The secret of victory. Memo on World War 1812 of the year

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I apologize for another educational program. But - since the year is jubilee - the closer to the date of the Borodino battle, the more sensational historical revelations, the essence of which, as usual, will boil down to "ours filled the French with cannon fodder." So it makes sense to briefly explain what the secret of victory really was.

In short, there were no secrets to the victory of the Russian Empire in the Patriotic War of 1812: there were many factors leading to victory, not secrets.

The most well-known “secret” among the people is the “club of the people's war”, beautifully shown by Leo Tolstoy. If it’s quite primitive, then this factor looks like this - our army, heroically fighting, retreated with battles, unable to stop the great forces of the great commander Napoleon (and he really was a great commander and his forces were really huge - more than 600 thousand people). But the Russian people, rising against the invaders, in the partisan struggle, broke the back of Napoleon's “Great Army”.

True, the Spanish people, having risen to the “guerrilla” and leading an even more large-scale and successful partisan struggle, could not liberate their country in 7 years, although they bound the 300-thousandth army of Bonaparte. Well, the guerrillas themselves can not defeat the occupying regular army. They even cannot paralyze its activity - they can only permanently cause one or another damage. For the liberation of Spain, it was necessary to crush Napoleon’s entire coalition forces. So this “secret” cannot claim to be the main secret of victory.

The secret of victory. Memo on World War 1812 of the yearAnother "secret" is the amazing resilience and courage of Russian soldiers and officers. And this is an important factor. Without the heroism, skill and courage of the Russian soldier, it would not have been possible to stop Napoleon. But this factor, the most important one, is smoothed by the fact that Napoleon’s troops also fought bravely and skillfully. And there were more of them. 444 Thousands of persistent and skillful soldiers - this is stronger than 220 Thousands of persistent and skilled soldiers. And this is confirmed by the fact that Napoleon was not stopped at the border, did not stop near Smolensk, and was not stopped even at Borodino. Moscow and that Napoleon left. Now, if our soldiers were steadfast and skillful, and the Napoleonic - cowardly and inexperienced, then this factor could be decisive. But, unfortunately, the enemy was strong in this respect, although not stronger than us.

Many rest on the great talent and courage of our generals. But the French marshals, too, were not recruited by ad, but achieved their position by personal courage and leadership skills. Our best commanders, Barclay and Bagration, Napoleon at Smolensk beat in the maneuver, like kittens. So here the parties are also close in level.

We did not have both tactical superiority and technical - here, too, Napoleon and I were equal.

So what's the secret? How did it happen that during the first months of the war we retreated in front of a much stronger opponent, and then drove both Napoleon in the center and his marshals on the flanks?

In fact, the “secret” is extremely simple, known to almost any military man and works in most wars. This “secret” is military potential and its use.

Napoleon invaded us with the army in 444 thousand people. During the war, he was able to pull in the form of reserves and marching battalions about another 170 thousand people. Total - more than 600 thousand.

The Russian army, concentrated against Napoleon, numbered more than 230 thousand people. In addition, reserve corps were pulled up (more than 30 thousand), the Danube army, liberated after the war with Turkey (about 60 thousand) moved from the south to the theater of operations. But all this was not enough.

However, by 1812, the Russian Empire was one of the Great Powers. She had great human resources and powerful military production. By the year 1812, after the reforms of Arakcheyev and Barclay de Tolly, the Russian army was at the forefront of organization, tactics and armaments, had considerable mobilization reserves of equipment and armaments, powerful horse-breeding factories.

Over the 1812 year, the Russian Empire put under the gun more than 400 thousands of recruits and 280 thousands of militiamen. And this with the acting army is already much more than Napoleon’s. And all this mass of troops could equip, arm, provide with equestrian personnel. Of course, not all of these forces managed to take part in the battles of the 1812 campaign of the year and fought already in the foreign campaign of the Russian army. But the majority - had time.

It is thanks to this that the Russian strategic plan worked. And while the Russian troops, keeping the backbone of the army, retreated and exhausted in the defensive battles of the enemy, the balance of forces was constantly changing in our favor. And when in all directions the Russian troops outnumbered the enemy, then Napoleon was driven in the center, and his marshals were on the flanks.

That is, the decisive "secret" turned out to be that Russia could constantly build up forces, had military reserves and military production, which was enough for that war. And there no one spoke about the “small professional army”, about the procurement of main armaments abroad, and even about horror, about the restoration of icons on the Kremlin as a means of increasing the country's defense.

