Federico Carlos Gravina and Napoli: High Society Admiral
A boy from a good family
From the very birth, Federico Gravina was a "star boy". His father was Juan Gravina and Moncada, the Duke of San Miguel, Spain’s grand 1 class, his mother was Dona Leonor Napoli and Monteaporto, daughter of Prince Resetena, another grand. Born in Palermo in 1756, he received his primary education in one of the most prestigious educational institutions in the world associated with the church - the Clementine Catholic Collegium in Rome. Little is known about his childhood and youth, all information about him begins to come from 1775, when he becomes a midshipman, and begins his long journey through the hierarchy of ranks of Armada.
Gravina was assigned to the fleet by his uncle, the Naples ambassador to Madrid, and the boy himself, apparently, did not particularly resist such a fate, especially since he was successful - he completed the special naval training with honors, and, apparently, did not due to its origin. Then not only the inclinations of a good naval officer, but also a diplomat appeared, since Federico always knew how to find a common language with completely different people, and became a fairly popular figure in the highest society of Spain.
He received his first assignment on the San Jose ship, but he was soon transferred to the Santa Clara frigate, promoted to midshipman of the frigate (alferez de fragata). There was a war with Portugal, and the "Santa Clara" was sent to sail to the coast of Brazil, where Gravina achieved success in his first independent task - the capture of the Assension fortress on the island of Santa Catalina. But on the way back, "Santa Clara" suffered a terrible catastrophe - the ship crashed on the rocks, almost the entire crew died. Here, for the first time, another talent of Gravina, which many people will notice in the future, and which will only dry out after the Battle of Trafalgar, has vividly recommended. Despite the critical situation, he was able to escape, and even get out of trouble without much damage to his health. In the future, more than once in such situations he was very lucky, and again and again he came out whole or with minimal losses from the most difficult scrapes where, it seemed, the losses could have been much greater.
In 1778, Gravina returned to Spain, where he joined the Coast Guard, responsible for protecting the Spanish coast from raids by Algerian pirates. Having received the rank of lieutenant of the frigate (teniente de fragata) and the post of commander of the Shebeba “San Luis”, he took part in the Great Siege of Gibraltar. And although it ended unsuccessfully, and Armada's light forces did not show their best, Gravina was marked by a promotion to the rank of lieutenant of the ship (teniente de navio), and was appointed commander of the marine station in Algeciras. But here he did not stay long, and at the end of the war with the British he managed to mark in the capture of Fort San Felipe in Menorca, where he was again lucky and attracted the attention of senior officials, thanks to which he received another promotion - to the captain.
In the mid-1780's, Gravina already commanded a small detachment of ships, which, together with the rest of the Armada forces, fought with Algerian pirates in the Mediterranean Sea, and in 1788, accompanied the Spanish ambassador to Constantinople, where he first engaged in a detailed study of astronomy, conducted long observations of stars and compiled several reports, which, however, did not contribute much to the development of science. Upon his return to Spain, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier, received the frigate "Paz" under his command, and undertook to fulfill a rather gloomy task - to notify the colony of the death of King Carlos III as soon as possible. And again, Gravina was lucky, filling the Paz sails with the wind, and driving away illnesses - without much loss, in just 3 months he completed the task, after which he returned home and took command of his first battleship Paula.
From this moment, he begins to constantly combine diplomatic work and military affairs, while not ceasing to behave like a typical native of the upper classes, attending balls and social gatherings, being personally acquainted with the favorite Manuel Godoy and King Carlos IV. For this, he gained a reputation as a “parquet sharkun” in Armada, and earned a rather dismissive attitude from many of his compatriots and allied English with the French, but such people were always in the minority - despite everything, Gravina remained a military officer, and although he did not cover himself fame as regularly as some, but still remained one of the most active and successful naval commanders in Spain.
