For what Stalin removed from the post of "Marshal of Victory" Zhukov (documents)

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On the pages of our site a frequent topic is the theme of the Great Patriotic War ..... special disputes flare up around the evaluation of the actions of the military leadership of the Soviet army, especially around one of the leaders - Zhukov GK ... I am not trying to evaluate here to whom under Brezhnev and now. began to be called a loud title-Marshal of Victory and count. that it was his genius that led the USSR to victory over Germany .. I want to familiarize the participants in such discussions with some documents.

ORDER OF THE MINISTER OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNION SSR




No. 009 9 June 1946 Moscow. Top secret.

Council of Ministers of the USSR by decree of 3 June p. approved the proposal of the Supreme Military Council of June 1 for the release of Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and by the same resolution freed Marshal Zhukov from his duties as Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces.

The circumstances of the case are as follows.

Former commander of the Air Force Novikov recently sent a statement to the government against Marshal Zhukov, in which he reported about the facts of unworthy and harmful behavior on the part of Marshal Zhukov towards the government and the Supreme Command

The Supreme Military Council at its June 1 meeting. considered the statement Novikov and found that Marshal Zhukov, despite the high position created by him by the government and the Supreme Command, considered himself offended, expressed dissatisfaction with the decisions of the government and spoke hostilely about him among his subordinates.

Marshal Zhukov, having lost all modesty, and being fascinated by a sense of personal ambition, believed that his merits were not sufficiently appreciated, attributing to himself, in conversations with subordinates, the development and conduct of all major operations of the Great Patriotic War, including those operations to which he had nothing to do.

Moreover, Marshal Zhukov, being himself angry, tried to group around himself the disgruntled, failed and suspended from the work of the chiefs and took them under his protection, thus opposing himself to the government and the Supreme Command.

Being appointed commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Marshal Zhukov continued to express his disagreement with the decisions of the government among his closest people, and some measures of the government aimed at strengthening the combat capability of the ground forces were not considered from the point of view of the defense interests of the Motherland, but as measures aimed at restricting his , Zhukov, personality.

Contrary to the statements by Marshal Zhukov outlined above at the meeting of the Supreme Military Council, it was found that all plans for all major operations of the Patriotic War, without exception, as well as plans to ensure them, were discussed and adopted at joint meetings of the State Defense Committee and members of the Stavka in the presence of the relevant front commanders and staff of the General Staff, and often the chiefs of the armed forces were involved in the case.

It was further established that he had no relation to the plan for the liquidation of the Stalingrad group of German troops and for the implementation of this plan, which Marshal Zhukov ascribes to himself: as you know, the plan for the liquidation of the German troops was developed and the liquidation itself began in the winter of 1942, when Marshal Zhukov was on a different front, far from Stalingrad.

It was found, further, that Marshal Zhukov was also not related to the plan for the liquidation of the Crimean group of German troops, as well as to the implementation of this plan, although he attributed them to himself in conversations with subordinates.

It was further established that the liquidation of the Korsun-Shevchenko group of German troops was planned and carried out not by Marshal Zhukov, as he stated, but by Marshal Konev, and Kiev was not liberated by a blow from the South, from Marshal Zhukov, but blow from the north, because the Stavka considered the Bukrin bridgehead to be unsuitable for such a large operation.

It was finally established that recognizing the merits of Marshal Zhukov in the capture of Berlin, can not be denied, as does Marshal Zhukov [

keep silent about that

] that without a strike from the south of Marshal Konev’s troops and a strike from the north of Marshal Rokossovsky’s troops, Berlin would not have been surrounded and taken in the period in which it was taken.

Towards the end, Marshal Zhukov said at a meeting of the Supreme Military Council that he had really made serious mistakes, that he had the arrogance, that he certainly could not remain as commander in chief of the land forces and that he would try to eliminate his mistakes at another place of work.

The Supreme Military Council, having considered the question of the behavior of Marshal Zhukov, unanimously recognized this behavior as harmful and incompatible with the position it occupies, and proceeding from this, decided to ask the Council of Ministers of the USSR to release Marshal Zhukov from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces.

The Council of Ministers of the USSR, on the basis of the foregoing, adopted the above decision on the release of Marshal Zhukov from his posts [7] and appointed him commander of the troops of the Odessa Military District.

This order shall be announced to the commander-in-chief, members of military councils and chiefs of staff of military groups, commanders, members of military councils, chiefs of military districts and fleets

The Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR Generalissimo of the Soviet Union I. STALIN

APRF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 442. Ll 202 – 206. Script. Typescript.