That's all.
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  1. +10
    13 July 2012 08: 48
    Article plus. While on a business trip in Izhevsk, I constantly heard proud stories of local people involved in the arms business that Izhmash released its first fusée in 1806 as part of a program to expand arms production to the east. So we were preparing. But the bashful silence about one of the main and effective types of Russian weapons - climatic - gives the enemies again the opportunity to fantasize about "General Moroz".
    1. Machaon
      +8
      13 July 2012 15: 45
      The winter was ordinary, so it's not worth talking about "General Frost". But the fact that Napoleon's army was not equipped is completely different, it has nothing to do with the Russian winter. This is Napoleon's stupidity and arrogance, Hitler also got burned out on this! Plus hunger, and here the great commander gave a blunder, did not provide!
    2. yurasumy
      +3
      13 July 2012 19: 57
      Napoleon lost the campaign before the frost. Already in October, he ran without looking back. General frost at the beginning of the 19th century was not a big deal for the French. The small ice age had not yet ended, and in France, frosts of 30 degrees were not unusual. For some reason, everyone thinks that the climate has always been the same. But if you paint the original sources, it turns out that in the 17th century the Thames in the London area was always covered with thick ice in the winter. About Germany and Poland, I generally keep quiet. The temperature regime that we could not withstand there at that time, even with their humidity. In the 18th century, it was not uncommon for the Bosphorus Strait to freeze and the Turkish Sultan rode a sled through the strait. And even in the 1830s in France people died from 30-degree frosts no less than in Russia. And in the 1820s, the general of the governor of the Tavrian province was very surprised that a stable snow cover suitable for a sled was established in CRIMEA only in the second half of November.
      1. +2
        13 July 2012 22: 01
        yurasumy
        All right. In the 17-18th century, there were cases of ice disappearing from the Danube in Europe only in the month of June. When in 1814 the Russian army entered France, Russian soldiers suffered from severe frosts and colds.who literally mowed down the Russian army. So the weather hits everyone equally.
        1. Churchill
          +2
          13 July 2012 23: 09
          Quote: Prometey
          yurasumy

          A brilliant layout, it remains to hammer these facts into the heads of the admirers of General "Moroz". And ignoramuses are like flies ...
    3. 0
      18 July 2012 20: 11
      "General Frost" has no allies (unless "General Rasputitsa"). Many Russians were also killed by frost and disease. Smaller than the French, but still.
  2. +3
    13 July 2012 09: 14
    Mobilization potential, as the author correctly noted in the much success of any campaign. And here you need to see first of all the industrial component, high-quality labor and natural resources - in the economy and the presence of reservists, former conscripts.
    About frost, I won’t write a huge territory. Since only a very short-sighted person does not pay attention to these objective factors that significantly affect any military operation.
    1. Rikoshet
      +7
      13 July 2012 14: 15
      Doesn’t frost affect Russians? And I thought that frost is measured in degrees, and he turns out to be racist!
      1. 0
        13 July 2012 15: 55
        Quote: Rikoshet
        Doesn’t frost affect Russians? And I thought that frost is measured in degrees, and he turns out to be racist!

