Kharkov battle. January 1942 of the year. The formation of the Barvenkovo ledge
As a result of the defeats of the Bryansk and Southern fronts and the impending threat of encirclement of the troops of the South-Western Front on October 24 of October 1941, Kharkov was left without serious resistance. Soviet troops, waging rearguard battles, retreated to 60-150 km, entrenched on the eastern bank of the Seversky Donets river.
By the end of 1941, the area of Kharkov and Donbass was defended by the troops of the Southwestern (Kostenko) and Southern (Malinovsky) fronts, consisting of the 38th (Maslov), 6th (Gorodnyansky), 12th (Koroteev), 18th (Kolpakchi ), 9th (Kharitonov), 37th (Lopatin) and 56th (Gypsies) armies. They were opposed by a group of German armies “South” (Runstedt), consisting of the 6th (Reichenau), 17th (Goth) field, 1st tank (Kleist) armies and the Italian expeditionary force.
The situation at the front in the region of Donbass and Kharkov in December 1941 was characterized as an unstable equilibrium with mutual attacks with a fairly stable front. Soviet troops carried out a successful Rostov operation in November-December 1941 and drove the Germans out of Rostov-on-Don.
After the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, the Headquarters of the High Command demanded a total offensive of all Soviet fronts from Ladoga to the Sea of Azov. The command of the South-West direction (Tymoshenko) at the end of December 1941 set the command of the South-West (Kostenko) and South (Malinovsky) fronts to prepare an offensive operation in the Kharkov and Donbass regions with a view to quickly reaching the Dnieper in the areas of Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye, crossing the water barrier on ice and the seizure of bridgeheads on the right bank, as well as the liberation of Kharkov and Donbass. At the first stage, the operation was called Kharkov, and from the end of January 1942 Barvenkovsko-Lozovskaya.
The operation was carried out (18-31) on January 1942 by forces of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts.
In the area of Balakliya, Lozova and Barvenkova, enemy defense was organized as a series of strong points. The plan of the operation consisted in a joint strike of two fronts with the aim of breaking through the defense between Balakleia and Artyomovsky, reaching the enemy Donbass-Taganrog rear group, pushing it to the coast of the Sea of Azov and destroying it. The troops of the Southwestern Front — the 38 Army (Maslov) were to attack Kharkov, and the 6 Army (Gorodnyansky), in the strip of which the 6 Army Corps (Bychkovsky) was to enter the breakthrough — was supposed to attack and from the side of Izyum, the troops of the Southern Front — the 9 and 37 armies.
In the Izyumsk-Barvenkovo direction, in the line of the enemy’s defense line, there were two infantry divisions and two in reserve in the area of Lozova, Barvenkova, and Slavyansk. In the Artyomovsk direction in the defense zone were 5 infantry divisions, an Italian expeditionary force and one infantry division in the Konstantinovka area. The lowest density of enemy defense was in the area of Izyum, however, the advancing troops had to face strong enemy defense nodes in Slavyansk, Balakley and Barvenkovo. The most dangerous was the defense center in Balakliya, with a fortified bridgehead on the left bank of the Seversky Donets.
With the 1 of January 1942, the regrouping of the troops of the 9 and 37 armies of the Southern Front began from Rostov to the Izyum-Barvenk direction and it was completed by January 17.
The troops of the 6 Army of the South-Western Front had one and a half superiority over the troops of the 6 Army of the Wehrmacht in manpower and tanks, but they lost three times in artillery.
The troops of the 37 and 9 armies of the Southern Front were inferior to the opposing German Schwedler group in manpower and armament. With limited offensive resources and not having overall superiority over the enemy, the command of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts was about to conduct a large-scale offensive operation, the objectives of which did not correspond to the operational situation at the front.
The terrain in the area of Balakliya and Raisins contributed to the enemy in terms of organizing a long-term defense with limited forces. The floodplain of the Seversky Donets was wide on the left and narrow on the right bank. The entire gentle left bank was covered with swamps and elders. The steep right bank with a narrow strip of floodplain pressed against the chalky slopes, reaching a height of 80-160m, from which the entire left bank was clearly visible.
