri Skrynnik believes that such a situation is possible in the case of jamming.//
    I agree. But one must understand that these are not teachings ... crying
  7. +2
    14 January 2020 18: 09
    I am more and more inclined to the version about the air defense operator recruited by enemies. As a confirmation of this version, shooting by an unidentified operator can also hit missiles in an airplane in the night sky. Why should I shoot an empty sky on video at night? By the way - from my hand this tragic moment seems to me not removed.
    1. +2
      14 January 2020 20: 14
      Quote: gurzuf
      I am more and more inclined to the version about the air defense operator recruited by enemies.

      Well then, just the calculation.
  8. -4
    14 January 2020 18: 10
    Did the transponder work?
    1. +2
      14 January 2020 19: 27
      Quote: knn54
      Did the transponder work?


      He worked until the rocket hit the cockpit. Monitoring tools (for example, the same Flightradar) recorded the signal, and the pilots had communication with the controllers, and after the hit, of course, everything turned off.
  9. +3
    14 January 2020 18: 11
    Shock, clean water, and most importantly, notice how strange the US behaved .. They didn’t even respond to Iran’s rocket fire and most importantly, the US Congress forbade Donald to do anything against Iran without their knowledge ..
    And who in the US Congress basically, I think everyone knows ..
  10. +9
    14 January 2020 18: 13
    Quote: ender
    Flightradar saw the mark correctly, but Iranian air defense did not.

    Flight radar is not a radar, it is a site where track records are sent.
    1. +6
      14 January 2020 18: 19
      it's not recordings, but real-time data from ADS-B receivers
      1. 0
        14 January 2020 19: 58
        And where is the data from the missing Boeing in the Indian Ocean?
        1. +1
          15 January 2020 00: 59
          perhaps for some time flew out of range of receivers.
          real-time data from receivers
  11. +21
    14 January 2020 18: 15
    Or maybe it's still worth asking about the work of air defense, not the pilots, but the appropriate specialists? Well, it turns out funny ...
    If interference was caused, and the Americans could do it, for example, as a response to the Iranian missile bombardment of their military bases, then the mark of the complex operator could not be displayed as a specific aircraft, but as an unidentified flying object.

    - we look carefully at the map, measure the distance from Tehran to the nearest point on the border, from where the Americans could interfere - and we forget this nuclear nonsense forever.

    ... the label of the operator of the complex could not be displayed as a specific aircraft, but as an unidentified flying object. If the aircraft transponder is working, then all information is displayed, including data on altitude and flight speed, flight number ...

    - this is the TOP. There is nothing of the kind there. Such functionality is available at air defense command posts with which the installation did not have a connection.

    If the aircraft transponder is working, then all information is displayed, including data on altitude and speed, on the flight number. Today, such information is automatically transmitted to specialized sites, where virtually everyone can track it.

    - the character asks the operator to put a laptop at his workplace and open the Flytradar website on it with a premium subscription? But...

    By the way, the presence of a transponder does not guarantee that the target is a civilian aircraft. Civil transponders work with transponders. Which transmit respectively. information to the military.
    But the military deals only with its state system of state recognition.
    1. +11
      14 January 2020 19: 12
      Quote: Mik13
      Or maybe it's still worth asking about the work of air defense, not the pilots, but the appropriate specialists? Well, it turns out funny ...

      I am 100% subscribing to your opinion: with all the respect, there are a lot of titles, but how does he know about interference, is this something taught from civilians?
      It is better to wait for air defense officers and signalmen, although there seems to be a problem in organizing the process of combat control, well, amers 'thank' say
      Quote: Mik13
      the presence of a transponder does not guarantee that the target is a civilian aircraft. Civil transponders work with transponders. But the military deals only with its state system of state recognition.

      A transponder is not a state recognition system at all, from a word at all.

      There is somewhere a problem in coordinating actions and transmitting civil information to the military
      1. +4
        14 January 2020 21: 50
        The transponder is needed by the tower controllers and, basically, the zonal centers (they are responsible so that the planes do not collide in the air).
        The transponder is needed so that on an ordinary radar you can see at what direction it flies, who flies (board number, type of board), where and where ... They do not have encryption, it's just all the available warning device ..
    2. 0
      14 January 2020 20: 13
      Quote: Mik13
      the nearest point on the border, from where the Americans could interfere - and forget this nuclear nonsense forever.

      But is it possible to put interference "manually", so to speak, whatever a small portable device or a device installed on a car (say, with a range of a kilometer - half a tar)?
      1. +4
        14 January 2020 20: 18
        is it possible to put interference "manually"

        Possible.
        There are even disposable throw-away jammers.
        With normal counteraction, they must be detected and destroyed.
        1. +3
          14 January 2020 20: 21
          add a "bystander" and something is already emerging
      2. +1
        15 January 2020 01: 03
        it is unlikely that such a device would be discovered very quickly, especially since it should be close so that there is direct radio visibility between Thor standing on the ground and the device itself
  12. +7
    14 January 2020 18: 20
    Let the investigation understand. There, the most complete information is collected from everywhere.
    Nothing to guess ...
  13. +1
    14 January 2020 18: 21
    Quote: Mik13
    Or maybe it's still worth asking about the work of air defense, not the pilots, but the appropriate specialists? Well, it turns out funny ...
    If interference was caused, and the Americans could do it, for example, as a response to the Iranian missile bombardment of their military bases, then the mark of the complex operator could not be displayed as a specific aircraft, but as an unidentified flying object.

    - we look carefully at the map, measure the distance from Tehran to the nearest point on the border, from where the Americans could interfere - and we forget this nuclear nonsense forever.

    ... the label of the operator of the complex could not be displayed as a specific aircraft, but as an unidentified flying object. If the aircraft transponder is working, then all information is displayed, including data on altitude and flight speed, flight number ...

    - this is the TOP. There is nothing of the kind there. Such functionality is available at air defense command posts with which the installation did not have a connection.

    If the aircraft transponder is working, then all information is displayed, including data on altitude and speed, on the flight number. Today, such information is automatically transmitted to specialized sites, where virtually everyone can track it.

    - the character asks the operator to put a laptop at his workplace and open the Flytradar website on it with a premium subscription? But...