        It is necessary to prepare for frosts, preferably from childhood. Both Hitler and Napoleon knew that Russia had a harsh winter, but did not prepare. A small example. In the 50-70 years, hiking clothing called “stormtrooper” was very popular among our tourists, it appeared after the war. This is such a canvas jacket with a hood, no lining. The story of its appearance is curious. German infantry during the war had overcoats. They were thinner and colder than the Russians, but still they were greatcoats. But the motorized infantry, paratroopers, reconnaissance, tankers and other advanced units of the Blitzkrieg (in German assault) were dressed .... correctly in the attack. And they had nothing else until the 43 year, only trophy. And now, attention, test. You buy a ground attack before the winter, then you wait until 25 degrees are frosty, dress up in it and during the day (no, don’t fight) walk around your village. I assure you that in a few hours you will understand that frost is not only measured in degrees. For the completeness of the experiment, if the opportunity presents itself, put on an attack plane and take German, Italian, Romanian with you (Finn is not necessary). Frost is not a racist, but during the test you will find many interesting discoveries on this topic.
  3. -6
    13 July 2012 09: 54
    The author's derogatory attitude to the people's war is simply tactless. First, the partisan formations cut off the supply of the "Great Army" and forced it to devour the horses and flee from Moscow, which the "successful" Spaniards did not succeed in. Secondly, how could it be that frost freezes only the Germans and the French, and the Russian peasant is blessed with frost. Another thing is the moral strong-willed qualities that manifest themselves during an extreme situation, which frosts are. After the Borodino victory, the traitor freemason Kutuzov surrendered Moscow and up to the Berezina did not bring regular units into battle at all, and under the Berezina, Napoleon somehow escaped strangely because of the "strange" mistake of the military leaders.
  4. +3
    13 July 2012 10: 11
    The military-industrial, scientific-technical, and mobilization potentials of the state are indeed the basis of a successful military campaign. Not a single major war of the new and modern times was won by the forces of the peacetime armies and relying on pre-war reserves.
  5. Brother Sarych
    0
    13 July 2012 12: 30
    Something I had big doubts about 400 of thousands of recruits - the recruitment set is not a mobilization! And about the militias, I doubt ...
    In general, I did not like the article at all ...
  6. -1
    13 July 2012 13: 18
    In my opinion, discussing the theme of the Patriotic War of 1812 does not make much sense, because nothing new has been written over the past 50 years. From article to article the same facts wander. I would like to see a full-fledged study on the topic of war, where things would be called by their proper names - Alexander I is a coward and a traitor who surrendered half the country to the aggressor without any fight. The retreat of the Russian army is not a great strategic calculation, but a consequence of disorganization and squabbles in the General Staff. Why was the general battle given near Moscow, and not near Smolensk, at least?
    The partisan movement is yes evidence of a patriotic upsurge, but it did not play a significant role in defeating the enemy, because armies were always victorious in wars, not irregular militias. Well, many, many things. Let us consciously and critically study the facts and comprehend them, and not look through ideological lenses.
    1. 0
      13 July 2012 15: 10
      Here, just the regular units, apart from the Battle of Borodino, did not fight at all, they retreated to winter apartments near Tula, and the enemy plundered Moscow and it was only irregular formations where peasants, Cossacks and nobles cut off supplies shoulder to shoulder causing famine and the aggressors were unable to stay in Moscow and they had to spank a peskodral, the horses were devoured (horses in the army of that time were not only cavalry, but above all draft power, for guns and ammunition, and most importantly, the supply of a convoy). Further, the rags slap in the opposite direction to Smolensk, but even here the regular units only follow (again, this is a betrayal of the Kutuzov-Masonic unit where the "Great Army" was supposed to go home without a fight in full force), and the militia attacks them from all sides , plundering the loot, not allowing small detachments to separate to replenish food. After the murder of Paul, Russia was ruled by a secret Masonic council, Alexander was an infantile and a patricide was only listed as emperor. Russia was prepared for liquidation without a fight, but in order to pretend to be legitimate, they staged a massacre near Moscow and despite the mediocre defense organized by Kutuzov, the Russians did not budge, and in violation of the commander-in-chief's order, Platov's raid with a hundred Cossacks, where he missed by several hundred meters from Napoleon's headquarters, caused horror and panic in the enemy's camp and an order to retreat. On Borodino there was a slight superiority of the French in personnel, but after the battle, where the Russians acted on defense, the numerical strength changed dramatically in our favor, moreover, the Franks lost most of their offensive forces, such as cavalry. Not for nothing in Fili Dokhturov wanted to chop off the head of Kutuzov.
      1. Brother Sarych
        0
        13 July 2012 20: 50
        You, see, on alternative history special?
        1. +1
          14 July 2012 16: 45
          Not a gram of alternative, every word from the sources that Kutuzov Mason is a well-known fact.
  7. +1
    13 July 2012 13: 21
    Quote: Brother Sarich
    Something I had big doubts about 400 of thousands of recruits - the recruitment set is not a mobilization! And about the militias, I doubt ...