The enemy’s defense was based on settlements adapted for defense as strongholds, and in the interval between settlements, besides trenches for shooters and machine guns, bunkers were built. Thus, on the right bank of the Seversky Donets, the enemy created a well-fortified defensive line of sufficient depth.
After the artillery preparation on 18 on January 1942, the troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts went on the offensive against the Kharkov and Donbass enemy groups from Volchansk to Artyomovsk. Already in the first days of the offensive, the enemy turned into quite powerful counterattacks.
At the first stage of the offensive, the main role was assigned to the fresh forces of the 57 Army, which delivered the main blow in the direction of Barvenkov and Lozova. The troops of the 38 Army went on the offensive east of Kharkov; south of Kharkov, the troops of the 6 Army attacked from the bridgehead captured on the eve of the right bank of the Seversky Donets.
By 21 January 1942, Soviet troops completed the task of breaking the enemy’s defense and reaching the operational space. But the troops of the 38 and 6 armies, covering Kharkov from the north and south, advanced to a limited depth of 10 km, after which the attack on Kharkov stalled. Tymoshenko has decided to abandon a further attack on Kharkov until results are obtained in the main direction of the strike.
The fresh 57 Army, which, according to the results of the first battles, was supposed to reach the maximum depth of the breakthrough, did not live up to the expectations of the command of the South-West direction. Tymoshenko reoriented the 6 Army on the offensive in the main direction - to the Western Donbass and the bend of the Dnieper. Now, the 57 and 6 armies were advancing at the junction of the South-Western and Southern fronts.
According to the plans of the operation, the South-Western Front was to take over the Kharkov region, and the Southern Front had completely different tasks - access to the bend of the Dnieper. In the process of implementing the plan, the main forces of the two fronts were aimed at solving the second problem and the command set a goal to tactically encircle the Slavic-Kramatorsk group of the enemy by intercepting communications in the rear of the resistance node, which was Barvenkovo. In this city, the roads converged to Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, Balakley, Lozovaya, Krasnoarmeyskoe. Barvenkovo was also the rear supply base of the enemy grouping and the important Lozovaya-Slavyansk railway passed through it.
Given the great importance of the defense node in Barvenkovo, located between Slavyansk and Lozova, the command of the South-West direction gave the order to advance on the Barvenkovo right-flank divisions of the 57 army, 1 and 5 cavalry corps.
The elimination of this resistance node provided a double gap in communication between the Kharkov and Donbass groups of the enemy, and the isolation of the resistance node in Lozova deprived the Kharkov and Donbass groups of communications and, as a result, the supply of the Donbass enemy group was disrupted.
The next day, on the 22 of January, the troops of the 57 Army, which had previously been advancing parallel to the troops of the 6 Army in a westerly direction, began to turn southwest, in the direction of Barvenkovo. Thus, the Lozovaya-Slavyansk railway was cut in the area west of Barvenkovo for the subsequent offensive and bypass of the resistance node from the south-west. By the evening of January 22, the city was liberated due to the horsemen’s roundabout maneuver, and 7 settlements in its vicinity were also liberated.
On January 25 of the 57 Army, the task was set to reach the line of Semyonovka, Bogdanovka, Bogodarov, Viknin, Novo-Grigorovka, Ivanovsky, Nikolsky to ensure the maneuver of the main forces of the 5 Cavalry Corps from the south-west. Having overcome the resistance of the enemy, the horsemen rushed to Stepanovka. For a joint strike in the Kramatorsk direction, the 6-I tank brigade was sent to the range of the 255-I rifle division. On the morning of January 27, the 5 Cavalry Corps crossed the river. The bull burst into Kryvyi Rih and defeated the battalion of the Croatian “devilish” regiment of the 101th Infantry Division.
On January 27, units of the 1 Cavalry Corps began to develop the offensive in the Constantine direction, penetrating the enemy’s deep rear. On the same day, units of the 270th Infantry Division occupied Lozova, Panyutino, Ekaterinovka and the surrounding area.
However, this was the last noticeable success of the troops of the South-West direction in the January offensive, which was succeeded in securing in subsequent February battles. The Caucasus Corps was ready for the Krasnoarmeyskoye throw, but the enemy completed the regrouping of troops of Army Group South by the end of January and launched a counterattack.