    By the way, the presence of a transponder does not guarantee that the target is a civilian aircraft. Civil transponders work with transponders. Which transmit respectively. information to the military.
    But the military deals only with its state system of state recognition.

    Actually, the point is that an operator (one’s not someone else’s) can make such a mistake only in the case of jamming. How to do it technically is another matter.
    1. +7
      14 January 2020 18: 24
      and the interference, presumably, was point. They did not affect the operation of airport services, but only the operator of one air defense system.
      1. 0
        14 January 2020 18: 43
        Quote: ender
        and the interference, presumably, was point. They did not affect the operation of airport services, but only the operator of one air defense system.


        I agree, if you interfere with the Iranian border closest to the airport, then the labels of all the transponders that were in the air at that moment will disappear. It is most likely that interference is in place in the immediate vicinity of the ASEZ. Then it’s clear why they were able to capture the moment when the plane crashed so well — they knew where the target was flying from and where the rocket was flying from. There are enough agents of many intelligence services in Iran, but I think for some reason that it was not without Isailites.
        1. 0
          14 January 2020 20: 10
          "They are not there .." And what about the Israelis right away? Just a little - just the Israelis. You talk to them, my friend. Is that what they want? Iran is not a half-nailed Assad, who can be bombed with almost impunity, emerging at an ultra-low altitude from behind the Golan. Iran, in the event of hostile actions, can respond in such a way that Tel Aviv will be in big trouble. Is this what Nitanyahu needs?
          1. +1
            14 January 2020 20: 19
            Quote: gregoryivanov
            "They are not there .." And what about the Israelis right away? Iran is not a half-beaten Assad, which can be bombed with almost impunity, emerging at an ultra-low altitude from behind the Golan.


            So they emerge there for some reason? Pralno, in order to bomb the Iranian SSO forces operating in the SAR. And although everyone knows that they are not there - the Israelites find them there again and again and ruthlessly suppress, but here such an incident turned up to compromise Iran and curry favor with the Americans.

            Eh ... you can feel the outrageous Jewish lawyer daring in you!
            Or IDF cadet? lol (joke)
            1. 0
              14 January 2020 20: 29
              Offend. Mossad, however! laughing
              1. 0
                14 January 2020 20: 39
                Quote: gregoryivanov
                Offend. Mossad, however! laughing


                I apologize, my respect. hi
                Just thought Mossad does not advertise its existence wink
                1. +1
                  20 January 2020 11: 35
                  What an exception you will not make for a good person ... hi wassat
    2. +5
      14 January 2020 19: 15
      Quote: Shahno
      the point is that an operator (one’s not someone else’s) can make such a mistake only in the case of jamming. How to do it technically is another matter.

      It is more likely that the particular operator did not have information about civil traffic at all. Generally ... these are problems of management and communication
      1. +3
        14 January 2020 20: 40
        At a press conference, Amir Ali Hajizadeh said that the air defense crew that shot down the plane was deployed to strengthen the air defense ring around Tehran, along with equipment from another area.
        1. +4
          14 January 2020 21: 43
          Quote: asv363
          the air defense calculation that shot down the aircraft was deployed to strengthen the air defense ring around Tehran along with equipment from another area.

          In truth, I assumed that they were in a constant position there, like a research center there. But when I read about the transfer - it explains a lot - the calculation was transferred, but they did not manage to equip the position
          1. +1
            14 January 2020 23: 49
            It was necessary to strengthen the security of the center near Tehran - that’s what they threw. Simultaneously with the center (it is west of Tehran), an additional cover of the city was obtained from the expected retaliatory attacks of the United States.
            1. +6
              15 January 2020 00: 46
              The logic of the Iranians is fully understood. Sluggishness in position equipment and general wrap situations and led to such sad consequences. And as a colleague says
              Quote: antiaircrafter
              lack of combat control and target designation.
              What I completely agree with him.
              It's rubbish and I can imagine how many people went through exit schemes that day and now they have to put candles ..
    3. +3
      14 January 2020 20: 21
      Actually, the point is that an operator (one’s not someone else’s) can make such a mistake only in the case of jamming.

      And also in the absence of combat control and target designation.
      1. +5
        14 January 2020 21: 40
        Quote: antiaircrafter
        in the absence of combat control and target designation.

        Well, it seems to me that this is the main reason for the tragedy, well, if you don’t remember about the arousing of the situation by amers.
        Nick you are very evil recourse
    4. +3
      15 January 2020 01: 04
      interference to what? if the radar of the TOP, then he would simply not see the target, if the communications, then the interference should have affected the communications in the entire district
  14. +9
    14 January 2020 18: 25
    Understood nothing. The expert claims that the Ukrainian Boeing could intentionally interfere with Iran’s air defense knocking it down?
    1. +3
      14 January 2020 18: 31
      So far, this is the most beautiful of all the advanced versions. Lois.
    2. +1
      15 January 2020 01: 05
      here questions arise already on the word "expert".
      he is a civilian pilot in the past
  15. +14
    14 January 2020 18: 27
    Why, the pilot, and not the anti-aircraft gunner, comments on this situation? And to compare this situation with the situation over the Black Sea is not correct. There, the C200 rocket redirected toward a larger target
    1. +2
      14 January 2020 19: 09
      hi With the tongue removed, you
  16. +1
    14 January 2020 18: 30
    Quote: ender
    and the interference, presumably, was point. They did not affect the operation of airport services, but only the operator of one air defense system.