    I can clarify the pace of mobilization only by the example of the Cossacks. At the beginning of the war in the army was only a separate flying corps M.I. Platov from the 14 regiments, he covered the territory between two Russian armies - Barclay de Tolly and Bagration. . At the end of September, when the Russian army, having left Moscow, was camped at Tarutino, 26 of new Cossack regiments approached from Don. In total, more than forty Don regiments, one regiment and one hundred Black Sea troops, four Ural regiments and three Orenburg ones were put up for war against Napoleon. The Don Cossacks took the brunt of the blow. Don regiments carried Cossack, guard, reconnaissance and outposts in the Russian armies opposing Napoleon. A significant part of the Cossack regiments, which had been in the army since the beginning of the war and came up from the Don with a militia, was transferred under the command of such well-known partisans as Davydov, Seslavin, Figner, Dorokhov, Wincenzherode. Cossacks and partisans every day captured hundreds and even thousands of enemy soldiers, detached from their units, and sometimes smashed entire detachments of the French. Napoleon complained that the Cossacks "plundered" his army. In December 1812, Russian troops reached the borders of the Fatherland. During this time, the Cossacks took more than 500 guns, the number of prisoners captured by them is estimated to 100 thousand. The mobilization continued, regiments from distant troops came later, participated in a foreign campaign and took an active part in the battles for the liberation of Europe. Cossack units that came up from the Danube and removed from the border especially for participating in a campaign to Europe were just useful here. Four regiments of the Ural Cossacks and three regiments of the Orenburg bravely fought under Dresden, Leipzig, Weimar, Ganau. The painting of the Polish artist Mazurovsky shows the battle of the Polish Lancer and Orenburg, judging by the stripes, the Cossack. Judging by the mise en scene, the lancer has little chance, the Cossack is unlikely to miss, only the misfire can save the lancer.
    1. Brother Sarych
      -4
      13 July 2012 20: 56
      You reason in a strange way - and how many people were in those Cossack regiments? Only Cossacks could be collected relatively successfully - there is no one else! You can't get a lot of people by recruiting, the militia warriors were only fit to help the "correct" troops, but not as an independent force ...
      And the picture you, right word, picked up a strange one! WHAT can a Pole draw? The "brave zholnezh-ulan" will hack to death our village resident - is it really incomprehensible? The composition itself speaks about this ...
      1. Brother Sarych
        -2
        13 July 2012 23: 27
        And what are the cons?
        Yes, a lousy picture, Russophobic - but claims along the way to me? Is it not obvious that the horse of a lah will knock down a Cossack horse from its feet? And how will it end?
        1. 0
          16 July 2012 13: 22
          Quote: Brother Sarich
          And what are the cons? Yes, a lousy picture, Russophobic - but claims along the way to me? Is it not obvious that the horse of a lah will knock down a Cossack horse from its feet? And how will it end?

