Constantinople at the feet of the Russian Tsar
Russian-Turkish war 1828-1829 190 years ago, on September 14, 1829, peace was signed between Russia and Turkey in Adrianople, ending the war of 1828-1829. The Russian army won a brilliant victory over historical the enemy, stood against the walls of ancient Constantinople and brought the Ottoman Empire to its knees. However, Russia's acquisitions in the Adrianople world were insignificant.
In the summer of 1829, the Russian army under the command of Dibich on the Balkan Front made an unparalleled march-throw through the impenetrable Balkan Mountains, defeated the Turkish army in a number of battles. The Russians took Adrianople. Cossack patrols were visible from the walls of Constantinople. In Istanbul, panic broke out. The Ottoman leadership had no opportunities for the defense of the capital. On the Caucasian front, a Separate Caucasian Corps under the command of Paskevich-Erivansky defeated the Turks, took the main strategic fortresses of the enemy in the Caucasus - Kars and Erzerum. That is, the Turkish front in the Balkans and the Caucasus collapsed. The Ottoman Empire for some time completely lost the opportunity to fight.
Thus, the army of Dibich stood at the walls of Constantinople, which could occupy the Turkish capital with virtually no battle, the Ottomans did not have combat forces to defend the city. The Russian army launched an offensive in western Bulgaria, liberated the cities of central Bulgaria, crossed the Balkans and was on the outskirts of Sofia. Russian troops could liberate all of Bulgaria. Near the Bosphorus, the Black Sea Fleet cruised, which controlled the situation off the coast of the Caucasus, Anatolia and Bulgaria, and could support the capture of Constantinople by landing. In the Dardanelles zone was a squadron of Heiden, composed of ships of the Baltic fleet. In such a situation, the Russians could easily take Constantinople, which was demanded by national interests. And then dictate any conditions of peace in Turkey, in particular, to pick up Constantinople-Constantinople, which was planned by Catherine the Great, to give freedom to Bulgaria.
It is not surprising that panic began in Istanbul. The Sultan's Palace in Eski Sarai, where Dibich’s headquarters was located, was immediately visited by European diplomats in the capital of the Ottoman Empire. They were unanimous in their aspirations. The ambassadors of the European powers wanted immediate peace talks to prevent the Russians from occupying Constantinople and the straits.
The military historian General A. I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky (the author of the official history of the Patriotic War of the 1812 of the year), who was then at the headquarters of the acting army, conveyed the mood of the Russian army. He noted that the capture of Constantinople was not a problem. The city did not have modern fortifications, there was no combat-ready garrison, the townspeople were worried, the capital was on the verge of rebellion. At the same time, the Russians could cut the water pipes supplying Constantinople with water and provoke an uprising. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky emphasized that the army was ready to go to Constantinople and experienced great gloom when they refused to capture Constantinople.
Unfortunately, in St. Petersburg they thought differently. Chancellor and Foreign Minister Karl Nesselrode (he served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire longer than anyone else, he was engaged in foreign affairs from 1816 to 1856), who constantly feared the discontent of Western Europe, was guided by the position of Austria. And for Vienna, the Russian occupation of Constantinople and their victory in the Balkans was like a knife in the heart. The Austrians were afraid that Russia would occupy a dominant position on the Balkan Peninsula, relying on Slavic and Orthodox peoples. This dealt a mortal blow to the strategic interests of the Habsburg empire.
Russian sovereign Nikolai the First hesitated. On the one hand, he would be glad to see the Russian flag over the Bosphorus, on the other hand, he was committed to the ideas of the Holy Alliance (Russia, Prussia and Austria), did not want aggravation with the “Western partners”. In the end, the tsar formed from the bureaucrats, who were far from understanding the national, strategic interests of Russia, the "Special Committee on the Eastern Question." The committee adopted a resolution drafted by D. Dashkov: “Russia must be willing to preserve the Ottoman Empire, because it could not find a more convenient neighborhood, since the destruction of the Ottoman Empire would put Russia in a difficult position, not to mention the detrimental consequences that it could have for common peace and order in Europe. " This resolution meant the rejection of Petersburg from the fruits of victory, which brought her the victory of the Russian army. Tsar Nicholas did not allow Dibich to take Constantinople.