Posted: Militaryhistorical Journal, 1993, No. 5.

PROTOCOL No. 9 OF THE MEETING OF PLENUM OF THE CCP VKP (b) from 21, 22, 24, 26 FEBRUARY 1947 of the year

Present:

Members of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) tt. Andreev, Andrianov, Bagirov, Badayev, Beria, Borkov, Budyonny, Bulganin, Voznesensky, Voroshilov, Vyshinsky, Dvinsky, Dekanozov, Efremov, Zhdanov, Zadionchenko, Zakharov, Zverev, Kaganovich, Korniets, Korotchenko, Kosygin, Kuznetsov A., Kuznetsov NG, Kuusinen, Lozovsky, Malenkov, Malyshev, Manuilsky, Mikoyan, Mitin, Mikhailov, Molotov, Nikitin, Patolichev, Pegov, Pervukhin, Ponomarenko, Popov, Poskrebyshev, Pospelov, Pronin, Rogov, Sedin Skvortsov, Stalin, Suslov, Tevosyan, Timoshenko, Fadeev, Khrushchev, Shvernik, Shkiryatov, Yusupov.

Cand [idaty] in the members of the Central Committee

TT Alexandrov, Alemasov, Bagaev, Bakradze, Benedict, Fighters, Vlasov, Gvishiani, Goglidze, Gorkin, Gromov, Gusarov, Denisov, Doronin, Zhavoronkov, Zaporozhets, Zotov, Ignatiev, Kalnberzin, Kartashev, Kaftanov, Zaporozhets, Zotov, Ignatiev, Kalnberzin, Kartashev, Kaftanov, Zaporozhets, Zotov, Ignatiev, Kalnberzin, Kartashev, Kaftanov, Zaporozhets, Zotov, Ignatiev, Kalnberzin, Kartashev, Kaftanov, Zaporozhets, Zotov, Ignatiev, Kalnberzin, Kartashev, Kaftanov, Zaporozhets, Zotov, Ignatiev, Kalnberzin, Kartashov, Kaftanov, Kobulov, Kolotov, Kavoranov, Koffanov, Koffanov, Kovtanov, Zoborozhek Kruglov, Krutikov, Kulakov, Kupriyanov, Makarov, Maslennikov, Meretskov, Nikishev, Nosenko, Popkov, Rodionov, Seleznev, Serdyuk, Serov, Snechkus, Sosnin, Starchenko, Storozhev, Tyulenev, Khokhlov, Charkviani, Chernousov, Chuyanov, Shtykov, Chtoyanov, Tyulenev, Khokhlov, Charkviani, Chernousov, Chuyanov, Shtykov Yumashev.

Members of the Central Auditing Commission tt. Abdurakhmanov, Anoshin, Boytsov, Bochkov, Bulatov, Vladimirsky, Golikov, Grekov, Dukelsky, Ignatiev, Kabanov, Kiselev, Krivonos, Kudryavtsev, Kuznetsov I.A., Kuznetsov F.F., Kulatov, Kuliev, Kurbanov, Linkui, Lobanov, Lukin, Lyubimov, Mishakova, Mishchenko, Molokov, Moskatov, Ogorodnikov, Panyushkin, Peresypkin, Piruzyan, Popov, Protopopov, Smirnov, Tarasov, Tributs, Undasynov, Tsanava, Shatalin.

from 21.P. 1947

1. - On withdrawal from the Central Committee of the CPSU (b): 1) Withdraw from the members of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b): a) Donskoy V.A., who did not ensure the fulfillment of the duties of a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), b) Shakhurin A.I. as a convict by the Military Collegium of the Top [USSR] court of the USSR.

2) Withdraw from the list of candidates for members of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), who did not ensure the fulfillment of the duties of candidates for members of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) - GK Zhukova, IM Mayskogo, A. Dubrovsky, K.I. , Cherevichenko Ya.T.

Secretary of the Central Committee I. STALIN

RGANI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 9. L. 1 – 2. Script. Typescript.

LETTER G.К. ZHUKOVA N.A. Bulganinu

27 February 1947 city

Nikolai Aleksandrovich!