    Well, who did this? No?
    It could be someone on board the liner. Or someone .. Suicide bomber?
  17. +2
    14 January 2020 18: 38
    But the director Almaz-Antey says that at our complexes horseradish you can distinguish a plane from a rocket, and no interference is necessary. It all depends on the curvature of the operator.
    But nobody is interested in his interview request
    1. +3
      14 January 2020 20: 20
      Nonsense is complete. Yes, the mark on the radar screen is the same point on the screen as from a Boeing, from a rocket, no figures of an airplane or a rocket are drawn there. But ... The signature from the huge Boeing and from the much smaller cruise missile is not comparable - the effective dispersion surface differs like an elephant from a fly. But, if the operator expects an attack at any second, then due to a great nervous strain, he can forget about it and make a tragic mistake.
    2. +5
      14 January 2020 20: 39
      The director is not an authority, he is a protege, manager) must be able to sign in the specified place on the documents. Still, "a monkey with a grenade"
      Radar development engineer Andrei Gorbachevsky: the incredible mistake of Iranian missiles can only be explained by fear of a US attack

      EXPERT CARD


      Radar engineer, engineer Andrei Gorbachevsky
      Andrey Gorbachevsky, engineer, radar developer. After graduating from Fiztekh (1973) he worked all his life in the defense industry. He developed radars for anti-aircraft missile systems, began with shipborne systems, and then moved to the Research Institute of Aviation Systems (now GosNIIAS). Head of the Strategic Aviation Defense Sector

      - Andrei Alekseevich, Iran actually blamed “American adventurism” for the downed plane: they say, they were preparing to repulse the blow. What is the connection between the expectation of a strike and an attack on a civilian plane in Ukraine?

      - This is a purely political statement: Iran wants to hide the degree of collapse of its air defense. Because I will not remember a more serious mistake in the history of air defense.

      The flight of Ukrainian Airlines from Tehran was regular. All scheduled flights in the country's air defense system are recorded. Air defense crew commander compares the received mark of the target with marks that should go on schedule. At a certain time, the plane takes off from the airport - and the commander of the SAM system knows: this is such a flight.

      - The Ukrainian plane took off with a delay of about an hour.

      “It doesn’t matter, the message to the commander should have been received anyway.” But the point is not even in the schedule. The plane took off from a civilian airfield and went along a standard highway. A passenger plane cannot fly anyhow, it goes along a dedicated corridor. The commander of the air defense system’s crew must see that the target is in the corridor allocated for passenger aircraft. This alone should show him: before him is not some American drone, but a civilian airliner.

      Next - the plane took off. At a certain height, he gains a certain speed. The crew commander immediately correlates: if the target goes at such a height and at such a speed, then it is most likely civilian.

      - In addition, transponders are on passenger planes.

      - Mandatory. And on the air defense system is a state recognition system - such a "requestor" of data from this transponder. And she had to recognize the plane as a civilian. But Iran may have its own state recognition system, different from the standard NATO one. That is, Iran could create for itself a special system that does not coincide in frequency with NATO.

      - What for?

      - So that the enemy could not interfere with their system with interference.

      - Just one of the versions is that they did not recognize the passenger plane due to interference. It turns out that there could be no interference?

      - I can’t say exactly what state recognition system is in Iran. But, for example, in Russia such a system for military aircraft differs from NATO. Therefore, in addition to our own system, we put a second one, which reads the data of civilian aircraft. So it was accepted back in the Soviet Union, when we did everything differently than in NATO. And what was there with the state recognition system when we delivered Tor air defense systems to Iran? The Iranians could well put some of their own.

      - But you have already mentioned other degrees of protection, in addition to the state recognition system.

      - That's right. Therefore, I can only repeat that the mistake is gross. Incredible.

      A terrible mistake or a “monkey with a grenade”? Radar development engineer - about why the attack could not be the reason for the fall of the Boeing near Tehran
      - And yet, since they still haven’t fired on each aircraft, the Iranians have some kind of system. Why didn’t she block the launch of the rocket?

      - This may indicate some kind of malfunction. This means that the Iranians do not have service personnel who would monitor the status of all air defense systems.

      - But there are probably Russian instructors there too?

      - How do Russian instructors work - you saw it when the Syrians shot down the IL-20. It was also a gross mistake, although still less gross than in this case.

      - Iran claims that the passenger Boeing was mistaken for a US cruise missile. Can they be mixed up at all?

      - No one could confuse a passenger plane with a cruise missile under any circumstances. Unless it was just a monkey with a grenade, but a drunk monkey with a grenade.

      This means that Iran no longer knows what to lie.

      At the Tor air defense system, as I told you last time, there are two locators. One is a panoramic one that rotates continuously and captures everything that flies around. When the plane took off from the airfield, the survey locator saw it in twenty seconds. And then all the while the plane flew, all six minutes, on the screen of the surveillance radar was the track. That is, from the very beginning of the flight it was clear where the target flew from.

      “Did they see the cruise missile launched from a civilian airfield?”

      - Of course. While only the survey locator was working, one would still think that something military was flying next to a civilian plane. But then the missile guidance locator turns on. The missile is aimed at the target by a very narrow beam, of the order of one degree wide. He distinguishes everything so well that there can already be no mistake. The probability that not only a civilian aircraft, but also something else military will fall into this beam is zero.

      The crew commander also evaluates the signal strength from the target by the magnitude of the mark: a large target or a small one. The indicators show a bright mark or dim. Simply put, the commander should have seen something big fly. From a large passenger plane, the mark will be ten times brighter than from a military target. And the size of a cruise missile is from a small airplane. And she has a very low reflected power. The brightness of this point is no longer ten, but a hundred times less than that of an airplane. And a rocket flies so that it is not noticed, at a very low altitude, these are tens of meters. And the Iranians shot down a huge plane flying at an altitude of 2400 meters. How can this be confused? The difference is where to direct the beam: up to the sky or down along the earth.

      - You have listed so many degrees of protection against a fool that I will repeat the question that you answered the last time. Maybe the plane was shot down all the same intentionally?

      - It's impossible. It is too likely that it will be installed very quickly. In addition to satellite data and other things, there are also wreckage of the aircraft. And according to them, the “handwriting” will be set to 100 percent: each rocket has its own damaging elements. Notches are made on the bomb so that it explodes into pieces during an explosion. And because of these notches, all the pieces are the same.


      A delegation of Ukrainian experts was allowed by Iran to the scene of the tragedy, and after Iran officially recognized the destruction of the Boeing, footage was published with characteristic damage to the liner’s body by the striking elements of the rocket. Photo: Office of the President of Ukraine
      - In the story with MH17, this is how the Buk was identified.

      “And here, in exactly the same way, the Thor would be identified by the wreckage.”

      - Maybe Iran was counting on not letting anyone into the wreckage?

      - At first, they had such tactics. Moreover: they announced that the "black boxes" themselves will decrypt.

      But the matter is not only in the wreckage. They launched two rockets. As far as I know, this is done only when it is necessary to guaranteedly hit a military target.