His "Paula" participated in the evacuation of the Spanish army from Oran, and after another increase Gravina went to England, combining a diplomatic mission with reconnaissance goals. The inhabitants of Misty Albion met him with honor as an ally and experienced sailor. Having studied the peculiarities of modern naval tactics and strategy of Great Britain, he returned home and received under his command a squadron of four ships, raising his flag to the San Ermenehildo (112 guns, type Santa Ana). At the head of this detachment, he took an active part in the war with France in the Mediterranean Sea, where he again and again showed himself quite well, having noted himself in several combat episodes.
In 1796, Spain signed an agreement with France in San Ildefonso, and everything turned upside down again - now the British were the enemy again, and the French were allies and friends. After this, Gravina came under the command of Admiral Masarreda, and was marked by him as one of the best junior flagships. Again, quite a successful commander, Gravina showed himself during the blockade of Cadiz by the British in 1797-1802, when, returning to active operations with light forces fleet, managed to defend the city and cause serious problems to the fleet of Admiral Jervis, as a result of which the blockade ring was loose and military and merchant ships constantly broke into the city.
In 1801, Gravina even led an expedition to the West Indies, which, however, did not achieve great results. But in 1802, the signing of a peace treaty with the British followed, and hostilities ceased, and the need for military officers in the existing fleet disappeared. Gravina was offered to become a diplomat in Paris, which was a prestigious assignment in his own way, and he agreed to fulfill it, but with only one condition - in the event of a new war he would be returned to the fleet. As a diplomat, he was close enough to Napoleon, and was even present at his coronation by the emperor 18 on May 1804.
Cape Finisterre and Trafalgar
At the end of 1804, the war with Great Britain began again, and Gravina was returned to the fleet. Since he was very popular in France and was personally known to the emperor, and in Spain enjoyed the reputation of an experienced sailor, he was appointed fleet commander, despite the availability of more suitable candidates like the same Masarreda. However, all this selectivity in the eyes of Napoleon was nullified by the subordination of Gravina to the French admiral Villeneuve, a controversial man and in the eyes of the Spaniards who did not have any makings of a naval commander, if only because he had little experience of active military operations at sea. In addition, the French, as always, behaved rather arrogantly, did not listen to the opinions of the Spanish captains, who had much more naval practice, as a result of which the relations between the allies did not immediately go smoothly.
Gravina, having raised the flag at the 80-gun “Argonaut” in February 1805, acted as a kind of transmission link between the French and Spaniards, and tried to somehow smooth out the friction that arose, but he managed to do it with difficulty. In addition, he was responsible for mobilizing the fleet and the formation of a combat-ready squadron from that scum, which at that time was the Armada. Years of peace, systemic pumping of money from Spain by Napoleon and the abominable management of Godoy negatively affected the state of affairs. The Armada was earlier inferior in terms of the quality of general personnel training to the British, standing out only for its excellent officer corps and ships, but in the 1804 year the situation was on the verge of a catastrophe - the crews were disbanded, the ships were mothballed, there wasn’t even money already about normal combat training. It was necessary to form a fleet almost from scratch, and here Gravina showed remarkable patience and organizational abilities, having managed to find funding by the middle of the summer of 1805, to form a combat squadron capable of at least more or less keeping order, and almost completing the formation of several more detachments.
Soon, an exit to the sea led by Villeneuve followed, distracting maneuvers in the Caribbean and returning home when at Cape Finisterre the allied fleet of 6 Spanish and 14 French ships was intercepted by 15 English led by Admiral Calder. The battle took place in difficult weather conditions (the sea was covered with dense fog), in which it was difficult to figure out where and who is located. Villeneuve, deciding that the most important thing was to obey the order and go to Brest, decided to ignore the fact that part of his squadron was fighting the British, and in fact left her to the mercy of fate. This part of the squadron turned out to be six Spanish battleships of Gravina, supported by several French, who had to fight against the British in the minority.