There was a turning point in the operation in the West Donbass direction. In view of the stubborn resistance of the enemy in the area of Slavyansk and Artyomovsk, the commander of the Southern Front Malinovsky decided to take advantage of the advance of the 57 Army to the west and go behind the enemy stubbornly opposed Slavic group. It was supposed to solve this problem by attacking the converging directions of the 1, 5 th cavalry corps and the 9 th army bypassing Slavyansk from the west, and the 37 th army from the east.
The transfer of the efforts of the troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts to the flanks, to Balakliya and Slavyansk, led to the fact that the development of the operation by the end of January 1942 was practically stopped. With the beginning of the spring thaw and as a result of fierce resistance of the enemy, the offensive of the Soviet troops on January 31 was stopped.
The German “Kollerman strike group” managed to recapture Petropavlovka and restore movement along the main communications of German troops in the Donbass. Formally, this day can be considered the end of the maneuver phase of the operation. After that, the battles entered the positional phase. Attempts to crush the defense of Slavyansk and Balakliya lasted almost a month, until the end of February 1942.
At the same time, the Grechko cavalry corps and the 57 – I army conducted maneuverable military operations against the “Mackensen group”, advancing north of Krasnoarmeysky. The main task of the German troops at this stage was the formation of a stable front along the perimeter of the Barvenkovo ledge formed as a result of the offensive of two Soviet fronts.
The first days of February were raged by snowstorms, which forced the troops of Army Group South and two Soviet fronts to abandon large-scale attacks on each other's positions. However, after the weather improved, starting on February 7, opponents launched offensive operations in key areas for each of the parties. The von Mackensen group gradually pushed the troops of the 57 Army out of the main communications of the troops in the Donbass.
In March, the offensive rush on both sides ran out. On 24 of March, snow melting began and a period of spring thaw came to the front. March and April became the time of an operational pause when both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army were recovering from the winter campaign and were intensively preparing for the summer offensives.
The tasks set by the Supreme High Command Headquarters to the troops of the South-Western and Southern Fronts to reach the Dnieper, intercept communications of the enemy Donbass grouping and liberate Kharkov as a result of the Barvenkov-Lozovsky operation were not fulfilled. The incompleteness of the operation was largely due to the slow development of the breakthrough and untimely adoption of measures to expand it towards the flanks.
The enemy, holding these strongholds at the base of the breakthrough, with his counterattacks, threatened the flanks and rear of the shock groups of the South-Western and Southern Fronts. In this regard, it was necessary to abandon the use of the 9 army to develop the operation in depth and send it to liquidate the enemy group in the area of Slavyansk and Artemovsk.
As a result of the offensive in the southwestern direction in January – February 1942, the Barwenck ledge was formed, which could become both a springboard for the new large-scale offensive and a trap for the armies that occupied it. The situation was aggravated by the division of a rather narrow ledge between two fronts. The northern part of the Barvenkovo ledge was under the jurisdiction of the South-Western Front, and the southern - of the Southern Front.
The German command did not have large reserves in the southern sector of the front, and the Soviet offensive was reflected mainly due to regroupings within Army Group South, with the dismantling of the strike force in the Rostov direction traditional in such cases.
The main task - to surround and destroy a large German group - the Soviet troops could not fully complete. Also failed to free and Kharkov. Given the general superiority of the enemy’s forces, the Soviet troops did not act decisively, and did not take timely measures to expand the breakthrough on its flanks. This allowed the Germans to pull up reinforcements. Nevertheless, thanks to this operation, the German command could not transfer troops from here to Moscow, where the Soviet troops successfully launched a counterattack.
By the spring of 1942, Soviet troops occupied on the right bank of the Seversky Donets River an extensive Barvenkov ledge with a depth of 90 and a width of 110 kilometers. This ledge hung from the north over the enemy Donbass group (Kleist army group), and from the south covered its Kharkov group (6 German Paulus Army). At the same time, German forces, holding the areas of Balakliya and Slavyansk, occupied an advantageous position for delivering counter-strikes under the base of the Barvenkovo ledge. As a result, the 38-I and 6-I armies of the Western Front, the 9-I and 37-I armies of the Southern Front were on a ledge with a rather narrow base.