I am giving you my letter to t. Stalin

If you consider it expedient to send such a letter, please report it to t. Stalin, and give a copy to t. Zhdanov. [13] As you will see from the letter, I once again want to report to t Stalin about my mistakes, about my fault before t. Stalin and by the party. I am not asking for anything, I am only asking me to believe that I, at the party, realized the mistakes made and that I will surely live out of them and at the same time as soon as possible

I am writing also because I am very hard going through the withdrawal from the Central Committee and I am even more worried about the mistakes I made before Comrade Stalin, who lovingly raised me, patiently raised me and raised me in the eyes of all the people.

Shake your hand

G. ZHUKOV

AP RF F 3 Op 58 D 304 L 210 Autograph


LETTER G.К. ZHUKOVA I.V. Stalin

27 February 1947 city

Comrade Stalin I.V. Copy - to comrade Zhdanov A.A.

Comrade Stalin, I once again sincerely report to you about my mistakes.

1. First of all, my fault first of all is that during the war I overestimated my role in the operations and lost the feeling of Bolshevik modesty. Secondly, it was my fault that when reporting to you and the Supreme Headquarters of my thoughts, I sometimes He showed tactlessness and rudely defended his opinion.

Thirdly, it is my fault that in conversations with Vasilevsky, Novikov and Voronov I shared with them about the comments you made to me on my reports. All these conversations were never offensive, just like I said Vasilevsky, Novikov and Ravens. I now understood with full responsibility that such narrow-minded chatter is certainly a blunder and I will not allow it anymore.

Fourthly, it is my fault that I showed softness and reported to you requests for commanders who carried the well-deserved punishment. I mistakenly thought that during the war, for the good of the cause, it was better to forgive and restore them to their former rights. I now realized that my opinion was wrong.

2. At the same time, Comrade Stalin, I wholeheartedly assure you that Novikov’s statement about my hostile mood towards the government is slander. You, Comrade Stalin, know that I, without sparing my life, climbed without hesitation into the most dangerous situation and always tried my best to fulfill your instructions.

Comrade Stalin, I also assure you that I have never attributed to myself an operation in the Crimea. If anywhere was discussed, then this referred to the operation under the stanitsa of Crimea, which I conducted on your instructions.

3. I deeply realized all the mistakes made, Comrade Stalin, and I give you the firm word of the Bolshevik that I will not repeat the mistakes. At a meeting of the Supreme Military Council, I gave you the floor as soon as possible to eliminate the mistakes I made and I fulfill my word. I work in the district a lot and with great desire. I ask you, Comrade Stalin, to give me complete confidence, I will justify your trust. G. ZHUKOV

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 304. Ll 211 – 212. Script. Typescript.


RESOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CK VKP (b) “ABOUT ILLEGAL AWARDS of vol. THE BUGS AND TELEGINIAN ARTISTS OF THE RUSLANA AND OTHER ORDERS AND MEDALS OF THE SOVIET UNION [14]

P 58 / 205 21 June 1947 g. Strictly secret

The Central Committee of the CPSU (b) established that tm. Zhukov and Telegin, being the first Commander-in-Chief of the group of Soviet occupying forces in Germany, and the second - a member of the Military Council of the same group of forces, with the order of 24 August 1945 of the year No. 109 / n awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the first degree actress Ruslanova and the order of 10 of September 1945 No. 94 / n different orders and medals group of artists in the number of 27 people [ovek]. Both Ruslanova and other awarded artists have nothing to do with the army. Thereby tt. Zhukov and Telegin committed a criminal violation of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from 2 of May 1943. “On responsibility for illegal awarding orders and medals of the USSR”, punishable by the Decree with imprisonment from 6 months to 2 years.

In order to conceal Ruslanova’s unlawful award, the order of 24 August invented the reasons for awarding Ruslanova allegedly “for active personal assistance in arming the Red Army with the latest technical means,” which is a clear falsification, [15] testifies to a low moral level Zhukov and Telegin and damages the authority of the command.

The very situation of awarding Ruslanova and the presentation of her order in the presence of troops during the parade of the 2 units of the Guards [Ardey] Kav [Aleriy] Corps represented a shameful spectacle, and even more aggravated the guilt of TT. Zhukov and Telegin.

The Central Committee of the CPSU (b) considers that Comrade Telegin, as a member of the Military Council of a group of forces, bears special responsibility for this matter, and the political unprincipledness that he showed at the same time characterizes him as a bad party member. Considering the above, and having heard the personal explanations of vols. Zhukov and Telegin, the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) decides:

1. Tov. Zhukov G.K. to reprimand 2. Tov. Telegin K.F. transfer from members of the CPSU (b) to the candidates.

3. Accept Comrade Bulganin’s proposal to release Comrade Telegin from political work in the army and dismissal from the Armed Forces. 4. Enter the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with a proposal to cancel the awarding of the actress Ruslanova, as well as other artists in the number of 27 people named in the order of Zhukov and Telegin No. 94 / n. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1065. L. 44 – 45. Script. Typescript.


RESOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CK VKP (B) “On t. ZHUKOVE GK MARSHALE OF THE SOVIET UNION »

P61 / 84 20 January 1948

The Central Committee of the CPSU (b), after hearing the report of the Commission in the TT. Zhdanov, Bulganin, Kuznetsov and Shkiryatov, allocated for consideration of materials received by the Central Committee about the misbehavior of the commander of the Odessa Military District, Comrade Zhukov GK, established the following. [16]

Tov. Zhukov, when he was the commander-in-chief of the group of Soviet occupying forces in Germany, allowed acts that defamed the high rank of member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and considered the commander of the Soviet Army. Being fully provided by the state with all necessary comrade. Zhukov, abusing his official position, embarked on the path of looting, taking up the appropriation and export from Germany for the personal needs of a large number of different values.

For these purposes, comrade Zhukov, having given way to rampant unleashed possession, used his subordinates who, pleading with him, were committing obvious crimes, took pictures and other valuable things in palaces and mansions, broke into a safe in a jewelry store in одódзи, seizing the values ​​contained in it, etc.

As a result of all this, Zhukov was assigned up to 70 valuable gold objects (pendants and rings with precious stones, watches, diamond earrings, bracelets, brooches, etc.), up to 740 silverware and silverware, and even more so before 30 kilograms of various silver products, up to 50 expensive carpets and tapestries, more 60 paintings of great artistic value, about 3 700 meters of silk, wool, brocade, velvet and other fabrics, over 320 skins of valuable furs, etc.

Being summoned to the Commission to give explanations, Comrade Zhukov behaved in a way that was unbecoming to a party member and commander of the Soviet Army, was insincere in explanations and tried to conceal and gloss over the facts of his anti-party behavior in every way.

The above actions and the behavior of Zhukov at the Commission characterizes him as a person who has fallen politically and morally.

Considering the above, the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) decides:

1. Recognizing that Comrade Zhukov for his actions deserves exclusion from the ranks of the party and bringing him to justice, to give Comrade Zhukov one last warning, giving him the last time the opportunity to improve and become an honest party member worthy of the rank of commander. 2. Release comrade Zhukov from the post of commander of the Odessa Military District, appointing him commander of one of the smaller districts of 15. 3. Oblige comrade Zhukov to immediately hand over all illegally appropriated jewelry and things to the State Fund.

Central Committee of the CPSU (b) 16 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 2198. Ll 28 – 29. Script. Typescript.
10 comments
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  1. Gretta
    +1
    4 February 2011 21: 54
    looter, not a hero !!!!
  2. The comment was deleted.
  3. Dry66
    0
    23 September 2013 13: 09
    a hero, not a marauder !!!
  4. +4
    3 May 2015 15: 29
    The article is tough, of course. But necessary. And the truth is, I'm tired of playing with one goal - everything is against Stalin ...
  5. kvs45
    +3
    3 May 2015 19: 52
    with all this, a monument was erected to him in Moscow, but there is no victory for the other marshals! This is not fair!
  6. +1
    25 January 2016 18: 45
    But the Order of Zhukov has not been awarded for 20 years.
    We handed 100 pieces to veterans and that’s it.
  7. +2
    7 October 2016 12: 14
    "The glitter of gold obscures the eyes" - I don't remember how it goes on ... It's easy to be kind, it's easy to be evil, it's hard to be just! And in Russia, the desire to live with justice has become a national dream. Only, the concept of "justice" is different for everyone. Here is Zhukov, he took everything in his own way!
  8. +5
    8 October 2016 08: 07
    I often read his memoirs, a heroic man ... but a bouncer, ouvy, not everything he wrote was true. They slandered and destroyed Beria
    1. +3
      8 October 2016 08: 35
      Quote: Gvas1174
      They slandered and destroyed Beria

      In Khrushchev’s coup, his hand is not the last.
    2. 0
      23 January 2019 16: 11
      From the memoirs of Zhukov, one cannot conclude that he is a "heroic man." It is full of all sorts of mud, but nothing personal.
  9. 0
    1 August 2019 19: 07
    There are many reasons for the defeat of the initial stage of the war, this is a set of reasons, but the main ones are incorrect planning of the beginning of the war by the leadership of the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff - Tymoshenko, Meretskov, Zhukov and betrayal in the prewar and initial military period.