          Brother, study the materiel. Mazurovsky Victor Inokentievich. He spent most of his life in the Russian Empire, known as the Russian battle painter. In 24, he returned to Poland, no longer painted, there was no inspiration, probably.
    2. 77bor1973
      +1
      13 July 2012 21: 29
      Do not confuse the Cossack irregular army, for which there were practically no mobility resources and whose recruits were required to collect, dress and train, and their number cannot be compared with the recruitment system based on military service! The article put "-", the author asserts one thing and then refutes it, where is the logic !?
  8. CC-18a
    +1
    13 July 2012 15: 00
    In my opinion, the secret is simple: we do not give up! no matter how hopeless the situation is.
    But what the author has listed also has a place to be.
  9. 0
    13 July 2012 18: 51
    I think that another important secret is the work of the rear troops and the strategy of dragging out the hostilities! It is a very difficult task to feed a 600 thousandth army in hostile territory. In cases of invasion of a foreign country, lightning-fast actions bring success: "I came, I saw, I won!" As the war drags on and the food and ammunition convoys are under constant guerrilla attacks, the path to victory becomes longer and harder!
  10. yurasumy
    +1
    13 July 2012 19: 47
    I will also insert my 5 kopecks into the discussion. The article does not answer the question: "where did 1812 thousand recruits come from in the second half of 400, and Napoleon had only 170 thousand?" Here we come to the assessment of the strategy of Russia and France in this campaign.
    Strategy of France (Napoleon). A massive blow to the largest possible number of advanced troops (440 thousand units) defeat the Russian army (which did not have time to gather after the war with Turkey, which is 60 thousand people) in the border zone and then finish off the remaining troops in smaller battles. Actually, this is Napoleon’s strategy in all the campaigns before that (since the Italian campaign of 1796). Even in the event of a draw outcome of the general battle as near Preislash-Elau, Napoleon had at his hand reinforcements of 170 thousand, and the Russian army did not have them, which also led to the win of the company.
    Russian Strategy (Barclay de Toli). Knowing the strategy of Napoleon (the quick defeat of the enemy’s forces in a general battle) and having an army scattered throughout the empire, he decides to exhaust the enemy’s forces, act on communications and prepare reserves for the subsequent offensive. For some reason, many forget that it was this tactic that brought victory in the Northern War of 1700-1721. and was an example for the commanders of 1812 The battle of Poltava in 1709 was preceded by the war of exhaustion of 1708-1709. And many forget that in this war the Battle of Narva in 1700 was (the first general battle of the war), which put Russia on the brink of defeat. Only by diverting the Swedish forces to other areas was it possible to rectify the situation. In fact, the campaign strategy of 1708-1709 is very similar to the campaign strategy of 1812. Only Peter 1 gave the general battle after exhausting the Swedes by the siege of Poltava and received a complete victory, and at the insistence of Alexander 1, the general battle was given too early in August 1812, and not somewhere in October-November 1812. (which was based on the logic of the plan), that almost disrupted the company's plan and put the country on the edge of destruction, as many historians estimate. It’s just that the war could drag out and lead to much greater casualties. Napoleon had no chance to win this war even after Borodin. Barclay did not want to make the fate of the country dependent on one battle (even having gathered all the forces (the Danube Army and reserve battalions, which will be discussed below) in one fist more than 400 thousand. to collect in June 1812 would not have succeeded.). Plus, he did not want to risk any direction. After all, Napoleon could strike in Ukraine in 2 and 3 armies (in total up to 70-75 thousand hours). There was no telegraph then and the result of ratification of the Bucharest peace by Turkey was not known. Turkey could break the truce. This has already happened in this war, it could happen now. Napoleon could also meet the Turkish troops, delivering the main blow to the right-bank Ukraine in the rear of the Danube Army, hiding from the 1st army with a strong barrier. This blow could also be fatal for the country. By the way, this tactic of exhausting exhaustion worked well in 1813. I think this is also not accidental. Then the Allied armies were divided into 3. Napoleon in the summer of 1813 within Germany had 400 thousand. and the army could also act on internal communication lines (i.e. could focus on the direction of the main strike superior grouping to defeat the enemy in a general battle). The army against which Napoleon struck retreated without accepting the battle, and the other two acted on communications, forcing them to disperse forces. The idea was a success. Napoleon lost this company. But back in 1812 Based on the plan, all regiments of the 1st and 2nd Russian armies were concentrated as part of 2 marching battalions, and 3 battalions of regiments were left in places of constant deployment (and this is up to 80 thousand people. ). It was they who taught the recruit of 1812, preparing them for the battles of the fall. Most of the regiments of the Russian army of that period were based on the territory of present-day Russia and the Left-Bank Ukraine. (Right-bank Ukraine and Most of Belarus were annexed to the empire only in the 1790s and were considered newly joined territories).
    1. Stretching enemy communications and weakening strike force
    2. The rapprochement of the army with the strategic reserve.
    3. Gained time for the approach of reserves from other directions (30 thousand from the Swedish border and 60 thousand from the Turkish).
    The idea was completely successful (with the exception of Borodino, but this is not the fault of Barclay or Kutuzov, but Alexander 1).
    From this I can conclude that in the company of 1812, the Russian command (Barclay) strategically outplayed the French (Napoleon) by concentrating superior forces in the key point of the campaign in the Moscow region at the key moment of the September-October campaign, which ultimately led to the victory in the war .
    1. Brother Sarych
      -1
      13 July 2012 21: 06
      The number of RIs in 1812 amounted to just over 40 million, under the gun there were already more than half a million people, and there was a war in the Caucasus, it was still troubled in a number of places - it was unrealistic to consider second half million to be recruiting sets ...
    2. 0
      13 July 2012 22: 24
      You again refer already to the classics of the Patriotic War of 1812, who somehow had to justify the surrender of half of the country without a fight. Like it was impossible to immediately engage in battle with the French, but it was necessary to run away from them. Yes, previous military campaigns have shown that with the number of armies over one hundred thousand, there could not be any single general battle, even for the reason that without a radio and a telegraph it would be practically impossible to control an army of more than 100 thousand people in one battle. Therefore, there is no general battle in which 200 thousand people would immediately come together on each side on a separate heel of army land. it just wouldn’t be. The concept of the front line will appear only during the Franco-Prussian war, when new means of communication will come to the aid of the commanders.
      And now let's remember whether there were so-called general battles at Napoleon, which would immediately decide the outcome of hostilities? And there were none. It’s just that all opponents of Napoleon, for some happy circumstance, did not want to wage a full-scale war. The rout of the Prussian armies along Jena and Auerstedt did not actually put an end to the war. If the Prussians had the will, they could rise to war and crush the French (well, the French never won the one-on-one wars against Germany). But Prussia did not want to fight and folded her legs. Then there was a war with Austria and the battle of Wagram. But here the French did not succeed in defeating the Austrians, who arranged a good bloodletting of the French and organizedly retreated, but the Vienna court refused to wage war and Napoleon created a legend about the battle that decided the outcome of the campaign.
      When Napoleon attacked Russia, the Russian armies themselves had to impose battles on the paddles already at the crossing and drown the paddling pools in the waves of the Neman, but they went back with a brave march, stretching the war for half a year and letting Napoleon on an excursion to the Kremlin.
      1. Brother Sarych
        0
        13 July 2012 23: 24
        Didn’t you try to look at the map, analyze the distribution of French troops in the directions?
        Was it possible to join the battle with the French at once? Yes, and immediately entered, but there were not battles, but separate battles! The trick is that each individual Russian army was weaker than the part of the French army exposed against it, plus the previous battles showed that the Russian army did not have any superiority over the French - they would either win, lose, or figuratively say no ...
        Napoleon would gladly join the battle on the border itself and would almost certainly win, and it would be extremely difficult to recover the losses of the Russian army, plus the Russian army would join the battles in parts without the slightest chance of success, in the best case a draw, and then the war I would have ended at the border ...
        The First World War was not so simple, Borodino also showed that it was practically impossible to control the battle due to too large a concentration of troops, but in some small battles the French would most likely have beaten ours because of superiority in forces ...
      2. 77bor1973
        0
        13 July 2012 23: 33
        You don’t get into the tactics of warfare of those times, the two opposing armies maneuvered according to those canons, chose favorable dispositions, while trying to cut off the enemy from the supply bases and not be cut off yourself! In the war of 1812, Russian troops managed to cut off the French from supply bases, due to an undeveloped network of roads, and to conduct several not quite victorious, but important battles that exhausted the enemy!
  11. 0
    14 July 2012 14: 40
    ... We did not have either tactical superiority or technical superiority - here, too, Napoleon and I were equal.

