Catch up to the "Maidan". On the prospects for the unification of Russia and Belarus
When less than a month ago I tried analyze the situation with the possible unification of Russia and Belarus, it never occurred to me that events would develop so quickly. That is, having guessed the direction of their development, I was greatly mistaken about the speed with which Minsk’s process of accepting the inevitability of the coming union will lead our countries to start some actual negotiations on this matter.
Let me remind you that in January, President of the Republic of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko made a number of harsh statements, according to which some Russian officials hinted to him that Belarus would join the Russian Federation in “six regions”. At the same time, he declared that the sovereignty of Minsk was sacred and untouchable, and also held a number of internal events on “information counteraction to the Russian media”. Also, some stuffing, presumably of Belarusian origin, was noted, according to which Lukashenko is preparing to “fly over to the West”. It is clear that they were needed only to expand the negotiating field with Moscow, but the hot heads in the Russian Federation took it all very close to their hearts.
Actually, then I assumed that the wave that had risen in the media was nothing but a quite conscious pressure on Minsk from Moscow. The Kremlin realized that it was impossible to postpone certain important integration decisions, and decided to put pressure on Lukashenka, forcing him to go through all the classical stages of making a difficult but inevitable decision: denial, anger, depression, bargaining and, finally, adoption.
And now we learn that Vladimir Putin and Alexander Lukashenko held a very productive three-day meeting in Sochi. Of course, no one will tell us about all its results, but one result is still very eloquent: Alexander Grigorievich told reporters that he and Putin are ready for unification, and the last word rests with the peoples of the two countries.
You must agree that this is somewhat different from the “plan for migration of the Republic of Belarus to the West”, which we were trying to slip a month ago, and indeed from the hysterical agenda of those days, when at first glance it seemed that relations between Russia and Belarus were about to be broken. In general, the very spirit of the talks that took place in Sochi testifies to the very good relations between Putin and Lukashenko. As an example, the phrase Lukashenka about the relations of the two leaders, he uttered after the negotiations:
Where and when could we hear something like that, if we talk about world politics? Between the leaders of which states could such a dialogue take place? It is unique even by the standards of the post-Soviet space, where most of the leaders speak Russian, where they are related history, have similar memories of childhood and adolescence. Here, where we all lived in the past under the same state roof, we can expect very warm and trusting relations, at least between several leaders of states. But this does not happen either between Putin and Nazarbayev, or between Putin and Aliyev, or even between some Baltic "stepchildren" of the USSR, who, although they live on one training manual, still do not condescend to a special sincerity in relations.
Yes, we all know that Lukashenko is still hit. And his maneuvering is quite consistent with the image of a cunning Polissian peasant who wants not to miss the benefits of relations with all his neighbors. But still, as practice shows, when it comes to fundamental decisions, it does not recede from the chosen course. And the recent negotiations are an excellent confirmation of this.
Frankly speaking, it is still very difficult to say on what basis the future unification will take place. It is clear that the statement that Belarus should “join the Russian Federation in six regions” could have been Moscow’s attempt to secure in advance a room for maneuver. As they say, ask for a hundred rubles to give at least twenty. In this case, it can work this way: initially, the high requirements were needed only in order to negotiate more or less normal conditions for integration during the negotiations.
On the other hand, it is quite obvious that Moscow does not really need unification on the basis of full equality of the subjects. Well, if only because the subjects are too unequal in their military, political, and economic power. At the same time, Minsk will remain de facto independent, because it is not going to abandon the sovereignty of the “sacred cow”. By delegating key powers to the new center of power (even if it will be located in Moscow), in the end, the Kremlin will not receive anything so valuable that it would be worth making such radical political changes.
In general, it is quite obvious that the Kremlin has enough difficulties with the existing national republics. Thinking about a leapfrog with a union state now, posing as a “new USSR” or even some kind of renewed Russia, means provoking regional elites in Kazan, Grozny or Yakutsk to another struggle for “sovereignty”. To follow this path, offering them equal rights with Minsk in the new Union State, is simply suicidal: in case of failure of this common project, he will instantly repeat the fate of the USSR, but this time with much more devastating consequences for Russia itself - it is in any way we just will not become a form.
For the same reasons, the way of giving Minsk some superpowers within the Russian Federation seems controversial. Yes, Kazan will instantly want as much sovereignty. The Caucasus and other national subjects of the federation will not lag behind it. So, no matter how cool you are, the partition of Belarus into six regions will be optimal with their subsequent inclusion into the Russian Federation.