In the fog, not knowing where their own, and where strangers, the forces of the Spanish admiral fought to the last, and inflicted a number of injuries to their British counterparts, but, in the end, the ships Firma and San Rafael (both Spanish) surrendered after the destruction of the mast and the deprivation of the course, and led away by the English in tow. The next day, as if recollecting himself, Villeneuve decided to pursue the British with all his might, but supposedly a weak wind prevented him from doing this. Finally, reaching Spain, he decided not to go to Brest, as required, but to the south, to Cadiz, by which the French admiral completely discounted his actions in battle, and foiled Napoleon’s plans to invade England, stating that in the last battle he also prevailed. The Spaniards, to put it mildly, were unhappy with the actions of their French allies, who actually threw them into battle, and only a few ships and captains deserved honor and respect. Gravina himself was suppressed, and Napoleon, having received news of the incident, spoke his famous speech, giving an assessment of what had happened:
However, this statement did not prevent Napoleon from leaving the French admiral in charge of national prestige, and the Spanish subordinate in the fleet, which began to assemble in Cadiz.
Four months the Spanish-French fleet stood in Cadiz, and standing it caused great damage to the already not the highest combat readiness of the Armada. The salaries to officers and sailors were not paid for 4-8 months, because of which they "slightly" put on a shirt, and could not even buy a replaceable uniform. Of course, there wasn’t enough money to maintain ships in the normal form, which is why there is information here and there, it may be entirely invented, or it may be quite reliable that some ships were kept in a more or less acceptable form for account ... Fundraising from officers, or rather those who had income other than officers' salaries, and could contribute to the purchase of at least paint and yarn for darn leaky sails. On top of that, an epidemic swept across Andalusia, which took a huge number of people out of the teams, to which desertion was added - as a result of which, in October, when Villeneuve decided to go to sea, it was necessary to announce mobilization of the population throughout the province, forcibly dropping anyone on ships literally grabbing people right on the streets and market squares in order to at least make up for losses, and get the right number of working hands to service the ships.
At least the basics of naval art did not have time to prepare recruits, even though Gravina did everything possible to increase the combat effectiveness of her ships at least slightly more than catastrophic. I even had to remove part of the gun crews from the fortifications of Cadiz and put them on the guns on the decks of the ships. He himself transferred his flag to the Principe de Asturias, one of the strongest and most efficient ships that remained in service, although things were far from being the best on it. A conflict with the French arose on the basis of a future exit to the sea - the Spaniards did not want to go out with the ships so sky-ready, especially since the barometer predicted a quick storm, but Villeneuve became calm and decided to act against all odds. It is possible that the French admiral, foreseeing troubles due to his behavior and knowing that he would soon be replaced by Admiral of Rossilla and sent “on the carpet” to the emperor, decided for the last time to show that he had gunpowder in the flocks, and he wasn’t must be shot, guillotined or punished in any other way, fraught with fatal consequences for his health. The voice of reason from the Spaniards, and even his own officers, he no longer heard.
The result of all this turned out to be quite predictable. The English fleet hit the Spanish-French, and although it suffered heavy losses, including the great Admiral Nelson, it achieved victory, causing tremendous damage to the allies. "Principe de Asturias" during the battle suffered considerable losses - 50 people killed and 110 wounded, from a crew of more than a thousand people, but lost all the masts and suffered considerable damage to the hull.
There is English and French evidence that, during the battle, this ship, instead of supporting the Allies, closed its gun ports and simply drifted, receiving shells from time to time on its thick mahogany sides. The phenomenon is outrageous, shameful - but not at all surprising given the fact that at least a third of the crew were people who did not really receive even the basic skills necessary for the battle, who did not manage to absorb naval discipline, and who saw this sea and these ships in the grave, because they got here directly from the streets and squares of Cadiz against their will. However, there is a possibility that such evidence has no real basis, because the chaos of the battle was such that it was impossible to talk about something with full confidence, and “closed gun ports” meant only the very low fire efficiency developed by the battleship. Despite all this, the Principe de Asturias did not give up, and, having survived the shelling and having lost its mast, was towed to Cadiz by the French frigate Temis. Federico Gravina himself was wounded in the battle, but has not yet lost his luck and mind, remaining in a cold mind. A storm was approaching, somewhere there the British towed captured ships to Gibraltar, and a number of damaged Spanish ships threw themselves onto the coast of Andalusia or drifted, having lost sails, in the open sea.