    In the Ministry of Defense immediately after the war (1946) I.V. Stalin under the leadership of Colonel General Pokrovsky A.P. created the Main Military Scientific Directorate. Among other works, Pokrovsky studied the topic of the defeat of the Red Army in the first battles of 1941 and conducted a survey of command personnel regarding action plans in the prewar time on the western border of the USSR - the famous 5 questions of General Pokrovsky who survived after the war to generals and marshals.
    In part, these generals' answers have been published. According to their answers, the researcher S. L. Chekunov compiled a 2-volume book - "I write solely from memory ... Red Army commanders about the disaster of the first days of World War II". It did not include all the answers of the generals and marshals. Some of the materials remained closed.

    According to the "preventive plan", which "a few days before their attack on the USSR would have disrupted their plans," we can say that such a plan was developed during the leadership of the General Staff by G. Zhukov - the so-called "Strategic Deployment Consideration"dated (no later than) May 15, 1941. The development, then Major General Vasilevsky, was not signed by anyone, although at the end of the document there are the names of Timoshenko and Zhukov.
    According to Zhukov’s recollections, when they came to Stalin with these proposals, Stalin categorically rejected them.
    I. Stalin, unlike G. Zhukov, thought with broader categories of military-political thinking, was more knowledgeable and competent in matters of the state of the Army, and strategic planning for the outbreak of war.
    Nevertheless, Timoshenko-Meretskov-Zhukov, violating the Plan for the beginning of the war in October 1940, developed by Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov. and signed by Stalin I.V. carried out all the pre-war measures according to their plan of "preemptive strike".
    According to this "Timoshenko-Meretskov-Zhukov" plan, the deployment of troops was carried out, with the main emphasis on the main strike of the Red Army from Lvov and an auxiliary strike from the Bialystok ledges.
    After Stalin rejected their plan, Timoshenko-Zhukov converted this "plan" into a plan for a counter-offensive of the Red Army from the aforementioned protrusions, expressed in Directive No. 3 of June 22.06, 1941, which led to the defeat of the Red Army and the entire summer campaign of 1941.
  10. 0
    1 August 2019 19: 13
    Attempts to understand the causes of the catastrophic defeat of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 were repeatedly made by Soviet and Russian historiographers. However, the research was complicated by the fact that most of the documents of the border divisions, armies and military districts were lost during the fighting.

    In 1949-1957 The military scientific directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army asked the commanders who accepted the first battle at the border about the start of the war. Participants in the events answered the questions posed, relying solely on memory, without using documentary sources. These materials, published in this publication, have long remained in secret custody. Today, these documents can be considered one of the most important sources for the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.

    I write solely from memory ... The commanders of the Red Army about the catastrophe of the first days of World War II: Volume 2.V 2 vol. / Comp., Ed. foreword, comment and biogr. essays S. L. Chekunov. M., 2017.
    https://www.litmir.me/br/?b=608057&p=1

    A. Form of a letter sent in 1952 to officers and generals of GENERAL-MAJOR / LIEUTENANT /
    TO COLONEL When developing a description of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 there are a number of obscure and documented incompletely covered issues related to the initial period of the war. Such obscure issues include: 1. Has the state border defense plan been communicated to you and parts of your compound with respect to them? If this plan was known to you as the commander of the formation, then when and what did you do to ensure the implementation of this plan? 2. To what extent was a defensive line prepared along the state border and to what extent did it ensure the deployment and conduct of hostilities by units of the unit entrusted to you? 3. Since when and on the basis of what order did units of the unit entrusted to you begin to enter the state border, and how many of them were deployed to defend the border before the outbreak of hostilities and what task did they receive? 4. When did you receive the order to bring the units entrusted to you on alert? What instructions and when were given to the units of the unit in the execution of this order and what was done by them? 5. Under what conditions did the units entrusted to you join the battle with the Nazi forces? 6. Where was the artillery of the units and formations entrusted to you at the time the hostilities began? If she was in training artillery camps, then when did she join her units and formations? What was the supply of ammunition to the units and, in general, the connection to the outbreak of hostilities? I ask you, as a former commander / chief of staff / division / corps /, to highlight, as far as possible, these issues and thereby help to more fully and objectively develop a description of the Great Patriotic War. It is advisable to receive your answer to these questions no later than 1953. COLONEL GENERAL / Pokrovsky /