A few months later, the German command took advantage of this, eliminated the Barvenkovo ledge and ensured a breakthrough of its troops to Stalingrad and the Caucasus.
To be continued ...
The state of the warring parties
By the end of 1941, the area of Kharkov and Donbass was defended by the troops of the Southwestern (Kostenko) and Southern (Malinovsky) fronts, consisting of the 38th (Maslov), 6th (Gorodnyansky), 12th (Koroteev), 18th (Kolpakchi ), 9th (Kharitonov), 37th (Lopatin) and 56th (Gypsies) armies. They were opposed by a group of German armies “South” (Runstedt), consisting of the 6th (Reichenau), 17th (Goth) field, 1st tank (Kleist) armies and the Italian expeditionary force.
The situation at the front in the region of Donbass and Kharkov in December 1941 was characterized as an unstable equilibrium with mutual attacks with a fairly stable front. Soviet troops carried out a successful Rostov operation in November-December 1941 and drove the Germans out of Rostov-on-Don.
After the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, the Headquarters of the High Command demanded a total offensive of all Soviet fronts from Ladoga to the Sea of Azov. The command of the South-West direction (Tymoshenko) at the end of December 1941 set the command of the South-West (Kostenko) and South (Malinovsky) fronts to prepare an offensive operation in the Kharkov and Donbass regions with a view to quickly reaching the Dnieper in the areas of Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye, crossing the water barrier on ice and the seizure of bridgeheads on the right bank, as well as the liberation of Kharkov and Donbass. At the first stage, the operation was called Kharkov, and from the end of January 1942 Barvenkovsko-Lozovskaya.
The operation was carried out (18-31) on January 1942 by forces of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts.
In the area of Balakliya, Lozova and Barvenkova, enemy defense was organized as a series of strong points. The plan of the operation consisted in a joint strike of two fronts with the aim of breaking through the defense between Balakleia and Artyomovsky, reaching the enemy Donbass-Taganrog rear group, pushing it to the coast of the Sea of Azov and destroying it. The troops of the Southwestern Front — the 38 Army (Maslov) were to attack Kharkov, and the 6 Army (Gorodnyansky), in the strip of which the 6 Army Corps (Bychkovsky) was to enter the breakthrough — was supposed to attack and from the side of Izyum, the troops of the Southern Front — the 9 and 37 armies.
In the Izyumsk-Barvenkovo direction, in the line of the enemy’s defense line, there were two infantry divisions and two in reserve in the area of Lozova, Barvenkova, and Slavyansk. In the Artyomovsk direction in the defense zone were 5 infantry divisions, an Italian expeditionary force and one infantry division in the Konstantinovka area. The lowest density of enemy defense was in the area of Izyum, however, the advancing troops had to face strong enemy defense nodes in Slavyansk, Balakley and Barvenkovo. The most dangerous was the defense center in Balakliya, with a fortified bridgehead on the left bank of the Seversky Donets.
With the 1 of January 1942, the regrouping of the troops of the 9 and 37 armies of the Southern Front began from Rostov to the Izyum-Barvenk direction and it was completed by January 17.
The troops of the 6 Army of the South-Western Front had one and a half superiority over the troops of the 6 Army of the Wehrmacht in manpower and tanks, but they lost three times in artillery.
The troops of the 37 and 9 armies of the Southern Front were inferior to the opposing German Schwedler group in manpower and armament. With limited offensive resources and not having overall superiority over the enemy, the command of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts was about to conduct a large-scale offensive operation, the objectives of which did not correspond to the operational situation at the front.
The terrain in the area of Balakliya and Raisins contributed to the enemy in terms of organizing a long-term defense with limited forces. The floodplain of the Seversky Donets was wide on the left and narrow on the right bank. The entire gentle left bank was covered with swamps and elders. The steep right bank with a narrow strip of floodplain pressed against the chalky slopes, reaching a height of 80-160m, from which the entire left bank was clearly visible.
The enemy’s defense was based on settlements adapted for defense as strongholds, and in the interval between settlements, besides trenches for shooters and machine guns, bunkers were built. Thus, on the right bank of the Seversky Donets, the enemy created a well-fortified defensive line of sufficient depth.