Obviously, this was stupid and strategic mistake. The Holy Alliance, which defended the principle of legitimacy in Europe, was from the very beginning the mistake that bound Russia. Emperors Alexander I and Nicholas I sacrificed the interests of Russia to the interests of Vienna, Berlin and London. The destruction of the Turkish Empire, the old historical enemy of Russia, which the West regularly set us against, was beneficial to St. Petersburg, in the national interest. Russia could form more “convenient” neighbors. Give full freedom to the Balkan peoples, liberate Bulgaria half a century earlier, annex the historical lands of Georgia and Western Armenia. Occupy Constantinople and the straits, turning the Black Sea into a "Russian lake", providing protection for the southwestern strategic direction. Get access to the Eastern Mediterranean.
It is clear that Western Europe would not approve of the solution of the Turkish question in the interests of Russia. But who in the 1829 year could prevent the Russian Empire? Russia recently defeated the empire of Napoleon, his "invincible" army, was the most powerful military power in Europe. It was considered the "gendarme of Europe." Turkey could no longer fight, it was smashed to smithereens. France was extremely weakened by the wars of Napoleon, economically exhausted, bloodless. France and Austria were on the verge of revolution. In the case of hostility of Austria, Russia had every chance to destroy the Habsburg empire - to support the separation of Hungary and the Slavic regions. England had a strong fleet, which was located in the Aegean Sea, but it did not have land forces to counter the Russians and defend Constantinople. Moreover, in the 1829 year, the British fleet could not do what it did in the 1854 and 1878 years, to enter the Sea of Marmara. At the entrance to the Dardanelles stood a Russian squadron of Heiden. It could be destroyed, but it automatically meant a war with Russia. And England, not having “cannon fodder” in the form of Turkey, France or Austria, was not ready for it.
Thus, Russia had no real opponents in 1829. However, Petersburg was frightened of the opinion of "enlightened Europe" and refused to solve the centuries-old problem.
On 2 (14) on September 1829, peace was signed in Adrianople. On the part of the Russian Empire, the agreement was signed by the authorized ambassador Aleksey Orlov and the head of the interim Russian administration in the Danube principalities Fedor Palen, on the Turkish side, Mehmed Sadyk-effendi, the chief guardian of finances of the Ottoman Empire, and Abdul Kadyr-bey, the highest military judge of the Anatolian army. The agreement consisted of 16 articles, a separate act on the advantages of the Moldavian and Wallachian principalities, and an Explanatory Act on Contributions.
Russian acquisitions under this agreement were minimal. The Russian Empire returned to Porte all the territories in Europe occupied by the Russian army and navy, except for the mouth of the Danube with the islands. At the same time, the right bank of the Danube remained behind the Turks. In the Caucasus, the eastern Black Sea coast departed from Russia from the mouth of the Kuban to the pier of St. Nicholas with the fortresses of Anapa, Sudzhuk-Kale (future Novorossiysk) and Poti, as well as the cities of Akhaltsykh and Akhalkalaki. The Porta recognized the previous successes of Russia - the transition to its structure of the Kartli-Kakheti kingdom, Imereti, Mingrelia, Guria, as well as the Erivan and Nakhichevan khanates. Turkey paid Russia an indemnity in the amount of 1,5 million Dutch chervonets. Russian citizens had the right to conduct free trade in Turkey, and were outside the jurisdiction of the Ottoman authorities.
The Turks guaranteed the free passage of Russian merchant ships through the Black Sea straits in peacetime. The regime of straits in wartime was not specified. The Adrianople Treaty did not concern the passage of Russian warships through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Although the free right of Russian warships in peacetime was enshrined in the Russian-Turkish agreements 1799 and 1805. And the Bucharest and Adrianople treaties 1812 and 1829. were foggy, they did not confirm or reject the articles of the 1799 and 1805 agreements. This uncertainty provided a formal reason for Russia, but it was more advantageous for Turkey, which could declare the articles of the 1829 treaty of the year exhaustive and resolve all issues that go beyond the framework of the Adrianople Agreement in their interests.
Thus, Russia received very little from its convincing military victory. However, Europe won, and Turkey lost a lot. Austria, France and England were pleased: the Russians did not occupy the straits and Constantinople. Turkey confirmed the autonomy of Serbia, the Danube principalities (Moldova and Wallachia) and Greece. In fact, they gained independence.
As a result, after the death of Catherine the Great, all the wars between Russia and Turkey led to the fact that the Russian Empire had small acquisitions in the Black Sea region. The Ottoman Empire suffered serious losses, but Europe won: Austria (expanding in the Balkans), France and England (financially and economically enslaving Turkey, expanding their sphere of influence in the Middle East) and the Balkan countries that gained freedom.