      Nobody will launch two missiles on a civilian plane; one would destroy it. Because a military aircraft is smaller, besides it maneuvers, it can evade, it is easier to miss on it. A civilian flies like an iron, you can’t miss it. And two missiles - it means more likely that someone will detect a launch.

      And then, how do you explain that it was the Ukrainian plane that was shot down? Ukraine has nothing to do with it. She could even be said to have been helping Iran in some way by selling old Soviet weapons. And almost all the passengers on this plane were Iranians. Even the citizens of Canada - these were Iranian students with Canadian citizenship. No, the Iranians were just so scared of a possible American raid that they did not see anything, but simply took and hit.
    3. +2
      14 January 2020 22: 40
      There was no interview with director Almaz-Antey. Now they write that the interview was given by his adviser. The adviser’s biography does not indicate the presence of professional knowledge of air defense from the word:
      https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Подберёзкин,_Алексей_Иванович
  18. +2
    14 January 2020 18: 42
    Quote: ender
    it's not recordings, but real-time data from ADS-B receivers
    ... which are collected by amateurs and broadcast in the form of a dynamic map with recording of tracks.
    And where is the radar?
    1. +1
      14 January 2020 19: 03
      Formally, receiving signals from transponders is a semi-active secondary radar.
      1. +2
        14 January 2020 23: 22
        Well, we understand that these are generally different things and there are no radars there, there is only passive reception of packets with information in which the data of the self-location on the ZhPS are already recorded.
    2. 0
      15 January 2020 01: 12
      as a dynamic map with recording tracks

      tracks are formed already on the resource flyar radar
      receivers through volunteer computers simply transmit information in real time
  19. +1
    14 January 2020 18: 48
    Quote: sledak
    Quote: ender
    and the interference, presumably, was point. They did not affect the operation of airport services, but only the operator of one air defense system.


    I agree, if you interfere with the Iranian border closest to the airport, then the labels of all the transponders that were in the air at that moment will disappear. It is most likely that interference is in place in the immediate vicinity of the ASEZ. Then it’s clear why they were able to capture the moment when the plane crashed so well — they knew where the target was flying from and where the rocket was flying from. There are enough agents of many intelligence services in Iran, but I think for some reason that it was not without Isailites.

    So the Saudis have a clear interest.
  20. +3
    14 January 2020 18: 52
    Quote: Mik13
    - we look carefully at the map, measure the distance from Tehran to the nearest point on the border, from where the Americans could interfere - and we forget this nuclear nonsense forever.

    The nearest point is approximately 460 km. And it is possible to interfere at such a distance, and so narrowly targeted. And what, nothing else in this zone was affected by interference?
    1. +2
      14 January 2020 19: 07
      Quote: Old26
      The nearest point is approximately 460 km. And it is possible to interfere at such a distance, and so narrowly targeted.

      I’m even in some difficulty ... If you are an expert in the field of electronic warfare, can you google yourself on the word "radio horizon"?
      But at the same time, it is possible to calculate what power is needed so that interference delivered from a distance of 400 km makes it impossible to receive a signal from an aircraft transponder from a distance of approx. 10 km
  21. +1
    14 January 2020 18: 53
    Quote: sledak
    Quote: ender
    and the interference, presumably, was point. They did not affect the operation of airport services, but only the operator of one air defense system.


    I agree, if you interfere with the Iranian border closest to the airport, then the labels of all the transponders that were in the air at that moment will disappear. It is most likely that interference is in place in the immediate vicinity of the ASEZ. Then it’s clear why they were able to capture the moment when the plane crashed so well — they knew where the target was flying from and where the rocket was flying from. There are enough agents of many intelligence services in Iran, but I think for some reason that it was not without Isailites.

    Not done ...
    Explored.
    Technique and people, well, unlikely.
  22. 0
    14 January 2020 18: 53
    I wonder how America distinguishes civilian aircraft from cruise missiles. They send an iron man for a visual inspection?
    1. The comment was deleted.
  23. +2
    14 January 2020 19: 06
    Quote: Crane
    The air defense system (Air Defense) is starting to be a threat. This was announced on the air of the Moscow Talking radio station by Alexey Podberezkin, director of the Almaz-Antey air defense concern, where Buk anti-aircraft missile systems were developed.

    According to him, on the radar it is difficult to distinguish one plane from another, as well as a civilian side from a rocket. Podberezkin believes that more experienced people should be air defense operators, because much depends on the human factor.

    Charming .This is a sensation. Of course, the operator must have a high level of training.
  24. +6
    14 January 2020 19: 07
    I personally haven’t seen such a thing in my life, it turns out that interference can significantly reduce the ESR of a lithak to mislead the air defense system operators. New not only in radar but also in fundamental physics. we do, the enemy relaxes and then he has it! steam locomotive
    1. +3
      14 January 2020 20: 45
      it turns out that interference can significantly reduce the ESR of a lithak in order to mislead the air defense system operators. New not only in radar but also in fundamental physics.

      Hm! And if vice versa? Can we increase the EPR of a rocket to a lithac and screw a transpoder to it? After all, there was a delay with a departure ...
      Well, just imagine ... So someone took the transponder signal for a specific flight, then called and said that the board was mined .... The aircraft stays on the ground, and in its time a missile with an increased EPR is sawing and signaling the desired signal ...
      1. +3
        15 January 2020 01: 15
        his course, it means she had to fly out of Tehran airport
        1. 0
          15 January 2020 10: 03
          his course, it means she had to fly out of Tehran airport

          Sergey.
          Well, this is not specifics, but fantasies.
          That is, technically it is possible to replace the board with a rocket? Then she can fly at the airport. And the air defense misses it.
          1. +1
            15 January 2020 10: 17
            Technically possible, of course
            Artificially increasing the ESR of a rocket is much easier than decreasing it, that is, it is impossible to get a rocket from a Boeing on the radar screen, but on the contrary it is not difficult to launch it along the international route instead of a scheduled airplane, having previously provided it with a relay option to respond to the dispatcher, otherwise it’s here he’ll make a noise to the crew, if the board doesn’t answer (note, the Boeing did shoot an isolated autonomous air defense of a specific object, and there’s another one that Tehran covers, it’s the dispatchers who report there if there is any doubt) they are led along the tracks , and ensure the execution of dispatcher commands. If necessary, he can also delay landing if the lanes are busy, for example, then you need to go into the waiting area, fly in circles, wait in line.
            So it is theoretically possible, but practically unrealistic, unless in a real Flight airplane explosives instead of baggage and a suicide bomber at the helm.
            1. 0
              15 January 2020 11: 29
              theoretically possible, but practically unrealistic,