But since the ideal in politics is almost unattainable, and it usually becomes a product of various compromises, it can be assumed that some “special way” will be found here. For example, Belarus may become part of the Russian Federation as a single entity and even get some specific rights, but the Constitution will stipulate that this is possible only for new subjects who voluntarily decide to join the Russian Federation. This option is more suitable for Lukashenko, as it allows him to almost honestly say that he defended the sovereignty of Belarus to the end, was his honest guarantor and achieved the best conditions for entry into the Russian Federation. Well, there, of course, it was up to the people, who are the main bearer of sovereignty and who made a decision in a referendum.
It is possible that the variant with the “six regions”, which have special rights in Russia, will also work. And also, of course, on the basis of the principle “only recently and voluntarily entered”. This would probably be the best compromise for the Kremlin, but Lukashenko would then have to be pretty tense for the referendum results to be positive.
It is clear that even a hint of such a development of events causes hysteria in the Belarusian opposition, which has long and firmly associated its country with Europe. And here it is not very important whether Belarusians are expected in Europe, and if so, under what conditions: it is clear that our oppositionists (and the Belarusian ones don’t differ much from ours) will arrange gevalt anyway, because they understand where the funding comes from.
The reaction of the most "non-living" part of the Belarusian public has already followed: journalist Natalya Radzina, editor-in-chief of the opposition website Charter-97, gave an appropriate interview to the Ukrainian (not surprisingly) 112 Ukraine channel. In it, she is quite competent, we must give her her due, beat the fears of the most radical part of the “Square”, noting that if combined, the military threat for Ukraine will also come from the north, which will force the APU to spray its forces and make the “nenka” even more vulnerable to "aggression." The journalist also spoke about the "threat" to Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, which even more clearly marked both her views and sources of funding.
And the conclusion made by Ms. Radzina is quite eloquent: she stressed that the conflict between the West and Russia as a result of the latter’s merging with Belarus will turn into an even hotter stage. Which is probably not too far from the truth: in Washington and London, few people will like it, so they will start shit even more.
Will the existing forecast come true, whether the unification of Russia and Belarus will take place, and if so, under what conditions it is difficult to say. But one thing is clear: in no case should we delay this. The next presidential election of the Republic of Belarus must take place no later than August 30 of 2020. And it is very likely that some forces will try to use them for the start of the Belarusian “Maidan”. In any case, the presence of such opposition journalists in Belarus as Radin does not leave us a chance to think otherwise.
So, you need to hurry. In addition, you must be ready, so as not to happen in Kiev. Because, otherwise, there will simply be no hope of a relatively painless return of Russia to its historical borders.
Let me remind you that in January, President of the Republic of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko made a number of harsh statements, according to which some Russian officials hinted to him that Belarus would join the Russian Federation in “six regions”. At the same time, he declared that the sovereignty of Minsk was sacred and untouchable, and also held a number of internal events on “information counteraction to the Russian media”. Also, some stuffing, presumably of Belarusian origin, was noted, according to which Lukashenko is preparing to “fly over to the West”. It is clear that they were needed only to expand the negotiating field with Moscow, but the hot heads in the Russian Federation took it all very close to their hearts.
Actually, then I assumed that the wave that had risen in the media was nothing but a quite conscious pressure on Minsk from Moscow. The Kremlin realized that it was impossible to postpone certain important integration decisions, and decided to put pressure on Lukashenka, forcing him to go through all the classical stages of making a difficult but inevitable decision: denial, anger, depression, bargaining and, finally, adoption.
And now we learn that Vladimir Putin and Alexander Lukashenko held a very productive three-day meeting in Sochi. Of course, no one will tell us about all its results, but one result is still very eloquent: Alexander Grigorievich told reporters that he and Putin are ready for unification, and the last word rests with the peoples of the two countries.
You must agree that this is somewhat different from the “plan for migration of the Republic of Belarus to the West”, which we were trying to slip a month ago, and indeed from the hysterical agenda of those days, when at first glance it seemed that relations between Russia and Belarus were about to be broken. In general, the very spirit of the talks that took place in Sochi testifies to the very good relations between Putin and Lukashenko. As an example, the phrase Lukashenka about the relations of the two leaders, he uttered after the negotiations:
We frankly tell each other that we are not forever. We will leave sometime. What will we leave to the children, how will they continue our policy?
Where and when could we hear something like that, if we talk about world politics? Between the leaders of which states could such a dialogue take place? It is unique even by the standards of the post-Soviet space, where most of the leaders speak Russian, where they are related history, have similar memories of childhood and adolescence. Here, where we all lived in the past under the same state roof, we can expect very warm and trusting relations, at least between several leaders of states. But this does not happen either between Putin and Nazarbayev, or between Putin and Aliyev, or even between some Baltic "stepchildren" of the USSR, who, although they live on one training manual, still do not condescend to a special sincerity in relations.