Having gathered strength in Cadiz and hastily repaired the existing ships, Gravina soon brought them to the sea, and even managed to recapture the Santa Anu from the British. Alas, the admiral’s luck ended on this - the storm was raging in earnest, the ships had to be taken back to Cadiz, and most importantly, the wound received in the battle brought a lot of problems, and soon it became very bad. Federico Gravina died on 6 on March 1806, receiving shortly before this promotion to the rank of fleet captain general. His remains are buried in the Pantheon in San Fernando, a large trace in the national stories Alas, he did not leave Spain, except for the islands in Alaska, named in his honor.
Execution can not be pardoned?
What kind of assessment can Federico Gravina give after all the above? Was he an unrecognized genius, or vice versa - complete mediocrity and mediocrity? Alas, oh, but in the assessments of this person various subjective points of view clash. The British and French, raising their opposition to the absolute, disregarded the Spaniards, and now, alas, it is their historical point of view that prevails, and Federico Gravina suffers from it, like many others.
People who do not have much sympathy for the British and French, on the contrary glorify Gravina, sometimes attributing to him those traits that were not actually observed. The Spaniards themselves are quite restrained in their assessment of this admiral, which I agree with. Of course, he was not a brilliant naval commander - not a single sign of this can be traced throughout his career. However, he was a top-notch professional, a skilled and experienced sailor who spent more than a year at sea, and more than once sniffed gunpowder in real battles, even if it wasn’t the scale of Trafalgar.
Having studied the history of Gravina’s service, one can clearly state that this person was both successful, decisive, and courageous - which in many cases was quite enough for commanding a ship or small formations. Finally, he was a good organizer and diplomat, which was especially useful to him during operations with the French allies, and the formation of battle squadrons from practically nothing. Both under Finisterra and under Trafalgar he showed enough initiative, courage and ingenuity to not call him a mediocre commander. In terms of decisiveness and initiative, he proved himself to be much better than the rather passive Villeneuve, and, more importantly, he simply had much more practical experience in the high seas, having spent more time there corny. It is possible that, commanding the Allied fleet, he, and not the Frenchman, the events could have taken a completely different course - under Finisterra Calder would have at least suffered heavy losses, and might not have taken San Rafael and the Firm with him, and Trafalgar simply would not have happened because Gravine would never have thought of having the order to go to Brest, to go to Cadiz - anything, he knew how to execute orders.
Actually, it was in the role of the junior flagship that Gravina usually showed himself best - and the flagship was initiative, successful, skillful, but still devoid of any significant creative streak. But speaking of Trafalgar, the Spanish fleet was simply doomed because of the complex of the above problems, command them even Federico, even Villeneuve, even Rossigli, even some Spanish Horacio de Nelson, because the reason was not in ineffective command, and in the systemic crisis throughout Spain, inadequate funding, personnel problems and a series of adverse circumstances like the same epidemic. All the more unfair are the attempts of some francophiles to make everything look as if Gravina was a fool, the Spanish fleet was of no value, and in general, if it were not for these noble dons from the Pyrenees, they would have shown the British where the crayfish hibernate! .. However, here as in other cases, history does not know the subjunctive mood, and it was Villeneuve that led the Allied fleet to defeat. And Gravina, no matter how professional and brave a sailor he is, will remain one of those who lost the battle of Trafalgar, covering himself with fame, albeit tragic, and chronologically becoming his last victim. By the way, the British highly appreciated Gravina's professionalism, and therefore, soon after the Battle of Trafalgar, the Gibraltar Chronicles wrote the following lines that characterize this person in the best possible way:
To be continued ....
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