              But why? It is quite possible to remove the signal from the transpoder when testing systems before departure.

              having previously provided him with the ability to relay in order to respond to the dispatcher,

              If you can stick a transcoder, then you can and the transmitter. Screw a cell phone to it and let the dispatcher communicate with the operator who is leading the rocket. Reorganization according to the course and the train he will be able to perform.
              Well, the start is due to the cordon and this rocket enters the zone already in the corridor.
              And the final section does not bother us at all - they will sort it out for three minutes. Where will she be in three minutes? winked
              And if it is aimed at the airport
              , then in the waiting area she does not need.
              So this option is quite possible. And then it will be complete .... ahedron.
              1. +1
                15 January 2020 12: 26
                Well, I can push- theoretically
                and in practice, the rocket is not very adapted to this
                where are you this transmitter - screw the additional receiver, and not simple, but so that it works like a repeater for 500 km without problems?
                And all the rest?
                and we are talking about a single rocket, the meaning of the city fence because of one single rocket ?.
                1. 0
                  15 January 2020 12: 33
                  we are talking about a single rocket, the meaning of the city fence because of one single rocket ?.

                  This is the straw that breaks the back of a camel.
                  If even one missile passes this way, then you have to take action. A bunch of measures. Reconfigure the entire system. Imagine what will happen in Heathrow, Reykjavik, Delhi, Kennedy .... This is the civil segment. And the military will drop at the slightest doubt ....
                  1. 0
                    15 January 2020 13: 08
                    Rather, the inventor of such an idea will have big problems, to take up arms against him not only at Heathrow, but also at Sheremetyevo and others.
                    At one time, the pilots union categorically insisted on the extradition to the USSR of hijackers of planes, and this would affect everyone even more.
                    1. 0
                      15 January 2020 18: 07
                      Rather, the inventor of such an idea will have big problems,

                      More precisely, the operator - director, and then only.
                      And you can write many different scripts. winked
            2. 0
              16 January 2020 12: 58
              EPR then increase very simply. This has been implemented a long time ago, installed on the CR in addition to the Lunenberg warhead lens, a ball of 20-25 cm in diameter, gives an EPR of 10 squares in the range of the air defense radar. Such CDs are part of strategic weapons systems, used as tricks and imitators.
  25. +1
    14 January 2020 19: 16
    Quote: Mik13
    Quote: Old26
    The nearest point is approximately 460 km. And it is possible to interfere at such a distance, and so narrowly targeted.

    I’m even in some difficulty ... If you are an expert in the field of electronic warfare, can you google yourself on the word "radio horizon"?
    But at the same time, it is possible to calculate what power is needed so that interference delivered from a distance of 400 km makes it impossible to receive a signal from an aircraft transponder from a distance of approx. 10 km

    Oh by the way. What power is needed to disorient a torus-type radar? And at what distance should the intruder be, and whether he must be on the ground. From the target, from the radar. You see what I mean. Well, let's say we have data on the bands and frequencies. Well, they got it somehow ...
  26. +2
    14 January 2020 19: 20
    Quote: Pete Mitchell
    Quote: Shahno
    the point is that an operator (one’s not someone else’s) can make such a mistake only in the case of jamming. How to do it technically is another matter.

    It is more likely that the particular operator did not have information about civil traffic at all. Generally ... these are problems of management and communication

    The strange concept of actually maximum combat readiness, do not find.
    And before this, airspace is not closed. sad
  27. +1
    14 January 2020 19: 35
    Quote: Mik13
    I’m even in some difficulty ... If you are an expert in the field of electronic warfare, can you google yourself on the word "radio horizon"?
    But at the same time, it is possible to calculate what power is needed so that interference delivered from a distance of 400 km makes it impossible to receive a signal from an aircraft transponder from a distance of approx. 10 km

    I am not an EW specialist. The flight altitude for an aircraft with an electronic warfare system, which could produce such interference at a distance of 500 km, should be about 14,6 km. In order for the radar to be in "line of sight".

    Quote: Mik13
    But at the same time, it is possible to calculate what power is needed so that interference delivered from a distance of 400 km makes it impossible to receive a signal from an aircraft transponder from a distance of approx. 10 km

    I can’t calculate this, I don’t know how, and the distance is probably better to take 500 km. But I think big ...

    Quote: O. Bender
    I personally haven’t seen such a thing in my life, it turns out that interference can significantly reduce the ESR of a lithak to mislead the air defense system operators. New not only in radar but also in fundamental physics. we do, the enemy relaxes and then he has it! steam locomotive

    laughing good

    Quote: Crane
    The air defense system (Air Defense) is starting to be a threat. This was announced on the air of the Moscow Talking radio station by Alexey Podberezkin, director of the Almaz-Antey air defense concern, where Buk anti-aircraft missile systems were developed.

    According to him, on the radar it is difficult to distinguish one plane from another, as well as a civilian side from a rocket. Podberezkin believes that more experienced people should be air defense operators, because much depends on the human factor.

    The director of the concern claims that it is difficult to distinguish, but for some reason, the locators do, contrary to his opinion. How many scans were in the network after the death of our IL in Syria, where scans from the screen showed the difference between the mark from the fighter and the "comb" of the IL. Well, the difference between the RCS of the rocket differs from the RCS of Boeing by tens, if not hundreds of times.
    1. +3
      14 January 2020 19: 41
      Forgive the rams who do not understand anything in air defense. Interference can reduce the target detection range, induce false targets, but not reduce the reflected signal in any way.
    2. +1
      14 January 2020 23: 26
      Quote: Old26
      The director of the concern claims that it is difficult to distinguish, and the locators for some reason, contrary to his opinion, are distinguished.