Moscow triumphal gates. Built in 1834 — 1838. according to the project of architect V.P. Stasov in honor of the victorious end of the Russian-Turkish war 1828 — 1829.
The Russian army put Turkey on the brink of disaster
In the summer of 1829, the Russian army under the command of Dibich on the Balkan Front made an unparalleled march-throw through the impenetrable Balkan Mountains, defeated the Turkish army in a number of battles. The Russians took Adrianople. Cossack patrols were visible from the walls of Constantinople. In Istanbul, panic broke out. The Ottoman leadership had no opportunities for the defense of the capital. On the Caucasian front, a Separate Caucasian Corps under the command of Paskevich-Erivansky defeated the Turks, took the main strategic fortresses of the enemy in the Caucasus - Kars and Erzerum. That is, the Turkish front in the Balkans and the Caucasus collapsed. The Ottoman Empire for some time completely lost the opportunity to fight.
Thus, the army of Dibich stood at the walls of Constantinople, which could occupy the Turkish capital with virtually no battle, the Ottomans did not have combat forces to defend the city. The Russian army launched an offensive in western Bulgaria, liberated the cities of central Bulgaria, crossed the Balkans and was on the outskirts of Sofia. Russian troops could liberate all of Bulgaria. Near the Bosphorus, the Black Sea Fleet cruised, which controlled the situation off the coast of the Caucasus, Anatolia and Bulgaria, and could support the capture of Constantinople by landing. In the Dardanelles zone was a squadron of Heiden, composed of ships of the Baltic fleet. In such a situation, the Russians could easily take Constantinople, which was demanded by national interests. And then dictate any conditions of peace in Turkey, in particular, to pick up Constantinople-Constantinople, which was planned by Catherine the Great, to give freedom to Bulgaria.
It is not surprising that panic began in Istanbul. The Sultan's Palace in Eski Sarai, where Dibich’s headquarters was located, was immediately visited by European diplomats in the capital of the Ottoman Empire. They were unanimous in their aspirations. The ambassadors of the European powers wanted immediate peace talks to prevent the Russians from occupying Constantinople and the straits.
The military historian General A. I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky (the author of the official history of the Patriotic War of the 1812 of the year), who was then at the headquarters of the acting army, conveyed the mood of the Russian army. He noted that the capture of Constantinople was not a problem. The city did not have modern fortifications, there was no combat-ready garrison, the townspeople were worried, the capital was on the verge of rebellion. At the same time, the Russians could cut the water pipes supplying Constantinople with water and provoke an uprising. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky emphasized that the army was ready to go to Constantinople and experienced great gloom when they refused to capture Constantinople.
Unfinished victory
Unfortunately, in St. Petersburg they thought differently. Chancellor and Foreign Minister Karl Nesselrode (he served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire longer than anyone else, he was engaged in foreign affairs from 1816 to 1856), who constantly feared the discontent of Western Europe, was guided by the position of Austria. And for Vienna, the Russian occupation of Constantinople and their victory in the Balkans was like a knife in the heart. The Austrians were afraid that Russia would occupy a dominant position on the Balkan Peninsula, relying on Slavic and Orthodox peoples. This dealt a mortal blow to the strategic interests of the Habsburg empire.
Russian sovereign Nikolai the First hesitated. On the one hand, he would be glad to see the Russian flag over the Bosphorus, on the other hand, he was committed to the ideas of the Holy Alliance (Russia, Prussia and Austria), did not want aggravation with the “Western partners”. In the end, the tsar formed from the bureaucrats, who were far from understanding the national, strategic interests of Russia, the "Special Committee on the Eastern Question." The committee adopted a resolution drafted by D. Dashkov: “Russia must be willing to preserve the Ottoman Empire, because it could not find a more convenient neighborhood, since the destruction of the Ottoman Empire would put Russia in a difficult position, not to mention the detrimental consequences that it could have for common peace and order in Europe. " This resolution meant the rejection of Petersburg from the fruits of victory, which brought her the victory of the Russian army. Tsar Nicholas did not allow Dibich to take Constantinople.