Yes, we all know that Lukashenko is still hit. And his maneuvering is quite consistent with the image of a cunning Polissian peasant who wants not to miss the benefits of relations with all his neighbors. But still, as practice shows, when it comes to fundamental decisions, it does not recede from the chosen course. And the recent negotiations are an excellent confirmation of this.
Frankly speaking, it is still very difficult to say on what basis the future unification will take place. It is clear that the statement that Belarus should “join the Russian Federation in six regions” could have been Moscow’s attempt to secure in advance a room for maneuver. As they say, ask for a hundred rubles to give at least twenty. In this case, it can work this way: initially, the high requirements were needed only in order to negotiate more or less normal conditions for integration during the negotiations.
On the other hand, it is quite obvious that Moscow does not really need unification on the basis of full equality of the subjects. Well, if only because the subjects are too unequal in their military, political, and economic power. At the same time, Minsk will remain de facto independent, because it is not going to abandon the sovereignty of the “sacred cow”. By delegating key powers to the new center of power (even if it will be located in Moscow), in the end, the Kremlin will not receive anything so valuable that it would be worth making such radical political changes.
In general, it is quite obvious that the Kremlin has enough difficulties with the existing national republics. Thinking about a leapfrog with a union state now, posing as a “new USSR” or even some kind of renewed Russia, means provoking regional elites in Kazan, Grozny or Yakutsk to another struggle for “sovereignty”. To follow this path, offering them equal rights with Minsk in the new Union State, is simply suicidal: in case of failure of this common project, he will instantly repeat the fate of the USSR, but this time with much more devastating consequences for Russia itself - it is in any way we just will not become a form.
For the same reasons, the way of giving Minsk some superpowers within the Russian Federation seems controversial. Yes, Kazan will instantly want as much sovereignty. The Caucasus and other national subjects of the federation will not lag behind it. So, no matter how cool you are, the partition of Belarus into six regions will be optimal with their subsequent inclusion into the Russian Federation.
But since the ideal in politics is almost unattainable, and it usually becomes a product of various compromises, it can be assumed that some “special way” will be found here. For example, Belarus may become part of the Russian Federation as a single entity and even get some specific rights, but the Constitution will stipulate that this is possible only for new subjects who voluntarily decide to join the Russian Federation. This option is more suitable for Lukashenko, as it allows him to almost honestly say that he defended the sovereignty of Belarus to the end, was his honest guarantor and achieved the best conditions for entry into the Russian Federation. Well, there, of course, it was up to the people, who are the main bearer of sovereignty and who made a decision in a referendum.
It is possible that the variant with the “six regions”, which have special rights in Russia, will also work. And also, of course, on the basis of the principle “only recently and voluntarily entered”. This would probably be the best compromise for the Kremlin, but Lukashenko would then have to be pretty tense for the referendum results to be positive.
It is clear that even a hint of such a development of events causes hysteria in the Belarusian opposition, which has long and firmly associated its country with Europe. And here it is not very important whether Belarusians are expected in Europe, and if so, under what conditions: it is clear that our oppositionists (and the Belarusian ones don’t differ much from ours) will arrange gevalt anyway, because they understand where the funding comes from.
The reaction of the most "non-living" part of the Belarusian public has already followed: journalist Natalya Radzina, editor-in-chief of the opposition website Charter-97, gave an appropriate interview to the Ukrainian (not surprisingly) 112 Ukraine channel. In it, she is quite competent, we must give her her due, beat the fears of the most radical part of the “Square”, noting that if combined, the military threat for Ukraine will also come from the north, which will force the APU to spray its forces and make the “nenka” even more vulnerable to "aggression." The journalist also spoke about the "threat" to Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, which even more clearly marked both her views and sources of funding.
And the conclusion made by Ms. Radzina is quite eloquent: she stressed that the conflict between the West and Russia as a result of the latter’s merging with Belarus will turn into an even hotter stage. Which is probably not too far from the truth: in Washington and London, few people will like it, so they will start shit even more.
Will the existing forecast come true, whether the unification of Russia and Belarus will take place, and if so, under what conditions it is difficult to say. But one thing is clear: in no case should we delay this. The next presidential election of the Republic of Belarus must take place no later than August 30 of 2020. And it is very likely that some forces will try to use them for the start of the Belarusian “Maidan”. In any case, the presence of such opposition journalists in Belarus as Radin does not leave us a chance to think otherwise.
So, you need to hurry. In addition, you must be ready, so as not to happen in Kiev. Because, otherwise, there will simply be no hope of a relatively painless return of Russia to its historical borders.
Information