      There was no interview with the General Director of Almaz-Antey. Journalists changed their shoes in a jump and write that his advisor gave the interview. In the biography of the adviser there is not a word about the connection with the air defense, he is a graduate of MGIMO:
      https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Подберёзкин,_Алексей_Иванович
  28. +2
    14 January 2020 19: 39
    To set up such an interference, a jammer must fly near Iran, and, as I understand it, there wasn’t any interference from the ground. If interference were to be made, then the airfield radars would be blinded. It is impossible to confuse the plane with the Kyrgyz Republic, especially on the Torah.
  29. -2
    14 January 2020 19: 56
    It is high time for us to equip passenger liners with anti-aircraft radar sensors and an automatic heat trap firing machine. First of all, this must be done for aircraft with air routes over rogue countries, countries under sanctions, or countries sponsoring terrorism. And to cover such airlines with military aircraft - in order to immediately strike at the place of launching anti-aircraft missiles.
    1. 0
      14 January 2020 20: 41
      Isn't it necessary to equip all passenger seats with ejection devices and parachutes? Don't talk nonsense, my friend. The dispatcher just needs to "close the sky" in a timely manner in the combat zone, and not fly where they are fighting.
    2. +1
      14 January 2020 20: 44
      At the Vesti FM radio station, a representative of the El Al company specializing in flight safety once spoke. Of course, I didn’t say anything about this, but I hinted that there is a similar system on their planes.
      In general, such situations are solved by the prohibition of flights over a dangerous territory. Because To hang such a system on every aircraft is too expensive a pleasure. And in 99,9999 .....% of cases, it flies off the entire life of the aircraft with dead weight.
    3. 0
      15 January 2020 01: 19
      in this case, a heat trap would not help
      TOR radio command guidance, not IR
  30. -1
    14 January 2020 20: 00
    In short, everything is clear. This was done by the Americans, they are to blame for everything .. In general, we disagree .. Nothing new.
    1. +1
      14 January 2020 20: 46
      Well, why only Americans? There are still Israelis trying to suck out a finger. They are trying to pull the chain of tragic events like a condom on a cactus, no more no less than on a worldwide conspiracy of Masons.
  31. +4
    14 January 2020 20: 09
    Honored Pilot commented .....
    Was there a noble air defense worker for comment?

    If the aircraft transponder is working, then all information is displayed, including data on altitude and speed, on the flight number. Today, such information is automatically transmitted to specialized sites, where virtually everyone can track it.


    From which transponder is the data transmitted to the air defense complex of the divisional level? The maximum that he has is a friend or foe recognition system.
    Which operator of the air defense complex has access to "special sites"? And where did he get the time to collect information from them and analyze it?
    And of course, you should try to mix up civilian bast shoes with a cruise missile. Even in the face of interference.
  32. +12
    14 January 2020 20: 27
    How many did not look for in the lists of Honored Pilots of Russia a name Skrynnik Yuri Miikhailovich, and did not find. But found Sytnik Yu.M. Which is still a civilian pilot. And his knowledge of the army, and even more so about air defense air defense, is clearly literary and artistic. For any air defense officer knows that only a complex can shoot a missile inside the country’s territory by special order from above.
    As a person who served in the air defense system, I can say this at any level. I have the honor to assume that such an order was issued by the IRGC command, and it was called as a response to Trump's statement about launching missile strikes on 52 targets in Iran. The IRGC command understood that the objects controlled by the IRGC were in the very first places on this list. Therefore, the order could be as follows: "Shoot down all aircraft approaching a distance of NN km to the protected object." At the same time, the command of the IRGC was obliged to go to the country's leadership with the argumentation of the ban on flights over the country. I believe that such an action was taken by the IRGC, but did not receive support from the country's Supreme Power.
    Now the main question. Why did the ZR complex fire? I have only two sound assumptions.
    1. At the complex, the interrogator rendered "friend or foe", so they did not see the transponder response ..
    2. The transponder response was seen, but the order to fire was requested from the higher command. And they ran into the cunning ... the answer made in the style of Gorbachev's arrival of Rust: "To act in accordance with the previously received order!"
    They executed the order.
    My Summary: Iran’s air defense, as a country as a whole, needs serious revision. However, this is hindered by the Supreme Government’s distrust of the IRGC forces. I don’t know how to fix this. But with a high degree of certainty I can assume a repeat of the incident in a similar situation for Iran.
    Best regards, hi
    1. +6
      14 January 2020 20: 50
      1. At the complex, the interrogator rendered "friend or foe", so they did not see the transponder response ..

      No transponders see the friend or foe system.
      The ground-based radar interrogator of the air defense system only sees the response of the defendant of the aircraft. There is no such defendant on any foreign aircraft and cannot be.
      The head of the calculation of a specific air defense system can independently fire at a target only if it is in the sector of its responsibility, while it is low-flying or suddenly appeared. Or if there is a team to blame everything that flew into the sector of responsibility, then he finally can not care and transponders and identification systems.
      Any other target is fired only at the command of a higher headquarters. Of course, with a connection. Theoretically, the lack of communication may also be an occasion to make an independent decision to fire.
      1. +1
        14 January 2020 21: 14
        Thanks for the answer. However, the question still hangs: "Why did this complex not fill up anyone a day or two before?" So on the day of the shooting down, the order was still there?!?
        And yes, I’m ready to admit my complete ignorance of the relationship between the air defense missile defense system and the transponder, for I finished my service on the S-125 in 1980, when no one could imagine the word TRANSPENDER throughout the USSR . To this I add that I am extremely interested in clarifying for myself two questions:
        1. SAM is absolutely "deaf and blind" to the transponder?!? So where can he get information about civilian aircraft in his sector of responsibility ??
        2. A foreign civilian plane departs from the country (in this case, the Ukrainian one from Iran). It is clear to the goat that there is no (and cannot be !!!) the defendant of the country from which it flies. So what - to "bring down" it?
        1. +4
          14 January 2020 21: 26
          Quote: K-36
          Why didn’t this complex overwhelm anyone a day or two before?

          The options from the sea from - it was not at all in position at that time before - no one flew into the sector of responsibility.
          Although, in my opinion, the airport area should have been in the forbidden shooting sector.
          Quote: K-36
          SAM is absolutely "deaf and blind" to the transponder?!? So where can he get information about civilian aircraft in his sector of responsibility ??