Beginning of the offensive
After the artillery preparation on 18 on January 1942, the troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts went on the offensive against the Kharkov and Donbass enemy groups from Volchansk to Artyomovsk. Already in the first days of the offensive, the enemy turned into quite powerful counterattacks.
At the first stage of the offensive, the main role was assigned to the fresh forces of the 57 Army, which delivered the main blow in the direction of Barvenkov and Lozova. The troops of the 38 Army went on the offensive east of Kharkov; south of Kharkov, the troops of the 6 Army attacked from the bridgehead captured on the eve of the right bank of the Seversky Donets.
By 21 January 1942, Soviet troops completed the task of breaking the enemy’s defense and reaching the operational space. But the troops of the 38 and 6 armies, covering Kharkov from the north and south, advanced to a limited depth of 10 km, after which the attack on Kharkov stalled. Tymoshenko has decided to abandon a further attack on Kharkov until results are obtained in the main direction of the strike.
The fresh 57 Army, which, according to the results of the first battles, was supposed to reach the maximum depth of the breakthrough, did not live up to the expectations of the command of the South-West direction. Tymoshenko reoriented the 6 Army on the offensive in the main direction - to the Western Donbass and the bend of the Dnieper. Now, the 57 and 6 armies were advancing at the junction of the South-Western and Southern fronts.
Offensive on Barvenkovo
According to the plans of the operation, the South-Western Front was to take over the Kharkov region, and the Southern Front had completely different tasks - access to the bend of the Dnieper. In the process of implementing the plan, the main forces of the two fronts were aimed at solving the second problem and the command set a goal to tactically encircle the Slavic-Kramatorsk group of the enemy by intercepting communications in the rear of the resistance node, which was Barvenkovo. In this city, the roads converged to Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, Balakley, Lozovaya, Krasnoarmeyskoe. Barvenkovo was also the rear supply base of the enemy grouping and the important Lozovaya-Slavyansk railway passed through it.
Given the great importance of the defense node in Barvenkovo, located between Slavyansk and Lozova, the command of the South-West direction gave the order to advance on the Barvenkovo right-flank divisions of the 57 army, 1 and 5 cavalry corps.
The elimination of this resistance node provided a double gap in communication between the Kharkov and Donbass groups of the enemy, and the isolation of the resistance node in Lozova deprived the Kharkov and Donbass groups of communications and, as a result, the supply of the Donbass enemy group was disrupted.
The next day, on the 22 of January, the troops of the 57 Army, which had previously been advancing parallel to the troops of the 6 Army in a westerly direction, began to turn southwest, in the direction of Barvenkovo. Thus, the Lozovaya-Slavyansk railway was cut in the area west of Barvenkovo for the subsequent offensive and bypass of the resistance node from the south-west. By the evening of January 22, the city was liberated due to the horsemen’s roundabout maneuver, and 7 settlements in its vicinity were also liberated.
On January 25 of the 57 Army, the task was set to reach the line of Semyonovka, Bogdanovka, Bogodarov, Viknin, Novo-Grigorovka, Ivanovsky, Nikolsky to ensure the maneuver of the main forces of the 5 Cavalry Corps from the south-west. Having overcome the resistance of the enemy, the horsemen rushed to Stepanovka. For a joint strike in the Kramatorsk direction, the 6-I tank brigade was sent to the range of the 255-I rifle division. On the morning of January 27, the 5 Cavalry Corps crossed the river. The bull burst into Kryvyi Rih and defeated the battalion of the Croatian “devilish” regiment of the 101th Infantry Division.
On January 27, units of the 1 Cavalry Corps began to develop the offensive in the Constantine direction, penetrating the enemy’s deep rear. On the same day, units of the 270th Infantry Division occupied Lozova, Panyutino, Ekaterinovka and the surrounding area.
However, this was the last noticeable success of the troops of the South-West direction in the January offensive, which was succeeded in securing in subsequent February battles. The Caucasus Corps was ready for the Krasnoarmeyskoye throw, but the enemy completed the regrouping of troops of Army Group South by the end of January and launched a counterattack.