    So what's the secret? How did it happen that in the first months of the war we retreated in front of a much stronger enemy, and then drove both Napoleon in the center and his ....


    Why is "we" everywhere? Did the author personally fight Napoleon?
  12. Simonov
    0
    14 July 2012 22: 42
    Guys, do not discuss the artistic intentions of writers, even great ones, such as Leo Tolstoy. Discuss calculations and analysis from serious historians.
    To the peasants, in principle, it was like a drum - there were an old bar, they spoke incomprehensibly, in French. A new bar has arrived, they speak the same incomprehensible French. Well, yes, the dog is with them, it is necessary to mow hay, but to harvest bread. In the fall, you still have to give the rent.
    The peasants were able to raise against the Napoleonic troops, when they distributed among the peasants a desu that Napoleon was the Antichrist. His army is anti-christ, does not go to church, does not get baptized into Orthodox images.
    Partisan detachments were organized by officers at the initiative of Davydov and his few like-minded people. And there were few of them.
    The main mystery of the war - why didn’t Napoleon take to Petersburg? Then it was the capital and residence of the emperor. Yes, and closer to the border.
    Napoleon perfectly understood this, he perfectly understood that the country was purely totalitarian and in fact serf-slaveholding. Everything was supposed to be solved in one general battle, to depose the emperor Alexander and proclaim himself the new Russian emperor.
    Barclay’s wise strategy (yes, Barclay, not Kutuzov’s) was to retreat to Moscow, lead Napoleon away from Peter and avoid a general battle.
    The huge army of Napoleon needed provisions and fodder for horses. The Russian troops retreated, burning behind them all the villages and towns, taking out and destroying food.
    Why was Kutuzov appointed instead of Barclay? Barclay, as a foreigner would not be forgiven for the surrender of Moscow.
    The official history of the Patriotic War was written in the offices of Pobedonostsev, when they were composing a new state doctrine: "Faith-Tsar-Fatherland." Since then, well-established misconceptions and official myth-making have appeared.
  13. trlexx
    0
    15 July 2012 19: 15
    (Our best generals, Barclay and Bagration,) the soldiers called Barclay, talk and only Bagration really, God’s ratification, he I can’t indicate the Source, but it seems from Tolstoy
  14. 77bor1973
    0
    15 July 2012 23: 34
    By the way, Bagration spoke about Kutuzov, who used to lose the battle!