          Yes, absolutely "deaf and blind to the transponder".
          Nowhere. Under normal conditions, civilian sides should not be in the zone of its operation. All information - data of own radar and target designation from a superior.
          Quote: K-36
          So what - to "bring down" it?

          If there is an order, yes.
          1. +1
            14 January 2020 21: 59
            Nowhere. Under normal conditions, civilian sides should not be in the zone of its operation. All information - data of own radar and target designation from a superior.

            Sorry, Alxandr, but you put me on my guard. Over my head in the period 1978-1980. a bunch of civilian aircraft flew by, landing at the Odessa airport. And from the cabin "U" I could look at them as much as I wanted (with the help of the "Karat visual"). And given to the SRTs P-12 complex, all their appearances in the viewing sector / up to landing and disappearance from the station screens / were timed and entered with a fountain pen into the special. magazine. Information from which was transmitted "upward". That is, I state that there were no civilian flights to my area of ​​responsibility "at the very least," and you exclude this in passing. Okay, let's wait (s).

            If there is an order, yes. Here, as it were, closer, and there is something to talk about. You are probably the only one of the commentators on this Theme who really understands that an air defense system cannot fire without an order (I mean peacetime!).
            Well, I’ll ask you a question: do you agree that the Iranian air defense missile system shot down a Boeing in accordance with the order received, or was it through any gate of the Makhnovshin?
            1. +1
              14 January 2020 22: 11
              S-125 and TOR are very different systems. And their range is very different.
              Thor is intended to cover troops and operates in their battle formations. This is his normal working conditions. There can’t be citizens there.
              The second use case is the protection of important state and economic facilities. For them, as a rule, zones forbidden for flights are determined. Again, citizens under normal conditions cannot appear there.
              Well, the appointment of 125 you yourself know how and where it is located, too.
              Quote: K-36
              Do you agree that the Iranian air defense missile system shot down a Boeing in accordance with the order received, or is it into any gate of the Makhnovshin?

              I have no idea about the control system and combat work of Iran’s air defense, therefore I can’t give a definite answer to this question.
              In my opinion, the airport area for a particular complex should be in the restricted shooting sector. Under no circumstances can one shoot there without a separate command.
              1. +1
                14 January 2020 22: 54
                He wrote you down in his notebook as an adequate interlocutor. Although there is still something to talk about, I am pleased to state your knowledge base in the country's missile defense system. In a word drinks
                For sim with respect, hi
                1. +1
                  14 January 2020 22: 57
                  Eh, what's up? Previously, the post could be edited. And now, a bummer. Of course, air defense, not missile defense
                2. +1
                  15 January 2020 12: 39
                  "the word tran with ponder" means the on-board transponder of the GA aircraft, RBS and S modes, responds to requests from secondary ATC GA radars (domestic "Aurora" for example), request 1030, response 1090 MHz.
                  According to the information about its passage: traditionally, interaction with the air traffic control center is provided by the control group on duty of the KP RTBr, RTG, flight plans, etc.
      2. 0
        14 January 2020 23: 35
        The SOC of the TOR is two-coordinate, does not measure the height to the target? As I understand the height draws ssst.
        1. 0
          15 January 2020 00: 18
          SW huntsman 650. I (from the heights of today) also have questions of applied geometry (for air defense). Having a range (essentially a bisector of a right-angled triangle) and a specific angle (referred to in air defense as the elevation angle), is it really difficult to calculate the other two legs, one of which will be just the height of the target?
          A lot of water has flowed since 1980, but if sclerosis does not change, a special station P-15 was used in air defense as a radio altimeter (however, I could be wrong how many years have passed).
          hi
    2. 0
      14 January 2020 21: 40
      You evaluate the actions of the Iranians according to European patterns, but they are not Europeans. I think the Iranians shot down the Boeing on purpose. There was no mistake, there was a deliberate action to stop the American attack, by sacrificing the Boeing and subsequent proceedings who were to blame. If the Americans attacked, then they could well be accused of "covering themselves with a Boeing", interfering with the attack, or even accidentally shooting it down. After all the news channels reported that a civilian Boeing had fallen, there would have been no talk of any attack on Iran in principle. Everyone would only talk about the catastrophe and look for the guilty ... and of course it would be the Americans. The Boeing was shot down 4 hours after the attack on American bases in Iraq, it was at this time that the Americans raised their aircraft, and the Iranians thought that the attack had begun. But what the Persians didn’t count is Trump. Any other president, after such a blow to his troops and prestige, would have already bit the bit and rushed into battle. But Trump is not a fighter, he is a businessman, this ignorance has let the ayatol down.
      The Shiites have experience in putting civilian objects under attack. During the operation "Grapes of Wrath" - 1996, Hezbollah exposed its own Lebanese refugees to the Israelis' retaliation. After that, the operation was canceled. The Iranians wanted to do something similar here.

      All Iranian tales about the fact that on a secret base of air defense lost contact and therefore the calculation decided to attack independently, do not withstand any criticism. They clearly received a direct and unequivocal order from the leadership to bring down the Boeing.
    3. +1
      15 January 2020 01: 24
      it’s usually represented on the net
      Former flight director of Vnukovo Airlines, honored pilot of Russia Yuri Skrynnik

      Vnukovo Airlines went bankrupt for a very long time
  33. +2
    14 January 2020 20: 35
    All the same, it is better to ask such questions not even to such respected people. And for those who have experience of serving in air defense, it is desirable for this complex. Or specialists from Almaz-Antey and the Izhevsk Kupol plant. Who are not by hearsay and not in general terms familiar with this air defense system.
  34. +6
    14 January 2020 20: 54
    Quote: Korg
    It is high time for us to equip passenger liners with anti-aircraft radar sensors and an automatic heat trap firing machine.
    .
    And knowing that the system of shooting thermal traps is a sign of military board - it means immediately substituting the passenger side for attack. And most importantly, what will these heat traps give if the missiles have a radio command or activated homing radar? Fireworks before death only to do?

    Quote: Korg
    First of all, this must be done for aircraft with air routes over rogue countries, countries under sanctions, or countries sponsoring terrorism.

    Or maybe then it’s better not to fly there at all?

    Quote: Korg
    And to cover such airlines with military aircraft - in order to immediately strike at the place of launching anti-aircraft missiles.