Obviously, this was stupid and strategic mistake. The Holy Alliance, which defended the principle of legitimacy in Europe, was from the very beginning the mistake that bound Russia. Emperors Alexander I and Nicholas I sacrificed the interests of Russia to the interests of Vienna, Berlin and London. The destruction of the Turkish Empire, the old historical enemy of Russia, which the West regularly set us against, was beneficial to St. Petersburg, in the national interest. Russia could form more “convenient” neighbors. Give full freedom to the Balkan peoples, liberate Bulgaria half a century earlier, annex the historical lands of Georgia and Western Armenia. Occupy Constantinople and the straits, turning the Black Sea into a "Russian lake", providing protection for the southwestern strategic direction. Get access to the Eastern Mediterranean.
It is clear that Western Europe would not approve of the solution of the Turkish question in the interests of Russia. But who in the 1829 year could prevent the Russian Empire? Russia recently defeated the empire of Napoleon, his "invincible" army, was the most powerful military power in Europe. It was considered the "gendarme of Europe." Turkey could no longer fight, it was smashed to smithereens. France was extremely weakened by the wars of Napoleon, economically exhausted, bloodless. France and Austria were on the verge of revolution. In the case of hostility of Austria, Russia had every chance to destroy the Habsburg empire - to support the separation of Hungary and the Slavic regions. England had a strong fleet, which was located in the Aegean Sea, but it did not have land forces to counter the Russians and defend Constantinople. Moreover, in the 1829 year, the British fleet could not do what it did in the 1854 and 1878 years, to enter the Sea of Marmara. At the entrance to the Dardanelles stood a Russian squadron of Heiden. It could be destroyed, but it automatically meant a war with Russia. And England, not having “cannon fodder” in the form of Turkey, France or Austria, was not ready for it.
Thus, Russia had no real opponents in 1829. However, Petersburg was frightened of the opinion of "enlightened Europe" and refused to solve the centuries-old problem.
Adrianople
On 2 (14) on September 1829, peace was signed in Adrianople. On the part of the Russian Empire, the agreement was signed by the authorized ambassador Aleksey Orlov and the head of the interim Russian administration in the Danube principalities Fedor Palen, on the Turkish side, Mehmed Sadyk-effendi, the chief guardian of finances of the Ottoman Empire, and Abdul Kadyr-bey, the highest military judge of the Anatolian army. The agreement consisted of 16 articles, a separate act on the advantages of the Moldavian and Wallachian principalities, and an Explanatory Act on Contributions.
Russian acquisitions under this agreement were minimal. The Russian Empire returned to Porte all the territories in Europe occupied by the Russian army and navy, except for the mouth of the Danube with the islands. At the same time, the right bank of the Danube remained behind the Turks. In the Caucasus, the eastern Black Sea coast departed from Russia from the mouth of the Kuban to the pier of St. Nicholas with the fortresses of Anapa, Sudzhuk-Kale (future Novorossiysk) and Poti, as well as the cities of Akhaltsykh and Akhalkalaki. The Porta recognized the previous successes of Russia - the transition to its structure of the Kartli-Kakheti kingdom, Imereti, Mingrelia, Guria, as well as the Erivan and Nakhichevan khanates. Turkey paid Russia an indemnity in the amount of 1,5 million Dutch chervonets. Russian citizens had the right to conduct free trade in Turkey, and were outside the jurisdiction of the Ottoman authorities.
The Turks guaranteed the free passage of Russian merchant ships through the Black Sea straits in peacetime. The regime of straits in wartime was not specified. The Adrianople Treaty did not concern the passage of Russian warships through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Although the free right of Russian warships in peacetime was enshrined in the Russian-Turkish agreements 1799 and 1805. And the Bucharest and Adrianople treaties 1812 and 1829. were foggy, they did not confirm or reject the articles of the 1799 and 1805 agreements. This uncertainty provided a formal reason for Russia, but it was more advantageous for Turkey, which could declare the articles of the 1829 treaty of the year exhaustive and resolve all issues that go beyond the framework of the Adrianople Agreement in their interests.
Thus, Russia received very little from its convincing military victory. However, Europe won, and Turkey lost a lot. Austria, France and England were pleased: the Russians did not occupy the straits and Constantinople. Turkey confirmed the autonomy of Serbia, the Danube principalities (Moldova and Wallachia) and Greece. In fact, they gained independence.
As a result, after the death of Catherine the Great, all the wars between Russia and Turkey led to the fact that the Russian Empire had small acquisitions in the Black Sea region. The Ottoman Empire suffered serious losses, but Europe won: Austria (expanding in the Balkans), France and England (financially and economically enslaving Turkey, expanding their sphere of influence in the Middle East) and the Balkan countries that gained freedom.
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