Offensive tipping point
There was a turning point in the operation in the West Donbass direction. In view of the stubborn resistance of the enemy in the area of Slavyansk and Artyomovsk, the commander of the Southern Front Malinovsky decided to take advantage of the advance of the 57 Army to the west and go behind the enemy stubbornly opposed Slavic group. It was supposed to solve this problem by attacking the converging directions of the 1, 5 th cavalry corps and the 9 th army bypassing Slavyansk from the west, and the 37 th army from the east.
The transfer of the efforts of the troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts to the flanks, to Balakliya and Slavyansk, led to the fact that the development of the operation by the end of January 1942 was practically stopped. With the beginning of the spring thaw and as a result of fierce resistance of the enemy, the offensive of the Soviet troops on January 31 was stopped.
The German “Kollerman strike group” managed to recapture Petropavlovka and restore movement along the main communications of German troops in the Donbass. Formally, this day can be considered the end of the maneuver phase of the operation. After that, the battles entered the positional phase. Attempts to crush the defense of Slavyansk and Balakliya lasted almost a month, until the end of February 1942.
At the same time, the Grechko cavalry corps and the 57 – I army conducted maneuverable military operations against the “Mackensen group”, advancing north of Krasnoarmeysky. The main task of the German troops at this stage was the formation of a stable front along the perimeter of the Barvenkovo ledge formed as a result of the offensive of two Soviet fronts.
The first days of February were raged by snowstorms, which forced the troops of Army Group South and two Soviet fronts to abandon large-scale attacks on each other's positions. However, after the weather improved, starting on February 7, opponents launched offensive operations in key areas for each of the parties. The von Mackensen group gradually pushed the troops of the 57 Army out of the main communications of the troops in the Donbass.
In March, the offensive rush on both sides ran out. On 24 of March, snow melting began and a period of spring thaw came to the front. March and April became the time of an operational pause when both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army were recovering from the winter campaign and were intensively preparing for the summer offensives.
Operation results
The tasks set by the Supreme High Command Headquarters to the troops of the South-Western and Southern Fronts to reach the Dnieper, intercept communications of the enemy Donbass grouping and liberate Kharkov as a result of the Barvenkov-Lozovsky operation were not fulfilled. The incompleteness of the operation was largely due to the slow development of the breakthrough and untimely adoption of measures to expand it towards the flanks.
The enemy, holding these strongholds at the base of the breakthrough, with his counterattacks, threatened the flanks and rear of the shock groups of the South-Western and Southern Fronts. In this regard, it was necessary to abandon the use of the 9 army to develop the operation in depth and send it to liquidate the enemy group in the area of Slavyansk and Artemovsk.
As a result of the offensive in the southwestern direction in January – February 1942, the Barwenck ledge was formed, which could become both a springboard for the new large-scale offensive and a trap for the armies that occupied it. The situation was aggravated by the division of a rather narrow ledge between two fronts. The northern part of the Barvenkovo ledge was under the jurisdiction of the South-Western Front, and the southern - of the Southern Front.
The German command did not have large reserves in the southern sector of the front, and the Soviet offensive was reflected mainly due to regroupings within Army Group South, with the dismantling of the strike force in the Rostov direction traditional in such cases.
The main task - to surround and destroy a large German group - the Soviet troops could not fully complete. Also failed to free and Kharkov. Given the general superiority of the enemy’s forces, the Soviet troops did not act decisively, and did not take timely measures to expand the breakthrough on its flanks. This allowed the Germans to pull up reinforcements. Nevertheless, thanks to this operation, the German command could not transfer troops from here to Moscow, where the Soviet troops successfully launched a counterattack.
By the spring of 1942, Soviet troops occupied on the right bank of the Seversky Donets River an extensive Barvenkov ledge with a depth of 90 and a width of 110 kilometers. This ledge hung from the north over the enemy Donbass group (Kleist army group), and from the south covered its Kharkov group (6 German Paulus Army). At the same time, German forces, holding the areas of Balakliya and Slavyansk, occupied an advantageous position for delivering counter-strikes under the base of the Barvenkovo ledge. As a result, the 38-I and 6-I armies of the Western Front, the 9-I and 37-I armies of the Southern Front were on a ledge with a rather narrow base.
A few months later, the German command took advantage of this, eliminated the Barvenkovo ledge and ensured a breakthrough of its troops to Stalingrad and the Caucasus.
To be continued ...
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