    Yeah, I see it. A Washington-Moscow plane flies, and is guarded by its steam or a link of fighters. Just in case, what if these treacherous Russians fired on board an anti-aircraft missile. Or the same option with Iran ... Or with North Korea ...
  35. 0
    14 January 2020 21: 22
    There was or could not be interference on the civilian radars of the airport.
  36. -1
    14 January 2020 22: 09
    And this one otmazyvaet Iran. I don’t understand, all of our propagandists have relatives in Iran?
  37. +3
    14 January 2020 22: 24
    Hindrance-shmamehi - a hot Persian young man was afraid of a near-flying mark on the radar, there was no time to consult with anyone, so he shot
    It happens
    1. +2
      14 January 2020 23: 06
      Can you name the position in / sl., Which on the air defense system has the right to press the "Start" button? (Just don’t talk about "OPERATORS" - for completely journalist crap!)
      1. +3
        14 January 2020 23: 09
        I think the commander of the KP / calculation of air defense systems. I did not serve in air defense, so without a clue))
        And what's the difference? Clicked the same
        1. 0
          14 January 2020 23: 19
          Interesting. You have no idea (who is allowed to the button), but hot persian youth baked in two seconds ... What can I say? That I don’t respect you, because you don’t want us to do this, are you?
          1. +5
            14 January 2020 23: 53
            And the decision was not made by a Persian youth? laughing We don’t know about something? Who controls Iranian air defense? Luminati? Masons? Americans? Aliens? )))
      2. +1
        15 January 2020 01: 31
        Actually, the calculation of Tor M1 is three people - commander, operator, driver
        Significant changes were made to the equipment of the combat vehicle. The calculation of the car was reduced to three people (commander, operator, driver).
  38. +1
    14 January 2020 23: 30
    Some pretzel from Ukraine requires attracting a supplier of weapons, which brought down a Boeing))). Do not know who the supplier is))) Torah))))?
  39. 0
    15 January 2020 00: 08
    Quote: K-36
    Can you name the position in / sl., Which on the air defense system has the right to press the "Start" button? (Just don’t talk about "OPERATORS" - for completely journalist crap!)

    I don’t understand ... You want to say that the operators, senior operators, etc. are not listed in the calculations.
    I don’t know how in the RF Armed Forces now. And so, the head of the calculation of PU
  40. +3
    15 January 2020 00: 19
    Honored pilot of the Russian Federation commented on the situation with a strike on the Boeing from the air defense system "Tor"
    Actually, probably this case should (with all due respect to Skrynnik) comment on an air defense specialist, that is, a "hunter", not a "game". This would be more reliable on the one hand, and correct on the other. sad
  41. 0
    15 January 2020 03: 06
    Quote: Mik13
    this is TOP. There’s nothing close there.

    Is it really difficult to fasten a computer that would analyze the parameters and behavior of the object and give a hint on the screen about the type of target? It will take a split second for the computer, and the operator would have double-checked and made a decision. God himself prescribed such functionality to the Arabs, because they are tight.
  42. 0
    15 January 2020 03: 58
    Given the close interaction between the special services of Ukraine and the United States, it was most likely an interference in the positioning of the aircraft in space, which briefly misled the anti-aircraft system operators. And since GPS is American, it is almost impossible to track this intervention.
  43. +1
    15 January 2020 04: 54
    Yes, for any state, it’s to blame, although they didn’t bring down, we were washed to such an extent that even when we have diarrhea, who is to blame - right .... comrade!
  44. +1
    15 January 2020 09: 16
    If it is believed that, for example, a lot of tracking bugs and other rubbish are included in the Windows software, then why can't a Boeing do the same with its electronics? Most likely it does ... Then why can't they just turn off the aircraft’s transponder remotely at the right time? Indeed, in this case, Boeing Corporation does not risk its reputation at all. Who will now be able to tell that the electronics behaved somehow wrong before the plane was shot down? Maybe this by the way explains the slight deviation of the aircraft from the course in the last minutes. Yes, even if the Boeing had risked anything, if they ordered from the Pentagon, then where would you go ...
  45. 0
    15 January 2020 10: 35
    But what about the other flights departed?
  46. 0
    15 January 2020 13: 45
    In other words, saying: is it time to close the airspace? ...
    By the way, it’s nasty ... So are they fighting there or not?
  47. 0
    15 January 2020 16: 01
    My family members darted either to Tunisia, or to Egypt, I don’t remember already, when the Il-20 was shot down. It took a long time to damn it, why the hell did it fly to where rockets periodically back and forth, someone permanently fights with someone. In 1988, the Americans shot down an Iranian liner, taking with the F-14.
  48. 0
    15 January 2020 21: 57
    It seems to me more that this Thor was put on purpose. Need to look for a rat in Iran.
  49. 0
    16 January 2020 01: 27
    I like it when an expert refutes himself in an expert opinion. He himself says that there is a table with flights and you can see everything on the site, and then he says that if there is interference on the radar, nothing is visible. What connection between the radar and the Internet is no longer necessary to explain, hamsters are happy.
  50. 0
    16 January 2020 12: 32
    There could have been a bookmark with a jammer, the installer of the interference on this particular flight, the Ukrainians do not mind the owners, as well as the Iranians all the more.
  51. 0
    16 January 2020 16: 40
    Strange experts gathered here. For some reason, everyone believes that the missile strike on the plane, which led to its ignition and fall, was inflicted on take-off at the point where the signal from the transponder disappeared. And no one takes into account the place where the plane crashed and the direction of its flight at that moment. But after the communication and signal from the transponder disappeared, the plane began to turn right with a radius of about 7 kilometers and was shot down after about three minutes of flight with a turn, decrease and heading south-east in the direction of the departure airport. And this is about 14 kilometers to the right of the permitted flight corridor and closer to Tehran. Here there was a post of air defense of the near cover of the capital of Iran. But something that happened on take-off at the point of disappearance of communication and signal from the transponder led to this defeat of the aircraft by air defense missiles. And it is not yet known whether they will determine the reason for decrypting black boxes. But if we assume that the first video (with an attack on a plane on take-off, most likely from MANPADS, and filmed to report on a completed mission) is not a fake, then someone’s ears stick out there and it was a planned action.